

# *After Wittgenstein*

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## *Introduction*

Ludwig Wittgenstein (LW; 1889-1951) was an Austrian-British philosopher. He is largely a historical figure in philosophy today.<sup>1</sup> His work is studied and interpreted primarily historically and philologically. Of today's prolific philosophers, almost only Robert Brandom refers to LW variously, but fundamentally critically. He still, however, even writes of "our Wittgensteinian philosophical world."<sup>2</sup>

In the following essay, I would like to recall LW's basic insights and achievements. What others might make of it for philosophy is beyond my influence.

LW's two main works are TLP (1921/22) and PI (1953). They are far apart in time, but PI refers closely to the first (and during his lifetime only published) book. In the *Preface* to the latter, W. claimed to have "solved the problems essentially once and for all". This seems a hypertrophic claim. For LW could have meant only the philosophical problems mentioned in the context, for which he claimed to show in TLP "that the questioning of these problems is based on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language." LW seems to admit the hypertrophy of this claim in the *Preface* to PI itself, when he writes that he (had to) recognize "grave errors in what I had set down in that first book."

The close relation of the PI to the TLP consists in the fact that it largely consists in or emerges from the self-criticism of that first book. LW had at times (1943/44) aspired to publish TLP and PI at Cambridge UP in one volume, because, as it says in the *Preface*, the new thoughts "could only get their right illumination through the contrast and on the background of my older way of thinking". The project only failed due to the revocation of the already granted permission to reprint the TLP by its original publisher (Kegan Paul).

LW's intellectual development, accordingly, has a very simple form. At the end of her first period from 1911-19, he published a logical-metaphysical system (TLP), which claimed to have essentially solved the problems. After 10 years of absence from continuous philosophical work, also due to this conviction, LW returned to it in 1929 and undertook to thoroughly

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1 LW is quoted from the German 8-volume edition. Codes for the most important writings: TLP: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; PI: Philosophical Investigations; PPF - Philosophy of Psychology - A Fragment (formerly Part II of the PI); PG: Philosophical Grammar; PB: Philosophical Remarks; BIB: The Blue Book; OC: On Certainty. I also use the Big Typescript (BT - Wiener Ausgabe Bd. 11), the Nachlass with the sigles from G.H. von Wright's index (MS, Nr.;Seite; TS, Nr., Seite) and the collection of small writings Philosophical Occasions (PO).

2 *Tales of the Mighty Dead*, Harvard UP 2002, 210.

destroy his first system and transform it into a changed philosophy(-view). This period culminated in the only posthumously published PI.

It is one of the greatest intellectual adventures one can have with a 20th-century philosophical writer to follow this development thoughtfully. That is what this essay invites you to do.

Admittedly, the intention meets with great difficulties. LW was, at least in TLP, a philosopher's philosopher, whose study presupposes knowledge of mathematical logic and its more recent development since Frege and Russell, whom the *Preface* of the TLP also thanks. Further, LW's whole philosophy is a very personal project. Not only did he explicitly hold that work in philosophy is really more work on oneself (on one's own conception; on how one sees things and what one demands of them; cf. BT 407); he also did not want to found a school and be imitated (MS 134, 143; 146). Finally, although LW declared overview of conceptual relations to be an essential aim in philosophy (PI § 122) and wanted to give a ›lucid exposition‹, the texts of his two main works are in any case *prima facie* not very lucid. TLP uses a numbering system, but few readers have bothered to actually follow the reading instruction to be taken from it, which is not satisfied by linear reading. PI, on the other hand, LW himself compares to an ›album of landscape sketches‹, but he does not clearly state of which landscape it gives a picture. (PI, *Preface* c) Since he wanted to encourage his readers to think for themselves, they should be able to acquire the picture of the landscape (of the language and the conceptual relations that permeate it) only by working through the sketches.

But in my experience, every effort is worthwhile here. So let's go on the journey.

# I. Dissolving conceptual problems - What philosophy should have learnt from Wittgenstein

## *The philosophical problems*

My starting point is LW's standing formula of ›philosophical problems‹. Examples, for what he thinks of, when he uses this formula, he seems to give only in the *Preface* to the PI: "the concept of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition and sentence, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things." (PI 3e). Actually, he calls them here the "objects" of his philosophical investigations. Except, apparently, for the two examples previously mentioned, they are all also subjects of the TLP. Are they, then, the philosophical problems (or examples of them)?

The question does not allow for a simple, affirmative answer. I will argue the following: In TLP, LW's formula primarily refers to the triad of the fundamental problems of modern epistemological philosophy: realism versus idealism, skepticism (as a consequence of idealism), and solipsism (as a radicalisation of idealism). The descriptive clarification (according to the claim) of the concepts of sense and meaning; thinking (meaning and understanding); of the proposition and logic are the basis on which the afore mentioned philosophical problems are solved.

When, in the *Preface* to PI, W. writes of the grave errors in the TLP, he does not mean the solving of the philosophical problems, but the insufficient descriptive basis for that. The problem of realism vs. idealism, which is fundamental for him in the triad, he believes/considers to be (re)solved, also on the changed descriptive basis in PI and only now rightly so.

The reasoning: Only in one other place after the *Preface* does LW writes explicitly about the philosophical problems in TLP:

Most of the propositions and questions, that have been written about philosophical matters are not false,

but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language.

(They are of the kind as the question whether the Good is more or less identical than the Beautiful).

And so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems are really *no* problems.

TLP 4.003

Once again, the philosophical problems are characterised by the criterion of ›misunderstanding the logic of our language‹, insofar as they are said to be based on "our failure to understand the logic of our language." One step further is the claim that the problems are "nonsense" and therefore "*not* really problems".

The only example of a philosophical problem given in the parenthesis of the quotation, being clearly nonsense, makes it difficult to understand the exact sense of the formula. But if philosophical problems are based on misunderstanding of the logic of language and are therefore supposedly nonsense, might not a nonsense example be as good as any other, even if it seems to be fictitious? But even this need not be assumed. If you think of Hegel's treatment of the ideas of cognition and the good at the end of his *Logic*, they are treated as precursors to the absolute idea, which is the perfect logical instance of the central figure of absolute idealism - the so-called identity of identity and non-identity. It is also discussed how close cognition and the good come to the perfect instance of this figure; and this can be described - nonsense, but understandable nonsense - as the question whether cognition or the good are more or less 'identical' with the absolute idea. This is nonsense, because 'identical' is an adjective without comparative (cp. TLP 5.473; 5.4733), but it is understandable. LW, educated Viennese bourgeois that he was, read about Hegel in contemporary works e.g. Spengler (1926; 26, 30, 456, 468-9, 471, 480, 611, 649, 987) and Weininger (whom he esteemed; 1920, 527 (193)). And he, of course, knew Schopenhauer's polemics against Hegel.

The concept of nonsense now alludes to the need to distinguish between sense and nonsense, and thus to the basis of the misunderstanding of our linguistic logic that will turn out to be a lack of distinction between sense and truth/falsehood.

Most important for understanding the attribute ›philosophical‹ for ›problems‹ is a remark on philosophy (4.112):

The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts.

Philosophy is not a theory, but an activity.

A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.

The result of philosophy is not a number of 'philosophical propositions' but to make the propositions clear.

Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred.

Interpretation remains difficult as no further examples of philosophical problems, characterised by the feature of misunderstanding the logic of language, seem to be given. But appearances are deceptive, and it helps further to pay attention to the fact that Wittgenstein explicitly gives an example of a traditional philosophical problem which simply, in its treatment - the determination of its nonsense - fits exactly into the framework of the generally given characterisation, scepticism (6.51):

Skepticism is *not* irrefutable, but palpably senseless, if it would doubt where a question cannot be asked.

For doubt can only exist where there is a question, a question only where there is an answer, and this only where something *can be said*.

The epistemological, since Descartes traditional scepticism doubts the existence or reality of the (external) world. He starts the controversy between idealism and realism. With this, and with the reminder that one side of this controversy, epistemological idealism, tends to radicalised extremes, it is clear that the LPA not only mentions but explicitly and extensively treats another example of a traditional philosophical problem, solipsism. Hence my thesis: the philosophical problems in TLP, characterised by the misunderstanding of our linguistic logic, whose nonsense can only be demonstrated, are those of scepticism, idealism vs. realism, and solipsism. The basis of establishing their nonsense is the explanation, the clarification of our linguistic logic and its descriptive foundation, the distinction between sense on the one hand, truth-or-falsity on the other.

The brief dismissal of scepticism, for example, is based on (justified by) this foundation in this way: sense is the prerequisite of truth-or-falsity. In order for a proposition to be true or false, it must have/make sense, be meaningful i.e. understandable/intelligible. The existence of the world, which scepticism wants to doubt, is an indispensable precondition already in the dimension of sense. For between language and world there exists an internal relation in this



dimension, a relation of sense, which cannot not exist (4.014). Therefore, this presupposition already of the sense of propositions cannot be put up for debate again in the subordinate dimension of the truth-or-falsity of propositions. Already the question of the existence of the world - whether or whether-not - cannot be asked because it cannot be answered - and it cannot be answered because nothing sensible at all can be *said* with respect to it. If anything is said at all, the existence of the world is already presupposed. The question of scepticism is thus nonsense, incomprehensible, because it seeks to suspend the presupposition of ability to formulate questions.

It is a confirmation of this interpretation that Wittgenstein, where this stance is concerned, has not wavered. Including his last writing, *On Certainty*, scepticism is briefly dismissed thus (383):

›The argument ‚I may be dreaming‘ is senseless, for this reason: if I am dreaming, this remark is dreamed as well - and indeed it is also being dreamed *that* these words have any meaning.‹

That *everything* he perceives is perhaps only a dream was one of Descartes' arguments for epistemological scepticism. Wittgenstein insists on the consequence of accepting the argument: then the utterance of this radical doubt is also to be taken as dreamed, and even, that the words of this utterance have meaning at all. But if this is assumed, nothing at all can be *said* by this utterance; it must be classified as nonsense, as incomprehensible. The sceptic is thus driven into speechlessness and to that extent refuted. Still the existence of everything - of the world - is the precondition of the sense of sentences (and questions) and of the meaning of words.

It is historically undisputed that the talk of philosophical problems came into Wittgenstein's thinking thanks to a small 1912 book by his "friend Mr Bertrand Russell". It is to him, in addition to "the great works of Frege," that he thanks in the *Preface* to the TLP for owing "a large part to inspiring my thoughts." The writing titled *The Problems of Philosophy* stimulated Wittgenstein in the writing of his first book primarily critically; one can know from Russell's own letters that Wittgenstein did not really appreciate the "shilling shocker" (cp. Monk, 1990, Ch. 3)

Russell explains in the preface of this popular work that it deals primarily with problems of epistemology, not metaphysics, because he believes he can say something positive and constructive about them and that this is not the place for negative criticism. Russell opens the book with a chapter on ›Appearance and Reality‹, in which he discusses Berkeley's idealism, to

whom "the credit" is given for having "shown that the existence of matter (as opposed to consciousness) can be denied without contradiction." (14<sup>3</sup>). In Chapter 2 Descartes is mentioned as the "founder of modern philosophy" and his skeptical doubt as the beginning of philosophy is praised as a great service to philosophy that is still "valuable today." (19) It is also stated that we can "never strictly prove" the existence of things behind the indubitable sense-data (to be understood as the way things are given to us - in perception): "The assumption that the whole of life is a dream in which we ourselves create all our objects is logically not impossible." (22)

In Wittgenstein's words, then, Russell understands scepticism to be "irrefutable." LW diametrically contradicts Russell: Scepticism, as outlined, is *logically* impossible - because logic is the condition of sense, of intelligibility, and thus presupposes the distinction between sense and truth-or-falsity, and the existence of the world as a condition of sense that cannot be problematised. A direct utterance of the TLP to this effect is very presuppositional and therefore in need of explanation in various ways. For the sake of marking the positions, I include it below, for the time being without further explanation (5.552):

›The 'experience' we need to understand logic is not that such and such is the case, but that something *is*; but that is just *no* experience.  
Logic precedes every experience - that something is *so*.  
It is before the How, not before the What.‹

With the What of the world, logic is equal-original, because as a condition of sense, of intelligibility, it already presupposes the That of the world, and its sentences/rules/propositions "represent(represent) the scaffolding of the world...", i.e. *are* this scaffolding (as is evident from the context in which Wittgenstein corrects the wording of the thought with the expression ,describe'). The logical propositions presuppose „that names have meaning and elementary propositions make sense.“ (6.124)<sup>4</sup>

Now, in his works, Russell treated the problem of scepticism as fundamental to the problems of realism vs. idealism and solipsism; motivated by an epistemological context. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, in his semantic and logical-metaphysical approach, treated the (pseudo) alternative of realism vs. idealism as fundamental and pivotal, scepticism as an

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3 Retranslated from the German edition, translated by E. Bubser, Frankfurt/Main 1967.

4 Logical propositions "presuppose that names have meaning, and elementary propositions have sense: and this is their connection with the world." (6.124) - Cf. Lange 1989, ch. 1; 1996, ch. XXIV.

implication of idealism, and solipsism as its possible radicalisation. In doing so, his dissolution of the (pseudo-) alternative remained implicit in the clarification of the logic of our language as the basis of insight into the nonsensicality of philosophical problems, so that it is at least not obvious *prima facie*, that he was concerned with the triad of philosophical problems of modern epistemological philosophy; and these are the problems that are treated as senseless, i.e. dissolved, by means of the logical-metaphysical theory of LPA which corrects the misunderstanding of our language logic and shows them to be nonsensical.

*The basis for dissolving the problems* The matter at hand, calls for a more extensive look at the philosophy of logic and the theory of propositions of TLP as a whole. I choose a propaedeutically abbreviated way in connection with Wittgenstein's already mentioned, summarizing remark on logic (6.124). Only the first two principles of the logical-metaphysical system of TLP are important for the dissolution of philosophical problems - the bipolarity principle as a meaning-theoretical principle for propositions, and the propositional context principle as a meaning-theoretical principle for the constituents of propositions (words), terminologically, "expressions" (cf.3.31).<sup>5</sup> Both principles are addressed in the following principle: "Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of the proposition has a name meaning." (3.3) The proposition has meaning in that it is a picture (as an expression of thought - 3.1 - the logical picture of the fact - 3). What is defining for a picture is that it agrees or disagrees with reality, is right or wrong, true or false (2.21). It's independence of its factual truth or falsehood (2.22) constitutes the proposition's "sense" (2.221). In the independence of the picture from its factual truth or falsity consists the primacy of sense over truth-or-falsity.

Now the normal propositions of colloquial language are supposed to be logically ordered, just as they are (5.5563), which is conceivable only in connection with the postulate of the unambiguous logical analysis of the proposition into the elementary propositions (5) which determine its sense. The elementary propositions are logically independent of one another (4.211; 5.134), and are taken to be truth-functionally linked. (3.25)

The foundation of the theory of propositions is thus the conception of the elementary proposition, which is supposed to be a direct concatenation of simple names, primitive signs.

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5 For further principles and conclusions from them, cf. Lange 1996, chap. III, and, more briefly, my account in the *Autoren-Handbuch zur deutschen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Bedorf/Gelhard, Darmstadt 2012, partly translated in the Appendix 137 sqq. below.

Now of these elementary propositions, (which exist, as it were, only in the plural), it is said in remark 6.124 that they are presupposed by logic inasmuch as the latter presupposes "that names have meaning, and elementary propositions have sense; and this is their connection with the world." Further elucidation, then, requires explicating how elementary propositions have meaning because names have meaning.

Of course, elementary propositions also have sense because they each are a picture. (The general picture theory is even already developed in view of the elementary proposition model). But if elementary propositions have sense by the fact that names are directly linked in them ("like the members of a chain" - 2.03), then the redeemability of the conception obviously depends on the understanding of names (simple signs - 3.202 - or primitive signs - 3.26). These are implicatures of a postulate which as of yet still has to be subject to an univocal logical analysis, which the TLP calls "the postulate of the determinateness of the sense". (3.23)

Concerning names, the TLP makes two essential provisions in addition to those mentioned. They refer in a two-sense way to objects as their meaning (3.203). This results from a different perspective on the name-object relation. Viewed, as it were, from the object, „In the proposition the name represents the object." (3.22) Viewed, as it were, from the name, it holds that "The name means the object." (3.203) Now this is one salient place in TLP where its numbering system takes on an argumentative function. According to the principles of the numbering system explained (incompletely) in a note at the beginning of the TLP, the more decimal places its numbering has, the less important the comment is. Thus the 'meaning'-sense of the name-object relation is subordinated to its 'representation'-sense. The thesis that is connected to this - as it were: First representation, then meaning - was 'shown' by Wittgenstein in the TLP only through the differently weighing numbering, but explicitly formulated in the *diaries 1914-1916*, which contain parts of the preparatory work for the TLP, and thereby Wittgenstein emphasised an important, additional aspect:

›If a name designates an object, it thereby stands in a relation to it which is entirely conditioned by the logical nature of the object and characterizes it again.‹ (NB 22.5.15, fifth paragraph from the back)

TLP replaces ‚causing' with 'representing', and ‚characterising' with 'meaning', and the formulated assertion is maintained only by the numbering indicating the different logical weight of the two remarks. The emphasised, important additional aspect of the diary remark is

the qualification of the two relations 'condition/represent' and 'characterise/mean' - they are said to refer essentially to the 'logical nature of the object'. What is meant by this has to be explained from the context of the TLP, but is completely unknowable in its presentation. To explicate, I will need to elaborate a bit.

A picture, thus also an elementary sentence picture, is supposed to consist of the fact that its elements - in the case of the elementary sentence itself: the names - „are combined with one another in a definite way." (2.14) Thus the picture has a certain structure, and the possibility of this structure is what Wittgenstein calls the "form of the picture": "The form of the representation is the possibility that the things are combined with one another as are the elements of the picture." (2.151) Now, according to these determinations, the elementary propositional picture apparently has its structure because of the immediate behaviour-to-one-another of the names. One should therefore expect the names themselves to have forms which determine the structure of the proposition, by their concatenation, and therein presuppose its form of the picture as its possibility. But this is not the case. In the rich repertoire of 'forms' in the TLP, the category 'form of the name' does not exist.<sup>6</sup> There is only the category 'form of the object', explained as the possibility of its occurrence in states of affairs (2.0141). Judging from the diary note and the primacy of conditioning prior to characterising clearly expressed in it, Wittgenstein's idea was that names, by virtue of the representational relation to their objects, absorb the forms of the objects (possibilities of occurrence in states of affairs), as it were.<sup>7</sup> This explains the absence of the category 'form of a name'. The elementary propositions serving as truth-function bases of propositions would thus have an 'ontological' foundation in the representation relation between names and objects. And logic, insofar as it presupposes, according to 6.124, that elementary propositions have meaning (as have names), was also 'ontologically' based on the structure or 'form' of the world expressed in the forms of objects (cf. 2.022). For this conception of a logic with an ontological foundation, I would like to appropriate the term ›logical objectivism‹, usually explained differently in literature, according to which logical propositions are the "scaffolding of the world" itself (cf. 6.124) and do not only characterise or describe this scaffolding for the propositions of language.

Given logical objectivism, the resolution of the realism vs. idealism controversy looks like

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6 This observation is due to Henry Le Roi Finch: *Wittgenstein - The early Philosophy*, New York 1971, 151.

7 Almost a 'smoking gun' as evidence for the correctness of this interpretation is that Wittgenstein in 'Some Remarks on Logical Form' (1929), Wittgenstein explicitly explains his TLP remark 2.1511 ('The image is so connected with reality; it reaches up to it') as follows: 'by this I meant that the forms of the entities are contained in the form of the proposition which is about these entities'. (PO, 34).

this: The realist insists on the independence of reality or the world (note that I am *here* not following the distinction between the two terms in TLP) from our representation of it in language. In this he can rely on the fact that whether our propositions are true or false is dependent on reality, on the how things are, and not on us. The idealist, on the other hand, understands reality or the world as dependent on us (our consciousness; our language; our thought). He can depend on that reality is accessible to us, 'given' to us, only linguistically, and that is, only in terms made by us. In doing so, both opponents in their endless debate make the common presupposition that only one or the other can be the case. Wittgenstein's conception leads to the dissolution of the controversy by eliminating precisely this shared presupposition of the adversaries. According to it, in many respects both can be the case at the same time. There is an internal relationship between language (thinking) and the world in the dimension of sense - in this respect the idealist is right: the What and How of the world is only given to us linguistically. But whether our propositions describing the world (as ›reality‹ according to the terminology of the LPA - cf. 2.04 and 2.063) are true or false depends, because of the primacy of sense over truth-or-falsity and the independence of the sense of pictures from their factual truth or falsity, on how it really is, which situations are facts that verify or falsify our propositions. In this respect the realist is right. Insofar as in different respects idealist and realist are both right, and the clarification of our linguistic logic with the fundamental distinction of sense vs. truth-or-falsity proves the compatibility of their two views, the controversy is thus dissolved. But this is only true under the presupposition of logical objectivism, which, with the That of the world, presupposes simultaneously a logical structure that is peculiar to it, that, via the representative relation of simple names to their objects and their form, passes over, as it were, into language, and that sets limits to possible sense.

It was precisely from this presupposition that Wittgenstein, in his self-criticism leading to the second major work, saw that it had to be abandoned and transformed into a linguistic-descriptively redeemable conception. This is also why he did not again claim explicitly to have essentially solved the problems of philosophy in a definite way. But in what follows, I defend the view that the "grave errors" the PI *Preface* sees in TLP do not concern the resolution of the philosophical problems, but only the descriptive basis upon which that dissolution has taken place. Whether the altered linguistic-descriptive basis - which in the TLP was, after all, not exclusively descriptive at all, but in crucial respects - ›elementary proposition‹, ›name‹,

›extensionality‹<sup>8</sup> and ›logical analysis‹ - postulatory and constructive - permits the defence/maintenance of the seemingly presumptuous claim must first be investigated.

*The Resolution of the Problems - additions and (cleared up) difficulties*

In the interest of clearly marking *a terminus a quo*, I have refrained from difficulties for my thesis in this outline given so far. Also, unaddressed points remain which I would like to now focus on.

The most important philological point concerns the only passage that might call into question my clear distinction of philosophical from logical (and other) problems - the passage where Wittgenstein writes of 'our problems'. It reads (5.5563):

›All propositions of our colloquial language are actually, just as they are, logically completely in order. - The most simple thing we ought to give here is not a simile of truth, but the complete truth itself.  
(Our problems are not abstract but perhaps the most concrete that there are).‹

This talk of problems is maximally inclusive. In 'our problems' the logical ones are certainly included (and the others too) in the context (which under 5.556 ff. concerns the possibility of a hierarchy among elementary propositions). But the factual problem of understanding remains: One will not be able to claim of the logical problems the characteristic of the philosophical problems which rest on the misunderstanding of the logic of language - they may still be unexplained or not sufficiently obvious, but not misunderstood. One can make mistakes in logic (3.325, 5.4731), but one cannot actually misunderstand it. For 'misunderstanding' must surely mean: understand something other than was meant - but logic as a condition for understanding means nothing. Nor does any speaker mean anything logical (unless he philosophizes): if what he says is understandable, he acts according to the rules of logic linguistically; if not understandable, he does not.

I therefore interpret the fact that Wittgenstein speaks of our problems, thereby includes the logical ones, and certainly would have called all his problems also philosophical ones (the - ethical - problems of life are perhaps excluded.) to be explained by a distinction from another (philosophy-of-science) context - the difference between research perspective or research

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<sup>8</sup> In the philosophy of logic, the 'extensionality thesis' is the view according to which there can only be truth-functional links between propositions. (cf. TLP 5, 5.3)

process and representation / exposition. From a research perspective, in which Wittgenstein dealt with all his problems at different times (such as his preliminary work on TLP) and was philosophizing, an inclusive use of 'problems', also including 'philosophical problems', is understandable/accepted/adopted. In the perspective of representation / exposition philosophical problems, defined by the feature of being based on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language, are distinct from the other, especially logical, problems - they are only illusory problems that need to be critically dissolved.

The philological point is also a factual one in the perspective of ›learning from Wittgenstein‹. As is well known, at the end of TLP, Wittgenstein revokes its propositions, viewed immanently: with best reason, as nonsense. (6.54) The basis of the verdict is the fact that TLP uses formal terms like ›object‹, ›number‹, ›fact‹ and others in propositions, but the clarification of their logical roles as variables explicitly prohibits this (4.126 b):

›That anything falls under a formal concept as an object belonging to it, cannot be expressed by a proposition. But it shows itself in the sign of this object itself. (The name shows that it signifies an object, the numeral sign that it signifies a number, etc.)‹

The question regarding the nonsense verdict is whether it also includes propositions/sentences like this one, in which the logic of our language is clarified. Many interpreters did not want to believe this (beginning with Russell's *Introduction* to the TLP), especially well-meaning ones who wanted to learn from Wittgenstein independently of the purpose of interpreting his writings. They developed the view that although the verdict of nonsense is TLP-immanently consistent, also for the propositions clarifying the logic of language, it is because Wittgenstein tries to say something in them that can only be shown/demonstrated. But this is also legitimate in a train of thought that wants to lead to the correct logical view of the world (as a ladder that has to be thrown away after it has been climbed - 6.54).

The disadvantage of this benevolent interpretation is that it must distinguish between two kinds of nonsense, insightful nonsense and outright nonsense.

An important current controversy between, e.g., Peter Hacker and the representatives of a 'new Wittgenstein' still mainly concerned with precisely this question.<sup>9</sup> Hacker has advanced a

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<sup>9</sup> The interpretative approach of a 'new Wittgenstein', whose central thesis on the TLP is that the propositions clarifying logic are included in the verdict of nonsensicality in 6.54 and other interpretations merely chicken out of it, was inaugurated by Cora Diamond. Cf. 'Throwing away the Ladder: How to read the Tractatus', in: Dies.: *The*



crucial methodological argument against the views that refuse to distinguish between types of nonsense with respect to the TLP: the logical clarifications that are the factual basis of the nonsense verdict are an integral part of the TLP. If they are included in it, the verdict lacks any factual basis and is itself nonsense. But this, by potentiating the nonsense verdict, increases the paradox of the situation which the author finds himself in because of the exposition of his thought process. This cannot be the reasonable outcome of an interpretation.<sup>10</sup> So one should bite the bullet and admit (at least<sup>11</sup>) to two kinds of nonsense. Wittgenstein, in the remarks clarifying the logic of language in the LPA, tried to say things that, according to his stated view in the TLP, could not be said, but only shown - so by his own standards he wrote nonsense. But it was insightful nonsense, and therefore legitimate. Without it, his claim to have solved the philosophical problems essentially in a definitive way lacks any intelligibility. And that he did solve them can be shown, as outlined.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty concerns the content of my interpretation of the dissolution of the realism vs. idealism controversy. In the context of the only detailed discussion of a philosophical problem in the proposed sense in TLP, that of solipsism, Wittgenstein says at the end that solipsism coincides with pure realism when carried out rigorously (5.64). His dissolution of the realism vs. idealism controversy (and scepticism as its implication, and solipsism as its radicalisation) thus does not mark a position beyond the controversy, but is taking a side within it. In addition, his logical objectivism must also be seen as a form of (Platonist) realism in the context of logical-philosophical positions. And finally, if one does not

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*realistic Spirit*: Wittgenstein, *Philosophy and the Mind*, Cambridge/Mass. In the anthology *The New Wittgenstein*, ed. Alice Crary/Rupert Read, London 2000, Peter Hacker was given the opportunity to respond to the views of the representatives of this interpretative approach (353-383).

10 Cp. Peter Hacker: 'Philosophy', in: Hans-Johann Glock (ed.): *Wittgenstein - A Critical Reader*, Oxford 2001, 323 - 347, here 328. - My view differs from Hacker's only in nuances - especially with regard to the character of the 'lucid presentation' of grammatical relations that Wittgenstein declares in PI to be the goal of philosophical clarification (section 122) and with regard to the formula's understanding of philosophical problems. Hacker does not seem to consider necessary, even with regard to the TLP, the distinctions I am struggling to make here. Moreover, I think that an apologetic interpretation should not deny things that the author explicitly says - that "any attempt to answer them (sc. the philosophical problems) is mere nonsense" (329 - cf. on the other hand 4.003: "We cannot ... answer questions of this kind at all, but only establish their nonsense").

11 Hanjo Glock argues for many more kinds of nonsense; cp. >All kinds of Nonsense<, in: Glock *Normativity, Meaning and Philosophy* – Essays on Wittgenstein, London 2024, 111-131. – Ich folge Glock hier in der restriktiven Deutung des Satzzusammenhangsprinzips wegen der Formulierungen in 3.3 und 3.314. Aber anders als er stelle ich eine gewisse Spannung in LWs Konzeption fest, weil er in einer späteren, gemäß der Nummerierung untergeordneteren Bemerkung (5.5261) doch sagt, dass die Elemente auch einer nicht verallgemeinerten Satzes „unabhängig in bezeichnenden Beziehungen zur Welt (stehen)“. Diese Konzession folgt aus der elaborierten Theorie über Namen, die ich differenzierter auffasse als Glock. In einem mail-Austausch hat mich Glock selbst auf die Vorgänger-Formulierung von 5.5261 in den *Tagebüchern 1914-1916* hingewiesen, die den Elementarsatz ausdrücklich erwähnt (31.1014 a; NB 22).

restrict the historical context of the TLP to Frege and Russell<sup>12</sup>, as analytical exegetes tend to do, but takes into account that Wittgenstein was very much influenced by Schopenhauer since his youth, so that the whole conception of the TLP of the relation between subject, language/thought and world can be interpreted as an attempt at a realist transformation of Schopenhauer's 'world as conception'<sup>13</sup>, my interpretation seems to become completely indefensible.

This difficulty only arises, however, on the premise that Wittgenstein himself advocated solipsism in the TLP. This is a widespread and probably also the predominant view among interpreters. But it has been emphatically contradicted by David Pears and myself. I do not want to repeat here the - to my mind, correct - interpretation of TLP 5.6 ff., but I want to remind of the reasons against a solipsistic interpretation.

1. Wittgenstein does not ask *whether* solipsism is a truth and answer this question in the affirmative, but asks to what *extent* it is a truth. This rules out the possibility that solipsism is simply right.

2. Indeed, what he means must first be ascribed to him; he does not say, "The world is my world." There is no talk at all of the consciousness of epistemological solipsism with regard to Wittgenstein's solipsist.

3. And there can be no question of it, because the "thinking, presenting subject does not exist." (TLP 5.631) But its uniqueness would have to have been claimed by an epistemological solipsist. The meaning of Wittgenstein's remark is: Neither the presenting subject of knowledge, which the modern epistemology from Descartes to Schopenhauer thought, exists, nor a thinking subject, which seems to follow the conception of language of TLP, according to which sections of reality are represented by thinking the sense of propositions. In place of an active, imagining subject there is only an "extensionless point" (5.64) as the point of reference for/of representation of the world by the propositions of language<sup>14</sup>; instantiated in every case of the thinking of propositional senses (like Kant's ›I think‹, which must be able to accompany

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12 Hacker also still does this: "The conceptions of philosophy Wittgenstein was familiar with as a young man, were primarily those of Frege and Russell, and derivatively, via Frege's polemic, with the psychologists' empiricist tradition in Germany". ('Philosophy', op. cit., 324). One wonders where Wittgenstein's Kantianism, also seen by Hacker, came from (325), which is stronger than Frege's (because, unlike Frege's, it includes Kant's reflexive conception of philosophy), so it cannot come from the latter alone. The source was Schopenhauer.

13 I did this in *Wittgenstein und Schopenhauer*, Cuxhaven 1989.

14 David Pears has called Wittgenstein's conception of the subject in the TLP that of a "sliding peg egocentrism" and explained it (in: *The false prison*, 2nd ed., Oxford 1988, 233). The position is related to solipsism, but not solipsistic, because the subject does not exist only once as a 'sliding peg'. Every speaker and hearer, when and insofar as they think the meaning of sentences, is the subject. Kant's formulation (in an admittedly different context) that there is a 'subject thinking in us' (KrV B 770) gives an idea of the 'sliding peg'.

all my ideas).

4. Solipsism (as radicalised epistemological idealism) is supposed to coincide with pure realism (TLP 5.64). In philosophical disputes, proving to a controversial view that it cannot be distinguished from its diametrical opposite should be understood as intending a radical critique of the view in question.

5. Solipsism in its core is a radicalised scepticism. Wittgenstein considers this *ex professo* to be "nonsense" (TLP 6.51) and it would be contradictory if he were to proceed differently with solipsism.

If in the critical treatment of solipsism Wittgenstein aims at a third option between radical solipsism (I am thinking the propositions of language) and idealism (all subjects think the propositions of language only for themselves), then his thesis of the collapse of solipsism and radical realism is also to be taken either as such a third position - that would be compatible with the resolution of the controversy realism vs. idealism - or to be read purely dialectically as a proof of the senselessness of solipsism (refer to my 4th reason against a solipsistic interpretation). In either option, the strong realist colouring of Wittgenstein's treatment of solipsism (and the realism of his logical objectivism) does not contradict the outlined resolution of the realism vs. idealism controversy, because in this resolution, after all, both opponents are proven right in different respects, i.e. in no way, as it appears in 5.64, does one side (realism) bring the other (solipsism) to fall.

Finally, I would like to add to the sparse information of the historical context of the philosophical problems in the TLP, because this will provide the topic and the interpretation with the appropriate broad perspective. Following the TLP's *Preface*, the limitation of its historical context to the "great works of Frege" and the suggestions of his (then) friend Bertrand Russell, which still prevails among analytic exegetes, is incomplete - Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the ›World as Representation‹ (not as ›Will‹) (cp. Anscombe 1971, 11f.) is an essential part still also of the LPA. Thus, in the genealogy of TLP belong two philosophers, Schopenhauer and Frege, who were both Kantians in certain respects. Now, it is well known, Kant already tried to reconcile idealism and realism as 'transcendental idealism' and 'empirical realism'. To Wittgenstein's direct Kantian instigators, this attempt at mediation by Kant fell apart - Schopenhauer became a radical idealist in his preference for the First Edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Frege an equally resolute realist. Assuming that Wittgenstein perceived this and found it deeply unsatisfactory, one presumably has the intellectual motive,

in the background, for his proposal of the resolution of the controversy. An indication of this interpretation being correct is that Wittgenstein, in a letter to Frege (not preserved) on the latter's treatise *Der Gedanke*, apparently defended the ›deep reasons for idealism‹, which he had to do because, after all, in the resolution of the controversy he had proved the idealist right where the dimension of sense is concerned. This is supported by Frege's explanation in a preserved letter that he could not see ›the deep reasons for idealism‹.<sup>15</sup>

*Philosophical problems - the extended term/concept* The observable changes in Wittgenstein's use of the formula of philosophical problems are, of course, related to the transformation of his whole conception into the one then presented in PI. If they are to be described synoptically, various characterisations are possible. The definitional feature of being based on the misunderstanding of the logic of language is retained, but the use of the formula becomes more inclusive. In terms of what has been argued in the TLP, this can be expressed thus: Wittgenstein later only talks about philosophical problems at all from the research perspective. Not for nothing is the title of the second major work is 'Philosophical Investigations'.<sup>16</sup> One can also say: the philosophical problems are no longer separated from the logical ones. It must be noted that the aspects of ›logic‹ relevant to philosophy expand into ›grammar‹, where the philosophically relevant grammar of a proposition, for example, is understood to mean: 'all the conditions (the methods) of comparing the proposition with reality. That is, all the conditions of understanding (of the sense).' (PG IV.45 c) The extension of logic to grammar as the entire conditions of sense for all units of language is, systematically speaking, a consequence of the liberalisation of the concept of proposition. Since Wittgenstein realised "that what we call 'proposition', 'language', is not the formal unity I imagined (in TLP; my addition), but the family of more or less related entities", that is, that 'proposition' and 'language' are family resemblance terms, he abandoned the two defining principles of bipolarity and propositional context that were fundamental to the TLP theory, restricting bipolarity to a wide range of empirical sentences, the propositional context principle as senseless/meaningless (*Wiener Ausgabe* vol. 2, 165 - 10.1.30; cf. PB II.14). He therefore formulates his synoptic explanations of 'meaning' (sense) only for words [the use in language - PU § 43 (for a large

15 Frege's letter is cited in Ray Monk: Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, op. cit. 190. All of Frege's extant letters to Wittgenstein have been published. Frege's letters to Wittgenstein are published by the Brenner Archive, Innsbruck.

16 Wittgenstein also thought it important to note from Augustine: "... quia plus loquitur inquisitio quam inventio ...Augustinus.)" (Z 457)

part of cases, not all); that which is explained in an explanation of meaning - PU § 560]. The explanatory second sentence of the explanation for ›grammar of the sentence‹ in PG applies also to the smaller units of language which propositions are formed of, the words, because the distinction between 'sense' and 'meaning', according to which sentences have sense and words (names) have meaning (3.3), is abandoned.<sup>17</sup> Analogically, the philosophical problems in the extended use become grammatical problems (misunderstandings) because the kinds of misunderstanding that have given rise to the traditional philosophical problems of modern epistemology also are exemplified by simpler linguistic misunderstandings. Finally, the shift in the use of 'philosophical problems' can be described as the meaning of the formula becoming detached from the 'problems of philosophy' in Russell's and TLP's sense. Realism vs. idealism, scepticism and solipsism are philosophical problems among many other philosophical problems.

The inclusive philosophical problems remain however the reference point of the grammatical considerations (PU §§ 90 b, 109) of philosophy. Also a clear overview (in German: ›übersichtliche Darstellung‹) of grammatical relations (PU §122) is intended only insofar as it is necessary for the resolution of philosophical problems.<sup>18</sup> The motto is: "We see problems in philosophical thought in places where there are none. And philosophy is supposed to show that there is no problem there." (PG I.9 a) "For philosophy, these are the philosophical problems, i.e. the certain individual inquietudes which we call 'philosophical problems. Their common denominator extends as far as what is common between different areas of our language." (PG X.141 a) An example of a philosophical problem then looks like this (PG X.141 b):

›If we now consider a certain philosophical problem, such as that: 'How is it possible to measure a period of time, since past and future are not present and the present is only a point?'-; the characteristic thing about it is that here a confusion expresses itself in the form of a question which does not acknowledge this confusion. That the questioner is *redeemed* from his problem by a certain change in his mode of expression.‹

The questioner's confusion in the example is based on his exclusive orientation in understanding what measuring a period of time means, to the measurement of lengths and other spatial quantities. This confusion does not recognise that the measuring of time has its own

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<sup>17</sup> However, Wittgenstein goes on to write predominantly of the 'sense' of the proposition, not its 'meaning'.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Wittgenstein: *Vorlesungen 1930-1935*, Frankfurt am Main 1984, 270 f. The passage is cited in the section 'Semantics'.

standards, its own standard processes (such as the rotation of the earth on its axis or the position of the sun as the standard for determining the time of day; the revolution of the earth as the standard for determining the unit of a year, etc.), as the measurement of length must assume the standard metre as the reference for measuring rods. The distinction of the methods of measuring time from those of measuring other dimensions makes the confusion disappear, dissolves the problem, relieves the questioner of his problem.

*The Changing Resolution of the Realism vs. Idealism Problem* In a revealing critical statement on the TLP, Wittgenstein said on July 1, 1932: "Unclear to me in the tractat were the logical analysis and the ostensive definition. I thought at the time that there was a 'connection between language and/with reality'." (WVC, 209f.). As shown, in TLP Wittgenstein assumed a connection of logic with the world, in that elementary propositions have sense and names have meaning. (6.124) But he did not deal explicitly with ›ostensive definition‹ in TLP. Instead, there is a provision on ›elucidations‹ as the only possible explanations for ›names‹ or ›elementary signs‹, and the self-criticism cited makes it very likely that Wittgenstein thought of ›('inner') ostensive definitions‹ as necessary for these explanations. Insofar he did know of an 'ostensive explanation' in TLP. The remark (3.263) reads:

›The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by elucidations. Elucidations are propositions which contain the primitive signs. They can, therefore, only be understood when the meanings of these signs are already known.‹

That which conveyed the familiarity with the meanings of the primitive signs, which is already required/presupposed for an understanding of the explanations, would be, according to the interpretive hypothesis, the ›inner ostensive definitions‹ whose impossibility forms the central point of the later argument against the possibility of a radical, private language (PU §§ 258, 380 b).

Now, the internal relation of language and world in the dimension of sense hinged on the relation name-object in the TLP and thus, in connection with the basic distinction of sense vs. truth-or-falsity, the resolution of the controversy realism vs. idealism. At the same time, the conception of the propositions of logic as the ›scaffolding of the world‹, which I called ›logical objectivism‹, was connected to it. (6.124) Accordingly, from a systematic point of view, it is at this point that the transformation of the conception of the relation between language and the

world starts. This transformation leads to a changed understanding of the internal character of this relation, which can be language-descriptively redeemed.

For the new understanding of the internal relation between language and the world can be shown in a description of a common linguistic practice, in the description of the ›ostensive explanation‹ of expressions for (initially) perceivable things. Such explanations of meaning are possible for all such expressions by using 'this -> is (an)...' in conjunction with a pointing gesture. The elements of reality pointed to in such explanations thus become paradigms to which the meaning of the expressions is ‚calibrated‘ (This lucky expression (‘geeicht’/‘calibrated’) is by David Pears: cp. 1988/89 passim). These paradigms (example: a colour table) are ›instruments of language‹, belong to language, even if not to the ›language of words‹ (cp. PU § 16). They internalise elements of reality as constituting the meaning of expressions, they found the internal relation of language and reality (world). This transforms the conception of language as a whole (PG IV. 46 c; 55 c):

›One would like to distinguish between rules of grammar which make 'a connection between language and reality', and those which do not. A rule of the first kind is 'this colour is called >red<', - a rule of the second kind: ' $\neg \neg p = p$ '. There is a misconception about this difference; language is not something to which a structure is given, and which is then fitted to reality.‹

›The connection between 'language and reality' is made by the word explanations, - which belong to grammar (in German: ›Sprachlehre‹, which exactly means ›the teaching of language‹), so that language remains self-contained, autonomous.‹

Explanation of meaning becomes constitutive of meaning; the meaning (of an expression) is 'what the explanation of its meaning explains'. (PU § 560) Neither are names or any primitive signs exempt from this (as in the TLP, where their understanding was presupposed for the understanding of their ›elucidations‹). An important implication of talking about 'grammar' is that, in a ›theory of meaning‹ (of which Wittgenstein definitely did not want to speak), the explanations of meaning must have a form<sup>19</sup> that makes them suitable for teaching language. The determination that language is *autonomous* sums up the transformation of the relation between language and reality (world); for it must be said of TLP that in it language was

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19 Under the question of the form of a 'theory of meaning' for a natural language, in the 70s of the previous century and since, first between Donald Davidson and Michael Dummett, a linguistic-philosophical discussion has been conducted that could largely have been made superfluous by a better perception and knowledge of Wittgenstein's conceptions of language and philosophy.

*heteronomous*, dependent on a logical structure of the world that was supposed to represent the propositions of logic. (This structure was to structure language essentially in that the names ›absorb‹ the forms of their objects, "that the forms of the entities are contained in the form of the proposition, which is about these entities" - PO 34) More elaborate characterisations of the ›autonomy of grammar‹ often emphasise the 'arbitrariness' of the rules of grammar (PG X. 133 a, h):

›Grammar is not accountable to any reality. The grammatical rules first determine the meaning (constitute it) and are therefore not accountable to any meaning and insofar arbitrary.‹

›The rules of grammar are arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement. But surely this can only mean that it is independent of the length of the object of measurement; and that not the choice of one unit is 'true', the other 'false', as the indication of length is true or false. This is, of course, only a remark on the grammar of the word 'unit of length'.‹

On the basis of the conception of the autonomy of grammar, however, the resolution of the controversy between realism and idealism now looks exactly as it did in TLP - the idealist is right for the dimension of sense, meaning and their explanations, the realist for the dimension of truth vs. falsity, or, because in the liberalised conception of propositions there room not only for descriptive statements (as in TLP), for the dimension of fulfilment vs. non-fulfilment. Still, the assumption of the adversaries is false, that only one of them could be right. This erroneous assumption could be expressed in terms of the transformed conception thus: Language (grammar) could only be either autonomous or only heteronomous. And this error is based on the lack of distinction between meaning and sense on the one hand, fulfilment vs. non-fulfilment on the other.

However, Wittgenstein describes the controversy differently in the context of his transformed conception (PU section 402 b):

›For this is what the disputes between idealists, solipsists, and realists look like. The one attack the normal form of expression as if they were attacking an assertion; the other defend it as if they were stating facts that every reasonable man recognizes.‹

Still, the distinction between sense and truth-or-falsity, with the primacy of sense, is the basis. But because sense is no longer rooted in the logical structure of the world (via the forms



of objects and their relation to their names), the judgement of the metaphysical conceptions of idealism, solipsism and realism loses the appearance of constituting a truth-question. In the dimension of sense, on the basis of an autonomy of grammar, questions are no longer to be decided between true or false, but between useful or useless, applicable or not applicable, expressively appropriate or inappropriate. Wittgenstein must therefore concede to the criticised positions that they are possible conceptions. This he realised in his second critique of solipsism in *The Blue Book*. If the solipsist (which is now thoroughly understood in terms of consciousness and epistemology, no longer merely, as in the TLP, metaphysically) insists that only he really experiences, that only he really feels pain, for example, then it must be conceded to him that he proposes a possible notation in which the pain of others and simulation are then accounted for in a different way. For the solipsist's felt pain, it might simply be said 'there is real pain now', of another's pain 'he behaves as (the solipsist behaves) if there is real pain'. (cf. BIB 96<sup>20</sup>) But the solipsist is mistaken in claiming, that his notation is 'true', the common one 'false'. Wittgenstein explains this with the parable of various possible demarcations of the county of Devonshire. (BIB 92 f.) The question of the correct delimitation does not arise, because it is a question of convention and not a question of fact.

It is in the sense of the objection 'convention, not fact' against the solipsist that PI section 402 says that some - namely idealists and solipsists - "attack(ed) the normal form of expression as if they were attacking an assertion." And that the others - namely, the realists - "defend it ... as if they were stating facts which every reasonable man acknowledges." The controversy between the two is meaningless as one that intended to pose and decide a question of truth, because it belongs to the dimension of sense that precedes truth-or-falsity. It would be very impractical to have to express oneself in the way the idealist and solipsist suggest. Idealist talk of the world as our 'imagination', for example, would not allow us to distinguish between 'the world' and 'the imagination of the world', even though our imaginings often enough miss the mark of what is really the case, and we have to take painful note of this, for example, when intentions and attempts at action fail. But this does not make our normal mode of expression a realistic one in the metaphysical sense which claims to grasp the facts alone really and correctly.

Because in ordinary use ›*problem*‹ is the opposite of ›*solution*‹, but philosophical problems require *dissolution* and are perhaps the only ones 'to be (dissolved) in the proper sense' ('like a

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20 Retranslated from the German, where *Das Blaue Buch* is in vol. 5 of the paperback *Werkausgabe*. The code BIB is used for the German version of BB.

lump of sugar in water' - BT 421), there should really be no talk of problems in the sense of the 'great' 'philosophical problems' of realism vs. idealism etc.: "The word 'problem' might be misapplied when applied to our philosophical perplexities." (BIB 77) For the general form of a philosophical problem (in the extended sense) is "I do not know my way about" (BT 421, PU § 123) and ignorance can only be eliminated by investigation and overview, not by 'discovering' solutions: "The philosophical problem is an awareness of the disorder in our concepts, and fixed by ordering them." (BT 421)

To the extent that one is prepared to see<sup>21</sup> that Wittgenstein's rectification of the metaphysical positions is descriptively adequate in terms of the nature of the controversy, one will acknowledge that he has achieved a definitive resolution for the realism vs. idealism (scepticism, solipsism) controversy on the basis of the conception of the ›autonomy of grammar‹ (which has taken the place of ›logical objectivism‹ of TLP). This, with regard to the 'big'<sup>22</sup> 'problems of philosophy' in the narrower sense of TLP, is something philosophy should finally learn from Wittgenstein.<sup>23</sup>

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- 21 Wittgenstein saw that philosophical conceptions are also affectively based and that the difficulty of being convinced by philosophical clarifications is or can be not only one of the intellect but also of the feeling: "As I have often said, philosophy does not lead me to any renunciation, since I do not renounce saying something, but give up a certain word connection as meaningless. In another sense, however, philosophy then requires a resignation, but of the feeling, not of the understanding. And that is perhaps what makes it so difficult for many. It can be hard not to use an expression, as it is hard to hold back tears, or an outburst of anger/rage." (BT 406)
- 22 In the extended use of 'philosophical problem' (of the form 'I don't know my way about'), there is also an explicit denial of a difference between major and ordinary problems (cf. BT 407).
- 23 The key problem of Robert Brandom's semantic theory - the determinacy of conceptual content - is still determined by a taking seriously of scepticism as a philosophical position, albeit in the form of the consummating scepticism of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. But what is proven to be meaningless cannot be taken philosophically seriously.

## *Philosophy with logic*

A possible illustration of the thematic-structural structure of the TLP would be a round cone standing on a horizontal base plane with a flattened top (so that it can stand up). Through the round cone, parallel sections to the base plane would be laid, which naturally have a smaller surface area than the base plane.

What I have dealt with so far concerns the base and consequences from the views located on it in LW's self-criticism, i.e. the problems of philosophy in narrow sense understood (realism vs. idealism, scepticism, solipsism) and their dissolution as the comprehensive purpose of the TLP. A first cut not far from the base contains what gives the title of this section 'Philosophy with Logic'. At further levels marked by cuts up the cone are ontology, philosophy of language (explanation of basic language-related concepts; model of language use), psychology and semantics (philosophy as description of language). On the smallest area of the flattened top belong the two basic semantic principles of TLP, bipolarity and propositional context. The following account goes along with this model broadly speaking. Since TLP is also the continuous reference point of LW's self-criticism, the model also provides the starting points for the longitudinal sections of the development of his thought as I shall demonstrate. The clarity of the model in separating the levels, however, is also misleading insofar as the levels interpenetrate in LW's account. Thus, in the treatment of the problems of philosophy and their dissolution, reference already had to be made to the conceptions that can be justifiably elaborated upon only in ontology, psychology, language model, etc.

I speak of philosophy *with logic* and not *of logic* because, as will be shown, an a priori ontological interpretation of logic – logical objectivism - is specific to TLP. In the end LW is interested in logic purely philosophically, for reasons of constructing his system. His proposals for improving the logic of Frege and Russell/Whitehead, which was significant for him, are also philosophically motivated. He does not limit himself to making clear the foundations of

logic in language and linguistic activity, therefore there is not only philosophy of logic.

Nevertheless, what belongs to a philosophy of logic must be the first topic. Frege is the starting point and is therefore rightly named in the *Preface* as one of LW's two great analytical influences. Frege founded *mathematical* logic by applying the mathematical function/argument notation to language. His fundamental, terminological innovation was to decompose the simplest grammatical subject-predicate propositions into argument and function rather than into logical subject and logical predicate, as in syllogistics.<sup>24</sup> A proposition like 'Caesar conquered Gaul' is analysed not into the subject 'Caesar' and the predicate 'conquered Gaul' but into a function 'x conquered Gaul' for which 'Caesar' serves as the argument. The value of this function is true (e.g. if we insert 'Caesar') or false (e.g. if we insert 'Alexander'), depending on whether the proposition resulting from inserting is true or false. In this way, concepts like the one expressed by 'x conquered Gaul' are treated as functions that map arguments to truth values. The simple, atomic formula in Frege's *Concept Script* is made up of an argument expression and a function name. The argument expressions are names of objects, and the conceptwords name functions. In the next step, Frege extends this idea to the logical connectives by which molecular formulas are formed. Negation, for example, is a one-place function that maps one truth value to the opposed truth value (if 'p' is true, then 'not-p' is false and vice versa). Propositions are thus treated as proper names of one or other of two 'logical objects'<sup>25</sup>, ('the True' and 'the False'), and they are argument expressions for the function names denoting the logical connectives (conjunction, alteration etc.). Finally, 'All Greeks are bald' is not analysed as the subject 'All Greeks' and the predicate 'are bald', but into the complex concept-expression 'if x is a Greek, then x is bald' and the quantifier 'For all x'. The quantifier expresses a second-level function that maps terms (first-level functions) to truth values, to the True if the term has the value true for *all* arguments, to the False otherwise. ('Some Greeks are bald' is treated accordingly).

This apparatus made it possible to give the first complete axiomatization of first-order logic - including proofs containing multiple generalities, characteristic of mathematical reasoning - and to present mathematical induction as the application of a purely logical law. LW, like Russell before him and many after them, was rightly fascinated by the enormous progress that these innovations of Frege's brought about. In his first publication while still a student, he

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24 I am adopting here Glock's account in: Wittgenstein-Lexikon, transl. By E. M. Lange, Darmstadt 2000, 13. (Engl. Oxford 1996)

25 Which Frege believed to have discovered by analogy with chemical elements - *Nachgelassene Schriften*, ed. Hermes, Kambartel, Kaulbach, Hamburg 1983, 211 ('Introduction to Logic').

compares them to the scientific revolution that the Copernican system brought about in the world view. (cp. PO 2-3) But he quickly came to having to make philosophical objections to the application of the innovations to a clarification of linguistically constituted understanding.

The function-argument analysis of simple propositions preserves an essential property of subject-predicate sentences. Essentially they are complex signs, that is compounds of signs, in which the linked signs have different roles. The first constituent of a subject-predicate sentence *names* what the proposition says something about, the second *says* it. In function-argument analysis, this becomes: the function states what is said, the argument determines whether what is said is true (whether the value of the function for the chosen argument is true) or false. Frege has clarified the difference between the roles of function and argument with a chemical metaphor: the function is 'unsaturated', essentially in need of complementation by arguments, the argument, on the other hand, is 'saturated', an independent expression, which admittedly can only exercise its role dependent, as an insertion-instance for functions. Frege has therefore already formulated a version of the propositional context principle<sup>26</sup>: Only in the context of a proposition does a word have meaning; only as an insertion-instance to a function does an argument have meaning.

Wittgenstein first adopted these basic insights without reservation. Like Frege and Russell<sup>27</sup>, he thinks of the proposition "as the function of expressions contained in it." (3.318) He maintains the essential composition, complexity of propositions, and holds that apparently the equivalence proposition / complex sign is a tautology (28.5.1534). That the values of the elementary propositional functions are 'true' and 'false' becomes the fundamental semantic principle for a proposition for him - the principle of bipolarity: what is to be a proposition (a proposition, a 'picture') must essentially be capable of being both true and false. (2.221; NB 94) And the independent-dependent role of arguments in propositional functions (words in the sentences) becomes the second fundamental semantic principle of propositional context, essential to the meaning of words (3.3, 3.314).

But already where this principle is concerned Wittgenstein saw the necessity to deviate from Frege's conceptual determinations. The primacy of propositions over words he formulated thus: "Only the proposition has meaning; only in the context of a proposition does a name have meaning." The difference is at first merely terminological: whereas Frege applied 'sense' and 'meaning' to constituents of sentences as well as to whole sentences - 'the True' and 'the False'

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<sup>26</sup> *Foundations of Arithmetics* (1879), § 62.

<sup>27</sup> I shall mention Russell in the following, but not deal with him in detail.

are supposed to be the *meanings of sentences*, their *sense* is supposed to be a 'mode of presentation (being given)' of either the True or the False - Wittgenstein reserves the semantic expression 'sense' for sentences, that of 'meaning' for constituents of sentences (words, expressions). The terminological difference, however, has great factual consequences. For if, as in Frege, propositions are supposed to have meanings, too, by analogy with the way in which names (words) have meanings, then propositions, although essentially complex signs (composed of words), must somehow also be names. Wittgenstein thought this to be wrong. He saw that this error was forced by Frege's generalization of function-argument analysis beyond simple propositions to complex propositions (composed of simple propositions). A (two-place) logical propositional conjunction is also treated by Frege as a function name, and the function as an expression that maps pairs of propositions to truth values. But then propositions have then to be taken as names due to the only binary manifold of the function-argument terminology.

›Frege has said "propositions are names"; Russell has said "propositions correspond to complexes." Both is false; and especially mistaken is the statement, "Propositions are names of complexes." (NB 97; cf. 3.143)

Wittgenstein therefore needed a different explanation of propositional connectives than Frege's conception of function, because the latter immediately denied its correct basic insight from the application to simple sentences - that sentences are essentially composite signs in which the constituent parts play different roles - in the generalization to complex sentences. (Frege's talk of sentences as 'compound names' - TLP 3.143 - analogous to labels as complex object-designating expressions, Wittgenstein considered unprincipled.<sup>28</sup>) Wittgenstein came to conceive of connectives as 'operations' that must not be confused with functions (5.25). For the conceptual treatment of propositions as names in complex propositional functions cannot be based on the nominalisation of propositions in terms of expressions 'that p' in colloquial language. Colloquially, 'that p and that q' is, according to a standard analysis<sup>29</sup>, a compound singular term and not a sentence, nothing is said yet, no move has been made in the language game.

28 Wittgenstein was ironic about Russell's corresponding conviction: "Russell's 'complexes' are said to have the useful property of being composite, and to combine with this the pleasant property of being able to be treated like 'simple objects'. ... then it would not have been inconsistent to claim of a simple object that it is complex." (NB 100 f.)

29 An even simpler conception of 'that p' is that of Belnap and collaborators as a pro-sentence [analogous to pro-nomina for singular expressions (names, labels)]. Cp. Brandom 1994, 299-305.

The conception of connectives (and then also of quantifiers) as operations led to LW's basic logical idea that logical constants "do not represent" (4.0312), that they are not function names, do not denote 'logical objects'. He has tried to explicate the difference between operations and functions by a number of features, not all of which are sound (cp. Glock, 225f.; Baker, 1988, 106-108).

But neither these features nor their soundness need be of interest here. As for the independence of operations over functions, philosophical arguments have had the decisive weight for LW. Complex propositional functions are simply further functions, further forms of propositions. Operations, however, do not mark forms, "but only the difference of forms" : „It gives expression to the difference between the forms." (5.241, 5.24) "The occurrence of the operation does not mark the sense of the sentence. (-) After all, the operation says nothing, only its result, and this depends on the bases of the operation." The functional view of propositional connectives, by being forced to treat the constituent propositions that are connected (the bases of the operation) as names, cuts off the sense of the complex proposition from the sense of the constituting propositions. This is what makes them inadequate. Functions and operations are simply different types of means of formation for complex expressions in language, and not noticing their difference in type also damages the sense connection of a complex proposition with the sense of its constituents.

LW's critique of Frege's conception of logic, presented so far, is essentially the consequence of his determination to hold on to the distinction between names (singular terms) and propositions, for all propositions, not just atomic ones. In doing so, he unwaveringly maintains the function-theoretic analysis for atomic propositions, but is forced to a different conceptual version of propositional connectives - as operational expressions, not function names.

Frege arrived at his function-theoretic analysis of atomic propositions partly because, against syllogistic logic, he wanted to distinguish strictly the logical relations of the falling of an object under a concept and the falling of a concept under a concept. Syllogistic logic chooses the second case as its paradigm and therefore analyses elementary propositions as subject terms and predicate terms. Frege chooses the first case as paradigm and therefore analyses into argument and function. Please note that both paradigms lead to an ex ante regulation of the possible forms of propositions, both are theoretical anticipations - neither can make an exclusive claim to describe *the* logical form of elementary propositions. LW holds to Frege's conception as far as elementary propositions are concerned, and holds to it against

Frege's function-theoretic analysis of complex propositions.

LW's operational conception of logical connectives and quantifiers now has far-reaching consequences for the three questions that became generally disputed between him, Frege and Russell. What is logic after all? What are the logical propositions? What role do inference rules play in logic?

Frege and Russell answer the first question unanimously to the effect that logic is a science and, like all sciences, searches for laws, in logic, according to Frege, for the 'most general laws of being true'<sup>30</sup>; for the laws that express the most general features of empirical reality, according to Russell. LW, on the other hand, comes to the view that logic is not essentially a science seeking general laws, but the most general condition of sense, of intelligibility in general, and as such is a priori to pre-scientific understanding and the sciences alike. This is partly connected with the answer to the second question: For Frege and Russell, the laws of logic were essentially general propositions, precisely laws. Wittgenstein, after an intermediate step<sup>31</sup>, came to the view that the generality of logical propositions should not be understood as a generalization of propositions, but as a formal generality, and that the propositions themselves should be understood as tautologies, meaningless propositions at the limit of language, which all *say* the same thing, namely nothing (5.43), but very much *show* different things:

›The correct explanation of logical propositions must give them a peculiar position among all propositions.

....

The fact that propositions of logic are tautologies, *shows* the formal - logical - properties of language, of the world.

That its constituent parts, linked in this way give a tautology, characterizes the logic of their constituent parts.

In order that propositions connected together in a definite way may give a tautology they must have certain properties of structure. That they give a tautology when *so* connected shows therefore that they possess these properties of structure.

....

The propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions by combining them into propositions which say nothing.< (6.112, 6.12, 6.121)

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30 *Nachgelassene Schriften*, 139 ['Logic', (1897), Introduction].

31 In which he considered logical propositions to be generalisations of tautologies (Letter to Russell Nov./Dec. 1913; cf. NB 100)



The generality of logical propositions is 'essential', formal validity, and not the generality of being fulfilled by all instances. (6.1231-2)

Only the operational conception of logical connectives is able to hold this because, unlike the functional conception, it is free of ontological implications for itself (it does not require any 'logical objects'). Wittgenstein's conception secures its formality to formal logic.

Inference rules, finally, for Frege and Russell were further laws of logic, but for Wittgenstein they are only technical aids for easier recognizing tautology (6.1262) and "senseless" and "superfluous" where they are "supposed to justify conclusions." (5.132)

The understanding of the propositions of logic as tautologies also contains an implicit criticism of the axiomatic conception of logic, which Frege thought necessary because logical laws are infinite and cannot be brought into overview without the distinction of plausible basic laws. LW must also recognize propositions such as 'it rains or it does not rain' (as saying nothing about the weather - 4.461) as (tauto)logical propositions because "an ungeneralized proposition ... can just as well be tautological as a generalized one" (6.1231) And because all logical propositions are on a par and there are not essentially logical basic laws and derived propositions (6.127), logic cannot essentially require axiomatization.

LW's corrections of function-theoretical logic so far presented contain rigidities, including those that lead to dogmatism, but as such they do not yet have metaphysical implications. Thus the principle of bipolarity, according to which a correct proposition must be able to be both true and false, is at least a terminological dogmatism. For LW himself calls logical propositions *propositions* (a kind of propositions), but tautologies are not bipolar (as propositions proper must be according to TLP 3.3), but necessarily true. LW wanted to restrict the necessary truth to tautologies - they are the 'analytic propositions' (6.11). Propositions that would be 'synthetic a priori' are supposed not to exist. But that would be to have to be shown for each and every proposal of a proposition to be synthetic a priori - how it is analytic - , and not established dogmatically ex ante. (LW himself later started to doubt that propositions like 'this is blue, therefore not red, yellow, green, etc.' - cf. 6.3751 – express analytic truth, or, which comes to the same, that all logical inference is based on the form of tautology; and that colour-exclusion is not 'synthetically a priori' but analytic would first have to be shown by a suitable conception).

LW's strong understanding of the propositional context principle - the possible occurrence of an expression in a sentence should not only be a necessary but also a sufficient condition for its meaning - leads straight into the dogmatism of logical analysis. Wittgenstein once expressed the intuition guiding him by the formulation "the proposition(s) represent(s) the facts as it were on its own terms". (NB 5.11.14) The strong understanding of the context principle, in conjunction with this intuition, leads to the conclusion that the proposition in itself must contain everything that determines its meaning (allows its meaning to be determined). And this leads to the "demand of the determinacy of sense" which is equivalent to the demand of the possibility of simple signs (unanalyzable names for absolutely simple things) (3.23) and also to the demand of logical analysis, of which there should be only one for each proposition (3.25). These are dogmatic a priori consequences, and they already have metaphysical consequences in the postulates of absolute simplicity as the endpoint of analysis. But these consequences and postulates alone would not be compelling for LW's philosophy of logic being metaphysically embedded, because they themselves are not compelling. (One could understand the propositional context principle as only a necessary, but not sufficient condition for word meaning and would be rid of unwanted consequences).

This also applies to the construction of the logical system, which LW follows up on his descriptive corrections of Frege and Russell. He summarized his rejection of logical constants in favour of operations in the thesis that the only logical constant is the elementary proposition itself (5.47), because it already contains all logical constants. This leads to basing logic exclusively on the essence of the proposition (because the propositions of logic, as tautologies, show only the logical properties of propositions) and to making the characterisation of the general propositional form the central theoretical task, because it is "the description of the one and only general primitive sign of logic" (5.472). Only in this construction does logic appear as the fascinating "domain of questions... whose answers lie - a priori - symmetrically, and united into a self-contained, regular entity." (5.4541) The construction presupposes "that everything that can be said at all a *priori* about the form of propositions must also be possible to say *at once*." (5.47) But why should it not be possible to say it step by step, by way of recursive definitions? Nor is the construction of the logical system obligatory, and has for itself no metaphysical extensions. For the fact that logic presupposes that names have meaning and elementary propositions have sense, and even that therein lies their connection with the world (6.124), admits of a modest, non-metaphysical reading.

## *Ontology*

What ultimately makes the metaphysical embedding of the philosophy of logic in TLP inevitable is simply the ontological notion of fact in the way LW makes use of it. Of course, I have only artificially not used the term 'fact' in the present account of LW's philosophy with logic. For he formulated his insight into the central role of propositions and their essential compositeness from expressions playing different roles by means of the concept of fact from the outset, taking as fact both what 'really corresponds' to the proposition as its meaning (Sinn) (NB 104) and the proposition itself, this as a 'symbolizing fact' (NL 105). In this terminological decision the basic intuition of the picture theory of the proposition is pre-decided, that proposition and fact must be homologous and in analysis even isomorphic:

›In 'aRb' it is not the complex which symbolizes, but the fact that the symbol 'a' stands in a certain relation to the symbol 'b'. Thus facts are symbolized by facts, or more correctly: that in the symbol something definite is the case says that in the world something definite is the case.‹ (NB 98; cf. 3.1432)

LW formulated his basic conviction of the essential difference between names (simple signs) and propositions (complex signs) with the concept of fact in this way: "Only facts can express sense; a class of names cannot." (3.142; cf. NB 105)

Now this inevitably has metaphysical implications. For in order for facts to be used to symbolize (represent) facts, they must exist. Wittgenstein took as his *whole* theoretical task,

"To state the essence of the proposition. ( - ) That is, to state the essence of all facts of which the proposition *is* the picture. ( - ) To state the essence of all being." (Tb 22.1.15; cf. 5.471-1)

In a quasi-transcendental theory of the possibility of propositions, the fact of propositions and thus of facts must be presupposed just as in Kant's theory of the possibility of empirical knowledge the fact of empirical knowledge must be presupposed so that the ›conditions of possibility‹ may be inquired into.

This is why the TLP begins with the ontology of the world as a totality of facts. And this is why, among the facts of which the ontology explains the world to consist, the distinguished fact is that we make pictures of facts to ourselves (2.1). (In a lower-level explanation of the explanations of this proposition of the TLP it is stated that the picture is a fact; 2.141.)

The fact-character of pictures implies, because sentences as facts picture facts, the fact-

character of sentences (and the propositions expressed by their assertive use). (3.143) LW here says only that the "sentence sign" is a fact. But it is a point of the picture theory that the proposition - "the propositional sign in its projective relation to the world" (3.12) - is also a fact, that the intentional and internal relation of the proposition to the fact is reduced to something factual, homology or even isomorphism of proposition and fact. That this is insufficient is shown by the question: Why, in the case of an isomorphic relation, is the picture the picture of the fact and not also, reversely, the fact the picture of the picture? Self-critically, Wittgenstein commented on this error thus:

"A wrong conception of the functioning of language naturally destroys the *whole of* logic and all that is connected with it, and does not at any point produce only a slight disturbance. (-) If one removes the element of intention from language, its whole function collapses with it." (PR III.20, 63)

Because thoughts are logical pictures of facts (3) and are essentially expressed in sentences, thoughts are also facts. (5.542; cf. letter to Russell 19.8.1919) This now has consequences for the form of the execution of the task that LW set TLP as a whole, and for which even the theory of the proposition is only instrumental: to draw the bounds between sense and nonsense ("for the expression of thoughts" in language; *Preface c/d*) and thus to unfold the only thought that the TLP wants to unfold as an organic philosophy in Schopenhauer's sense, and which the *Preface* formulates as the whole sense of the book, proposition 7 as its conclusion. For if one wonders how this task of marking the bounds of sense is solved in the most general and therefore the most far-reaching way, one has to look at the two only seemingly synonymous propositions in the middle of TLP:

3.5 The applied, thought(-out), sentence is the thought.

4 The thought is the meaningful proposition.

Proposition 3.5. delimits the meaning of 'thought' (because it is a first-level explanation of proposition 3) and says: Only that which is expressed or expressible in a sentence that is applied or explicitly thought (and thereby unconsciously translated into its logical analysis) is a thought. And proposition 4 complementarily delimits the meaning of 'proposition', for it is the head proposition of the explicit theory of the proposition. It closes the gap left by 3.5, namely, that there could be sentences, independent units of language usable for communication, which

do not express thoughts (a possibility which undoubtedly exists in ordinary language - wishes do not express thoughts but a desire for .../to ..., commands a command, a request to ..., intention sentences the intention/intent to.... etc.) Because proposition 4 says, only what expresses a thought is a meaningful sentence, the propositional theory of TLP is occupied with descriptive propositions, statements, only. But these explanations for the use of 'thought' and 'proposition' is ontologically based on the fact-character of sentences, to which thoughts are bound as their essential expression. Pictures, thoughts, propositions are thereby bound to the world as a totality of facts, as essential elements of this totality. Thus, the metaphysical embedding of the basic logical assumption of an irreducible type difference between names and propositions by declaring propositions (pictures, thoughts) to be facts has the most comprehensive and absolutely decisive consequences for the theoretical claim of TLP.

Thanks to the epoch-making work of Michael Wolff<sup>32</sup> on logic, we can now know that the progress achieved by Frege's function-theoretical logic actually looked much greater than it really was, as the Nestroy-motto of *Philosophical Investigations* says.

First<sup>33</sup>, Frege's claim to replace syllogistics as the proper science of general formal logic was unfounded. The truth-functional logical relations presuppose non-truth-functional ones by means of which they can be defined, but not vice versa. Moreover, Frege's and Russell's logics were not in fact purely formal. The use of truth-functional links entails that the validity of the proposition of the excluded middle and the validity of the principle of arbitrary sufficient justification (enshrined in the truth table for the material implication, which is supposed to be true even if the if-proposition is false) are tacitly presupposed. It further entails that the validity of the syllogistic principle of qualitative existential presupposition is suspended, and is assumed instead that from the negation of any statement (universal, particular or singular) it follows that there *is* something (to which the predicate of the negated statement does not apply) - and this regardless of what is spoken of in the negated statement. The use of quantifiers and individual constants in connection with truth-functional logical connections presupposes: *there are those objects* to which individual constants (or bound individual variables) refer.<sup>34</sup> That is, quite independently of explicit metaphysical inferences or embeddings: Function-theoretical

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32 Michael Wolff: *Abhandlung über die Prinzipien der Logik*, 2nd improved and extended edition, Frankfurt a.M., 2009 (1<sup>st</sup>. ed. 2004). And: *Einführung in die Logik*, Munich 2006.

33 I have adopted here Wolff's own summary at the end of § 35 of the treatise. (150 sqq.)

34 Cp. Wolff: *Einführung* ..., l.c., ch. 10.

logic makes ontological, substantive presuppositions and is therefore not purely formal.

Frege's and Russell's logic is not the general formal logic, but a special logic of mathematical reasoning and proof that refers directly to operating with letters that denote single individual objects.

Wittgenstein's replacement of truth-*functions* by truth-*operations*, together with his thesis of the ineffability of the existence of objects (which is supposed to be shown only by the use of individual variables and constants, cannot be stated - 3.221, 4.1272, 5.53, 5.61)<sup>35</sup>, can be understood as an attempt to secure, in the function-theoretic framework, the formality of logic and thus the status of function-theoretic logic as general formal logic. Perhaps this attempt can be maintained for the areas of language in which signs are (can be) really used truth-functionally (cp. PI § 3), but as a theoretical proposal with a claim to general validity it has failed, even according to LW's own conviction.

That this attempt still is philosophically immensely instructive, is made clear above all by the wealth of insights that Wittgenstein himself developed from the comprehensive and radical self-critique of the logical-metaphysical system of TLP, some of which are treated in more detail below as ›Lessons from Wittgenstein‹.

## *Philosophy of Language*

### *Language and sentence, sense and meaning, explanations, rules, language game(s)*

'Sense' and 'meaning' are central concepts for making the linguistic understandable. That they seem to have been moved to the centre by LW has contributed to his understanding and classification as a 'philosopher of language'.

This understanding is narrowed and also hermeneutically inappropriate, if one realises that LW's interest in language throughout was instrumental only. This is why there is no 'theory' of language in his work - rather, arguments that such a 'theory' cannot even exist, because language must be made understandable 'from within', already using it (PU §§ 120-1) - and no 'theory' of meaning and sense. Readings of his work from these perspectives are

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35 Wittgenstein's rejection of Russell's 'axiom of infinity' also points to this (cf. NB 9.101914; TLP 5.535).

misunderstandings, although of course especially his argument for the impossibility of a theory of language can be seen as an important contribution to the philosophy of language.

That LW was interested in language instrumentally only is already the case for TLP for two reasons: 1. the logic of language is clarified in the TLP in order to be able to dissolve the 'philosophical problems'; 2. language is only of interest as an expression of thoughts, because thoughts are intersubjectively (objectively) accessible only as "perceptibly expressed" (3.1) in propositions. LW is after all only interested in the proposition in the TLP, because: "The totality of propositions is language" (4.001) Language systematically is only a set of propositions in the TLP.

Another philosophical perspective of instrumental interest in language is a quite traditional, which W. once put in the question, "Is there, *a priori*, an order in the world, and if so, what does it consist in?" This, he said, is "the great problem around which everything I write revolves." (1.6. 15; NB 53) The affirmative solution to this problem is given by the objectivist conception of logic rooted in fact-ontology. Just as propositions are essentially complex, composed of words, and language is only a set of propositions, so the world consists in facts in which objects are concatenated; facts are what makes propositions true, so that reality forms a set of facts. The precise correspondences: Objects - words; states of affairs/facts - propositions; world/reality - language; make up the order *a priori* in the world.

But even in the narrowed conception of language as a set of propositions, LW encounters a property that then comes more to the fore in the transformed conception - the holism of language. For in TLP every proposition is said to be already analysed in terms of the truth-function of elementary propositions which determines its meaning, but for elementary propositions it is said (5.524 b): "If the elementary propositions are given, then *all* elementary propositions are thereby also given." The transformed conception then states (PGVI. 84 d; cf. BT 63):

›Something is a proposition only in a language. To understand a proposition is to understand a language.

The sentence is a sign in a system of signs. It is *a sign* connection among several possible ones and in contrast to other possible ones. As it were *a pointer's* position in contrast to other possible ones.‹

For the transformed conception since 1931-32 and the PI, a merely instrumental interest in language applies to an increased extent (for TLP had, after all, seen its "whole task" also in "explaining the essence of the proposition" – NB 22.1.15), because it is no longer with the

essence of the proposition that only the 'one problem' of the relation of language/thought and reality is to be clarified<sup>36</sup>, but (philosophical) "problems" in essential plural: "Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not *one* problem." (PI § 133) And as already noted, language is of interest in this "only insofar as it troubles us" (Vorl 270). And 'sense' and 'meaning' are thereby normal terms like all others, not "*super-terms*" in a "*super-order*" of the logic of language (PI § 97).

*Notes on Logic* (1913) and *TLP* (1918) The oldest of Wittgenstein's texts after a brief scathing review of a traditional logic book<sup>37</sup> are the *Aufzeichnungen über Logik* of 1913 (which I am combining with 'Aufzeichnungen zur Logik' of G.E. Moore – NL – based on dictations by Wittgenstein published one year later), published in the appendix to the notebooks 1914-1916 (NB). In these texts Wittgenstein's basic insight into the independence and primacy of the meaning of a proposition over its truth-or-falsity is present from the beginning. The point of departure for this insight is the thesis about the bipolarity of propositions:

›To understand a proposition *p*, it is not enough to know that *p* implies 'p is true', but we must also know that  $\neg p$  implies 'p is false'. This shows the bipolarity of the proposition.

....

Every proposition is essentially true-false: to understand it we must know both what must be the case if it is true, and what must be the case if it is false. Thus the proposition has two *poles*, corresponding to the case of its truth and the case of its falsity. This we call the *sense* of the proposition. (NB 94, 98 f.)

Because Frege had conceived of propositions as a complex names of truth-values as their meaning ('the true', 'the false'), Wittgenstein saw the need to distinguish the 'meaning' of names (words) from the 'sense' of propositions. The distinguishing feature is bipolarity - names (words) are not bipolar. "Naming is similar to pointing." (NB 94) It is not yet 'saying that ...'. That is only possible with and in propositions, which "are always complex" (NB 99), always linkages of several words/signs:

›Names are dots, sentences arrows - they have meaning. The sense of a sentence is determined by the two

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36 Cp. TLP 5.4711: "To state the essence of the proposition (sc. the general propositional form – 5.471; my addition) is to state the essence of all description, that is, the essence of the world."

37 Paul Coffey: *The Science of Logic*, 1912. The review is reprinted with a contextualising commentary *Philosophical Occasions* 1912-1951. (PO, 1-3)



poles true and false. The form of a sentence is like a straight line that divides all points of a plane into right and left. The straight line does this of itself, the form of the proposition only by agreement. (NB 101 f.; cf. TLP 3.144)

Names (words) are essentially propositional elements; only with propositions something understandable, meaningful is said. This holds, after the bipolarity principle for the propositional conception of TLP as first principle, the second fundamental principle of propositional context, in which Wittgenstein, incorporating of Frege<sup>38</sup>, summarizes the documented provisions in the TLP (3.3): "Only the sentence has meaning; only in the context of the sentence does a name have meaning."

Now, in the postulatory conception of TLP, names are terminologically the constituents of elementary propositions. Every normal proposition is supposed to be a truth-function of elementary propositions and to be capable of being analysed as such. Wittgenstein assumes in TLP, as has already been pointed out in detail before, but which emerges from its text only in passing<sup>39</sup>, that the analysis of propositions into the sense-determining elementary propositions is already provided of in the thinking of the propositional sense - thus makes the assumption of a language-of-thought.<sup>40</sup> The assumption of this postulatory connection is explained by the remark (4.23): "The name occurs in the proposition only in the context of the elementary proposition." It occurs in normal propositions *like* in elementary ones - in immediate functional concatenation with the other constituents of the proposition - and it occurs in it only in the

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38 Frege: *The Foundations of Arithmetics*, Introduction (1934 edition: XXII) and § 60.

39 In TLP, it only follows from the difference in meaning of the apparently synonymous propositions 3.5 and 4 as well as from the contrast of 3.2 sqq. and 4.2 sqq., , where both times the concept of elementary proposition is treated, but one time under the title of thought (3 sqq.), the other time under the title of proposition (4 sqq.), and the analysis of setting propositions (5.54 ff.). The most important pre-TLP reference is 12.9.16, the most important immediately post-TLP is the explanatory letter to Russell of 19.8.19 on 'thoughts'. Retrospectively, there is much evidence, most revealingly BIB 71 and PI section 102: 'The strict and clear rules of logical sentence construction appear to us as something in the background, - hidden in the medium of understanding. I see them even now (though through a medium), since I understand the sign, mean something by it.' - Cp. my detailed defences of this interpretation in Lange 1989, chap. III: 'Thought sentences - the hidden psychologism of the conception of language', and in Lange 1996, 51-60.

40 Wittgenstein assumed exactly what a contemporary representative of a language-of-thought assumption says: "Thoughts cannot be construed as simply strings of words; they must be taken to have the structure of sentences under analysis." (Gilbert Harman: *Thought*, Princeton 1973, 67). LW retrospectively compared the assumption with the theory of the 'dynamic unconscious' in Sigmund Freud's metapsychology (Z 444 a): "We now have a theory; a 'dynamic' theory of the sentence, of language. It is, after all, the characteristic of such a theory that it looks at a particular, clearly illustrative, case and says: 'This shows how it behaves in general; this case is the archetype of all cases'. - 'Of course! That's how it must be,' we say, and are satisfied. We have arrived at a form of representation that makes sense to us. But it is as if we have now seen something that lies beneath the surface." The clear case of analysis that TLP so irresponsibly generalised a priori was Russell's 'theory of definite descriptions' (- even Wittgenstein frequently mistranslates 'definite descriptions' as 'Beschreibungen'. In German it has to be 'Kennzeichnungen'), whose "merit" is said to have been "to have shown that the apparent logical form of the proposition need not be its real one." (4.0031)

context of the elementary proposition, because the proposition is only 'meant' or 'understood' if it is already analysed by thinking the sense of the proposition (3.1).

The distinction between the sense of propositions and the meanings of words is in TLP not only motivated by logic-theory, but embedded in the implied constructive conception. Therefore, in TLP with the marginalizing of the *use* of the means of language (which occurs systematically only in the verbal-substantive "thinking" as the method of projection of the sensually perceptible sentence-signs - 3.11) also *explanation of meaning* plays no role for meanings. After all, as already discussed, it is explicitly denied that names can be introductively explained (3.263) as the fundamental independent<sup>41</sup> signs. Their possible and necessary circular *explanation*, however, is called 'elucidation', despite the stipulation that in order to understand the *propositions* that are supposed to be explanations, the understanding of the explained names/primitive signs must already be presupposed. Because the expressions that are fundamental to the later conception are thus already used in TLP, albeit in a factually depotentiating way, it could seem that the TLP conception is not so far removed from the later one when it says, for example:

›To recognize the symbol by the sign, one must pay attention to its meaningful use. (3.324)

(In philosophy, the question 'why do we actually use that word, that sentence' always leads to valuable insights).‹ (6.211 b)

*'Big Typescript' / Philosophical Grammar and Philosophical Investigations* TLP had combined an objectivism of logic as the 'scaffolding of the world' with an obscure psychologism or mentalism in the background, the language-of- thought assumption. In his transformed conception, he twice has briefly characterised the former as the 'mythology of symbolism' and the 'mythology of psychology' that we are always tempted to set up in philosophy (PR II.24 b, PG II.18 b):

›One is always tempted in philosophy to set up a mythology of symbolism or psychology; instead of simply saying what one knows. (Variant PB: what everybody knows and has to admit).‹

Wittgenstein does not explicitly explain what he wants to be understood by 'mythology', but one arrives at an insightful and applicable understanding when 'mythology' is explained as

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41 Names are independent (3.261) because they represent objects (3.22) The components of (simple) sentences stand "independently in signifying relations to the world" (5.5261). – Cp footnote 11 above.

'reasoning in the mode of narration/description of primordial events/origins'. Myth, as it were, always says: what happens has ever already happened, and it happens *because* it has always already happened. The 'because', the justification, makes every myth already a mytho-*logy in nuce*. To TLP's combination of logical objectivism and psychologism, this understanding is applicable thus: Logical objectivism is the 'mythology of symbolism' if it assumes, with the dogma of logical analysis, that every proposition must contain within itself everything that determines its sense, must therefore, for the sake of determinacy of sense, ever already be analysed as a truth-function of elementary propositions<sup>42</sup> that speakers and listeners of language unconsciously 'operate' in thinking the sense of the proposition and thus 'understand' or 'mean' the proposition in a sense-determined way. ('Thinking' is metaphysically misleadingly used in the TLP as a general term for 'understanding' and 'meaning', so that there is no need to treat either explicitly at all). And the psychologism of the language-of-thought assumption is the 'mythology of psychology' in which making oneself understood by propositions is made understandable (explained) by the psychological realisation of the structures of analysis of the proposition as the truth-function of elementary propositions. It is an explanatory theory analogous to the 'dynamic' theory of the unconscious in Freud's metapsychology (unconscious thoughts assumed to explain conscious failures) (Z 444 a).

LW's later approach breaks radically with the metaphor of surface and (explanatory) depth dimension that is constitutive of these theories. Late on, he expressed his fundamental premise quite simply: "We talk and act. This is already presupposed in everything I say." (RFM VI. 17 e, 321) And this everyday belief (which everyone knows and must admit) is to be understandable, or, if not, to be made understandable, in its own dimension. For "there is nothing hidden" (PG V. 63.c; PI § 435, a-b):

›How does thought do that, that it represents? - The answer might be, 'Do you really not know? You see it when you think.' After all, there is nothing hidden.

How does the sentence do that? It's not like there's anything hidden.<

In clarifying the misunderstandings about the propositional mode of representation of

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42 "Surely it is clear that the sentences which humanity uses exclusively, that these will have a meaning as they stand and do not wait for a future analysis to make sense of them. ... All I want, after all, is only the complete decomposition of my sense!!! In other words, the sentence must be completely articulated. Everything that its sense has in common with another sense must be contained separately in the sentence. ....Whenever the sense of the proposition is perfectly expressed in itself, the proposition is broken down into its simple components ..." (NB 17.6.15)

language, the basic descriptive presupposition of people's speech and action is also used to clarify 'understanding' and 'meaning', 'meaning' and 'sense', 'explanation of meaning' and 'rule', and many other terms important for the use of language, to the extent necessary to clear up the misunderstandings about them (the ›philosophical problems‹).

*Excursus on the changed conception of philosophy* Only with this move is Wittgenstein's philosophy also de facto what had been only proclaimed in the TLP (4.111-2), purely descriptive (PI §§ 124 a-c, 126):

›Philosophy must not touch the actual use of language in any way, so in the end it can only describe it. Because she can't justify it either.

She leaves everything as it is.

....

Philosophy simply exposes everything and explains and concludes nothing. - Since everything lies open, there is also nothing to explain. For we are not interested in what is hidden.

'Philosophy' could also be called that which is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.‹

It is not missing the point if, in a section intended to discuss the corrections of the notions of 'sense' and 'meaning', first the correction of philosophy's procedure is dealt with. For there is a need, for a reflexive conception of philosophy, to be able to give a consistent account of each of its clarifying steps at any time. According to its intention, TLP's conception of philosophy was already reflexive, while its practice was de facto theoretical-constructive and dogmatic.

The *Preface* (c-d) to TLP stated:

›The book wants ... to draw a boundary to thinking, or rather - not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to draw a boundary to thinking, we would have to be able to think both sides of this boundary (we would therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought).

So the boundary will only be able to be drawn in language and what lies beyond the boundary will simply be nonsense.‹

The bounds of sense must be given 'from within', in language, using language. LW explains that he wants to adhere to this when he discards the 'dogmatism' of his earlier approach in 1931 (WVC 182 f.):

›I wrote (sc. TLP 5.55; my addition): About the form of the elementary propositions one cannot give any indication, and that was also quite correct. ... But I did mean that one would be able to state the elementary propositions later on. It is only in the last few years that I have come to terms with this misconception. At that time I wrote in the manuscript of my book (not printed in the treatise - but cf. 6.1251; my addition): The solutions of philosophical questions must never be surprising. One cannot discover anything in philosophy. But I have not yet understood this clearly enough myself and have been lacking against it.

The misconception that I would like to oppose in this context is that we could come up with something that we don't see today, that we could find something completely new. That is a mistake. In truth, we already have everything, and we have it presently; we need not wait for anything. We are moving in the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and that grammar is already there. ...

.....

I once wrote (TLP 6.53; my addition): The only correct method of philosophizing would be to say nothing and leave it to the other to assert something. I now adhere to this.‹

The no longer dogmatic approach of philosophy moves in the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, which is already there. In LW's texts, leaving the assertion to the other, takes the form of commenting on and correcting the statements of an inner dialogue partner that express obvious (to be made) misunderstandings. The reflexivity of the procedure is expressed in the fact that for the conceptual clarifications 'the full language, not a merely preparatory one, must be used' (BT 72; cf. PG VI. 77 d, PU §120 a-e):

›Because when I talk about language - word, sentence, etc. - I have to talk the language of everyday life. - But is there any other?

Is this language too coarse, material, for what we want to say? (PU adds: *And how is another one formed?* )

And how strange that we can still /at all/ do something with ours.

That in explaining language (in our sense) / PU: That in my explanations, concerning language, / I must already use the full language (not, for instance, a preparatory, preliminary one), already shows that I can only say / put forward / external things about language.

Yes, but how then can these remarks satisfy us? - Well, your questions were already written in this language; had to be expressed in this language, if something was to be asked!

And your scruples are misconceptions.

Your questions are about words, so I have to talk about words.‹

*More on sense and meaning* The questions in connection with, among others, the words 'proposition' and 'language' refer back to the words 'sense' and 'meaning'. These are

equivalents for each other for the conceptual considerations as higher-order terms, and as such they keep contact with the problem of the relation of language (thought) and reality concerning the basis of the dissolution of the realism vs. idealism controversy. Wittgenstein records this in a short sequence of Chapter III of BT on the subject of 'Satz. Sinn des Satzes' (BT 63):

›Proposition' is obviously the heading of the grammar of propositions. But in one sense also the heading of grammar in general, thus equivalent to the words 'grammar' and 'language'.

This is what is meant by saying that there are surprises in the world, but not in grammar.

It seems to further complicate our question that the words 'world' and 'reality' are also equivalents of the word 'proposition'.<

Now these seem to be just as steep assertions as some of the postulates of TLP. What is adduced to make them plausible? LW tries to express two essential insights in these equivalences - the internal relation of language and world/reality, and what has been (could be) called the universality of language because of this internal relation. The internal relation of language/world leads to the conclusion that "it is after all ... ridiculous to want to delimit the world, or reality. To what then did one want to oppose it (?)" (BT 63; PB V. 47):

›Again and again it is the attempt to delimit and emphasize the world in language - but this is not possible. The self-evidence of the world expresses itself precisely in the fact that language only means it and can only mean it.

For, since language receives the nature of its meaning only from its meaning, from the world, no language is conceivable which does not represent this world.<

LW first became aware of this in realizing the ambiguity of propositions of the form 'this is A', from which the universality of language can be inferred already (PR I.6):

›If I explain the meaning of the word 'A' to a person by saying 'this is A' and pointing to something, this expression can be meant in two ways. Either it is itself already a proposition and can only be understood when the meaning of A is already known. I.e., I can only leave it to fate, if the other person understands the proposition in the way I mean it, or not. Or the sentence is a definition. For instance, I would have said to someone 'A is ill', but he would not know whom I meant by A, and now I pointed to a person and said 'this is A'. Now the expression is a definition, but this can only be understood if the nature of the object was already known by the grammatically understood sentence 'A is ill'. But this means that any way of making a language intelligible already presupposes a language. And the use of language in a

certain sense is not to be taught. I.e. not to be taught by language .... -  
I.e. nothing else than: I can't get out of the language with the language.<

The fact that the internal relation of language and world is and must be explained in terms of the fundamental descriptive fact of ostensive explicability of expressions is not external. For that it is through this that the world as a precondition of the sense (intelligibility) of language becomes clear, because an "internal relation ... exists only when its components are there" (BT 94; Vorl 52; B III, 1931). And independent of such paradigmatic examples, "general explanations of the world and language do not exist." (BT 66) So it is only with retention that I can say: The 'universality of language' as an essential means of expression and representation is what I call the fact that language can be used to explain its own expressions and forms, insofar as they can be explained at all and do not simply have to be learned (by observation, inference, and training), and in doing so "one (cannot) use language to get out of language." What formal semanticists such as Alfred Tarski have called the 'universality of language' - that normal language contains its own truth-predicate and is therefore inconsistent: against which the distinction between object- and meta-language, to which the truth-predicate is to be reserved, is supposed to provide a remedy<sup>43</sup> - is only a 'negative' consequence of the internal relation of language and world, whose positive explanation is the possibility of the 'self'-explanation of language in meaning-explanations of its elements. By virtue of this character of normal language, 'proposition', 'language', 'grammar', each in one of their multiple meanings connected by family resemblance, are headings for a philosophical grammar, and to that extent equivalents for each other.

Under this logical concept of language there are more specific ones, which become accessible when he states the "*correct use of the word 'language'*" (BT 64 f.):

›It means either the experiential fact that people talk (on a par *with that that dogs bark*), or it means: fixed system of understanding /.../ in the expressions 'the English language', 'German language', ... etc. 'Language' as a logical term could only be equivalent to 'sentence', and then be a / the / heading of a part of grammar.<

'Language' in the sense of the multiplicity of natural languages is a family resemblance concept, especially because their possibility of extension and modification belongs to them

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43 Wittgenstein, however, as already indicated, has the descriptive objection against the formal conception of language that formal semantics implies, that it is also only applicable to formal sign language, because normal language "is not (something) to which a structure is given, and which is then fitted to reality". (PG IV.46 c)

essentially (BT 65 f.):

›How did I come to the concept of 'language'? Only through the languages I have learned.

But they took me beyond themselves in a certain sense, because I would now be able to construct a new language<sup>44</sup>, e.g. to invent words. So this method of construction still belongs to the concept of language.

But only if I fix it in this way. Again and again my 'u.s.w.' (= etc.) has a limit.<

In relation to natural languages, philosophical clarification has to proceed descriptively, not explanatorily/justifyingly, because (BT 191):

›Could I not regard language as a social institution, subject to certain rules, because otherwise it would not be effective / ... / But here it lies: this latter / ... / I cannot say; a justification of the rules I cannot ... give. I could only describe them as a game that people play.<

If, on the other hand, it is said that a proposition is something only in a language, that to understand a sentence is to understand a language, then the logical headline expressions 'language', 'proposition', 'grammar' diverge in their meanings - language as the totality of the means of expression and representation becomes the family of language games, the uses of propositions become moves in these games, and the grammar of propositions, as the totality of the conditions of the meaning sense, is the totality of the rules which distinguish types of propositions and their uses from one another.

For clarification of the concepts of 'sense' and 'meaning', LW first sees the difficulty inherent in the grammatical character of words as nouns, that they seem to designate something objects (BT 13):

›The use of the nouns 'sense', 'meaning', 'conception' and other words tempts us to believe that this sense etc. is opposed to the sign in the same way as the word, the name, is opposed to the thing which is its bearer. So that one might say, "the arrow has a very definite meaning,' is meant in a very definite way, which I have only *faute de mieux* to express again by a sign." The opinion, the intention would be, as it were, his soul, which I would prefer to show directly, but to which, unfortunately, I can only point indirectly through his body.<

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44 In the TLP, Wittgenstein understood the first-level predicate calculus (without identity) as the deep structure of normal language that reveals its 'logical form'. Now it is an example of a constructed (and highly simplifying) language that can only be considered as a 'comparative object' (see below).



Against the misunderstanding (of the inner dialogue partner of the conceptual clarification of philosophy) formulated twice, however, it is pointing out a descriptive fact to assert:

›The answer to the question 'how is that intended' establishes the connection between two linguistic expressions /.../. So the question also asks about this connection.<

The question: 'How is this intended / to be understood?' asks for an explanation of meaning, which, given the premise 'we speak and act', is the proximate mode of action that becomes constitutive of meaning and sense alike. Both expressions are no longer systematically distributed between words and propositions (as in TLP 3.3), although Wittgenstein continues to speak predominantly of the sense of propositions and the meaning of words, but in doing so he is simply following the usage of ordinary language, not presupposing a systematic theory of propositions as in TLP, according to which they were essentially complex signs ('articulated' - 4.032). He remarks on this terminological shift that 'meaning' comes from 'interpret' (in the sense of 'show') (BT 27), but “there is no ostensive definition of *propositions*”. (BT 189) If the explanatory view of meaning and sense is expressed as a 'use' view, then the scopus is the defence against the representational misunderstanding of 'meaning' and 'sense' and the emphasis on the activity-character of using language (BT 37, cp. PI §§ 560; 81; 98):

›Grammar explains the meaning of words as far as it can be explained. And it is to be explained so far as it can be asked about; and it can be asked about so far as it is to be explained. The meaning is what we explain in the explanation of the meaning of a word.

The sense of a proposition is not pneumatic, but is that which comes in answer to the question of the explanation of the sense. And - or - the one sense differs from the other, as the explanation of the one differs from the explanation of the other.

The use of the phrase, that is its meaning.<

Explanations of meaning are used in everyday language only in case of (rather rare) misunderstandings ('that is not what I meant, but ...'; 'not like *that*, but ...'); philosophical clarification continues this practice 'systematically' and takes 'its light, i.e. its purpose' (PI § 109) from philosophical problems. Explanations of meaning are normative - they say how something *is to be understood* because they describe (in the case of given expressions) or

endow (in the case of the introduction of new expressions or the redefinition of old ones) an internal relation between two expressions of the language.

LW's redefinition of the concept of meaning for words also has a specific self-critical aspect. In its context, he introduces his reference to Augustine's account of his own learning of language, which then opens the PI and is generalised in it to the 'Augustinian picture of language' in order to encompass conceptions related to TLP as well (cf. BT 25-27; PG 19 a-d, 20 a):

›The concept of meaning, as I have adopted it in my philosophical discussions, derives from a primitive philosophy of language.

'Meaning' comes from 'interpret' (German: '*deuten*', which relates to *Bedeutung*'. My addition.)

Augustine, when he speaks of learning language, speaks only of how we attach names to things, or understand the names of things. Naming here seems to be the foundation and the be-all and end-all of language. Augustine does not speak of a difference in the kinds of words ..... (And Plato says that the sentence consists of nouns and tense words).

They describe the game more simply than it is.‹

But there is in 'our language' the 'calculation' which Augustine describes, as one among many others for which other descriptions and explanations of meaning are used.

The general character of explanations of meaning - normative uses of language articulating internal relations - is now also the systematic context in which Wittgenstein uses the expression 'rule' (in the normative sense of 'prescription', not in the empirical-descriptive sense of 'regularity'. But, of course, following a prescription several times generates a regularity.). Here again he is not dogmatic, but investigates the sense of 'rule', thereby also asking whether it can only be understood descriptively (BT 240 sqq.). Again, the point of distinction is that there is an internal relation between a rule in the normative sense and what counts as compliance with it, whereas there is the external relation of truth-or-falsity between the description of a regularity by means of the expression 'rule' and what is described:

›The rule is the fixing of the unit of measurement /... /, and the sentence of experience says how long an object is. (And here you can see how logical similes work, because the fixing of the unit of measurement is really a grammatical rule and the statement of a length in this unit of measurement is a sentence which makes use of the rule).‹

The conception of a rule of language as describing the factual use of language, which leads to rule-scepticism (Kripke 1982), does not take into account the internal connection between rule and its applications. In insisting on this and on the primacy of sense, it is expressed that one must *start* with the distinction between sense and nonsense: "Before it, nothing is possible. I cannot justify it." (BT 78, PG VI.81 c)

Grammar, as the epitome of the conditions of sense, of understandability, contains the rules for the use of words and/or sentences. Now Wittgenstein admits that language is only very marginally learned or even taught according to explicit rules and also that the consideration of language under the 'normative aspect' of its rules is a 'one-sided way of looking at it' (PG III.36 a-b, II.26 e, II.32.b):

›When we look at the real use of a word, we see something fluctuating.

In our reflections, we oppose this fluctuation with something more solid. Similar to painting a still image of the ever-changing (!) picture of a landscape.

We look at language *from the point of view of the game* according to fixed rules. We compare it to a game, measure it against him.

....

We look at games and language from the point of view of a game that proceeds according to rules. That is, we always *compare* language with such a process.

....

We are interested in language as a process according to explicit rules. For the philosophical problems are misunderstandings, which are to be eliminated by clarifying the rules according to which we want to use the words.

We look at language from a one-sided point of view.‹

The consideration under a normative aspect is methodological and thus itself normatively motivated - out of the interest in the solution of philosophical problems.<sup>45</sup> The philosophy-critical motivation of the application of the normative aspect is made even clearer by Wittgenstein in *The Blue Book*:

"What we have in mind when we speak of language as a symbol system in an exact calculus can be found in the natural sciences and in mathematics. Our ordinary use of language only rarely meets this standard.

Why then do we compare our use of words, when we philosophize, to something that takes place

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45 Friedrich Waismann speaks of the 'normative aspect' of the consideration of language in the book that emerged from his collaboration with Wittgenstein: *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie* (Stuttgart 1976, Engl. 1965; completed 1939), 196-200.

according to exact rules? The answer is that the puzzles we try to clear out of the way always arise precisely from this attitude toward language." (BIB 49)

Nevertheless, LW rightly insists on the descriptive character of philosophical clarifications, because even as normatively regulated they can shed light on normal language use by comparison with them as models, and thereby can also be 'just' (PU §§ 130-131):

›Our clear and simple language games are not preliminary studies for a future regulation of language, - as it were first approximations, without consideration of friction and air resistance. Rather, the language games stand there as *objects of comparison*, which, through similarity and dissimilarity, are to throw light on the relationships of our language.

...

Only in this way can we escape the injustice, or emptiness, of our assertions, by setting up the model for what it is, as an object of comparison - a standard, as it were; and not as a prejudice to which reality *must* conform. (The dogmatism into which we so easily fall when philosophizing).‹

The expression of the comparison of language with games according to explicit and fixed rules is LW's most famous terminological coinage - the expression 'language-game'. It is a word that Wittgenstein invented in view of to the extensibility of language. The logical basis of the coinage is that both source words express family resemblance concepts, accordingly the expression 'language-game' does so too. (The logical notion of 'family resemblance' is, after all, introduced in PI sections 65-67 with the example of 'game'; such notions are defined not by features for their instances that are shared throughout, but by "an intricate web of resemblances that overlap and intersect.") The term of language-game is intended to highlight three traits that uses of language share with 'games': Autonomy, rules, and interconnectedness with non-linguistic actions in a 'form of life'.<sup>46</sup> The picture of language as a family of language-games is the antithesis of the 'Augustinian picture of language' with the primitive name-object model of the meaning of words. The family-like character explains why Wittgenstein can give such heterogeneous examples of language-games (PI § 23) and also "call the whole: of language and of the activities with which it is interwoven, the 'language-game'" (PI § 7 d).

*Lessons* For Wittgenstein, as for Kant, the central task of philosophy in general was "the logical treatment of concepts" (CPR B 91/ A 66). His clarifications of language-related

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46 Cf. my explanations in Lange 1998 on sections 1-32 and 'b.' and the methodological remarks made there.

concepts, which I have presented, clarify the tools of this activity. If philosophy wants to return to its core business and learn from LW in the process, it must first recognise this core task of conceptual clarification as such again. The distinction between meaning and truth-or-falsity (fulfilment-or-non-fulfilment) is fundamental to this and unassailable as is the primacy of meaning - for something to be true-or-false it must first be understandable, meaningful. Likewise, it seems to me that the (normative) explanatory view of meaning and sense is incontestable because it applies descriptively to our normal linguistic practice. The integration of the instruments of clarification in the conception of language as a family of language-games, on the other hand, seems to me to be optional if the descriptive points underlying it are observed - that normal language is permeated not only by lexical but also by syntactic (and pragmatic) metaphoricity, and that logic cannot in this respect be brought to bear in a topic-neutral way. LW repeatedly makes the point with separate/individual examples, probably first with respect to expressions for generality: the form of expression ' $(\exists x).fx$ ' is "a sublimation of the form of expression of our language" (PG 203), and it is quite clear "that the grammar of this ' $(\exists x)$  etc.' is in many cases quite different from that in the primitive case, which serves as an archetype." (BT 322) In general, "The subject-predicate schema serves as a projection of innumerable different logical forms." (PG 205)<sup>47</sup>.

There is no need to talk about language-games, if only speech-range-specific logical differences are taken into account. The expression 'language-game' is only an aspect-illuminating metaphor, which one does not have to use. But then one has to consider the traits made salient by the metaphor in other descriptive ways. Wittgenstein wanted

›establish in our knowledge of the use of language an order: an order to a purpose; one of many possible orders; not *the* order. To this end we shall always *emphasize* distinctions which make our ordinary forms of language easy to overlook.‹ (PI § 132 a)

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47 The generalisation of these insights and the coining of the term 'syntactic metaphor' for them owe much to Hans Julius Schneider (*Phantasie und Kalkül*, Frankfurt am Main 1992, especially chap. V § 4). - An example of a pragmatic metaphor is the language-game of praying in relation to addressing people. For the addressing of God in prayer does not allow for a publicly audible answer. ("God cannot be heard talking to another, but only if you are the one being addressed". - This is a grammatical remark." LW: Z § 717).

## *Psychology I*

### *Thinking, understanding and meaning*

'Understanding' and 'meaning' are the two psychological expressions corresponding to hearing/reading and speaking/saying/writing, respectively, which are fundamental to the use of language. In TLP, LW had used both expressions only operationally (unreflectively)<sup>48</sup> and meant (wanted to express) by them what we mean by them in ordinary language and what he makes explicit in his transformed conception. Systematically, he had used 'thinking' and 'thought' as an umbrella term not differentiating between listener and speaker perspectives and, in investing the language-of-thought assumption, he had revised it constructively to a considerable extent compared to its manifold normal-language uses.

BT and PG, on the other hand, begin (as does implicitly PI: for language learning is, after all, learning to speak and to understand language) with the problem of understanding in the form of the question of what it means to understand a proposition, and whether it is still a proposition if one does not understand it.

LW insists - in accordance with his methodological insight that in order to clarify language one must already use the full language and not a merely provisional or preparatory one - first of all that 'understanding' and 'meaning', like all other terms used for clarification, not "metalogical", justifying logic: „'understanding', 'meaning' are not metalogical terms". (PG I. 8 a) In TLP, the logical structure of the world presupposed by the logic of language functions metalogically<sup>49</sup>, because metaphysically (BT 1):

›As there is no metaphysics, so there is no metalogic. The word 'understanding', the expression 'to understand a proposition', is also not metalogical, but an expression of language like any other.

We do not, therefore, deal with the understanding of the proposition in our considerations; for we ourselves must understand it, in order that it may be a proposition to us.

It would be strange that science and mathematics use the propositions but do not speak of their understanding.<

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48 'Understand': Preface; 3.263, 3.334, 4.003 ('understanding': 4.026, 4.062, 4.002, 4.411; 'meaning': 3.315, 4.062, 5.62, 6.123 (in the last two places the 'solipsist' and 'Russell' mean something)).

49 Cp. on 'metalogic' the article in the Wittgenstein-Lexikon Glock 2000. LW justifies that there is no metaphysics by saying that it is based on the blurring of the boundaries between conceptual and factual investigations (Z 458). Of course, like LW's objections to meta-disciplines in general, this is a major issue that can only be alluded to here.

Wittgenstein is dealing with 'meaning' and 'understanding' as terms to be clarified, but not in a metalogical understanding. They are not super-concepts of a super-order. (cf. PI § 97)

Systematically, the expression 'meaning' could be eliminated by 'wanting to say' (French : vouloir dire). In reference to this, therefore, LW mainly treats philosophical illusions (misunderstandings), and Chapter I of BT is consequently entitled 'Understanding, meaning, Drop out of our Consideration'. For this contemplation with a Kantian perspective is a logical treatment of concepts. Its first negative insight is that 'understanding' and 'meaning', insofar as they are relevant to the clarification (of the logic) of language, do not denote experiences. And insofar as they can denote mental experiences - which Wittgenstein does not deny, because the expressions are used colloquially 'amorphously' and 'ambiguously' (BT, chap. II, heading) - they are not relevant to the logical treatment of concepts. The most important, positive insight that LW's clarifications strive to promote is that 'understanding' and 'comprehension' are the correlates of explanations of meaning and do not denote a process (German: ›Vorgang‹) that accompanied the use of language. (Although such processes, e.g. aha/oh'-experiences, accompany the use of language and are also called 'understanding', they are logically irrelevant). 'Understanding' is an ability (disposition) comparable to 'being able to multiply' (PG I.11 e). (For 'meaning' it is correspondingly true that someone means / has meant something in *this way*, if he is willing to give the corresponding explanation of the meaning). And with this explanation of 'understanding' as an expression for an ability again is to be connected the negative insight that 'understanding' and 'meaning' cannot be a *tertium quid* that would have to be added for the language to function. For there is an internal relation between the meaning of an expression and the explanation of its meaning. If 'understanding' correlates essentially with 'explanation of meaning', then it too must stand in internal relations to 'meaning' and 'explanation of meaning'. Ergo it cannot be a *tertium quid*. For 'meaning', Wittgenstein makes this point quite succinctly: "You mean what you say." (BT 4) Or rather, one should add, what you are willing to explain when asked for an explanation.

LW makes these points according to his critical methodology mainly in the course of dissolving philosophical illusions and misunderstandings, among them very importantly especially those which he himself had been subject to. Thus, linked to the clarifications of 'understanding' is the critique of the language-of-thought assumption.

The dispositional understanding of language (analogous to being able to multiply) seems to require the 'presence' of the system of language in the understanding of language. In this sense,

LW in TLP thought conscious thinking (tracing the sense of a proposition to its analytic determinacy) as the presence of the calculus of truth-functions for analysing propositions into the elementary propositions constituting and determining their sense. (This would be a very bold interpretation in view of the text of TLP alone, but it emerges clearly from his subsequent self-critique). The positive insight is formulated thus (PG I.11 e):

›The understanding of language, of the game as it were, seems like a background on which the individual proposition first acquires meaning. - But this understanding, the knowledge of language, is not a state of consciousness that accompanies the propositions of language. Even if it had such a state in its wake. Rather, it is of the same kind as understanding, mastering a calculus, that is, like: *being able to multiply*.‹

The illusion against which this insight is directed is described thus (BIB 71; PG VII.104 a):

›If you are not clear about the nature of thought, belief, knowledge, and the like, substitute the expression of thought, etc., for thought. The difficulty which lies in this substitution, and at the same time its whole purpose, is this: The expression of a belief, thought, etc., is merely a proposition; - and the proposition has meaning only as a member in a system of language; as an expression in a calculus. Now we are tempted to imagine this calculus as the constant background, as it were, of every sentence we utter, and to think that in the mental action of thinking the whole calculus is present at once, though the sentence, as spoken or written, stands isolated. The mental act seems miraculously to accomplish what could not be accomplished by any manipulation with symbols.

....

The movement is like a key bit, whose individual serrations move levers of the soul in a certain way. The sentence plays, as it were, a theme (the thought) on the instrument of the soul. But why should I now assume, apart from the systematic play of words, a play of mental elements running parallel with it? It increases the language only by something of the same kind.‹

But if the proposition is the proposition only in the language system, what role does the system play in the meaning of the proposition if it is not a present constant background in the use of language? The answer LW gives may seem disappointing, but that is what accepting philosophical clarifications simply entails (PG VII.104 d):

›I said it was the system of language that makes the proposition a thought and makes it a thought to us. It is not said: it is the system of language which, when we use the proposition, makes it a thought to us, for the system is then not present and nothing at all is needed to make the proposition alive to us, since



the question of aliveness does not arise at all. If, on the other hand, we ask: 'why does not the proposition appear to us isolated and dead, namely, when we think about its essence, its meaning, the thought, etc.', we may say that we then move on in the system of language.<

An account of Wittgenstein's logical treatment of the concept of understanding would be incomplete, if it were limited to what has been said so far. The necessary addition can tie in with the aforementioned concession that we use 'understanding' ambiguously, as we do with 'experience' and other mental expressions. At the same time, the addition is suitable for correcting the narrowing understanding of LW as a philosopher of language not only methodologically (as before), but also with regard to a descriptive clarification in detail. Namely, by conceding that 'understanding' can also be used for an experience, LW becomes and makes us aware of the fact that experiences of understanding also frame the understanding of the linguistic. In PI, Wittgenstein has placed these uses in the context of his clarifications on aspect-seeing and separated them from the logically basic uses for the terms describing and making intelligible what is linguistic (meaning, Sinn, Verstehen, etc.), while conceding from the outset that the clarification of what is logically basic requires this addition. For the explanation of the meaning of a word as its use in language is intended from the outset to apply only to a large class of cases, not to all. (PI § 43) Wittgenstein calls the other cases: "((The meaning (-) a physiognomy.))" (PI § 568 b) Descriptively, it is elucidated under the title 'understanding under aspects' with respect to the linguistic (PPF §§ 260-303).

In BT, on the other hand, the cases, in which one must grant an experiential sense to 'understanding', are already the subject of ch. 2 of the book. This is why Wittgenstein contrasts understanding a sentence with what it means to 'understand a painted picture' (BT 8 a-c). If we see figures in such a (genre) painting as people, for example, despite the smallness of their representation, this is "quite analogous to seeing the picture / drawing / as a three-dimensional entity." Wittgenstein also has already his solution against reductionist explanations of aspect-seeing:

›We cannot here say we always see the same thing, and afterwards conceive it once as the one (sc. a combination of strokes or spots of colour) and once as the other (sc. as the intended representation of a sight), but we see each time something different.<

That the latter is the case is shown by our (also and above all) linguistic reactions, which do not have to differ from those to real scenes (when describing a market hustle and bustle we say,

for example, 'there are farmers at the market selling their products'). The fact that we react in this way indicates that such pictorial representations are familiar to us, that we have 'assimilated' them and that a *constant* aspect shapes our perception. A constant aspect only becomes salient when the aspects change, for example when a picture initially appears to us as a combination of colour spots and we have to make an effort to be able to recognise what is depicted in it. When we have succeeded, the aspect of the picture has changed. This is why LW first explained the phenomenon in PI in terms of simple psychological test pictures such as the rabbit-duck head by the psychologist Jastrow. That 'perceiving' and 'seeing-as' express different concepts is shown by the "categorical difference of the two 'objects' of seeing" (PPF § 111), which in perceiving is an object or scene, but in seeing-as "an internal relation between it and other objects" (e.g. seeing a resemblance in a face). (PPF § 247)

Regarding the notion of 'aspect blindness', Wittgenstein remarks: "The importance of this notion lies in the connection between the notions of 'seeing the aspect' and 'experiencing the meaning of a word'." (PPF § 261) He does not yet have this term in BT, but the relevance of his comparison between understanding a sentence and understanding a picture is the same: he points out that a steady aspect is also important for understanding the linguistic - one must, in order to understand something uttered, conceive of it as meaningful, as giving something to be understood. This is shown by examples where this conception causes us difficulties – for instance, when a sentence is written in a cipher which we first have to decipher (BT 6-7). And therefore it is true that we see / understand something different every time also for sentences / propositions (BT 9):

›And so also when we read a sentence with understanding and without understanding. (Remember how it is when one reads a sentence with wrong emphasis, therefore does not understand it and now all of a sudden comes up with how to read it).

(Reading a skiddish script, you can see what it means to see something in the given image).‹

For those cases in which we must first make an effort to find the intended aspect, the description that one is inclined to give of 'meaning' is quite applicable, if one is caught up in the illusion that it is an intangible psychic or mental act that first revives or animates the dead sign into a meaningful symbol (BT 7):

›I'm not just saying this, I mean something by it'. - If you think about what is going on when we *mean*

words (and not just say them), we feel as if something is then coupled with these words, whereas otherwise they ran empty. - As if they intervened in us, as it were.

I understand the command as a command, i.e., I not only see this structure of sounds and strokes in it, but it has - so to speak - an influence on me. I react differently to a command (even before I obey it) than, for example, to a message or a question.

The sentence, when I understand it, takes on depth for me.

I say: Understanding consists in having a certain *experience*.

But the fact that this experience is the understanding of *that - what I understand* - is that this experience is part of my *language*.

So LW does not deny that there can be an experience linked to the understanding of a sentence, but the What of understanding is to be elucidated on its own by the meagre logical considerations summed up in 'to understand a sentence is to understand a language'. That it can be so, not that it must be, is simply another aspect of the it-happens-to-us (in German: Widerfahrnis-) character of interaction with language (BT 6):

›If someone says something to me and I understand it, this happens to me just as much as if I hear what he says. / .../

And here understanding is the phenomenon that occurs when I hear a German sentence, and which distinguishes this hearing from hearing a sentence in a language I am not familiar with.

To mean, on the other hand, seems to concern the active use of language. To mean seems to be the activity (of the mind, of the soul) which is required for the speaking (writing) use of language. But to mean (wanting to say) this would betray an illusion of the verbum (activity-word), according to which every verb denotes an activity or action. But it can be said that meaning is connected with the active use of language. If it is paraphrased, using the French usage as a reference, as 'wanting to say', 'wanting to give to understand', the connection with the use of language becomes clear through wanting to communicate, wanting to express oneself. And just as the wanting itself is only metaphorically (grammatically) the activity of will, so is meaning in relation to saying. When someone speaks seriously, he means what he says (wants to say what he says).

In BT, LW always treats questions and misunderstandings concerning meaning in

connection with understanding; he often switches directly from one to the other in remarks. This reflects the fact that in TLP he did not differentiate between the speaker's and the listener's perspective under thinking as a meaning-giving, because determining (*bestimmt machender*) activity. Thinking, too, is not an operation of the analytic language of thought during the utterance of an unanalysed sentence, nor is it a process that accompanies saying (just as little as understanding is a process that accompanies hearing).

However, from the outset LW also becomes aware that meaning brings with it its own illusions. Thus the statement in past tense 'I meant him / that-and-that' seems to suggest more strongly than 'I understood' that a certain process had taken place at a previous point in the time of meaning ( BT 155; PG V.62 d):

›But if I now asked him, 'As you pronounced the word, what did you mean?' - If he answers me: 'I meant (sc. with >chess<) the game that we played so often etc. etc.', then I know that this explanation had in no way been in his mind when he used the word, and that his answer does not answer my question in the sense that it tells me what, as it were, 'went on / happened in him' when he said this word.

But with the word 'Napoleon', when you pronounce it, you are designating that very person'. - How, then, in your opinion, does this act of designating go on? Momentarily? Or does it take time?' - 'Yes, but if you are asked: >did you mean the man who won the battle of Austerlitz<, you will say: 'yes'. So you meant this man when *you uttered the sentence!*' - But probably only in the sense in which I also knew at that time that  $6 \times 6 = 36$ .

The answer 'I meant the victor of Austerlitz' is a new step in our calculation. What is deceptive about it is the past form, which seems to give a description of what was going on 'in me' while it was being uttered.<

Nevertheless, in 'that shall be he' ('he is meant') "is the whole problem of representation" (PG 62 a; BT 12 f.):

›How do I know he means the painting to be a portrait of N?

Well, like by saying it, or writing it underneath.

What connection does the portrait of N have with him (sc. N)? For example, that the name underneath is the one with which he is addressed.

The difficulty is to see clearly the grammar of the word 'mean'. But the way to do this is only through the answer to the question 'what is the criterion for meaning something like this' and what is the nature of the expression that this 'like this' represents. The answer to the question 'how is this meant' establishes the

connection between two linguistic expressions / ... /. So the question also asks about this connection.<

In the case of a pictorial representation, the question 'who is meant by this' establishes a link between two modes of representation.

In the course of extending his reflections into the more detailed clarification of the psychological vocabulary even beyond the expressions 'understand' and 'mean' most closely associated with the use of language, LW came to see that the illusions associated with meaning are inevitably linked to the grammar of psychological language (PI §§ 357- 358):

›We don't say a dog *could possibly be* talking to itself. Is that because we know his soul so well? Well, you could say that when you see the behavior of the living being, you see its soul. - But do I also say of myself, I speak to myself because I behave in such and such a way? - I don't say it with respect to the observation of my behavior. But it only makes sense because I behave in such a way. - So it doesn't make sense because I *mean* it?

But is it not our meaning that gives sense to the sentence? (And of course this includes: meaningless series of words cannot be meant.) And meaning is something in the spiritual realm. But it is also something private!

It is the intangible something; comparable only to consciousness itself.

How could one find that ridiculous! It is, as it were, a dream of our language.<

LW's clarifications of the obvious misunderstandings of psychological vocabulary can help separate the day's residue in the dream of language from the fictions of its processing. With this, above all, he wages his "battle against the bewitchment of our minds by the means of our language." The deceptions he undertakes to expose and dissolve are "grammatical deceptions," "grammatical fiction(s)." (PI §§ 109, 110, 307) And the central fiction and deception associated with the use of psychological expressions is that of a 'private' interior to which only the speaker has access.

To show that 'meaning' does not take place in such a 'private' space is, as it were, the first step in an extended campaign. It does not take place in 'private' space because it is only possible in a language, but language is something intersubjectively public (since the meanings of its expressions are constituted by explanations and explanations must be accessible if expressions are not understood) (BT 4, cf. PI §§ 503-4; PI note at § 39):

›But if one says 'how shall I know what he means, I only see his signs', I say: 'how shall *he* know what he means, he also only has his signs'.

How does it happen: to *mean* the words '*That* is blue' once as a statement about the object to which one points - once as an explanation of the word 'blue'? In the second case, then, one actually means '*That* is called >blue<' - So can one mean the word 'is' once as 'is', and the word 'blue' as '>blue<'? And another time the 'is' really as 'is'?

It can also happen that someone draws a word explanation from what was meant as a communication.

[...]

Can I mean by the word 'bububu' 'If it does not rain, I will go for a walk'? - Only in a language can I mean something by something. This clearly shows that the grammar of 'mean' is not similar to that of the expression 'imagine something' and the like.<

For the difficulties of taking up the misunderstanding of being as 'intentional experience', LW even deviates once - and without any systematic claim - from his break with the picture of surface structure and depth of being from TLP (PI section 664):

›One could distinguish a 'surface grammar' from a 'deep grammar' in the use of a word. That which immediately impresses itself on us in the use of a word is its mode of use in the *sentence structure*, that part of its use - one might say - which one can grasp with the ear. - And now compare the deep grammar, of the word 'meinen' [mean] for instance, with what its surface grammar would lead us to suppose. No wonder if one finds it difficult to know one's way around.<

This makes no systematic claim, for it reads 'one could', not 'one must'. What is not obvious in the sentence structure of propositions with 'meinen (mean)', in which it seems to be a transitive verb like 'zielen (aim at)', is its semantic function. But this is not something hidden in a depth to be uncovered, but "must show itself in the course of the calculus." Nothing is hidden, "we see, after all, the whole sentence!" (PI § 559) Only the sentence is not conceivable (intelligible) in isolation, but belongs with other sentences and non-linguistic actions in language-games, in the wider context of which (context) the function of the word 'mean' and of phrases such as 'I meant ...' also becomes clear. In them a speaker gives something to understand *about himself*, what he wants to talk about or what he has wanted to say. And in this, 'meaning' is less related to 'aiming at' than to 'go towards someone/something'. And despite this kinship, it is not a 'mental activity'<sup>50</sup>, that is, "a kind of mental pointing, indicating"

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50 Although related to an activity rather than an event/experience - cf. PG VII.107 b, f-h (156 f.): "not something that ...would happen to us (...) but what we do. ... - ...We want to say: 'When we mean, here is no dead image (of

(Z 12). To say so would be "foolish": "because it would encourage a false idea of the function of the word." (Z 20; Z 24):

›Instead of 'I meant *him*' one can also say 'I spoke of *him*'. And how does one do that: speak of *him* with those words? Why does it sound wrong to say 'I spoke of him *by* pointing to him in the words'?

'Meaning him' means something like: talking about him. Not: to point to him. And when I speak of him, there is certainly a connection between my speech and him, but this connection consists in the application of speech, not in an act of pointing. Pointing is itself only a sign, and it can regulate the application of sentences in the language game, that is, indicate what is meant.‹

In order to be clear about 'meaning', it is necessary to describe the language-game with the word and to avoid the fundamental error of "saying that meaning consists in something." (Z 16) It consists only in what the description of the language-game shows.

## *Psychology II*

### *Thought, intention, expectation, desire - The solution of the riddle of intentionality*

'Meaning' and 'understanding' are psychological expressions rendering linguistic action itself intelligible. LW's campaign to dissolve our language's dream of a privately self-contained psychological interior starts from them and then turns to the expression 'thinking' itself, which is developmentally in the background of 'understanding' and 'meaning' because of the distinction not made in TLP between speaker and hearer perspectives - in both the sense of the proposition is 'thinking' by operating the calculus of truth-functions to secure the determinacy of the sense of the proposition. This use of 'thinking' is a constructive distortion of our normal usage.

The operation of the calculus of truth functions as thinking of the proposition is, as it were, the operation of a logical mechanism. Wittgenstein criticises this idea at first (BT 211):

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whatever kind), but it is as if we were going towards someone. We are going towards what is meant.' (-) But here we falsely construct an opposition between experience (sc. of meaning) and something else, as if experience were that when one sits quietly and lets the images pass by.  
'When one means, one means oneself'; thus one moves oneself. One rushes forward oneself and cannot also observe the rush forward. Certainly not. Yes, meaning is like walking towards someone.“

›One is tempted (by the misleading grammar) to ask: how does one think the proposition p, how does one expect that-and-that to come to pass (how does one do that [?]). And in this false question lies probably the whole difficulty in nuce.

'How does thought work, how does it make use of its expression?' - this is /sounds/ analogous to *the question*: 'how does the pattern loom work, how does it make use of the cards?'

The feeling is that with the sentence 'I believe that p is the case' the process of believing is not described (that only the cards of the loom are given and everything else is only implied). That one could replace the description 'I believe p' by the description of a mechanism, wherein then p, i.e. *now* the sequence of words 'p', would occur like the cards of a loom only as a constituent. But here is the mistake: whatever this description contained would be worthless to us, except just the sentence p *with its grammar*. It is quasi the actual mechanism, in which /... / is embedded.‹

The grammar concerning thinking leads astray, as far as expressions like 'I think so-and-so, by ...(assuming, ....., and therefore concluding....)' are possible, which let 'thinking' appear as an activity using certain, and therefore possible alternative means. Implicit in this would then be a double-process conception, thinking itself and the process of using the means (of its expression). We would then have to discover or explore the process of thinking itself. This notion is the target of LW's clarifications (BT 221-2):

›[Thinking is not to be compared with the activity of a mechanism which we see from the outside, but into whose interior we must first penetrate].

....

The thought is essentially that which is expressed by a proposition, where 'expressed' does not mean 'caused'. A cold is caused by a cold bath, but not 'expressed' by a cold bath.

One does not have the thought and *beside it the language*. - It is not, then, that one has the signs for the other, but a mute thought for oneself. It is a gaseous or ethereal thought, as it were, in contrast to visible, audible symbols.

So one could say that there is nothing essentially private about the *thought* - anyone can look into it.‹

The essentiality of the expression for thought [the internal relation between a thought and (its) expression] became clear to LW in his second phase when confronting Frege's critique of the formalistic conception of arithmetic (WVC 150):

›For Frege there is the alternative: a sign either has a meaning, i.e. it represents an object - ... - or it is only the figure painted with ink on the paper.



But this alternative does not rightly exist. There is, as the game of chess already shows, something third: in the game of chess the pawn has neither *a* meaning in the sense that it represents something, that it is a sign of something, nor is it merely the figure carved out of wood that is pushed around on a wooden board. What the pawn is is determined by the rules of chess.

This example shows that we must not say: a sign is either sign of something, or it is only the sensuously perceptible entity. So something about formalism is justified, and Frege did not see this right core.

The 'meaning' of the pawn is, if you like, the totality of the rules that apply to it. And so we can also say: the meaning of a numeral is the totality of the rules that apply to the same.<

LW's impressive willingness to reconsider clarifications once they have been reached is documented by the remark (BT 225). "Am I actually not playing the game of chess itself after all since the pieces could be <sup>?</sup> also different?!" But the exclamation mark after the question mark suggests a rhetorical question: I play the game of chess itself, whatever expressions of its rules (e.g. written notations of the game positions) or pieces I use, but I must use some. Comparison with the game of chess set the language-game terminology on its way, because the question what is a word is analogous to the question what is a chess piece (BT 263):

›Different types of chess pieces like bishop, ram, etc. correspond to different types of words.

I come here to that method of explaining signs which Frege made such fun of. For one could explain the words 'Knight', 'Bishop', etc., by giving the rules which deal with these figures.<

The rejection of the mechanism analogy for thinking hits at the substance of the language-of-thought assumption, the emphasis on the essentiality of its expression for thought a (semantic) version of the double-process view. Both movements of thought provide ammunition for the critique of much philosophical psychology today oriented to electronic computers and their programming, and of *language-of-thought* hypotheses in general. The critique of 'essential privacy' and the discussion of whether there are reasons for thinking at all strike at misunderstandings that are not only native to philosophising but also characterise everyday understanding.

The assumption of 'essential' privacy' is expressed, for example, colloquially in the often-heard remark: 'One can never really know what is ›going on‹ in oneself'. To that one can respond with LW: one can know it, if he (sincerely) tells one, avows it. And therein the sense of privacy of the interior is already touched, which actually exists. The other does not have to

answer the question 'what do you really think?' at all, does not have to express himself, can keep it 'to himself'. And he doesn't have to be truthful. This places psychological utterances in 1st person under peculiar evidential conditions that LW formulated nowhere with such conciseness before the PI (PPF § 319):

›For the truth of the *confession*, I would have thought such and such, the criteria are not those of the truthful *description* of an event. And the importance of the true confession does not lie in the fact that it accurately describes any event with certainty. It lies rather in the special consequences that can be drawn from a confession whose truth is guaranteed by the special criteria of *truthfulness*.‹

LW writes here of a 'confession' (which is why his English commentators speak of 'avowal'), but for utterances with psychological predicates in 1st person present tense in general, the expression 'Bekundung' ('exhibition') is preferable in German (English). Exhibitions, unlike utterances with other 1st person predicates that are amenable to direct truth-checking, are only indirectly linked to the true-false games, through the special criteria of truthfulness. The fact that I'm 5'7" is not an avowal. I, too, only know that by virtue of having been measured, and someone else who thought I was taller/smaller could verify it by using the objective process of measuring length. That I feel good/bad is an exhibition that only my truthfulness can vouch for.

Truthfulness is a disposition, dispositions cannot be proved in a single case, it requires several (and the question 'how many?' is meaningless, does not allow an intelligible answer - cf. PI I, § 145 b). The criteria of truthfulness therefore lie in what lawyers call implied conduct (LW would prefer 'demeanour'). Also, what an avowal is about is revealed in the further course of the language-game (calculus). And for the avower himself applies, what I have already indicated (PI § 357):

›I do not say it from the observation of my behaviour. But it only makes sense because I behave in this way" - in the case of the avowal, I behave in a way that is compatible with what is avowed.‹

The elucidation of the descriptively redeemable sense of privacy of the psychic interior - it does not have to be expressed, it can be kept 'to oneself' - now requires a critique of the also colloquial idea that thinking takes place 'in the head' ('in the brain') (BT 220-1):

›One of the most dangerous ideas, oddly enough, is that we think with our heads, or in our heads.

The idea of a process in the head, in the totally enclosed space, *gives thinking* something occult.<

Actually, if thinking is said to happen in the head, this only means that the head has to do with it. But when you do something in writing, you do not do it without thinking ('thoughtlessly'), and then 'you think with the pen on the paper' is as a "location" for thinking "at least as good as the first". Connectable to the notion of 'thinking in one's head' is that of "a machine process going on in a closed space" (as in the language-of-thought assumption). But not only this,

›Already the term 'activity' for thinking is misleading in one way. We say: talking is an activity of our mouth. For we see our mouth moving and feel it, etc., when we do this. In ... / this / sense one cannot say that thinking is an activity of our brain.

....

To say that thinking is just an activity of the mind, like speaking of the mouth, is a travesty (*of truth*). We use an image when we speak of the activity of the spirit.

....

The phrase 'that something is going on in our mind' is meant to imply, ... , that it is not localizable in physical space. Stomach pains are not said to go on in our mind, although the physical stomach is not the immediate place of the pains, in the sense that it is the place of digestion.<

We would probably, if we thought carefully, also not say that speaking is an activity of the mouth, but of the person who inevitably moves his mouth when speaking. But LW's clarifying contrasts are not essentially affected by this. The notion of 'thinking in the head' misunderstands the psychic interior (which is characterised by concealment and concealability) *spatially* analogous to the spatial localisation of the brain in the skull. This misunderstanding is the basis of all alleged results of brain research that believe to be able to draw psychological conclusions from image-giving procedures for brain processes. It is based on a grammatical fiction woven from the image 'in the head', the 'activity' of thinking (with the option of machine analogy) and the illusion of an essential seclusion ('privacy') of thinking.

More than these critical clarifications, Wittgenstein's reflections on 'reasons' (German: Gründe) for thinking at all have descriptive and methodically self-reflexive meaning. As an example of thinking, Wittgenstein takes the calculation of wall thicknesses for boilers (BT 227, 231; cf. PU § 466):

›What is man thinking for? What is it good for? Why does he calculate boilers and not leave it to

chance, .... / how strong the wall of the boiler becomes /? After all, it is only a fact of experience that boilers calculated in this way did not ... / explode / so often. But just as he would do anything rather than put his hand into the fire that used to burn him, so he will do anything rather than not calculate the boiler. But since we are not interested in causes, we can only say: men do indeed think: they proceed in this way, for example, when they build a boiler. Now can a boiler thus made not explode? Oh yes. -

....

'But you also believe that more boilers would explode / ... / if the boilers were not charged.' 'Yes, I believe it; - but what does that mean?' Does it follow that there will be fewer? And what is the basis of this belief?<

That man thinks at all, no reason can be given for it, and this is one of the reasons why philosophical clarification must remain purely descriptive (BT 228 f.):

›I calculate *this way* because I can't calculate any other way. (I believe *this* because I cannot believe otherwise).

No / ... / reason can be given for what to think.

Unless a reason of the nature of that for which one should eat.

One can reason one thought from others, but not reasoning. This, I believe, is what makes our inquiry purely descriptive.<

Just as the rules of grammar cannot be justified insofar as grammar is autonomous, so justifications in philosophical considerations always reach an end: "We expect *this and* are surprised by *that*; but the chain of reasons has an end." (PU §§ 326, 472-4; BT 228):

›The nature of belief in the uniformity of events is perhaps clearest in the case where we feel fear of the expected. Nothing could induce me to put my hand to the flame, - though, after all, I have *only* burned myself in the *past*.

The belief that the fire will burn me is of the kind of fear that it will burn me.

That the fire will burn me if I put my hand in: that is certainty.

I.e., that will see what certainty means. (Not only what the word 'certainty' means, but what it is all about).<

A final complex related to 'thinking' spills touches the topic of 'intention/intentionality', to which I now turn.

LW several times (e.g. BT 217, PI § 518) quotes a short bit from Plato's *Theaetetus* :

›Socrates to Theaitetus: 'And he who imagines should not imagine something?'

Th.: 'Necessary'.

Sok.: 'And he who imagines something, nothing real?'

Th.: 'So it seems'.(189 a)‹

In PI, Wittgenstein deals with this appearance of reasoning according to one of his methodological maxims: "to pass from a non-obvious nonsense to an obvious one" (PI § 464, cf. § 524) by adding:

›And who paints, should not paint something - and who paints something, nothing real? - Yes, what is the object of painting: the image of man (for example) or the man whom the picture represents?‹

Of course, whoever paints or imagines something does not have to paint (German: ›darstellen‹) anything real: for 'imagine' explains itself as 'representation in a medium of representation' and in the medium of representation pictures and scenes can be *imagined* - cf. PI § 397). The painted image of a human being can be a portrait (and then represents a particular human being) or a genre painting (in which case its subject is 'the image of man'). (cf. PI § 522) But the brief dismissal of Theaitetus' hesitant conclusion obscures, how much and how fundamentally the riddle of intentionality, to which the dialogue alludes, troubled Wittgenstein to its grammatical resolution.

The picture theory in TLP was his first attempt at solving this puzzle, which can be formulated thus: How can one think what is not the case? (cp. PI § 95) For if something is not the case, it does not exist, is nothing. But to think nothing seems, after all, to be the same as not to think at all. So the utterance of a no(thing) thought would be nonsense.

It is clear, that this riddle is answered in general by the basic distinction of sense and truth-or-falsity - what is thought, is, where appropriate, reasonable, has (a) sense. Something real is what is thought only if the proposition expressing the sense is true. But in TLP, the answer is presented in the form of an elaborate, explanatory theory of the representational performance of propositions. In the framework of the descriptive philosophy conception combined with the view of the autonomy of grammar, there can be no such explanatory theory of the proposition.

So LW had to abandon the picture theory of the sentence and transform it into a descriptively redeemable conception. To understand the movement of thought, one must first look at the appearance of the explanatoriness of the picture theory of the proposition and the resolution of the riddle of intentionality within its framework.

A proposition is essentially true-or-false for TLP, it is bipolar. (Bipolarity principle) At the same time it is essentially complex, a structured linking of words (names), and words have meaning only in the sentence context. (Propositional context principle) Because the proposition must also already contain in itself everything that constitutes its meaning (because the propositional context principle is understood as both a necessary and already sufficient condition for word meaning), the meaning of the sentence must be determined. The "demand of determinacy of sense" (3.23) requires simple signs that cannot be further analysed, thus leading to the demand of analysing every normal sentence into a truth function of elementary sentences in which only such simple signs (primitive signs or ›names‹) occur. And this demand is, as shown, even topped by the language-of-thought assumption that such a logical analysis is already operated in the 'thinking' of the sense of the sentence (is unconsciously available). This justified in retrospect talk of the ›dynamic theory of the proposition‹ and the implied comparison to Freud's Unconscious (Z 444).

Within the framework of this conception, the riddle of intentionality is solved this way: a sense is thought or expressed (asserted) with a proposition, which, because nothing has yet been determined about its truth or falsity, is nothing real, but represents (a) possibility(-ies). But the elements of the sense (of the propositions - in analysis) already refer to the world/reality by virtue of the double-sense relation of representation/meaning of names, so that the sense is not nothing, not nonsense, but a possibility of how objects relate to each other in a state of affairs, which can be realised (true) or not (false).

This theory has the appearance to be explanatory because it shows in a sequence of steps how something complex (the proposition and its meaning) can be traced back to something elementary (the names and their double-sense relation to their objects, thus to reality/the world). But the appearance is either false or nonsensical. It is false, insofar as LW already assumes an internal relation to reality for the proposition (its form of representation) and the tracing back of this internal relation to the internal relation of names to their objects does not really bring him further, but only illuminates further aspects of the internal relation (for the words are supposed to belong essentially to propositions by virtue of the propositional context

principle). The appearance to be explanatory is nonsensical when the relation of the proposition to fact is explicated as a relation between facts (picture fact - cf. 2.1, 2.141 - and, in the case of the truth of the proposition, represented fact). For for this explication the question arises: why should the picture be the picture of the fact and not vice versa (also) the fact the picture of the picture. (Isomorphism is direction-invariant.) In the TLP conception, LW has obscured the illusory character of an explanatory power of his theory by metaphysical assumptions that function as external anchoring points to guarantee sense and meaning: The thinking of the proposition's sense as a projection of the sentential sign, on the one hand (3.12); the forms of entities that the names were supposed to absorb into language, on the other (this was, after all, his explanation of the metaphorical information that the sentence reaches with its sense all the way to reality - 2.1511: "that the forms of the entities are containing in the form of the proposition which is about these entities"<sup>51</sup>). Metaphysical assumptions, however, are not really explanatory.

Thinking the proposition's sense and form of objects together guarantee in the TLP what LW retrospectively called the 'harmony between thought and reality'. The framework of his self-critically transformed conception gives the remark (PG VIII.112 e; Z 55): "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of language."

One example, in which Wittgenstein explains the changed conception several times, keeps close contact with the earlier theory about the name/object relation and the transformation of the apparently 'eternal', 'indestructible' objects as elements of the 'substance of the world' - in fact, Wittgenstein called the simple objects only "the solid, the existing" (2.027) - into paradigms to which expressions for perceptibles are calibrated in ostensive explanations of meaning (PG IX.113 b; PI § 429):

›The harmony of thought and reality lies in the fact that if I falsely say that something is red, it is not red after all. And if I want to explain to someone the word 'red' in the sentence 'That is not red', I point to something red.‹

The colour expression 'red' is ostensibly explained (explainable) by a colour table as paradigm. If an utterance of the proposition 'That is red' is false, one can convince oneself of it by a perceptual test, by comparing the colour of the object of the utterance ('That') with that of

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51 'Some Remarks on Logical Form' (1929), PO 34.

the paradigm and finding it non-matching - it does not look like the pattern. In any case, if the pattern defines 'red', then 'That' is not red, and to the extent that its colour is only negatively determined, all other colour possibilities are left open. And complementarily: in the word-explanation on the basis of the sentence 'That is not red' the perceptual test again has to compare 'That' with the pattern given at the same time and to find a non-match. (In this case a meaning-explanation for the actual, given colour could still be given). In any case, the explanations of meaning *establish* the internal relations (in the example between paradigms and colour-words), by the use of which the harmony between thought/sentence and reality alone is made possible. Instead of basing the harmony between language and reality on a metaphysical 'logical structure of the world', as in TLP, it is now based on rule-governed action in and with language. For determining truth or falsity (fulfilment or non-fulfilment), the rules are presupposed as explanations of meaning, because they represent the conditions of sense, of intelligibility, and sense is presupposed by truth-or-falsity.

So, too, in more complex cases than expressions for perceptual qualities. For these, too, ostensive explanations institute internal relations between paradigms (elements of reality) and expressions. In the case of intentional psychological verbs such as 'wishing that p', 'expecting that p', 'intending that p', the internal relations that foundational explanations of meaning seem to move within (word-)language only. (Wittgenstein favours the misunderstanding and draws the unjustified accusation of a language-idealism by beautiful formulations like: "Expectation and fulfilment make contact in language." PI § 445)

LW's proposition about harmony, which, like everything metaphysical, can be found in the grammar of language, is with him not a heading, as it were, but a conclusion from examples (PG VIII.112 d):

›'Surely the proposition determines in advance what will make it true'. Certainly, the proposition 'p' determines that p must be the case to make it true; and that is:  
 (the proposition p) = (the proposition that the fact p makes true). And the proposition that the desire that p may be the case is satisfied by the event p says nothing; except as a rule of signs:  
 (the desire that p may be the case) = (the desire that is satisfied by the event p)

Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of language.<



The order of the proposition commenting on the first (quoted) sentence shows at the same time that the appearance that the internal relations constitutive of intentional verbs in the explanations of their meaning 'moved only within word-language' needs qualification. Only linguistic expressions are used to express the internal relation in the sign rule, but one of the two equated expressions - the proposition ('p') quoted - functions in the formulation as a *linguistic* paradigm (cf. PI § 16) analogous to the colour spot in the ostensive explanation of a colour expression. The logical connection constitutive of the harmony of proposition and reality (fact) is given by the equivalences  $\text{'p' = p is true}$  and (because of the logical reflexivity of the equivalence)  $\text{'p is true' = p}$ . In the respective quoted expressions ('p', 'p is true') they act as paradigms; in the unquoted occurrences they are *used*, the meaning is fixed. Now the proposition extends to reality no longer as in the TLP (2.151 ff.), because its last elements, the names, absorb the logical structure of reality, but because the propositions are used according to the rules which express the explanations of meanings, because linguistic *action* is taken according to them.

These clarifications are the results of Wittgenstein's self-criticism of the picture theory of the proposition in TLP. Its teaching that a "correspondence of form" is constitutive for the representational performance of propositions now appears to the sober reflection of self-criticism as simply "misleading" (PG IX.113 a; PG. Part I, Appendix 4. B., 212-214):

›But is pictoriality a correspondence. In ... (TLP) I said something like: it is a correspondence of form. But this is a mistake.

Above all, 'picture' is ambiguous here. One wants to say: an order is a picture of the action that was carried out according to it; but also, a picture of the action that is *to be* carried out according to it.

One can say: a work drawing *serves as a picture of* the object which the worker is to make according to it.

And here one could call 'projection method' the way in which the worker has to translate such a drawing into work. One could now express oneself thus: the projection method mediates between the drawing and the object, it reaches from the drawing to the workpiece. One compares the projection method with projection rays that reach from one figure to another. - But if the method of projection is a bridge, then it is one that has not been built as long as the application has not been made. - This comparison makes it appear that the image, *together with the* projection rays, does not now admit of various applications, but that through image and projection rays, the thing depicted, even if it is not actually present, is etherically determined, namely, as determined as if it were present. (It is 'determined in yes and no'.)‹

The picture, even with its method of projection, even with drawn rays of projection - and also the proposition with its form of representation - must first be *applied, used*, so that a bridge is built between representation and what is represented. This insight is the reason why Wittgenstein sees the *use* of linguistic means of expression and representation as crucial to their sense and effective meaning. The focus on form rather than use is a fundamental error:

"If I had to say what the main mistake is that philosophers of the present generation - Moore included - make, I would say the mistake is that - when you look at language - you look at forms made of words and not at the way such forms are used."<sup>52</sup>

Prior to all logical clarifications in detail - including the clarifications on the logic of intentional verbs that already solve the riddle of intentionality - the insight that sense and meaning are never effectively determined by form and structure alone, but always by their use, would be something that must be learned from Wittgenstein in philosophy in general.

### *Psychology III*

#### *Non-intentional psychological expressions*

Thoughts are essentially expressed in propositions; 'thinking' and the other intentional psychological verbs essentially have propositional complements of the form 'that p'. That the grammatically transformed picture theory of the sentence, which focuses on explanation of meaning and usage rather than on form and structure, can account for them in descriptively clarifying them, is obvious. But there are also psychological expressions which are not intentional, and these seem to present an insoluble difficulty for the grammatical conception, and to support the illusion of radical privacy of psychological phenomena.

Sensations and (some) feelings are examples; Wittgenstein's preferred example is 'having pain', especially in the famous argument against the possibility of radically private language (PI §§ 243-315).

Wittgenstein approaches the problem of pain and the expression of pain from the intentional

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52 Wittgenstein: *Vorlesungen und Gespräche über Ästhetik, Psychologie und Religion*, ed. Cyrill Barrett, transl. Eberhard Bubser, Göttingen 1968 (u.ö.), 20 sqq.

psychological phenomena. In view of the (misleading) impression that one cannot recognise an intention from the outside, that one must „mean it oneself in order to understand it as an opinion", he chooses "stomach pain" as a contrasting example (PG VII,107 b):

›Can stomach pain, viewed from the outside, be understood as such? What is a stomachache seen from the outside? Surely there is no outside and inside here! Admittedly, insofar as being meant is a specific experience, no other will be called 'meant'. Only no specificity of sensation explains the direction of opinion. And when we say 'from the outside, intention cannot be recognized as intention, etc.', we do not mean to say at all that opinion is a specific experience, but that it is not something that happens or happens to us (for that would be dead) but something that we do. (Here the subject does not fall out of the experience, but is involved in it in such a way that the experience cannot be described).‹

The stomach is inside in the body of a living being, so why is there no inside and outside in stomach pain? Here the remark about the 'place' of thinking is relevant, again because 'stomach ache' is initially only used as a contrast (BT 221):

›The phrase 'that something is going on in our mind' is meant to imply, ..., that it is not to be located in physical space. Stomach pains are not said to go on in our mind, although the physical stomach is not the immediate place of the pains, in the sense that it is the place of digestion.‹

Pain, including stomach pain, is what the person, whom one pities, has when he complains of his pain, looking him in the eye (and not at his stomach) (cf. PI § 286). This is why there is no inside and outside for stomach pains either; the 'inside', which can be hidden and concealed and need not be expressed, is after all only important as what is expressed.

But that, what is expressed here, includes more and different things, that the subject is indeed involved here in a special way, becomes clear in the contrast to the language game with reasons for empirical opinions (BT 391 ff.). Wittgenstein starts from the comparison of "belief" related to "expecting, hoping, fearing, desiring" in contrast to "states amorphous in time" such as toothache or hearing a tone, which are also different among themselves. And he wonders if there is any point in asking 'how do you know that you believe that?' and answering 'I know it by introspection'. After comments on 'introspection', he contrasts the question of the epistemic ground for belief with 'how do I know I have a toothache?' and admits a similarity of cases in some respects, but then notes that the similarity apt to mislead:

›You construct here along the lines of 'how do you know someone is in the other room' - 'I heard him singing in there'.

'I know I have a toothache because I feel it' is constructed according to this scheme and means nothing. Rather: I have a toothache = I feel a toothache = I feel that I have a toothache (clumsy and misleading expression). 'I know I have a toothache' says the same thing, only more clumsily, unless by 'I have a toothache' is meant a hypothesis. As in the case: 'I know the pain is from the bad tooth, not from neuralgia'. ....

(Here belongs the question: what is the sense of talking about the verification of the sentence 'I have a toothache'? And here one sees clearly that the question 'how is the sentence verified' changes its sense from one area of grammar to another).<

It has already been explained what sense the question of verifiability assumes for exhibitions (or avowals): they are not directly verifiable, but in the utterance the truthfulness of the speaker must guarantee the truth of what is uttered, and truthfulness, as a disposition, can only be verified in several instances, not in the one instance of the utterance alone. Here what I have called, with the legal usage, 'implied conduct', comes into play. For the utterer himself it is true that what he expresses is not said on the observation of his conduct, but it has meaning only if he conducts himself accordingly. The expression of sensations, the utterance of experiences in 1st person, are also avowals. But these clarifications are only the conclusion of the discussion of many examples, including centrally the example of 'expressing pain'.

From the point of view of justification (verification), the special case of pain is first described thus:

›Now one could take the matter in this (wrong) way: The question 'how do you know that you have a toothache' is not asked because one learns this from the toothache (*itself*) at first hand, whereas one learns that a person is in the other room at second hand, for instance by a noise. The one I know by direct observation, the other I experience indirectly. Thus: 'How do you know that you have a toothache' - 'I know it because I have it' - 'You infer it from the fact that you have it; but in order to have it, must you not already know that you have it' - - The transition from the toothache to the statement 'I have a toothache' is quite different from that from the noise to the statement 'there is someone in this room'. That is, the transitions .... /belong to completely different language games/.<

On the method of the dialogue before the concluding, still programmatic commentary on the difference of language games, Wittgenstein remarks, thus admitting its nonsense:

›(One can confuse the philosophers /.../ by speaking not merely nonsense where they also do it, but also such as they (would) shy away from saying.)" and adds as another example: "Does one deduce a proposition from reality? So, for instance, 'from the real toothache, on the fact that one has a toothache'? But that's just an incorrect way of expressing it; it should be: one infers that one has a toothache from the fact that one has a toothache (obvious nonsense).‹

The determination now of the particular transition from toothache to the 'statement' 'I have toothache' leads to the characterisation of the difference of the language-game 'expressing pain' from that of 'stating empirical opinions and their reasons'. In doing so, Wittgenstein exploits the scope of freedom opened up by the self-criticism of the picture theory of the proposition. By confusing the method of projection with the rays of projection (and ignoring the fact that even a picture with such rays still permits various applications), the latter had assumed a necessary similarity between representation and the represented (and conceived of as 'form of representation').

The language game of 'expressing pain' is not based on a prestabilised harmony between the toothache and the utterance 'I have a toothache', so that the utterer only needed to read off his sentence from the fact<sup>53</sup>, but on the fact that we have learned to use the sign in a particular way: as an *expression of* the painful state. The language-game begins with this expression, which does not use any criteria; it does not end with it (PI § 290). Wittgenstein illustrates the specificity of expressive language use by comparing it to natural spontaneous expressions of experience (contorting one's face in pain, rubbing the painful spot, exclaiming 'ouch', etc.) and expresses the view that when children learn the linguistic expression of pain, they learn a "new behaviour of pain" (PI § 244):

›How does a person learn the meaning of the names of sensations? E.g. of the word 'pain'. This is one way: words are connected with the original, natural expression of the sensation and put in its place. A child has hurt himself, he cries; and now the adults speak to him and teach him exclamations and later sentences. They teach the child a new way of taking pain.

'So you say that the word 'pain' actually means crying?' - On the contrary; the word expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.‹

The 'teaching' of the meaning of 'pain' and 'I am in pain/It hurts (there)' ties in with the natural expression of experience and internalises it in the form of its linguistic substitution.

53 PI § 292: "Do not always think that you are reading your words from facts; mapping them into words according to rules! For the application of the rule in the particular case you would have to do without guidance."

Under this convention of meaning, the natural expressions of pain are on the same level as the linguistic expression (and not vice versa, as it were). Crying can replace linguistic expression (and - not: naturally; but: logically - vice versa). But the price of the internalisation of the natural expression is the modification of the character of the linguistic utterance - it becomes psychic expression by means of symbolic expressions.

The autonomy of the category of expression draws attention to the fact that, in descriptive terms, a treatment of the language game 'expressing pain' is 'wrongly bridled' taking the epistemic language games of expressing and justifying opinions as standard. And therein lies a philosophical-self-critical insight worth taking to heart. From the appearance of pain, Wittgenstein expresses it thus (PI § 245): „How, with language, can I still want to step between the expression of pain and pain?" I.e. the expression of pain is (a form of) the *expression(s)* of pain, nothing cognitive mediates. And for the case of the 3rd person, against a behaviourist view of which Wittgenstein himself has often been accused (although he wrote, linguistically very consciously, mostly of 'demeanor' – German 'Benehmen' – rather than 'behaviour' - to see the joke of this choice of words, one has to think of the connection of 'Benehmen' with the phrase ' sich etwas Benehmen' [in the sense of 'deprive oneself of something (for instance, an opportunity)], it is said already in the context of the earliest considerations (BT 509):

›Behaviourism. 'Seems to me I'm sad, I hang my head so'.

Why is there no pity when a door is uncoiled and screams as it opens and closes? Do we feel pity for the other person who behaves like us when we are in pain - on philosophical considerations that have led to the conclusion that he suffers like we do? ....

But we wouldn't feel sorry for the other person if we knew that he was only a puppet or only feigning his pain. Certainly - but we also have quite definite criteria for something being a doll, or for someone feigning his pain, and these criteria are precisely in contrast to those which we call criteria for something not being a doll (but, say, a human being) and not feigning his pain (but really being in pain).‹

Behaviorism radically puts 1st and 3rd person on the same level from the 3rd person perspective - you're fine, how am I? That we do not operate behaviouristically in the language game 'expressing pain' is already clear from the fact that we naturally do not feel sorry for the other on philosophical considerations and do not normally need the criteria that exist for cases of doubt and to which Wittgenstein alludes ('is he really suffering like that, or is he

simulating?').

Before I explore the implications of this, two clarifications of the specificity of the language game 'expressing pain' shall be described. One concerns the identity criteria for pain ('when is the same pain present?'). The noun 'pain' and ways of speaking of 'my/his pain' (analogous to 'my/his key') lead us to expect the normal, numerical identity criteria for things (something is the same thing if it is in the same place at the same time or describes a continuously traceable path through space in a time interval). But the expectation is deceptive (BT 510; cf. PU § 253):

›Of sense data in the sense of this word, in which it is inconceivable that the other has them, it cannot be said that the other does not have them. And for this very reason it is also meaningless that *I*, in contrast to the other, *have* them. - When you say, "I can't feel his toothache," do you mean that you've never felt the other person's toothache? How is *his toothache different* from *mine*? If the word 'pain' has the same meaning in the sentences 'I have pain' and 'he has pain', - what does it mean to say that he cannot have the same pain as I have? How, then, can different pains differ from each other? By the severity, by the character of the pain (sharp, piercing, etc.), and by its localization in the body. But what if these characteristics are the same for both? - But if one objects that .../the difference of the pains is just that in one case I have them, in the other case he! - then the possessing person is a characteristic of the pain itself. But then what is said by the sentence 'I have pain' or 'he has pain'? - If the word 'pain' has the same meaning in both cases, then one must be able to compare the pains of the two with each other; and if they agree with each other in strength, etc., etc., they are the same; as two suits have the same colour if they agree with each other in brightness, saturation, etc.‹

The 'identity criteria' for pain in the existing language game 'expressing pain' are not 'numerical' but 'qualitative'. For if 'his' vs. 'my' pain is supposed to distinguish 1st and 3rd person pain from each other despite qualitative sameness, then the 'possessing' person is made the characteristic of pain and the corresponding 1st and 3rd person sentences say nothing, become tautological.

The other clarification concerns the difference between 1st and 3rd person in sparse description. For it has to be said that in the 1st person linguistic expression 'I have pains', despite the use of the indicator 'I', the expressing person as subject in a sense does not enter at all. Wittgenstein took this as an occasion to distinguish at times, in view of the contrast of sentences expressing experiences with sentences like 'I am 1.79m tall', a use of 'I' 'as subject' from 'I' 'as object', and for the subject use he summarised his view with the beautiful aphorism (BIB 108):

"The man who cries out in pain, or who says he is in pain, does not choose the mouth that says it."

Since the same can be said of the man who says 'I am 1.79 m tall', a distinction between subject and object uses of 'I' can presumably not be based on this. But the meagre description that Wittgenstein gives before this elaboration can be understood, it also refers to the whole sentence 'I am in pain', not only to the word 'I' alone (BT 505):

›I have pain' is, in the case of me using the sentence, quite a different kind of expression than it is for *me* (emphasis mine, EML) in the mouth of another; and this is because it is meaningless for me in the mouth of another as long as I do not know which mouth uttered it. The expression in this case does not consist in the sound alone, but in the fact that this mouth produces the sound. Whereas in the case I say it, or think it, the sign is the sound alone.‹

LW, as I wanted to make clear by adding the emphasis in this quotation, bases his description on the speaker's perspective of the 1st person. The listener is in exactly the same position with regard to the two propositions in the 1st and 3rd person - he too uses only the sign and understands the sign used by the other only if the fact of its use by the speaker is also accessible to him. So for both the expression 'pain' has the same meaning only by virtue of the possible availability of both roles (speaker and hearer). But the respective hearer has to replace the 'I' of the speaker by 'he' and can replace 'he' by an objective definite description (the so-and-so) or the name. These equivalences belong to the meaning of the expressions in the language game, so the specificity of 'I' must be described differently.

Peter Hacker has made a proposal that follows on from Wittgenstein. If one compares referring by means of personal indicators, definite descriptions and names to aiming at a target, then 'I' has a special position in that it does not have to aim itself, but marks the target for others' references by means of objectifying indicators (he, she) or definite descriptions and names. In this description, 'I' is always 'subjective' (and the distinction Wittgenstein wanted to make at times between subject and object uses of 'I' does, after all, concern the verifiability of the truth of the predicates - having pain vs. being so-and-so tall, not of the indicator).

That, as noted above, we do not operate behaviouristically in psychological language games such as that of 'expressing pain' is, like the implications of the question why we do not pity a squeaking door when it 'screams' when it is opened or closed; why we do not apply expressions such as 'pain' to inanimate things at all, indicate that 'physiognomic' presuppositions are also at play for the psychological language games, as they already had to be assumed in the section on



'Understanding and Meaning' for the understanding of the language of words in general. Wittgenstein expresses himself most clearly about this in the PI and in his late writings on the philosophy of psychology.

One of the general presuppositions is that in our use of language we have quite a different 'attitude' towards the living as opposed to the dead. An attitude is not an 'opinion', not a 'conviction' for which reasons could be given: "Attitude comes *before* opinion." (Ms 169 67; PI § 284):

›Look at a stone and think that it has sensations! - One wonders: How could one even come up with the idea of ascribing a *sensation to a thing*? You might as well ascribe it to a number! - And now look at a wriggling fly, and at once this difficulty is gone, and pain seems to be able to *attack* here, where before everything was against it, *smooth as* it were.

And so even a corpse seems to us wholly inaccessible to pain. - Our attitude towards the living is not the same as towards the dead. All our reactions are different. - If someone says: 'This cannot simply be because the living moves in such and such a way and the dead does not' - then I want to mean to him that here there is a case of the transition 'from quantity to quality'.‹

In the psychological language games, the 'attitude towards the living' takes the form of the attitude 'towards the soul' (PPF § 22) or 'towards man' (LS II, 54):

›'I don't think he's an automaton', offhand like that, doesn't even make sense yet.

My attitude towards him is an attitude towards the soul. I do not have the *opinion that* he has a soul.‹

Because for the opinion I should be able to cite reasons, but I have none or incalculably many (too many). The attitude lies *before* opinions for which we have reasons. This attitude is already shown negatively by the fact that we do not apply psychological expressions to inanimate things, that "only of the living human being, and what is similar to it, (behaves similarly) can (be) said to have sensations; to see; to be blind; to hear; to be deaf; to be conscious, or unconscious." (PI § 281, cf. § 283 d-e) But in following this 'rule' (which we do not 'apply' but follow, so that it can only be called a rule in a thinned-out sense), the attitude to the soul/to man is not exhausted. It has specific consequences in the language games themselves, determines moves in them.

The considerations on the semantics of 'having pain' have shown that the expression has its meaning only in the interplay of the 1st and 3rd person usage. Physiognomic aspects of

understanding also play a role for the moves in the language game, which *begins*, not ends, with the expression of sensation (PI § 290). First of all, the linguistic expression of sensation must be taken as an *expression*, not as the expression of an opinion against which one could argue. And this conception (as an expression of 'attitude to the soul') also shapes reactions to the expression of sensation - thus, for example, pity becomes 'a form of conviction that someone else is in pain' (PI § 287) and the linguistic (or otherwise acting) expression of pity is itself an expressive (in 2nd person responding to/answering to the 1st person). Although indicative sentences are (can be) used, a very different game is played with them than in that of discussing opinions.

Only with regard to the physiognomic 'aspect' understanding of the linguistic did Wittgenstein once indicate an 'explanation' for the attitude that precedes the psychological language games - it exists because we have 'assimilated' the representational techniques of these language games, they have become natural and self-evident to us or will become so in the process of enculturation (LS<sup>54</sup> II, 30):

›Just think of the words which lovers speak to each other! They are 'loaded' with feeling. And they are certainly not replaceable by any other series of sounds by agreement. Is it not because they are *gestures*? And a gesture need not be anything innate; it is acquired, but just *assimilated*. - But isn't that a myth?! - No. Because the characteristics of assimilation are precisely that I want to use *this* word and would rather use none than one imposed on me, and similar reactions.‹

In becoming aware of such presuppositions lies an application of the insight into the inaccessibility of a priori presuppositions of our understanding (PI § 129):

›The most important aspects of things for us are hidden by their simplicity and ordinariness. (One cannot notice it - because it is always before one's eyes.) The very foundations of one's research do not strike one at all. Unless, that *is*, *they* once struck him. - And that is to say: that which is once seen, that which is the most striking and the strongest, we do not notice.‹

The philosophy that clarifies the peculiarities of language games cannot, even in its narrowest field, be only philosophy of language (considering only expressions of word-language, even less according to their mere form), but must extend itself to something that

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54 This code refers to ›Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie‹, in English ›Last Writings on ...‹, which first letters I already use for Wittgenstein.

could be called hermeneutics of human behaviour and culture. Philosophy should let itself be taught about this by LW's example, through all the details, ways and detours in his philosophy of psychology. It should lead to a reorientation of the factual framework of all contemporary philosophy, of anthropology. Just as the philosophy of language cannot proceed theoretically, forming theories, but must proceed reflexively, because in order to clarify language it must already use the full language, and cannot use a preparatory, provisional one, so anthropology should also proceed reflexively, if it has become aware of the central position of the command of language among the anthropologically distinguishing characteristics. From this point of view, LW's clarifications of the non-(word)linguistic a priori presuppositions of the use of psychological expressions are themselves contributions to anthropology, and their central contribution, under the general presupposition 'we speak and act', is the insight into the autonomy of the category of *expression*.

Excursus: *The 'psychological aspect' - inner life and its expression* LW himself did not speak of a 'psychological aspect'. To him, in examining aspects of the most diverse kinds (visual, linguistic, psychological, philosophical), it was important "to show what kind of multiplicity one is dealing with here" (LS II, 30): "It is important here to bear in mind that there is a multitude of phenomena and concepts related to one another." But he moved from visual aspects to linguistic<sup>55</sup> and then to psychological ones without comment in his detailed treatment of aspect vision (PPF § 111 ff.). And once he also said (RPP II § 35):

›I would like to say that psychology deals with certain *aspects of* human life.

Or also: with certain phenomena - but the words 'think', 'fear', etc. etc. do *not* denote these phenomena.‹

The psychological words do not designate the psychological aspects, but their use presupposes them in the 'attitude to man'. I believe, however, that without doing violence to LW's clarifications in detail, one can speak of a or the psychological aspect and characterize it thus: We grant each other, a priori, an inner life that can be expressed but need not be (and thus can be concealed but need not be). (In the use of 'expression' here we must include the sitting of linguistic expressions of experience on non-linguistic, natural and spontaneous ones). In this formulation, LW's dissolution of the 'dream of our language' is preserved by a privileged,

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55 For the transition from visual to linguistic aspects, there is the commentary on the concept of 'meaning blindness' that has been quoted before (PPF § 261).

enclosed privacy of each one's interior, because *the interior* (in contrast to the 'inside', which is thought of as essentially enclosed) is understood as essentially *externalisable* and thus potentially intersubjectively and publicly accessible (LS II, 88, 113):

The Inner is logically connected with outer, not merely experientially.

....

It is always assumed that the smiler is a human being, not only that what smiles is a human body. It is also presupposed that there are certain circumstances and connections between the smile and other forms of behavior. But when all this is presupposed, the other person's smile is pleasant to me.

When I ask someone on the street for directions, I prefer a friendly answer to an unfriendly one. I react directly to the behavior of the other person. I presuppose the *interior* insofar as I presuppose a *human being*.

The 'inside' is a deception. That is to say: the whole complex of ideas alluded to by this word is drawn like a painted curtain in front of the scene of the actual use of the word.<

Finally, the admissibility of the summary of Wittgenstein's clarifications on psychology in the attribution of the proof of a fundamental psychological aspect for the use of psychological words is supported by the fact that he spoke of seeing the soul in human behaviour (PI § 357): "When one sees the behaviour of the living being, one sees its soul". This must, in fact, be a matter of *continuous seeing-as*, after all, one *perceives* the bodies of living beings even when one does not deal with them directly. The alternative interpretation of the non-isolated utterance as a rhetorical exaggeration would, seen in the light of the whole of LW's clarifications on psychology, not be charitable, i.e. not the best possible interpretation.

### *Semantics (philosophy as a description of language)*

#### *Sense, Meaning, Truth - or: Wittgenstein's Method(s)*

Wittgenstein has been read primarily as a philosopher of language. Such a philosopher should be expected to clarify the concept of language and to provide clarification about the essential structures of language. Certainly, Wittgenstein did both. But he explicitly denied teaching anything about language. In the 10th lecture of the Michaelmas trimester in 1934, he discussed initially a question posed to him:

›I have been asked to what extent my method resembles the so-called description of meaning by exemplification. It sounds as if I had invented a method, a procedure of indicating meaning, which is *just as good* as the definition. In examining how a word is used, we are not at all concerned with providing a new method of indicating its meaning. When we ask on what occasions people use a word, what they say about it, what they may justly use in its place, and then when, in answer to the question, we describe the use of the word, we do so only so far as it seems to us useful in disposing of philosophical problems. It looks as if we were asking questions about the natural history of man, but in an obvious sense we are not interested in natural history, as we know. But when I say that a word is factually defined in this or that way, I still seem to be talking about natural history. It is not natural history, however, to invent one's own languages, as I have done, and to lay down rules for such languages, as, for instance, the chemists of the nineteenth century did with the language of chemistry. Language interests us only in so far as it troubles us. I describe the factual use of a word only when this is necessary to get rid of a problem we want to get rid of, and sometimes I describe the use of the word when the other person does not remember it. Some times I have to make new rules because new rules don't easily cause confusion, or because we may not have thought to look at our language in that light before. So we may use facts from natural history and describe the actual use of a word; or it may be that I invent a new game for a word that differs from its actual use to remind the other person of its use in our own language. The point is that I can't share any thing about the natural history of language, and if I could, it wouldn't make any difference. On all the questions we discuss I have no opinion, and if I had one that did not agree with the other's opinion I would give it up at once for the sake of argument, for it would be of no consequence to our discussion. We are constantly moving in a field where we all have the same opinions. I have nothing more to give than a new method; I cannot teach new truths. It is the essence of philosophy to be independent of experience, and this is precisely what is meant by saying that philosophy is a priori. One could teach philosophy by asking questions only. (Vorl. 270-1)‹

In any case, there are four points to be made about this long quotation. First, as the multiple references to 'the other' make clear, Wittgenstein understands his approach, even when it uses bound speech, to be essentially dialogical. The aim is to eliminate, by means of description of language, philosophical problems that the other has or raises, even if the other is, as is often the case in the written remarks, an inner dialogue partner or even an inner alter ego (usually the representative of LW's 'older way of thinking' of the TLP apostrophized in the *Preface* to PI).

Secondly, the multiple emphasis is important that in philosophical investigations natural-historical/factual things can be used, but their description does not therefore become the subject of the investigations. In this sense, it is denied to be engaged with language for its own sake

and to have something (natural-historical, factual) to communicate about it.

For, thirdly, the natural-historical, factual is used for the sake of the a priori contained in it, which is the subject of investigation, because the subject of philosophy. And in connection with this, fourthly, is what Wittgenstein claims as his alone to teach, to give - a method for determining the a priori.

This 'method' will be presented in the following. The title of the text also speaks of 'methods' in the plural, not only because LW himself wrote in a prominent place that there is not *one* method of philosophy, but that there are methods, as it were different therapies (sc. for diseases of the intellect that represent philosophical problems are - cf. PI §§ 133; 255; 593). These 'therapeutic' methods in the plural obviously belong to the dimension of the dialogue of investigations, in conversations. Indeed, since he also wrote of his 'method' in the singular, there is evidently, in addition to the dialogical-dialectical methods in the plural, a method that forms, as it were, the descriptive infrastructure of the methods in the plural. Of this method LW has written that it is "essentially the transition from the question of *truth* to the question of *sense*." (Ms 106, 46) This singular method obviously corresponds to the determination of the subject of philosophy as the realm of the a priori. It is related to fundamental clarifications of the language-descriptive notions of 'sense' and 'meaning' and the related notions of 'truth/falsity' (or, for non-indicative propositions, of 'fulfilment/non-fulfilment'<sup>56</sup>).

LW's clarification of these terms has been governed by two principles since TLP: the principle of the primacy of sense over truth-or-falsity; and the principle of the internal relation between the sense of propositions (the sense dimension of language) and the world or reality. But in the context of TLP, the principles function as postulates of a constructive logical-metaphysical theory of logic as at once forming the deep structure of ordinary language and the 'scaffolding of the world' (6.124). It is only in the self-criticism of the 'dogmatism' of his early mode of argumentation and representation that Wittgenstein arrives at a linguistic-descriptively redeemable version of his descriptive principles, and it is only in this version that they also become the basis of the singular method of which the information of the 1934 lecture says that it alone is what he has to give. Therefore, the transformation of the principles of the primacy of sense and the internal relation between language (sense) and world is the next topic.

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56 The addition "'fulfilment/non-fulfilment' for non-indicative sentences" is omitted in the following when speaking of truth/falsity, but is always meant.

The primacy of sense over truth-or-falsity is dogmatically claimed in the TLP as an element of the general picture theory, which is the subject between propositions 2.1 and 3.5 (before being explicitly applied to the propositions of language from proposition 4 onwards, which is not easy to see, because the general picture theory is already implicitly oriented to the proposition, even to the elementary proposition).

The term 'sense' first appears in TLP in the *Preface* in the context of the purpose of the treatise in the development of the only thought that TLP is supposed to unfold and which therefore also forms the conclusion in sentence 7: That what can be said at all can be said clearly, and everything else is to be kept silent. 'Meaning' is used colloquially here and related to its uses for 'purpose'. The concept of sense, on the other hand, which the TLP claims systematically, appears anticipatorily in 2.0211 - where, in the context of ontology, propositional theory is anticipated in order to give an argument for the world having to have a substance in simple objects. If it had not, it says, the sense of one proposition would depend on the truth of another - but that would make a picture of the world (true or false) impossible. It would thus contradict the primacy of sense over truth-or-falsity. This becomes of interest, with the concept of sense, then only under 2.2 sqq. 2.2 draws a conclusion from the explanations in 2.1 by stating that the picture has in common with the depicted the logical form of the depiction. This is a prerequisite for its representational function (cp. 2.16-2.17), which then becomes a topic in the first explanation of 2.1:

›2.201 The picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts.«

The two following explanations of equal logical weight (because of the same form of numbering) take up again the determination of logical space as the frame of representation (cp. 1.13; 3.4 ff.) and reaffirm the explanation of the picture as a fact (cf. 2.141): for it is only because it is itself one of the facts of which the world as a whole is said to consist (cf. 1, 1.1) that the picture contains the possibility of the factual situation it represents (2.203).

Its representational function implies its possible truth or falsity (2.21), but the picture performs it *independently of its factual* truth or falsity. As representing only a *possible* state of affairs (2.202), it has meaning: what the picture represents is its meaning (2.221). But this is

internally related to truth-or-falsity, in these two possibilities its sense consists, so that the following only apparently conventional correspondence theory of truth results: In the correspondence or non-correspondence of its sense with reality consists its truth or falsity. (2.222) For the recognition of its truth or falsity, therefore, a comparison with reality is required (2.223); from the picture by itself its truth or falsity cannot be recognised (2.224), and a priori true pictures do not exist (2.225).

That the correspondence-theoretic explanation for 'truth' in 2.222 is only apparently conventional can be seen by tracing the determination of the expression 'reality' in the ontology of the TLP. At the same time, it then becomes clear that the first principle of the primacy of sense over truth-or-falsity pursued so far is internally related to the second principle of the internal relation between language (sense) and world/reality.

The term 'reality' is one of two totality terms in ontology, the other being that of 'world'. Both are determined in connection with each other. The world is the totality of facts. (1.1) Reality is explained as 'the existence and non-existence of facts' (2.06), but at the same time it is also, and seemingly divergently, identified with the world as 'the totality of existing facts' as „total reality“ (2.04, 2.063). The terminus medius of the seemingly incompatible explanations - reality on the one hand as the totality of existing facts, on the other as the existence and non-existence of facts - is the insight that the totality of facts (the world) "determines what is the case and also what is not the case." (1.12); for this is explicitly repeated for the expression 'reality', in this it is identical with the world: "The totality of existing facts also determines which facts do not exist." (2.05)

In these determinations, the ontology of TLP anticipates its theory of propositions. The world is thus the totality of facts, as language is the totality of propositions (4.001). And just as propositions, as elements of language, are essentially truth-functions of elementary propositions and are only thus determined in their sense (cf. 3.23), so facts are, as elements of the world, functions of facts, "the existence of facts" (2), which, in the logical space in which facts are a priori (1.13), takes the form of the "existence(s) and non-existence(s) of facts" (2.06), the "logical form" as the "form of reality" (2.18). Ontology thus claims from the outset that the world is given to us only in negatable propositions; it thus presupposes the second principle of the internal relation between language (propositions, sense) and the world, which is the first in substance. This claim is not asserted, but only 'shown' in the given determinations. LW has thus made use here of the distinction, which he once declared to be the main problem



of philosophy, between that which can be said (or also thought) in propositions and that which only shows itself - and indeed only showing it itself (and thus respecting the principle of the inexpressibility of certain facts shaping our understanding as a whole, which the distinction asserts).<sup>57</sup>

For the explanation of truth in 2.222 the complexities of the determination of the expression reality have the consequence, that if in the case of truth the sense of a proposition corresponds to reality, in the case of falsity it does not, then not proposition and something given language-free correspond or do not correspond. But the proposition and other (elementary) propositions correspond, which make the sense of the proposition determined in logical analysis and are the unambiguous, last, dimensionally maximally resolving description of reality (of the existence and non-existence of facts). In the case of the recognition of the truth of a proposition by comparison with reality (2.223), it can be established that what makes the sense of the proposition determined as a function of elementary propositions actually exists. That the description of the world as reality in dimensionally maximally resolving elementary propositions fulfils the excellent function of the ultimate description<sup>58</sup>, by which the sense of propositions is compared and truth or falsity is established, follows from the postulate that every proposition as a truth function of elementary propositions should have only one logical analysis (3.25).

But Wittgenstein not only claimed the internal relation between language (sense) and world (cf. 4.014) (showing it in the structures of ontology), he also, if not arguing for it, tried to explicate it constructively. To see this requires going back once more to the relation he conceived between names - as the simple signs in elementary propositions that cannot be analyzed further - and objects, as the constituents of states of affairs that correspond to elementary propositions.

He does not think of this relation one-dimensionally. He uses two expressions for the relationship - 'meaning' (German: ›meinen‹) and 'represent' (German: ›vertreten‹) - and makes it clear in the text of TLP only through the different form of numbering that 'represent' has priority over 'meaning'. (cf. 3.22, 3.203) In NB 1915, the thought behind this is hinted at: "When a name designates an object, it thereby stands in a relation to it which is entirely

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57 The declaration of the distinction saying/showing as the main problem of philosophy is in the important letter explaining the TLP to Russell of 8/19/1919.

58 In the *Blue Book*, Wittgenstein formulates the illusionary thought behind the idea of the ultimate unambiguous description of the world: "Every sign can in principle be interpreted; but the meaning must not be able to be interpreted. It is the ultimate interpretation." (BIB 61)

conditioned by the logical nature of the object and characterises it again." (22.6.15) For 'denote' in TLP 'represent' is used, for 're-characterize the logical nature of the object' stands 'meaning'. But it was only ex post facto in 1929 that he made it quite clear that the conditional 'represent', on which the possibility of the proposition already rests according to TLP (4.0312), must precede 'meaning'. Indeed, as a comment on 2.1511, 'Some Remarks on Logical Form' says: "By this I meant that the forms of the entities are contained in the form of the proposition which is about these entities." (PO, 34) In TLP this is again only shown. Indeed, all that can be said of the objects in the proposition is that they are supposed to be absolutely simple, to be represented by names in elementary propositions, and to have a form ("the possibility of its occurrence in states of affairs", 2.0141) by virtue of which they contain the possibility of all states of affairs (2.014), and to be so concatenated in the proposition (2.03) as is shown by the concatenation of names in the elementary proposition (4.0311). What is conspicuously not said of names, however - despite the exceedingly rich repertoire of forms which TLP writes about - is that they have a form. The category 'form of a name' is absent from the repertoire, and the 1929 self-interpretation reveals the reason for its absence: names take on, absorb, as it were, in the relation of representation, the form of the objects they represent, and which they 'mean' only insofar as they represent them. In TLP, the internal relation of language (proposition, sense) and the world is based on the relation of names and objects understood in this way - first 'representing', then 'meaning'.

The anchoring of names in objects as the, by virtue of their form, elements of the substance of the world has two important corollaries. Ontologically, the objects are ambiguously determined - intensionally as the meanings of the names, extensionally as the constituents of the states of affairs which, in their configuration, "determine material properties" (2.0231). Semantically, the names cannot be explained in an introductory way, but only in a circular way, because the explanations supposedly can only be understood "if the meanings of these signs are already known." (3.263)

It was this last, semantic point concerning names, where Wittgenstein transformed his principle of the internal relation of language and world so that it could not only be constructively asserted, but linguistically descriptively redeemed. This was the result of the development of his conception of ostensive definition or indicative explanation of expressions (not just names). Ostensive definition very much allows for an introductory explanation, not just a circular elucidation of elementary expressions. As is well known, the later Wittgenstein

thinks that the objects to which indicative explanations point function in this use of language as paradigms that belong to language, are instruments of linguistic practice. His argument in section 16 of PI:

›What about the colour tables that A shows to B, - do they belong to language? Well, as you like. They do not belong to the language of words; but if I say to someone, "Pronounce the word 'that'," you will still count this second 'that' as part of the proposition. And yet it plays a role quite similar to that of a colour paradigm in the language game (8); namely, it is a paradigm of what the other is supposed to say.‹

Paradigms can enter propositions, so it makes sense, "causes least confusion, if we count patterns among the tools of language". (ibid.) Regularly they enter into language-teaching, insofar they are 'grammatical' sentences:

›The connection between language and reality is made in the word explanations, - which belong to grammar (German: ›Sprachlehre‹, quite literally to be translated as ›the teaching of language‹), so that language remains closed in itself, autonomous.‹ (PG IV.55, 97)

On the basis of the revised view that explanations of the meaning of words are consistently possible, indeed that 'meaning' can be explained precisely as that which explanations of meaning explain (PI I § 560), the principle of the internal relation of language (proposition, sense) and world is descriptively redeemable. By *internalizing* elements of reality as paradigms of the meaning of words into language - as a kind of its tools in (fundamentally) indicative explanations of meaning (ostensive definitions) -, we establish the *internal* relation in the first place [can conceive of it as (to be) established by us]. That language remains self-contained, autonomous, through the explanations constituting the meaning of words, does not lead to linguistic idealism. For with the determination of the meaning of words we do not yet say anything about reality, we do that only in propositions which we in fact use.

That propositions as a whole do not need yet another 'meaning'-explanation, not an explanation of their sense - Wittgenstein is quite consistent in reserving the expression 'meaning' for words and expressions, the expression 'sense' for propositions; especially in contexts of the philosophy of mathematics, he occasionally deviates from this and also writes of the 'sense' of expressions, but trivially not of words) - Wittgenstein had already assumed in TLP:

›The meanings of the simple signs (of words) must be explained to us that we may understand them. (-)  
But with the sentences we make ourselves understood.‹ (4.026)

This is maintained in the later view. He now justifies the essential complexity of propositions no longer by their logical form, supposedly clearly stated in the language of function-theoretic logic (4.032, 5.47), but pragmatically:

›When I said the proposition was compound, I meant ... it could not be simple in a certain sense. But why, in what sense can't it be simple?

If it were simple, that is, if it existed once and for all without change, there would be *no need for it at all*. Just as a character that appeared in all propositions would be superfluous...

.....

The sign only serves a purpose if I can operate with it.

And then it must be able to occur in different contexts.

The essential thing, the sense (i.e. purpose) of the proposition is, that I *can* explain the single signs by a translation rule, but the proposition explains itself.

The formation of word signs is, after all, only preliminary.

That is, it is worthless in itself, and its purpose is only the formation of a *combination of them*.

Let us think of someone saying 'this bit of wood shall be the A, this shall be the B'; and stopped. So we would ask: what is it about them now, why did you represent A and B by the pieces of wood? Because that can only be the preparation for you to say something about them.

As I said, the propositional sign does not represent (German: ›vertreten‹). - It presents (German: ›darstellen‹).‹ (Ms 109, 159-60)

One can reinforce Wittgenstein's pragmatic argument that even for the simplest propositions their composition is essential by pointing to different forms of ostensive explanation, which is, after all, possible not only for object-designating expressions. An indicative explanation of the expression to denote an object needs only a paradigm, and so conveys syncategorematically the category of particularity for the expression explained. That an object can be only one, 'itself', conveys the singularity of the paradigm to which it is calibrated. That it can have several properties of the same property dimension can be made clear, e.g. in the case of colour expressions, by painting the object with different colours.<sup>59</sup> An indicative explanation of a

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59 That elementary predications are bound to such paradigmatic possibilities of action is a basic idea of constructivist logic, which Hans-Julius Schneider has elaborated semantically - cf. Schneider 1992, s.v. 'sorting'.

property expression needs several paradigms in order to make clear by contrast and correspondence what is to be explained, and thus conveys syncategorematically the category of generality, of applicability to everything with that property. The expressions thus explained in various forms can also be demonstrated in their possible combinations, their possible function to represent in propositions, on the basis of the representational functions effected by the explanations. But these demonstrations must already be understood as possible communications which say something about something.

Even the seemingly correspondence-theoretic explanation of truth from TLP is pragmatically revised. Still the proposition representing something has to be compared with reality for its truth-or-falsity. But the point of the comparison now is no longer the ultimate description of reality in the maximally dimensionally resolving form of elementary propositions, but simply an independent description of the state of affairs that the proposition claims to represent:

›So it is now also with the correspondence of a statement of length with a length. If I say: "this rod is 2m long", I can e.g. [explain| give an explanation], how one checks the length of the rod according to this theorem with a yardstick, how one produces a measuring strip for the rod according to this theorem, for instance. And I now say that the theorem agrees with reality if the measuring strip constructed in this way agrees with the rod. This construction of a measuring strip, by the way, illustrates what I meant in TLP by saying that the proposition reaches up to reality. - One could also make it clear in this way: If I want to test reality to see if it agrees with a proposition, I can do it in such a way that I describe it anew and see if the same proposition comes out. Or: I can translate reality into the language of the proposition according to grammatical rules and now ((make the comparison)) in the country of the language.‹ (BT 204)

Thus, according to the latter alternative, in checking and, if necessary, establishing the truth of a proposition, it is checked or established whether the state of affairs described by the proposition actually exists, if one follows the rules of meaning of the expressions linked in the proposition, which in their linkage are supposed to represent the state of affairs, and sees whether or that they are fulfilled. In the case of the truth of the proposition it is established that the descriptive norms set in the rules of meaning are fulfilled. This is the standard procedure implied in the meanings of the expressions in the sentence for checking the truth of a sentence. The alternative first mentioned makes it clear that even simply an independent description of the state of affairs can convince us of the truth of the proposition, if either the same proposition comes out or a proposition that can be put into a plausible relation to the first one according to

unproblematic rules (can be translated into it in a more or less direct way).

On these descriptive clarifications of 'sense', 'meaning' and 'truth/falsity' now rests the singular method, the essentials of which Wittgenstein indicated with the 'transition from the question of *truth* to the question of *sense*' (Ms 106, 46).

Accordingly, your first question is about the meaning of propositions. Your answer must clarify whether the sentence has any sense at all, is understandable, can be used to communicate, has a use. This is a yes/no question; the statement that a proposition has meaning cannot be answered with the question 'which one?'

›On hearing the assertion 'this sentence has meaning' one cannot essentially ask: 'what sense?' Just as to the proposition 'this set of words is a sentence' one cannot ask: 'what sentence?' (PG I.13, 51; cp. PI § 502)

'Making sense', 'being understandable' is an all-or-nothing affair, there is nothing intermediate between sense and nonsense. But the substantival expression 'sense' can create the illusion that the sense is to the proposition as the object of reference is to the name or label.

›The way to see clearly the grammar of the word "mean" is to ask "what is the criterion for meaning something like this" and what is the nature of the expression that this "like this" represents. The answer to the question "how is this meant" establishes the connection [between two linguistic expressions | between two languages]. So the question also asks about this connection. The use of the nouns "sense," "meaning," "conception," and other words tempts us to think that this sense, etc., is to the sign as the word - the name - is to the thing which is its bearer. So that one might say, "The arrow| The sign has a very definite meaning, is meant in a very definite way, which I have only *faute de mieux* to express again by a sign." The opinion, the intention would be, as it were, his soul, which I would prefer to show directly, but to which, unfortunately, I can only point indirectly through his body.‹ (BT 12-13)

But that the question of the meaning of a proposition is all-or-nothing does not mean that it is without presupposition. For one thing, it differentiates itself according to types of sentence usage - in the case of propositional sentences, into the questions, what must be the case for the sentence to be true or false; in the case of command(s) (sentences), into the questions, what must be the case for them to be obeyed or not obeyed; in the case of desire sentences, what must be the case for them to be fulfilled or not fulfilled; in the case of intention sentences, what

must be the case for them to be executed or not executed.

And these differentiations of the question of the meaning of propositions lead to their presuppositions in the meanings of the constituents of the sentence, of the words, so that the question of the meaning of the proposition implies the questions of the meaning of the words linked within. With respect to these, the way to settle the question is to ask how their meaning can be explained - because the meaning of a word is what explanations of meaning explain (PI § 560).

At the same time, philosophical explanations of meaning in questions about the meanings of words in a sentence have a license that explanations of meaning in normal conversation do not normally have - they are allowed to assume that the addressee of the explanation already understands, has mastered, all the rest of the language. This is because they are directed at the question how a word is to be explained in an introductory way (not, like most meaning explanations in conversation are, how it is to be understood/used in that context).

The singular method with its questions about the meaning of propositions and the meanings of constituent parts of sentences that express them would be perfectly applicable to the descriptive purpose of philosophy, to give reflexive conceptual clarification, if the languages of interaction were purely rational entities and had not grown historically, and if we language users were purely rational beings, were completely transparent in our convictions, overlooked all implications, and did not also have inclinations and desires, including desires to understand so-and-so, to understand understandable things in general, and also to understand ourselves. With these counterfactual presuppositions, however, the method would also be superfluous.

The singular method, in view of the obvious unrealised presuppositions of ideal rationality, must differentiate into a multiplicity of dialogical-dialectically applicable methods.

Even the question of the meaning of a proposition is often not directly applicable, because the school-grammatically possible sentence formations by far exceed the number of sentences that (can) have meaning. A simple example of Wittgenstein is the sentence 'On the sun it is 5 o'clock' (PI § 350). The proposition is grammatically well-formed, but meaningless because of the normative function of the sun's position for time indications on earth. The standard (position of the sun) cannot also, in its turn, be determined by what is determined by it (time of day on earth) (cf. PI § 50 about the length of the primordial meter – German: Urmeter - or the colours of colour tables). In this case, to recognise the meaninglessness of the proposition, only considerations contextualising it are necessary. But often this is not enough. Then it is

necessary first to do what Wittgenstein professed to want to teach - "to pass from non-obvious nonsense to obvious one" (PI § 464; under certain circumstances the opposite transition is also instructive - cf. PI § 524). An example of this is Wittgenstein's handling of a quotation from Plato's *Theaetetus* (PI § 518).

The general reason why the question of the meaning of a proposition is often not settled by merely looking at the sentence has been given by Schneider 1992 in his complex theory of syntactic (as opposed to lexical) metaphoricity:

›If there is to be syntactic complexity at all (as opposed to the complexity of word-formation alone), the syntactically permissible complexes are always more diverse than the hitherto given uses of language (the established 'semantics'). Consequently, there is always a large supply of semantically unspecified, 'open' complexes available to an imaginative speaker for a constructively turned 'misuse', i.e. for a use that does not conform to any previously established language practice or rule.‹ (546)

Some 'misuse' leads to new sense, some to nonsense, and it is not obvious from the outset which is the case with deviant sentence formation and sentence use. Wittgenstein's general observation in this respect is:

›We do not know what to do with every propositional formation, not every technique has a use in our lives, and when we are tempted in philosophy to count something quite useless among the propositions, it is often because we have not sufficiently considered its application.‹ (PU § 520)

Operationally, then, the question of the meaning of a proposition in a dialogic-dialectical context becomes one of considering possible uses for a problematic sentence and, if necessary, establishing that there are none. It is advisable to start from clear and unproblematic cases and to put problematic ones aside at first:

›Treat the clear cases in philosophy, not the unclear ones. These will be solved when those are solved. The tendency to begin the investigation of a proposition where its application is quite nebulous and uncertain (the proposition of identity is a good example), instead of leaving these cases aside for the time being and approaching the proposition where we can talk about it with common sense, this tendency is characteristic of the hopeless method of most people who philosophize. (TS 212, 1195)

(It is a special method of philosophy, not allowed in the sciences, to assume the most favorable case). (This method is still most similar to that in mathematics of assuming an extreme case in which



such and such [but certainly| in any case] occurs. (Argument a fortiori?)  
(MS 104, 86)

The consideration of uses for sentences to express propositions is further complicated by two facts: Often an apt formulation must first be found for the conception of the inner dialogue partner, on which the test for possible uses can be made. Wittgenstein emphasized this requirement in general, and based it on the relationship of his philosophical therapies to the psychoanalytic cure:

›The philosopher supplies us with the word whereby [man| I ] may express the thing and renders it harmless.

(The choice of our words is so important because it is necessary to hit the physiognomy of the thing exactly, because only the exactly directed thought can lead on the right track. The wagon must be placed on the track with pinpoint accuracy so that it can roll on properly).

One of the most important tasks is to express all erroneous trains of thought so characteristically that the reader says "yes, that's exactly how I meant it". To trace the physiognomy of each error.

We can only convict the other of a mistake [if he acknowledges that this is really the expression of his feeling].

Namely, only if he recognizes it as such, it is the correct expression. (Psychoanalysis.)

What the other acknowledges is the analogy I present to him as the source of his thought.‹ (BT, 410)

The mention of false thought processes and fallacies already brings up the second reason complicating the task of coming up with sentence uses for problematic propositions. Language contains misleading images and ways of speaking that objectively suggest false trains of thought and fallacies about its functioning. The towering example in Wittgenstein is the inside-outside picture of the human mind (soul) that has dominated philosophy from Descartes on. In TLP he himself had perfected it in the form of a language-of-thought assumption. Misleading the picture is because the inside-outside difference, from its basic uses (on the basis of which it can be explained in introductory terms), has spatial sense, and when this is adopted in psychological applications, the psychic inside-outside, the spatial sense is suspended and replaced by being expressed (expressible) or not. (The brain idolatry of contemporary philosophical psychology rests fundamentally on not realizing this meaning-change). But the misunderstanding of the psychological inside-outside is only one example, albeit a centrally important one. LW gives a whole series of such examples in a consideration of 'progress' in

philosophy:

›Language has the same traps ready for all; the immense net of well [preserved| passable ] wrong ways. And so we see one after the other going the same ways and already know where he will now turn off, where he will go straight on without noticing the turn-off, etc. etc... So I should put up signs at all the places where wrong paths branch off, to help over the dangerous points

One hears again and again the remark that philosophy is not really making any progress, that the same philosophical problems that already occupied the Greeks still occupy us. But those who say this do not understand the reason why it [must be so]. That is that our language has remained the same, and always tempts us to ask the same questions. As long as there will be a verb 'to be' that seems to function like 'to eat' and 'to drink', as long as there will be adjectives 'identical', 'true', 'false', 'possible', as long as there will be talk of a flow of time and an expansion of space, etc., etc., so long people will keep coming up against the same puzzling difficulties, and stare at something that no explanation seems to be able to lift away.

And this, moreover, satisfies a craving for the supernatural| transcendent], for, believing they see the "limit of human understanding," they naturally believe they can see beyond it.

I read "...philosophers are no nearer to the meaning of 'Reality' than Plato got...". What a strange state of affairs. How strange that Plato could then get this far at all! Or, that we could then get no further! Was it because Plato was so clever?‹ (BT, 423-4)

In the case of the psychological inside-outside contrast, in order to draw attention to the syntactic-metaphorical character of the distinction, cognition must find helpful contrasts with the primary spatial uses before it can be worked out that the psychological uses of so-and-so cannot be understood, have no meaning, and so on. Rejecting the false spatial analogy is an example of why LW says that what he 'always' has to do is to correct philosophical errors:

›If I rectify a philosophical error and say, one has always imagined it to be so, but it is not so, [[so I always point to an analogy| so I must always point to an analogy], according to which one has thought, and, that this analogy is not true.| So I must always point to an analogy, according to which one has thought, but which one has not recognized as an analogy].

The effect of a false analogy incorporated into language: it means(?) a constant struggle and worry (a constant stimulus, as it were). It is as when a thing at a distance appears to be a man, because then we do not perceive certain things, and close up we see that it is a tree stump. As soon as we move away a little and lose sight of the explanation, a figure appears to us; if we then look closer, we see another; now we move away again, etc., etc..

(The exciting character of grammatical ambiguity.)

Philosophize is to reject false arguments

The philosopher strives to find the redeeming word, which is the word that finally allows us to grasp that which until [now always| then], intangibly, has burdened our consciousness.

(It is like having a hair lying on one's tongue; one feels it but cannot [grasp| it ] and therefore cannot get rid of it).< (BT 409)

With regard to this struggle with false analogies, Wittgenstein sees a second commonality with psychoanalysis besides the requirement that the client accept the interpretations (the inner dialogue partner accept the suggestions for formulating his view):

›It is a main activity of philosophy to warn against false comparisons. To warn against (the) false [comparisons| similes] that underlie our mode of expression - without our being fully aware of it.

I believe our method here resembles that of psychoanalysis, which also seeks to make the unconscious conscious and thus harmless, and I believe that this resemblance is not a purely external one.< (Ms 109, 174)

The similarity is also not an external one, because even in philosophical clarifications it is not only a matter of 'intellectual' but also of 'affective acceptance' (Freud) of the clarifications for the dialogue partner. We are attached to false images and misleading analogies that characterise our use of language; we are therefore reluctant to give them up:

›As I have often said, philosophy does not lead me to renunciation, since I do not renounce to say anything, but give up a certain compound of words as meaningless. In another sense, however, philosophy then requires a resignation, but of the feeling, not of the understanding. And this is perhaps what makes it so hard for many. It can be hard not to use an expression, as it is hard to hold back tears, or an outburst [of anger| of rage].

(Tolstoy: the meaning (Bedeutsamkeit) of an object lies in its general intelligibility. - This is true and false. That which makes the object difficult to understand is - if it is significant, important - not that some special instruction about abstruse things is required for its understanding, but the contrast between the understanding of the object and what most people *want to* see. Thus the very thing most obvious may become most difficult of all to understand. Not a difficulty of the understanding, but of the will is to be overcome).

The work on philosophy is - like the work in(?) architecture in many cases - actually more [the| a ] work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one demands of them.)

Casually speaking, [in| accordance with ] the old view - for instance, that of the (great) Western philosophers - [there have been two kinds of problems in the scientific sense| two kinds of problems in the scientific sense]: essential, major, universal, and non-essential, quasi-accidental problems. And against this is

our view that there is no major, essential problem in the sense of science.< (BT, 406-7)

Only with the insight into the self-formative character of 'work on oneself, one's own conception - how one sees things and what one demands of them' does the definition of the task of philosophy as 'reflexive conceptual clarification' gain its full breadth: 'reflexive' means not only 'considering' and not only 'clarifying one's own understanding' (Heraclitus fr 101: 'I investigated myself'), but also 'reasonably rectifying one's own understanding against one's own affective resistances'. The latter aspect of meaning also accounts for LW's independent repetition of an insight of Kant's into the conditions of successful philosophical criticism. Kant meant in his *Logic* that the philosopher only makes given concepts clear (A 95); that philosophizing consists essentially in the 'self-relying use of one's own reason'<sup>60</sup>, and that therefore

"it is not enough: that every doubt should only be answered; - it must also be resolved, that is, made intelligible, how the scruple arose. If this is not done: then the doubt is merely dismissed, but not abolished; - the seed of doubt then still remains." (A 130, cf. A 81-3)

LW formulates the same insight as follows:

›You have to start with the error and transfer it to the truth).

I.e. one must uncover the source of error, otherwise hearing the truth is of no use to us. It cannot penetrate [as long| as] something else takes its place.

(To convince one of the truth, it is not enough to state the truth, but one must find the way from error to truth).< (TS 211, 313)

For a final element of the dialogical-dialectical methods into which LW's singular method of transition from the question of truth to the question of meaning differentiates itself, there is, as far as I can see, no method-reflexive remark noted by himself. Between the departure from error in the search for the most eloquent possible formulations of the philosophical error that is to be corrected, and its transfer into truth by making comprehensible how the error (Kant: doubt, scruple) could have arisen, there is, in substance, a step interposed that consists in the most eloquent possible redescription of the error from the perspective of normal, reasonable understanding. This intermediate step makes the analogy with psychoanalysis perfect: If the

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60 German: ›selbsteigener Gebrauch der Vernunft‹ *Logic* A 26.

first step of formulating the error as accurately as possible from the point of view of the person representing it as his own view corresponds to the step of *anamnesis* in psychoanalysis, then the second to that of the *interpretation* of symptoms, and the third to the *presentation* of the whole case which psychoanalysts give, e.g., for the research community of practitioners of psychoanalysis. For the factual second step there is probably no independent method-reflective evidence in LW, because it is obviously factually dependent on the respective error discussed.

The example in which LW's methods have been most extensively applied by him in coherent longer discussion is his second critique of solipsism in *The Blue Book*.<sup>61</sup>74

The four distinguishable formulations of an epistemological solipsist's belief in the *Blue Book* are as follows:

- (a) 'If anything is seen (really *seen*), it is always I who see it' (BIB 98).
- (b) 'Whenever anything is seen, something is seen'. (BIB 101)
- (c) 'Whenever anything is seen, it is *this that is* seen'; I would have accompanied the word >this< with a gesture encompassing my visual field (however, by the word >this< I would not have meant the particular objects I had just seen at the time). (BIB 103)
- (i) (d) 'Only what I see (or: see now) is really seen'. Comment: I could also express my claim by saying, 'I am the vessel of life'; but notice: it is essential that anyone to whom I say this should be unable to understand me. ... But from me it shall be *logically* impossible that he should be able to understand me; in other words, to say that he understands me shall be senseless, not false. (BIB 103-4)

Wittgenstein uses the four formulations to drive the solipsist into speechlessness of the formulation (d). For (d) is intended to be unintelligible - and to intend not to be understood is tantamount to saying nothing meaningful, understandable. Formulation (a) is replaced in favour of (b) on the basis of a discussion of the ordinary criteria for personal identity, insofar as this shows that by 'I' the solipsist cannot mean an individual natural person who would (could) be recognised on the basis of these criteria. Formulation (b) is shown to be insufficient because the solipsist does not want to emphasise the situation or object(s) that supposedly only he sees, but 'the experience of seeing itself' (BIB 101). This is what (c) tries to satisfy, but turns out to be senseless because pointing to the visual field (the accompanying gesture) is meaningless insofar as it does not, like ordinary pointing, takes place in a public space and thereby 'has neighbours'. Thus the solipsist is driven to (d) and thus to speechlessness.

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61 Cp. Lange: 1989; and Lange, Art. 'Solipsism' in *The Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein*, ed. Glock & Hyman, Oxford 2017 .

But this dialectic only silences the solipsist, does not make him understand how he could have gotten into his trouble. The second step of the methods, the redescription of the solipsistic aberration from the horizon of normal understanding, serves to make this clear. Here, LW's basic insight into the 'autonomy of grammar' plays a double role. On the one hand, he must concede to the solipsist that the notation he desires, which gives his experience a distinguished position, would be possible. Instead of 'so-and-so sees that-and-that', it might be possible, as the solipsist wishes, to say of him 'Something is really seen'. It would then be necessary to say of others 'They behave as (the solipsist behaves) when it is really seen'. This would be awkward and inconvenient, but possible. What is not possible is to justify a notation on the grounds that it corresponds better to the facts - this is a descriptive inference from the 'autonomy of grammar': no system of notation can be justified on the grounds that it is best suited to represent the facts that can be described by means of it. On these premises, the redescription of the solipsistic aberration is thus (LW gives it in the *Blue Book* before the dialectic by which he drives the solipsist into speechlessness):

›The man who says, 'Only my pains are real,' does not mean to say that he has found out by means of the ordinary criteria - that is, the criteria which give our words their ordinary meanings - that the others who said they were in pain were vertiginous. Rather, he objects to the use of *that* expression in connection with *those* criteria. That is, he objects to the particular way in which the expression is commonly used. On the other hand, it is not clear to him that his objections are directed against a convention. He sees how the land can be divided in other ways than by the method that corresponds to the ordinary map. He feels tempted, for instance, to use the name 'Devonshire' not for the county with its conventional boundaries, but for an area bounded in a different way. He might put it this way: 'Isn't it absurd to make this a county, to draw the boundaries *here*?' What he says, however, is this: 'The *real* Devonshire is this.' We may reply, 'You only want a new mode of designation, and a new mode of designation will not change any geographical facts.' It is true, however, that we can be irresistibly attracted or repelled by a new designation.‹  
(BIB 92-3)

The third step corresponds to the Kantian requirement to make comprehensible how the solipsistic aberration can arise. LW finds the reason in the uncritical use of the 1st person present tense with psychological predicates. He wants to distinguish, as has been pointed out before in connection with the discussion of psychological verbs, a use of 'I as subject' ('I see so-and-so') from a use of 'I as object' ('I am six feet tall'). In the first case, there is no criterion for the truth of the utterance; for the truth of corresponding 3rd person ascriptions ('He sees so-

and-so'), the truthfulness of the utterer must vouch (cf. PPF § 319). In the second case, even the utterer knows of the truth of the statement of his height only by objective measurement. That there are uses of the 1st person that LW characterises as using 'I as subject' explains how the solipsistic aberration is possible:

›We feel that in those cases where we use 'I' as a subject, we do not use it because we recognize a particular person by his bodily features; and from this arises the delusion that we use this word to speak of something bodiless, which, however, has its seat in our body. In fact, *this* seems to be the real I, - that of which it has been said 'Cogito, ergo sum'.‹ (BB 110)<sup>62</sup>

The most important lesson of Wittgenstein's reflections on the method and methods of philosophy in the light of the applications he himself made of them, is probably the Kantian one, that the 'critical path alone is still open', that philosophy in its clarifications must begin with error and lead it into truth from there.

The question that Part II has to discuss is whether this is really compelling and without alternative because of the clarifications and insights that LW himself came to. Kant was clear in this that the *Critique of Pure Reason* not only did not rule out a *system* of transcendental philosophy, but in fact presupposed it (even if he himself never brought it about). And also factually it seems to be the case that criticizing presupposes correct insight into the matter of the criticized. Should it not then also be a task of philosophy to express and present for itself the correct insight it may have arrived at?

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62 On the merits, difficulties arise for Wittgenstein's explanation-how-possible of the solipsistic aberration, which need not be discussed here, where it was only a matter of illustrating his sense-critical method(s). Cp. Lange 1989, 131-4. - In 'Solipsism' I also make a suggestion as to how Wittgenstein's explanation can be improved and supplemented.

## Part II: From dissolving problems to attaining a conceptual overview

A hundred years after the first publication of TLP LW is mainly a historical figure. His method and many of his factual insights are largely forgotten. A great exception is the philosophy of Robert Brandom. Despite his abandonment of LW's method and many of his insights, he undertakes numerous "Wittgensteinian commitments"<sup>63</sup> and even writes that we live in a "Wittgensteinian philosophical world "<sup>64</sup>. The general development is certainly due to academic fashions and philosophical conjunctures, but LW himself has had a share in it.

I see two circumstances in particular as reasons for this. On the one hand, LW's philosophy in its development was in an extraordinary way a very personal project. (1) Second, its mode of presentation is opaque in a way that is in strong tension/conflict with its stated aim of providing an overview of the grammar of language. (2)

Ad (1): LW has held with great consistency to his thesis that work in philosophy is actually "work on oneself, on one's own conception, on how one sees things and what one demands of them" (cf. BT 407). Looking over his development, it has a very simple form. At the age of 30 he published a strongly integrated logical-metaphysical system (TLP), in which he claimed the problems of philosophy to have been essentially solved. After a period away from philosophical work, he came to realise that much of the TLP was wrong, and the philosophical work he then resumed was essentially devoted to self-criticism of the TLP.

Already this is not obvious. For example, hardly anyone has seen that the part of PI devoted to psychological terms (§§ 243 sqq.) is motivated by the critique of the language-of- thought assumption in LPA, because LW has arranged the intentional terms, in whose treatment this is clear, after 'pain' as an example of the non-intentional ones (Glock somewhere wrote about ›the painful preference for ›pain‹ as an example'). To be sure, LW's arrangement was helped by the closer proximity of the non-intentional psychological terms to the evidence for their use in the non-linguistic behaviour of persons; but it was not conducive to the transparency of his ongoing problematics and the identifiability of their self-critical motivation and treatment.

Stronger still is a maxim that LW follows and that aims at making the self-critical character of many remarks even unrecognizable:

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63 I discussed them in an essay that first appeared with many misprints in 2015 in the journal *Al-Mukhatabat*, Tunis, and is now available on [www.emilange.de](http://www.emilange.de).

64 Brandom 2002, 210.



"I have no right to give the public a book wherein simply the troubles I feel are expressed and chewed over. ... It is not my stomach troubles that are interesting, but the remedies - if any - that I have found for them." (24.1. 48)<sup>65</sup>

Accordingly PI presents their clarifications as predominantly unrelated by any unifying problematic and seemingly motivated merely by individual conceptual problems.

Ad (2): The stated maxim already plays into the second cause of a certain intransparency of LW's presentation. As explained in Part I, he has indeed declared the acquisition of an overview of grammar to be an essential aim of the *PI* (§ 122), but he has subordinated this aim to the intention of dissolving individual philosophical problems, from which the descriptive clarification is to "receive its light". (§ 109)

This subordination, now, has also led to the fact that LW has neglected the clues for an overview of grammar in normal language itself, the existence of which he himself had become aware of and pointed out in LPA. This concerns centrally the notion of formal concepts that he had formed. (4.122 – 4.128)

Formal concepts are distinguished from material concepts. Material terms classify everything that is directly given to us in perception and active dealings with our surrounding. Formal terms belong more strongly only to (word) language and classify what is already classified elsewhere. According to the analysis of LPA, formal concepts are characterized by two features - they express variables and they are already given with each of their instances. Because LPA is oriented towards logic languages, insofar as it takes 1st level predicate logic to be the deep structure of colloquial language, LW has given as an example only the illusory concept 'object'. It expresses a variable, the individual variable 'x', the "variable name" (4.1272); and it is already given with every individual constant ('a,b, c ...' etc.).

Formal concepts in the strict sense of LW in LPA exist only in formal languages. But in ordinary language the word 'object' also has uses, and one of these, in which it is to be understood as the nominalization<sup>66</sup> of the indefinite pronoun 'something', is formal in the sense in which variables in formal languages are: Both expressions are already given with each of their instances; and they express variables in so far as they must be replaced by one of their instances if anything definite, evaluable as true or false, is to be said. The indefinite pronoun 'something' is a normal language preform of the individual variable 'x' in predicate logic.

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65 LW: *Wiener Ausgabe* 5.157.3.

66 In the broad sense of formation of nouns.

Now predicate-logic knows only one type of individual-variable and in this it differs strikingly from normal language. For the latter has besides 'something' for objects or things also the indefinite pronoun 'someone' for persons. The domains of insertion instances for these two indefinite pronouns of normal language are mutually exclusive: what is 'something' is not 'someone' and vice versa; what is 'object' is not 'person' and vice versa. This formal relation establishes an exclusive partition in the universe of discourse of natural language among all that exists at all (formally speaking, in the *ontology* of normal language). This provides a basic starting point for attempting an overview of the grammar of normal language, and the notion of a formal concept (in the necessary attenuation for its application to normal language) provides a guide for locating the basic concepts of everyday understanding that structure normal language.

Isn't this sketch of a program for philosophy after Wittgenstein (here meaning not the Latin *post*, but *secundum*) completely un-Wittgensteinian, although developed from ideas to be found in him? A useful test would be to ask whether LW himself is aware of the difference between something/someone and object/person. The affirmative answer may point to a circumstance demonstrated in Part I. LW has stated that everything he has to say already presupposes that we speak and act. (BGM VI.17 e, 321) In the analysis to be presented, it will be shown that only persons talk (speak a propositional language) and only persons act in the full sense. LW has thus made use of the distinction as fundamentally self-evident, even if he has not explicitly commented on it. In this respect, an approach to gaining an overview that starts with this basic distinction between 'object' and 'person' remains in complete continuity with LW's clarifications and insights (and will make further use of them in many particulars).

To indicate the place of formal concepts in everyday understanding, I give an example. It should be noted that 'formal concepts' in relation to normal language can only mean: Formal uses of expressions in ordinary language that are closely related to the use of variables in formal languages. In the following series of expressions, each following expression denotes something more general than the expression preceding it:

Bonobo/chimpanzee/gorilla - apes - monkeys - animals - living beings -  
individuals - entities.

Up to 'living beings', the words in this series are names or express material generic concepts. Because they divide reference, they are sortal terms. 'Individuals' and 'entities', used as nouns, are actually only spoken of formally and in the context of logical consideration - they express formal concepts.

Philosophy as the pursuit of an overview of the fundamental concepts in everyday understanding is a contemplation of the formal concepts that structure it. 'Contemplation' (German: 'Betrachtung') here is meant to recall the basic visual meaning of the Greek loanword 'theory'. In terms of LW's clarifications, it is also possible to speak of this consideration being the contemplation *of meaning*, *i.e.* clarifying the basic *possibilities of understanding*. A shorthand for the conception thus implied is *reflexive conceptual clarification*.

Conceptual clarification is *reflexive* not only in the self-evident subjective sense of the reflection that a person undertakes, but objectively in that it presupposes everyday use of concepts and attempts to clarify them by turning back to them. The consideration is *conceptual* because concepts are the fundamental means of our understanding. *Clarification* is, after all, the goal of the observation, because the conceptual means of our understanding are not clear to us from the outset. The general reason for this is that we learn to use our native language as a matter of course long before we are capable of reflecting on it and yet repeatedly come into situations that motivate us to think about its use and to want to clarify it.

There are historical reasons for limiting the beginning reflexive conceptual clarification to everyday understanding. In the course of its history, more and more topics have emigrated from philosophy as objects of separate scientific disciplines. Since conceptual clarity is necessary for any form of intellectual enterprise that is to lead to factual insight, the clarification of the concepts guiding the sciences is the task of these sciences themselves. Thus, philosophy is left with only those concepts that are presupposed by everyday understanding and remain presupposed by all sciences, unless they are clarified by them in a methodically controlled manner and explicitly replaced by more precise concepts. The clarification of the basic everyday concepts remains the task of philosophy. The fact that the sciences presuppose the everyday understanding that philosophy clarifies can only be illuminated here with a spotlight. Often, at least in the general consciousness, the claim is made for physics and its theory of material reality to be the comprehensive and final theory about everything. This cannot be right, because not energy and material masses practice physics, but persons trained accordingly do. So if physicists want to say what they are actually doing in their science - devising theories,

deriving hypotheses, doing experiments and evaluating their results - then they need all the everyday language of action attached to the concept of the person and cannot get by with the terms of the physical theories of reality.

In the conception of *philosophy as a reflexive conceptual clarification of the basic concepts of everyday understanding*, what becomes of the problem of dissolving individual philosophical problems, which is pre-ordered in LW? Their treatment is also reflexive conceptual clarification, but when overview of understanding is made the overriding goal, it becomes subordinate and enters primarily into the justification for proposed analyses of concepts. (Such justifications take the form: Term X should be conceptualized in *such a way as* to avoid the misunderstanding/problem *so-and-so*.)

That this re-accentuation of his conception of philosophy is in accord with intentions of LW becomes clear from the fact that it allows to interpret an image used by him for the constitution of our everyday understanding without constraint. The consideration of this can also help to ward off obvious misunderstandings of the designation of the concepts to be clarified as 'fundamental'. In German, unlike in European languages more strongly influenced by Latin, the use of 'fundamental' brings with it the association of 'ground' and what is 'deep'. By contrast, the meaning intended here is exclusively tied to 'justification' and 'reason' (reason, raison, racion). But even if we hold to this strictly, when we speak of 'ultimate reasons', the foundational metaphoric reintroduces itself. Against this, one must remember that the ultimate reasons that fundamental insight is after in reflexive conceptual clarification essentially presuppose what they are founding - so essentially that these reasons remain mostly implicit in everyday understanding. For this, LW used a paradoxical image - the foundation is supported by the whole house (of everyday understanding) that is built above it. (OC § 248) In fact, LW's image could be tightened by shifting it upwards, as it were: The whole building is supported by the roof by which it is covered. The interpretation of the images is: the variables expressed by the formal terms of everyday understanding are ultimate terms and ultimate reasons, but lie 'above' what they ground, not, like a 'foundation' in the literal sense, 'below'.

Just as LW's philosophy differs from previous ones only in that it makes reflexive conceptual clarification, which philosophy has always been *methodologically* since Heraclitus (fr. 101) and the ›What is ...?‹-questions in Plato's dialogues, the exclusive task of philosophy, so his idea of formal concepts, which express variables and therefore (unlike material concepts) cannot be empty, takes up the traditional idea of categories. These, of course, were thought of

as necessary concepts, as *summa genera conceptus formalium*.<sup>67</sup> Formal concepts, however, need not be explicitly formed; their explicit formation is optional. Necessary, therefore, they are only in the weaker sense of 'pragmatically unavoidably given'. This, too, ties in with a traditional view expressed by Kant who, admittedly, is to be turned pragmatically with LW: "The philosopher only makes *given* concepts explicit. " (Kant, *Logic*, A 95)

### Part III: The Basic Concepts of Common Sense – Beginning with the transformed Wittgensteinian conception

One might expect that, because the distinction between person and object forms the basic distinction in everyday understanding (cp. Part II above), the analysis to be made would also begin with it. In fact, however, I want to begin with a clarification of the concept of *meaning*. This can first of all be motivated methodologically: if reflexive conceptual clarification is, in substance, a *consideration of meaning that* clarifies possibilities of understanding, then it has reason to initially clarify the concept of meaning claimed in its self-conception. But such a beginning is justifiable not only methodologically, but also factually. For the fundamental concepts in everyday understanding are highly interconnected. Persons will turn out to be essentially speaking animals, language as the universal medium of understanding, and as its general correlate that which is intelligible and understood in the first place, and that is to be called *sense*. Not only do all fundamental concepts as means and possibilities of understanding belong to the realm of philosophy that understands itself as the clarification of meaning, but they are also essentially interconnected by the concept of meaning through relations of presupposition and attribution. Therefore, it forms the starting point of clarification here.

#### *a. Sense (and meaning)*

The concept of meaning was first addressed in philosophy by Frege and LW. They are credited with the so-called 'linguistic turn' and, together with Russell and Moore, with the foundation of analytic philosophy.

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<sup>67</sup> Cp. Wilfrid Sellars, 'Towards a Theory of Categories' (1970), § 23.

But of course the concept of sense has been used and partially explained in philosophy before. An amusing example is found in Kant's 'Division on General Logic' concerning the question of a general criterion of truth:

"It is already a great and necessary proof of prudence or insight to know what one should reasonably ask. For if the question itself is inconsistent and demands unnecessary answers, it sometimes has the disadvantage, to the shame of the one who asks it, of leading the unwary listener to inconsistent answers, and of presenting the laughable sight that one (as the ancients say) milks the he-goat, the other holds the sieve to save the milk. "

An unrhymed question is a meaningless question. By calling it so, the notion of sense is implicitly used as a standard of intelligibility. Incidentally, Kant's clarification of the conditions of the possibility of empirical knowledge is, in substance, a clarification of the conditions of the sense of empirical speech.

The concept of sense, together with that of meaning, was first addressed by the logician Gottlob Frege. In his treatise 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung' (in English familiar under the title ›On Sense and Reference‹) he deals with the understanding of informative identity propositions using the example 'The evening star is the morning star'. Both expressions denote the same object - the planet Venus. They have, says Frege, the same ›reference‹ but different senses. As 'morning star' Venus is to be seen in the morning, as 'evening star' in the evening. In this respect, says Frege, the expressions have different senses. Frege explains the expression 'sense' metaphorically with 'way of being given'.

Although it is true that 'the so-and-so' (Russell's *definite descriptions*) and labeling names have cognitive sense and (through connection with other labels and pronouns) refer semantically to situations of immediate perception, this was an unfortunate start to the discussion of the notions of sense and meaning. For one thing, 'sense' is to be spoken of primarily concerning propositions, and only derivatively in relation to propositional constituents such as names and definite descriptions. For another, Frege's determinations thoroughly disfigure the meaning of 'meaning' when the meaning of a singular term is passed off as the object for which it stands (to which it refers). For when the bearer of, say, the name 'Moses' dies, the meaning does not die - one meaning of *the* name (being able to speak of a person by means of it) remains. It is only the other function of the name that ceases to exist

when the bearer of the name dies: it is trivially impossible to speak to him when he is dead (at least if one, as unusually in speaking to someone, expects an answer). The object theory of name meaning is simply wrong.

LW therefore correctly and categorically stated in the LPA: "Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of the sentence does a name have meaning." (3.3) The sense of the proposition consists is what can be *said* or *given to be understood* with it. And only with complete propositions can something be given to be understood. Therefore a name or a label has meaning (a semantic function) only in the context of the sentence. If I only say 'Peter', I have (if it is not a call or exclamation, i.e. to be understood expressively) not *yet said anything*, and I can be asked 'What about 'Peter'?' ('What do you mean = what do you want to say about 'Peter'?') [If I have called a person with a one-word utterance or made an exclamation, I have probably made use of linguistic devices, but have not yet *said* anything. What I mean – what is to be understood - is then given and to be taken from the context, is not made explicit and therefore not *said*].

For reasons of the logical-metaphysical system in LPA, LW still nominally held to the object theory of the meaning of names there, although the differentiation between the function of representation and the function of meaning already gives the approach from which his later use conception of meaning unfolds. For, as outlined in Part I, the crucial idea in the transition from the early system to the conception within the framework of the *autonomy of grammar* is that even names and other simple signs can be explained and not merely elucidated in a circular way. The general formula for meaning of expressions is therefore, "The meaning of the word is that which the explanation of meaning explains." (PU sec. 560) For the most general meaning of 'meaning' is 'importance'. A 'significant man' is a man important in unspecified respects. And the explanation of meaning of words explains what is important about them to understand, how they are to be used (hence also 'use theory' of meaning).

Only where something is said can linguistic things be understood. What is understood is the sense of what is said. As intelligibility in general, 'sense' expresses a formal concept.

If a perceptual predicate is characterized by the central feature that instances of such a predicate can be pointed to in typical situations of its use - including its situation of introduction in ostensive explanation - then 'sense' is never a perceptual predicate. We are entitled to the use of 'sense', in whatever of its uses, only by and in inference.

This is already true for the basic meaning of 'sense', namely direction (cf. clockwise; in

German: ›Uhrzeigerrichtung‹). We infer the direction of a movement from its starting point (from which it *moves away*). The direction of a movement leads from its starting point to its destination (if it has one). It is the mediator between the starting point and the goal and in this respect makes the movement rudimentarily understandable in an extended description as a movement to or towards the destination.

The character of the mediator also determines the structure of the further uses of 'sense'. Secondly, 'sense' means ability - fundamentally the perceptual abilities associated with the senses of seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting; higher-level then in such uses as 'sense of music, beauty etc.'. Even in these uses, 'sense' is not a perceptual predicate, because an ability is something that *explains* and grounds a performance (e.g. that of vision in the eye). Abilities belong to the starting points of certain (animal) movements; on the other hand, they mediate between the bearer of the ability and his action, insofar as they make it intelligible in one respect.

Third, a non-linguistic action or a linguistic utterance can be meaningful or not, have meaning or is meaningless. A non-linguistic action is directed towards a goal or a purpose for a *reason and is meaningful to the extent* that it is appropriate to this direction, i.e. justified and in this respect comprehensible. A linguistic utterance gives something to be understood and, if successful, is intelligible as such. In these uses, too, the concept of sense characterizes something mediating the starting point and the end point and serves to make things intelligible.

But therein lies the possibility of the fourth use of ›sense‹, which can, as it were, designate forms of the results of meaningful movements. This is because the 'purpose' and the 'goal' of a directed movement or action can themselves also be called its sense, the two expressions 'purpose' and 'goal' can be replaced by 'sense'. Here the expression then also denotes the end of the movement.

Finally, the formal concept of sense, which means comprehensibility, understandability, builds on this resultative sense of 'sense'. It first summarizes the other uses of sense, all of which express ways of making things understandable, and of which Grimm's *German Dictionary* had already noted in 1903 that it is "in more recent times the only common and very ordinary (meaning of ›sense/Sinn‹)".

'Sense' in resultative use is colloquially a mixtum between generic term and formal term (variable). A generic term can be used by itself to give something to be understood, a variable requires the insertion of one of its instances to give something specific to be understood.



Another difference of colloquial formal uses of expressions to variables in formal notations can also be pointed out using 'sense'. Formal variables are type-homogeneous; formal uses of colloquial expressions need not be. A direction belongs primarily to the phenomenon of locomotion; an ability characterizes a living being capable of movement or action; goals and purposes are starting and/or ending points of certain kinds of directed movement; intelligibility is an abstract characteristic exhibited by a wide variety of phenomena and circumstances - so what the formal notion of sense sums up is not only not type-homogeneous, but belongs to different categories.

Thus, the example of the concept of meaning shows that the reference of colloquial formal uses of expressions to their unifications in formal notations is to be understood in the way LW understood his simple language games for the clarification of colloquial uses of expressions: "as (use of) *comparative object(s)*, which by similarity and dissimilarity are to throw light on the relations of our language. "

The formal term 'sense' gathers its instances, which can themselves be used formally: Direction, ability, purposes and goals, linguistic intelligibility. But it cannot simply replace them if it should not result in a distortion of the conceptual field.

This becomes clear in the examination of the difficult concept expressed by the expression 'meaning of life'. For none of the basic meanings of 'meaning' distinguished so far simply fits 'meaning' in the phrase 'meaning of life'. 'Direction' is too unspecific and weak, although the life of a living being exhibits a temporal direction from birth to death. Perceptual organ/ability (to see, hear, smell, touch, taste, etc.) is not applicable, though some who get along with their lives smoothly and happily seem to have a 'sense' of life (for life) in that meaning. Nor is the inner sense, the soul, the 'meaning of life', though it is certainly what cares about meaning (can care, not must care). Most importantly, it must be realized that the 'meaning of life' cannot be purpose or goal or intention. For a life, though 'led', is not an action. It is not even, according to Aristotle's profound distinction, an 'activity'. Aristotle distinguished between action (*ποίησις*) and activity (*πράξις*) (an anticipation of section h), and in doing so encountered a polarity that deeply structures our conceptual system.

Poiesis and praxis are the categories referring to acting living beings and correspond to the distinction between events and processes (anticipation of section e) for primarily temporally determined natural phenomena and the distinction between things/objects and masses for primarily spatially determined entities. In each case, the one member of the distinctions is

distinguished by the fact that the instances of the formal concept carry with them a criterion of identity, while those of the mass concepts do not.

Now Aristotle, with his great conceptual discovery, at the same time introduced a conceptual error into the philosophical world. 'Life' is grammatically-logically a process or an activity - i.e. a process that has no internal beginning and no internal end. (Rather, the beginning and end of a process are each events; in life, they are the events of birth at a particular time and death at a particular time). Aristotle concluded that life itself is an activity. Since there are actions only on the background (in the context) of activities, Aristotle conceived of life as a *praxis* (and Tugendhat still followed him in this when he explained the life of a person as the context of his activities). But this is descriptively misleading. For in view of its beginning in birth and its end in death, as well as with regard to many events in its course, life is essentially also a ›*Widerfahrnis*‹, *something that happens to us*.

It lies as a presupposition for everything *in* life on this side of action-theoretical distinctions, is simply a given to which the living then have to relate. This is perhaps why Heidegger spoke of *Zu-Sein* (in the sense of '*having* to lead a life'). As this given of *Zu-Sein*, life has no intention, no purpose, no goal (to call its temporal end in death its goal would be a cynical conceptual error). We have purposes *in* life, but no purpose of life, conceptually, even if we unify our purposes in life (e.g. by subordinating them to a supreme purpose). So 'meaning' in the phrase 'meaning of life' cannot mean purpose or goal or intention, at least not without teleological distortion of its descriptive character. Finally, 'meaning' in the phrase 'meaning of life' cannot simply mean 'intelligibility' either because of the descriptive character of 'life' as *Zu-Sein*. We do not have the distance to our life of merely wanting to be able to understand it.

I have therefore proposed to reduce intelligibility in the context of 'meaning of life' to an attributive modification and to understand the *meaning of life* as its *acceptability as intelligible to the one leading the life*. The relativization to the one leading the life takes into account the descriptive circumstance that no one can judge or even deny the meaning of another's life. If someone said to me 'Your life is meaningless', I would consider that an impertinence or would simply shrug my shoulders. Because the judge of the meaning of my life would in effect only say 'I don't want to live a life like yours'. He would only be talking about himself and thus, against his will, confirming the reference of the question of the meaning of life to the person asking it, the reference, in other words, that Heidegger called 'Jemeinigkeit'.

The relativization of the question of the meaning of life to the one leading life and the one

asking the question also takes into account the fact that life essentially consists of activities/actions *and* experiences and is fundamentally itself an experience happening to us (religiously one would certainly speak of 'gift').

### *b. Concept of language*

The *linguistic turn* at the beginning of the 20th century remained within the framework of Kant's conception of philosophy in his *Logic*, according to which the philosopher 'only (makes) given concepts clear'. It is dominantly associated with the work of Frege, but there are reasonable doubts that already he brought it about. For Frege was first and foremost a *logician* who conceived of propositions as functions, solved with the quantification theory the problem of multiple generalization unsolved in syllogistic logic, and presented the first complete formalization of 1st level predicate logic that was possible on this basis. His logicist project of tracing mathematics (arithmetic) back to logic failed because of the class paradox discovered by Bertrand Russell and communicated to Frege ('Does the class of all classes that do not contain themselves contain itself or not?'). It was essentially only after this destruction of his formal project that Frege turned to the *philosophy of logic*, and in its context made some insightful observations and remarks about language. But logic he understood as a normative nomological 'science of the general laws of truth'. It had to deal with thoughts as the meanings of propositions and thought-structures in a Platonic third realm (as distinct from the realms of the physical and the mental of subjective ideas).

For LW, on the other hand, logic was not essentially science, but the most general condition of sense - he even considered the effort to axiomatize it, in which Frege and Russell had set their ambition, to be misleading (LPA 6.127; cf. 5.43). Logic gives the criteria for distinguishing sense from nonsense, whereby 'One/I/ must *begin with* the distinction between sense and nonsense. Before it, nothing is possible. (For otherwise I cannot speak at all.)' Although Frege had already conceived of thought essentially as the sense of a proposition, he had unfolded the concept of sense not from propositions but from singular terms. This led him, in *logic* conceived in terms of function theory, also to conceive of propositions as 'complex' names of truth-values, with the counterintuitive consequence that all true propositions must

have different sense but the same reference ('the true'). The departure from singular terms brings the notion of sense back under the dominance of the notion of meaning recorded in object theory, which confuses the bearer of the name with its meaning (its use for address and reference). There is no better example in the context of linguistic philosophy of the German idiom that something is 'wrongly bridled' ('falsch aufgezäumt'). It was only LW who took seriously the special functional position of propositions, the primacy of the smallest unit of language, with whose isolated use something can explicitly be given to be understood. Therefore, despite the influential tradition to the contrary, the linguistic turn should be understood as having been definitively accomplished by LW.

It is all the more surprising that LW was sceptical about a general concept of language. He thought that we take up the concept when we learn our mother tongue and only arrive at a quasi-sortal concept of language as that of mutually more or less related realities. Because there should be no general explanations of language, 'language' was for him only a "collective name" ("Sammelname") for various sign systems.

But LW's insight into the internal relation of meaning and explanation of meaning makes possible a concept of language formed, as it were, from the outside, contrary to his own misgivings. For this, one must form the more general formal concept 'medium of expression and representation'. Then, as the universal medium of meaning - of being and making intelligible - language emerges. Its concept is the only instance of the formal concept '*universal* medium of expression and representation' that we know. This becomes clear by comparison with other media of expression and representation. If in these media (dance, drama; painting, sculpture, architecture; etc.) something is incomprehensible and is to be made comprehensible, it must be spoken about, language must be used in order to clarify it. But if something linguistic is incomprehensible, then language itself must and can be used to clarify it. Language is therefore the only *universal* medium of expression and representation, because it is as far as possible *self-explanatory*. That is why it was formulated in the previous section that linguistic actions are, if felicitous, "intelligible as such".

As a medium (mediator), language consists of sentences (and connections between them: sentence systems or language games). Sentences, in turn, consist of words, are linkages of words. Sentences express propositions that have sense (i.e. something that is intelligible or claims to be). Words have meaning (importance), which lies essentially in their contribution to the meaning of sentences/propositions. The self-explanatory character of language starts with

its smallest meaningful units, words. For the meaning of words can be explained so essentially that LW could say directly: "The meaning of the word is what the explanation of the meaning explains."

This can be demonstrated most impressively by the indicative or ostensive explanations of meaning already discussed several times. In such explanations, the meaning of words (expressions) is first of all calibrated to elements of reality as paradigms by means of the sentence form 'This is a/the/that ...' in connection with a pointing gesture '—>' for what is given in perception or in active interaction. If an ambiguity or a misunderstanding arises with regard to a word explained in this way, then the paradigm itself can enter the propositional context instead of the word in order to clarify it, e.g. in the sentence form 'It doesn't look like this —>'. So, in this case, the word is replaced by its ostensive explanation itself. This initially demonstrates the equivalence of the meaning of the word and its ostensive explanation. But reflection on this practice leads to broader insight, especially with regard to the relation between language and reality.

For if one asks whether the paradigms in ostensive explanations of meaning belong to language or to reality, then it is "the most natural thing to do, and causes the least confusion, if we count the paradigms among the tools of language", even if they do not "belong to the language of words". But this means that there is an *internal*, essential or necessary *relation* between language and (subject to a terminological correction yet to be made) reality - *a relation that cannot not exist*. Language, even as a medium, is already objectively and essentially related or directed to reality. That this is essentially based on the self-explanatory potential of language, Wittgenstein has stated in this résumé of his reflections on its concept: "The connection between language and reality is made by the word-explanations, - which belong to the grammar (>Sprachlehre<), so that language remains closed in itself, autonomous."

This kind of directedness has been called *intentionality* in the tradition of philosophy. The term is derived from the Latin verb *intendere*, which has many related meanings, two of which are of interest here – to turn oneself to something (*sich richten auf*) and to intend something (*beabsichtigen*). The noun *intentio* means to pay attention to; then intention and, in legal language, accusation.

Via the basic meaning *sich richten auf*, 'intention' is related to the conceptual field of 'sense', the basic meaning of which was also 'direction'. In the philosophy of consciousness tradition of the modern period, taking up medieval Latin philosophical terminology, intentionality has been

ascribed as an essential characteristic to the consciousness of something (an 'object') or to the cognizing or active mind. In philosophizing after the turn to language, the first locus of intentionality is taken to be language as the medium of meaning and understanding.

This seems paradoxical at first, especially in view of the meaning of *intention* as *intent*. It is persons that have intentions in their activity and action. For persons, language is a technique of expression and representation, which they use habitually, but also explicitly intentionally, when they want to make something understood. Intentionality qua intentionality then seems to be able to characterize language only derivatively, for certainly people invented and created language (and developed, formed themselves into persons by using it).

But the appearance of paradox is deceptive. Action is essentially behavior for a reason or reasons. And a reason is what can be *said for* an opinion or a course of action. The intention of an action is its first and immediate reason, and it is this reason that an agent must (be able to) be *asked about* when an observer is in doubt. There is thus an internal relation between the concept of action and language; in other words, we reckon with action in the full sense only in the case of speaking living beings, persons. [Other living beings and entities move/are moving and produce effects on (and in) their environment, but they do not act]. If, then, persons live with and in a developed language, and if this language, by its rules, both makes possible and restricts their wanting to express themselves, it is not at all paradoxical to regard language as the medium of meaning as the first locus of intentionality, and the intentionality of the person as conditioned by his command of language.

The use of intentional expression and intentional representations - in the case of propositions - displays intentionality in the fact that they can be fulfilled or non-fulfilled or (in assertive mode) true or false. This to be understood as a fundamental way of modalization. In them, people have distanced what surrounds them in an environment (their ecological niche) into the *world* as a space of possibilities, from which the one that applies is selected in each case of use of a proposition and all others (including the opposite one) are excluded.

Language as a medium of sense (understandable) is a mediator between, on the one hand, the persons as speakers of language and what they can understand with and in it - sense as a correlate of understanding; and, on the other hand, between them and what has so far been called reality or world. So the reflexive clarification of the basic concepts of everyday understanding could turn from the concept of language both to the concept of the person (the one mediated pole) and to the connection of sense as correlate of understanding with reality.

Here I choose the first way.

### *c. Concept of the person*

One's attention is drawn to the basic conceptual status of *person* by the striking difference between natural language and the formal notation of predicate logic. In the latter, there is only one type of individual variable (variable name): 'x' ('y,z,...'). This is the formal counterpart of the indefinite pronoun 'something', whose corresponding noun (nominalization) is the formal term *object*. Colloquial language, on the other hand, contains, alongside 'something', another indefinite pronoun of equal rank, 'someone'. *Person* in the formal sense is thus the nominalization of *someone* as *object* is the nominalization of *something*.

There is much to infer from this observation. What is something is not someone - and vice versa. Objects and persons are mutually exclusive formal classes in natural understanding. Only formal logic subsumes persons as individuals also under the concept of object. The universe of discourse of logic, because it refers to everything that is individual or treated as individual, refers to 'entities'.

Since formal concepts are already (implicitly) given with each of their instances (and, unlike material concepts, cannot be empty), the distinction has ontological implications (i.e. implications with respect to the question of what there really is). This is also the case in predicate logic or quantification theory because, among other things, it is not entirely formal in the presupposition of a non-empty domain of discourse. The use of the individual variable 'x' implies that there is something/objects. In quantification theory, even the principle 'to be is to be the value of a variable' holds. As an explication of our colloquial sense of 'there is' (existence), this is controversial, because it makes existence an exclusively general fact, but colloquially there is an intuition that singular existence ['x is (there)'] must be primary. Be that as it may, it is safe to say: whatever we have reason to form variables for (a certain type of general expression), there are certainly specimens of; otherwise the use of the type of expression would be unintelligible, unfounded.

If now the indefinite pronouns are the colloquial preforms of variables, this means: Relative to our colloquial and insofar basic, because everywhere presupposed conceptual system, there are persons besides objects, because there is the indefinite pronoun 'someone', for which the rule 'someone is not (merely) something' holds. (This rule is suspended by the predicate

calculus).

Concerning the term 'sense' it had to be said that in colloquial usage it forms a mixtum between material generic term and variable, so that the strict separation of material and formal usage exists only analytically. Something comparable must be said of the expression 'person'. The closest to purely formal usage is when 'person' is used as a word of measurement and countability (sc. 'There were so-and-so-many persons present').

The material aspects of the concept of person are encountered when we ask ourselves what the instances of 'someone' are. Since we naturally assume that only humans form the symbolic structure of their person, the immediate answer is: living beings of the genus *homo sapiens sapiens*. The members of this genus that are persons already speak essentially. So persons are first of all speaking living beings. The argument for this is based on the fact that persons essentially have their personal name by which they can be addressed and referred to. It is reasonable to address only beings that can answer (if they want to). The formation of this form of expression would therefore be incomprehensible, unfounded, if persons were not speaking living beings.

Still preceding the characteristic 'speaking' is the characteristic 'active/acting'. For the use of language in general is an activity, the use of sentences in assertions, questions, wishes, commands (speech acts) are actions. But not all activities/actions are linguistic. Therefore, the determination 'active/acting' factually still precedes the determination 'speaking' in the attributive characterization of 'living beings'. From 'speaking' and 'acting', the third central characteristic of persons is derivable, self-evaluation. Whoever speaks and seriously wants to make something understood must try to say something correct (true; fulfillable). His utterances are thus fundamentally subject to a normative evaluation of right or wrong. His use of language is in this respect participation in a normatively regulated practice. However, someone is only a competent participant in this practice when he is also able to correct himself, at least in cases of slips of the tongue or empirical error. In this respect, speaking beings are essentially self-evaluating beings. Because of the success-orientation of purposive action, self-evaluation is also necessary for non-linguistic action. The agent must be able to evaluate his own actions as successful or unsuccessful. So a person materially is a speaking, acting and essentially self-evaluating living being. In the context of pragmatics regulated by other than linguistic norms, the concept of person will have to be further defined in section *h*.

Because there is an essential connection between language and reality, as can be seen from



the discussions about sense (*a.*), reality, in contrast to environment or surroundings, only exists for persons who have the command of language. In this respect there is an essential connection between sense, language as a medium of sense, persons as understanding sense and reality.

However, it has already been noted in the introduction of the internal connection between language and reality that a terminological differentiation is still advisable with regard to the expression reality. This is the subject of the following section.

#### *d. The concepts of 'world' and 'reality'*

'World', because the word allows the grammatical articles, quantificational expressions and the plural, expresses a sortal term for wholes (e.g. 'the world of sport'). 'Reality' is an abstract expression for the middle modality between possibility and necessity. One need not concern oneself with the word- and concept-history of 'world'. For it was LW, because he first clearly grasped the concept of a formal concept, who was also the first to explain 'world' as a formal concept. It is, in LPA, the variable expressed by the general form of the proposition, or rather: its objective correlate. (LPA 4.5; 6) Until Wittgenstein, philosophy understood itself fundamentally as science and ultimately metaphysics (the science of everything) and therefore used a cosmological concept of the world as the totality of what there is (exists). Wittgenstein used both expressions, 'world' and 'reality' as formal expressions for totals of everything, because he saw between them a connection established by the language-mediation of our understanding.

One of Wittgenstein's concise formulations for the connection between language and reality has already been cited. For the language-analytical view, the connection is based on the (possible) word explanations that belong to grammar, so that language remains self-contained, autonomous.

That Wittgenstein wrote 'reality' in this formulation has a reason in his intellectual development. In his first book LPA, which was the only one published during his lifetime (with a 2<sup>nd</sup> edition 1934), he had used both expressions for the totality of what is given to subjects (persons), which are interrelated: 'world' and 'reality'. In this duality, the ontology of LPA already takes into account the basic methodological insight of the linguistic conception: That subjects/persons can *objectively* access the given only in the propositions of language. Of course, we also see, hear, smell, taste and touch given things, but they become *objective* (i.e. at

least: intersubjectively verifiable) and scrutable to us only as represented in propositions.

The propositions that LPA is primarily interested in are those that can be used in assertions (to make truth claims). These propositions are essentially true or false when asserted. But to be true and (or) false, they must make sense = be intelligible, the sense of assertively usable propositions consisting precisely in their being able to be true-or-false ('truth-value potential'). The two expressions 'world' and 'reality' are related to propositions and, via them, to the distinction between truth-or-falsity on the one hand and sense = intelligibility on the other. For Wittgenstein, world was the totality of facts (= true propositions), reality the totality of the sensible = intelligible. Nevertheless, TLP 2.063 says: "The whole of reality is the world." This is not immediately compatible with the given explanation. By 'the whole of reality' here must be meant the totality of true propositions + the totality of false propositions + the totality of propositions still undecided. It becomes compatible with the given further explanation of 'reality' in *Tractatus* 2.04 and 2.06 by the interpretation that LW, with the world-inclusive explanation of reality in LPA 2.063, wanted to state that for our propositional understanding what is given and what can be seen as true is completely determined only in the light also of the possibilities excluded (as false) and of those seen as still undecided. If this interpretation is accepted, the explanation can be maintained with reference to it, that reality contains all possibilities (all sensible/understandable), world all true (factual).

Now this assignment does not take into account a linguistic connection that exists in German - that between 'Wirklichkeit' ('reality') and 'wirken': 'reality' also means 'everything that is effected (bewirkt)'. The expression thus alludes to causal relations that are factual, not merely symbolically representing (linguistic) ones. From this observation it could have been preferable for LW, as someone who lived in England for a long time but almost always wrote German, to make the assignment exactly the other way round, and to understand the world as all that is sensible/understandable, reality as all that is true/factual.

I suggest that this correction be made and retained. For the connection of the expression with the alethic modalities possibility and necessity, which presumably was decisive for LW's choice, is preserved as it is, but a connection not considered by Wittgenstein is additionally taken into account. Consequently, from now on, instead of the 'internal relation between language and reality (Zusammenhang von Sprache und \*Wirklichkeit), I write of the internal relation of language and world.

*e. The concepts of space and time*

Space and time are comprehensive frameworks for what is given to us in perception and active interaction; spatial and temporal determinations form a pervasive framework for this. But although comprehensive, they are not *all-encompassing*. Rules of any kind (grammatical, semantic, arithmetical, geometrical) have no essential spatial or temporal index, since they can in principle be explained *everywhere* and *at any time* due to the universality of the medium of language. It might therefore be natural to conclude that the world as the totality of the sensible/understandable, as distinct from reality as the totality of the actual or actually possible, is not in space and time. But this would be misleading because rules require paradigmatic applications and these can have both spatial and temporal determinations as well as being real. Nevertheless, it remains that not everything is in space and time (admits spatial and temporal determinations).

There are linguistic-historical indications that in the natural understanding of everyday life spatial determinations have priority over temporal ones. First of all, the temporal expression for 'present' in German, 'Gegenwart', originally had a spatial sense and denoted what was directly given in perception and active interaction. Then, for the formal terms expressing spatial and temporal determinations, the expressions 'space' and 'time' had no use in the older language. Instead, indefinite pronouns were used, 'somehow' (>irgend<; in the sense of our present-day 'somewhere') for spatial, 'irgends' (in the sense of our present-day 'sometime') for temporal aspects. Thus, in the structure of the older (German) language, time was, in grammatical metaphor, the genitive of space.

'Space' and 'time' as expressing formal concepts are in fact 'nominalizations' corresponding indefinite pronouns. But the correspondences recoverable from the older language are incomplete. Indeed, 'space' nominalizes both 'somewhere' and 'so-and-so big/small (high, deep, wide, etc.)'. Similarly, 'time' both 'sometime' and 'so-and-so long/short (etc.)'. These dualities require further explication.

First of all, we need to consider why both spatial and temporal determinations are necessary at all for the understanding of the real. In the totality of what is given to us as 'individuals' (single entities), there are beings that are essentially capable of self-motion, namely the living beings that are animals or humans. Persons are human beings, thus also movable and self-moving. It is the fact of movement that makes us need temporal in addition to spatial

determinations.

Of course, we are not necessarily given what we treat as spatial (primarily accessible to spatial determinations) or as temporal (...) in each case. And this circumstance, for which I will give examples in a moment, is an appropriate occasion for the renewed generally valid indication that our concept formation is dependent on interests. Wittgenstein, as already indicated, stated this in general terms: "Concepts guide us to investigations. Are the expression of our interest, and direct our interest." (PU § 570) What we take to be primarily spatially determined or primarily temporally determined is largely guided by interest.

Definite descriptions of events (e.g. ›Germany's first victory in a football World Cup in 1954 *in Switzerland*‹) can also contain spatial determinations, as in the italicized component of the example, but they are not the primary focus of interest. On the other hand, primarily spatially determined things necessarily have temporal aspects. An artefact such as a chair, for example, is in our conceptual system a spatially and functionally determined single thing - it has a particular shape or form and the function of serving as furniture for sitting on (and therefore has to be spatially dimensioned in a corresponding way). But as an artifact, a chair has necessarily *been made* by someone *at some time* and, depending on the materials from which it is made, will presumably at some point no longer be able to serve its function. So a chair also has temporal aspects. But we are not interested in these in forming the spatially/functionally determined concept of a chair. For its temporal aspects, other features of language than the categorial determinacy of the expression (type) itself come up - e.g. finite verb forms like 'has been manufactured' and 'is broken/will become unusable'.

In the characterization of the temporal aspects of a spatially determined artifact, it is already implicitly claimed that there are also primarily temporally determined entities. The *life course* of a person, a *process* of definite *duration*, is bounded by the *events* of *birth* at its definite *time* (date) and *death* at some point. The expressions italicized in this sentence denote either formal expressions (process-duration; event-time) or givens (birth, life, death) that are primarily temporally determined and to be determined.

The interest-dependence of our concept formation becomes generally clear from the fact that our everyday concept system is built up 'from us (the speakers of language)'. The first evidence of this is that 'person' belongs to the quadruplicity of the basic formal-ontological concepts of sense-language-person-world/reality. In the context of space and time, this is further illustrated by the fact that their understanding is built up through the 'space of deixis'

(=of pointing out) formed by indicators, so-called in grammatical theory. For each speaker of the language, implicitly, in each situation, his/her understanding is determined from the coordinate zeros of this space, denoted by the deictic pronouns 'I/you', 'here', 'now' and 'this/that'. These indicators stand in contrast relations, which are already indicated in the slash notation in the case of the 'gegenstands'-referential ones, are formed by 'there' ('da/dort') (etc.) in the case of 'here' and by 'then' ('eben/vorhin' and 'dann/später') in the case of 'now'. In these contrasts, the indicators create a primary level of contextual individuation and identification of given items, in the case of persons by the personal pronouns per se, in the case of 'this' not without the addition of a sortal term ('this *animal*'). Contextual identification becomes objective only by the fact that the corresponding deictic expressions stand in substitutability relations to definite descriptions (of the form 'this so-and-so') and proper names. An excellent role is played by localizing expressions (of the form 'this so-and-so here/there/there/next to X/next to Y/at Z'). The complexity of the unified, spatial/temporal identification system that results from this has been elucidated to some extent in analytic philosophy.

Here the presentation refrains from the complex details and restricts itself to the formal-ontological outline. The concept of a living being that goes hand in hand with the concept of a person also has temporal aspects - living beings are spatial entities insofar as they have a *shape* (form) that is movable and moving in *space*, but also entities in *time* insofar as they are born and die and the *process* of their life between these two boundary events has a certain *duration*. Space and time are fundamental formal concepts for what is given to us in perception and active interaction.

Spatial is, *methodologically understood*, what becomes clear and descriptive for us with maps and drawings, and what we measure with weights and rods. Accordingly, *space* is the possibility of localization and dimensioning (indications of place and size). Temporal is *methodological*, what we divide and measure with calendars and clocks. Correspondingly, *time* is the possibility of temporalization (of time indications: of *dating* events and *measuring* the *duration* of processes). *Taken formally-ontologically*, space is the possibility of bodies (things) and masses; time is the possibility of events and processes. The duality of explanations (methodological / formal-ontological) corresponds to the duality of active handling and perception (observation) as sources of instruction about the given.

Bodies and masses are the types of spatial (spatially conceived or conceived) facts; events and processes are the types of temporal (temporally conceived or conceived) entities. These

dualities correspond to and are to be inferred from the logical difference between sortal concepts and mass concepts. The former capture given entities and carry with them criteria of identity for them. The latter do not. In order to form units of givens falling under mass-concepts, a (however imprecise) quantifying expression has to be added to the expressions for them (a *piece of wood*, a *sip of water*; a *little sleep*, a *while of waiting*, a *short/long life*).

Space and time, like the other basic formal concepts of everyday understanding, can be taken as nominalizations of indefinite pronouns. *Space* nominalizes *somewhere* and *so-and-so dimensioned* (big; high, wide, deep; heavy); *time* nominalizes *sometime* and *so-and-so long/short*. The modal formulation of these particulars reflects the interest-dependence of these (as of all) conceptualizations.

The expression 'possibility' in the explanations for space and time is already justified by their variable character as formal terms. For variables as a kind of generalities, a concrete designating expression can and must be used in each case, so that something definite is said, given to be understood. Spatial and temporal determinations are therefore a kind of modal determinations. In stating this, it must be remembered that modalization, as already noted above (at the end of *b.* ), characterizes language and the expression made possible in it and the representations possible in it quite fundamentally.

#### *f. The concepts for the animate and inanimate*

The distinction between the animate and the inanimate is implied by the inevitable self-determination of persons as living beings. Animals, living beings are born and die, and the result of the process of dying is death, the transition from the animate to the inanimate.

The specification of an indefinite pronoun that would be nominalized by 'animal' is more complicated than in the case of the formal terms discussed so far. The effect of this is that, with the distinction between 'someone' and 'something' that conditions the concept of person, we have given our understanding the structure of distinguishing ourselves categorically from everything else and at the same time assuming ourselves in all understanding.

Accordingly, 'some' and 'any' are indefinite pronouns for masculine and feminine persons. That we stand out from *all other living beings* is clear from the fact that when the neuter 'any' is used for a living being that is not a person, an expression for a genus or a species must be added to say something definite (some *animal*; some *dog*). That we are also distinct from

anything else is evident from the fact that 'any' can also be used for inanimate things (some object in the sense of material object, e.g. an artefact: some bowl; or in the sense of natural object: some flower).

For animate versus inanimate, the continuation of a metabolic process in the animate is definitive; for animals and humans (persons), in contrast to plants, the ability of self-motion with the potential of locomotion (change of position).

How fundamental the distinction is can be made clear by an explanation of the different modes of understanding associated with the two categories. Metaphorically, they can be characterized as understanding 'from within' as opposed to 'from without'.

In explaining the first limb of the metaphorical opposition, it becomes clear once again that our understanding starts from us, since the understanding of living things is built up from the complex to the simpler (top down). For what 'from within' means must be explained by the case of understanding persons. This understanding reckons with the fact that the individual entities of the realm have their own perspective on their acting or being acted upon. (This is, what in part I was explained as the possibility to speak of the >psychological aspect< of attributing others an inner life a priori.) The central example is the action of a person. Action is behavior for a reason/reasons. A reason is what can be *said for* doing. The simplest reason for an action is its intention - what the doer wants to achieve in/with his/her action. When in doubt, the doer must eventually be able to be *asked* about his/her intention.

We apply action verbs to animals as well - a fox *wants to chase* a mouse, the mouse *wants to flee* and *hide*, etc. But animals have no language (at least no sentence-language that we understand). They cannot say why they do something, and cannot be asked for reasons. In place of these evidential possibilities in persons, in understanding animal behavior there is a frame of reference projected by us with assumptions about the basic behavioral drives and possibilities and the welfare of the animals. The understanding of animals is thus to a good extent only functionalistic and remains, compared to the understanding of persons, schematic and already external.

We also apply action verbs to plants. A flower *aligns* its blossoms with the sun and *opens* them, etc. But here our understanding remains even more external, the underlying frame of reference even more rigid. It essentially invests assumptions about the flourishing of plants and the maintenance of plant metabolism.

In contrast to all of this, we understand the inanimate only in its set connections with other

inanimate things and their reactions to our experimental interventions, and thus entirely 'from the outside'. In the case of the inanimate, a fundamental understanding from the simple to the complex is possible (bottom up).

The fact that the two modes of understandings are irreducibly different implies that there is no guarantee that they are consistently compatible, e.g. when the top-down understanding of the animate and the bottom-up understanding of the inanimate try to explain the same thing. That's why, among other reasons, attempts to explain the emergence of life from the inanimate or the relationship between mind and brain seem to be preoccupied with unsolvable problems.

The basic distinctions discussed allow us to correct a frequently observed conceptual error. The popularization of Charles Darwin's theory of descent has led not a few contemporaries, who consider themselves particularly realistic and enlightened, to express the view that humans are also just animals, albeit perhaps the most highly evolved. The title of a popular book on human behaviour was, in this sense, 'The Naked Ape'. This mode of expression does not respect the distinction we all make in ordinary language between 'animal' and 'brute'. Humans and animals (and plants) are living beings, but humans differ from all other living beings precisely in that they are persons, speaking a propositional language. This is fixed in the basic conceptual status of the expressions 'someone/person', which, according to the matter, no one ('not a one') who uses language can do without. Anyone who pretends to forget this in equating people with brutes is simply being conceptually inconsistent.

Objects and things either simply exist or they are products, i.e. they have been produced. Living beings have been born. Things become perceptible in certain places and at certain times. These together with their nature determine their identity - what they are (and when they are one and the same).

Persons, too, become perceptible in certain places and at certain times; but because they are self-moving, the places and times of their being perceived do not yet determine their identity. Only the continuous tracing of their path through space during their lifetime could do that. Since the application of this criterion of identity for living beings, which is also the criterion of identity (the essential characteristic of identity) for persons, is not possible on a regular and reliable basis for any observer (for this he would have to spend his life observing the pursuit of the other), there is an *identity card* for persons in order to prove their identity (to prove who they are) and in order to be able to have their identity established by a third party. This confirms their birth at a certain time in a certain place and, in the situation of questionability of



a person's identity, replaces the unavailable, because inapplicable, description of their continuous path through space with a legally secured ('official') confirmation supported by the characteristics of (relatively) 'unchangeable marks' (appearance shown by the biometric photograph; body size; eye colour; fingerprints; handwritten signature).

Conceptually, then, identity cards are always what they were called in Berlin (West) after WW Two until the replacement of the four-power status for the city for the legal reasons of limited and dependent statehood of this 'special political entity': 'makeshift'. For the criterion of identity for persons is conceptually that for living beings in general - their birth at a certain place at a certain time and their subsequent continuous journey through space and time. This criterion is not empirically manageable. The identity card is manageable - it is a readable document and the persons authorized to verify the identity of a person regularly take it in their hands.

The information about date and place of birth are temporal and spatial determinations. Their anchoring in our everyday understanding was therefore a necessary topic for the consideration of meaning. The concept of time is also used person-relatively in the thematization of activities and actions. ['Action' is the 'category' to which the rubric 'personal signature' in the identity card leads, because (under)writing is essentially an action of persons].

In earlier German versions of an identity card, there was still a 'Personenstand' (civil status) section, which recorded whether a person was single, married, divorced or widowed. This took into account the fact that persons rarely live alone intentionally and permanently. Living things that are animals or humans live temporarily or permanently in community with other living things of their kind. The speculative theories about communities of life among plants, according to which, for example, trees also communicate, may be left to their own devices. Animals in any case live in families, flocks, swarms, herds, nations, and other groups; humans, because of the long-term dependence of their offspring, live in any case initially and normally in families, later in groups of friends and neighbours, colleagues, communities and comprehensively in societies and states. Because of the preliminary forms of human community formation in the animal kingdom, the distinction between the animate and the inanimate is the decisive closer hinge between the previous basic concepts, which are also those of a merely physical world, and the world of persons, whose basic concepts will be the subject of the rest of the presentation. But even the merely physical world, like our understanding as a whole, also pragmatically presupposes persons and the fourfoldness of the

formal-ontological basic concepts (above *b.* to *e.*).

The understandings of persons on the one hand, inanimate on the other, could not be further apart. Nevertheless, in the philosophical tradition the distance has still been exaggerated. This is because living has been understood primarily as being active, and life (of a person) as the chain of his or her activities. Conceptually, this is based on an action-theoretical distinction by Aristotle, which has been mentioned before and will be discussed in the section after next. But already here, descriptively (as already in *a.* ), it can be noted again that a person's life certainly consists not only of his activities and actions, but just as much of adversities - that which is done to us or happens to us; which we can only accept and to which we can only find an attitude, without it ever becoming our own doing. It must even be said that (animal and human) life itself, according to its beginning in a birth and its end in death, is a ›Widerfahrnis‹, something that happens to us. So whatever life (as a process) may have to do conceptually with doing, activities and actions, it must not be equated with them. It is best understood as a prerequisite for everything else in life (as a temporal whole).

In order to be able to discuss the basic concepts of the world of persons adequately, however, it is first necessary to further define the material concept of persons.

#### *g. Continuation of the definition of the person*

The concept of the person has been formally explained in (c.) as that of the (a propositional language) speaking living being and materially as an acting/acting, speaking and already therein self-evaluating animal. In (f.) it has been further shown in considerations about the institution of the identity card, that persons are obviously the most complex individuals, whose understanding is needed to understand the context of everyday understanding, because it either presupposes or even explicitly uses all other basic concepts treated so far.

The overarching feature in the determination of 'person' is self-evaluation. This has been introduced via the idea that whoever speaks seriously must claim to say something right, and that implicit in this is the capacity for self-correction in case of slip or error.

Whoever says something right has, on the basis of the mere acceptance or even the explicit approval by his listeners and communication partners, a *recognized entitlement* to what he has expressed, an epistemic (claim) *right*. In this already lies the continued determination of the person as a *bearer of rights*, which, not limited to epistemic claims, is presupposed for the non-

linguistic normative orders of coexistence. A preliminary form of the rights-bearer is the person already as an agent or doer. For the latter can be understood as implicitly claiming, in being active or acting, not to be prevented from doing so by other persons. And this claim, if it is not hindered or not contradicted ('You can't do that'), is implicitly recognized or at least accepted. Already being active and acting are normative conditions in *statu nascendi*. This is to be kept in mind when the presentation now turns to the basic concepts of the world of persons, first of all to the concepts of activity and action themselves.

#### *h. The concepts of doing, activity and action*

The term 'acting' is unsuitable as an expression that describes the whole conceptual field of being active and acting. I prefer the expression 'doing' in contrast to 'suffering'. In this usage the expression functions, as it were, as a heading to a section of philosophical grammar. For if actions in contrast with activities are only ways of doing, the simultaneous use of 'action' as a categorical expression can only lead to confusion. The general term, then, would be that of doing. How is it explained?

The answer is a restatement of the criterion already used for living things - which, unlike inanimate entities, have their own view of their behavior. Doing is a *way of behaving for which something can be said* from the point of view of the one to whom the behavior is attributed or who ascribes it to himself - or in short: a doing is a behavior for a reason. A reason is not always a goal that the one behaving wants to achieve with his action (this is why too much is claimed with a 'teleological structure' for all notions of action by e.g. Tugendhat and Habermas). For some activity (e.g. playing the piano), the person performing it can perhaps only cite as a reason that he can do it and likes doing it - but then to address 'doing something he likes doing' as his goal expresses a hedonistic/utilitarian fallacy. To this one is additionally tempted by talk of 'self-purposes' in the context of activities. Talk of self-purposes, doing something 'for its own sake', presupposes, after all, a self-application of the means/purpose distinction: self-purposes are those purposes that are not supposed to be means for any other purposes; and this self-application of the distinction is only an expression of the determination to relate all doing to purposes, to conceive of it as having a teleological structure. Without such determination, however, one should not do so for reasons of descriptive adequacy.

Extensive discussions about the 'rationality' aspects of 'actions' and 'understanding actions', which authors such as Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas believe they have to make, are dispensable, they follow from the definition of the concept of doing in general. One must understand reasons for behaviour if one is to understand behaviour as doing, action or activity. Although what can be said for a behavior, the reason it has, need not be uttered by the behaving, the reason of its behavior must nevertheless be given from the point of view/perspective of the behaving. This makes it probable that we would not have the concept of doing, of behaving for a reason, if we did not give each other reasons for our behaviour, i.e. if we were not as persons speaking, language-using, self-evaluating animals. We reckon with doing, with reasoned behaviour in the full sense, only in the case of beings whom we must be able to ask for their reasons in case of doubt. I.e. further, that the expressions for doing belong to the in the broad sense psychological language, that part of language which, as LW has shown, presupposes a general attitude, the taking of a 'steady aspect', which LW called the 'attitude to the soul' or 'to the human being', by which we grant living beings like us an 'inner life' a priori ('inside' are aspects of their behaviour which they can express or conceal).

Doing (which logically, because of the yes-no polarity of all descriptions, the 'logical space' so called by LW, also includes omission - even 'doing nothing' or 'not doing something' can have a reason) now fundamentally breaks down into activities and actions. The difference thus made, already commented on, is a formal one, which the language for doing takes over from the language for temporally determinable entities and circumstances in general - the difference between processes and events.

Accordingly, activities, like processes, primarily have a certain duration, actions, like events, a point in time as their date. Activities are 'homogeneous' events in themselves, actions are changes from one state to another. Aristotle grasped this difference as that of *praxis* and *poiesis*. An activity has no logically (internally) determined end, but an action ends logically in the realization of a state. One can, as Aristotle put it, have already seen and still see, but not have built a certain house and still build it. ('Seeing' is a bad example of an activity, because it rather denotes a state - with this example Aristotle is perhaps sitting on a myth of the 'verb' / 'activity word', according to which every verb denotes either an action or an activity. I.e., for example, 'to swim' is an activity, a practice, but 'to swim to the other side of the river' is an action. Similarly, building is an activity (what architects and builders do), but building a specific wall (or a - particular - house) is an action. There is much to suggest that actions exist

at all only on the background and in the context of activities - or at any rate in the context of life. 'Life' is not itself an activity (for life, as has already been emphasized several times, essentially also includes experiences and suffering; indeed, after its beginning in birth and its end in death, life itself is logically presumably an experience), but the precondition of both activities and actions. In the case of 'experiences' (>Widerfahrnisse<, things that happen to us) one must not, as the colloquial language suggests, think of 'negative' events alone. Also 'positive' things can happen to us without our doing, we can simply have been lucky with something.

With activities, life shares the logical character of being a process, of not having an internal end for logical reasons: One can have already lived and still be living.

Speaking, the use of language, is an activity, speech acts by using sentences in a certain mode (assertion, question, command, wish etc.) are actions. The use of language does not always consist in certain speech acts. Chatting with someone, talking to oneself, cursing, swearing, giving vent to one's feelings in prayers, etc., but also thinking and other 'monological' use of language are certainly not speech acts that carry with them criteria of identity for individual actions.

That no theory of action, philosophical or sociological, can eliminate the distinction between activities and actions is due to its deep anchoring in our ordinary conceptual system. Aristotle's criterion draws attention to the fact that the distinction is anchored in the logical grammar of language - namely, in the relations of inference (logic) of the tempora of the corresponding verbs (grammar). The study of temporal language has shown that it rests as a whole on language for things and masses (and living beings, especially persons). Therefore, processes and events must be anchored to substrata or things or in situations, and activities and actions must be attributed to persons. The non-observance of the distinction between activities and actions is a 'logical' error, which, because of the deep anchoring and wide ramification of the formal distinction, which is continued with it in the field of doing. It not only entails a 'local' disturbance and confusion, but must have, or at any rate can have, widely (and above all uncontrollably) disorienting consequences.

*i. Contexts of doing: The concepts of 'nature' and 'art' (culture)*

The term 'nature' is a loanword from Latin meaning 'birth'; 'law of nature', 'course of things';

'essence' (both 'character, disposition, constitution'; and 'thing, basic substance, element'); also 'sexual characteristic', part'. It derives from the Latin verb 'nasci, nascor, natus sum', which means fundamentally 'to be born', and overlaps in part with the Greek 'physis', which derives from a verb for 'to grow, to come into being'.

In our language, the term 'nature' has a number of expressions used in contrast to it, of which the philosophically most important are 'mind', 'culture/civilization' and, since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, 'society' and 'history'. I defend the conceptual claim that these contrasts are derived from an underlying contrast.

In the contrasts to 'spirit', 'culture', 'society', 'history' and used as a formal term, 'nature' is ascribed a negative pragmatic content and is understood as that which arises, exists and develops without our essential intervention. But the conditions denoted by the contrasts more commonly used today, while certainly not without our intervention, do not exist and develop solely because of our doing. For them, the Scottish social theorist Adam Ferguson (Adam Smith's teacher) found the happy formula that they are >the result of human action, but not of human design<. The perfect antithesis to 'nature' as that which exists without our essential intervention, etc., would be an expression denoting something that exists essentially through our doing.

In elder discourses, the term 'art' was used for this in the sense of the Latin *ars* and the Greek *technē*, which denotes the (artistic) skill and technique of production and design as their results as well. An 'artefact' (a 'work of art') exists essentially because of the intention of its producer or commissioner, does not, like products of nature, have an 'essence' in the sense of 'character, disposition, constitution' essentially independent of human intention. 'Spirit', 'culture', 'history' and 'society' are - compared to art as being based on human planning and production - as various mixtures of (different parts of) art and nature rather 'second nature', as was already said by Cicero about habit.

If art is, for the reasons given, the fundamental antithesis of nature, then this basic distinction structuring our understanding also confirms once again that we 'start from ourselves' in our understanding. It contrasts what we can do with what we cannot, insofar as it is fundamentally independent of us.

With the reference to the person as a 'animal', as a 'living thing', reference is at the same time made to the 'natural', something that comes into being and exists independently of our actions. In the case of mobile animals, it is born and then lives until it dies.

Nature in the sense explained is the most comprehensive context of human activity. People must derive their livelihood and sustenance from it through work. In the process of work, the material basis of culture/civilization arises, including acquired means for facilitating and increasing the effectiveness of work - technology. This helps to save labour and enables higher cultural achievements through social releases, including art in the ordinary sense of purposeless products of visual and other expression.

In art and the arts (in the sense of *artes* and *technai*), persons produce the culture (of their society). The total of what is produced constitutes culture and thus an essential context of their activity, which stands out from nature as the context from which persons must extract their mere (physical) life through work, and which over-shapes it, but can never entirely replace it. And this conceptually even when the nature that persons (cooperatively) work on is already culturally shaped (cf. the talk of '*cultural landscapes*'). Action in nature, even where it takes place cooperatively, is 'monological' in its structure - the natural conditions do not respond, but merely submit, or not, to the interventions of labour and technology. Action in relation to cultural conditions, in the context of culture, is structurally dialogical in terms of possibility, because not only cooperating partners 'say something' to persons, but also the cultural productions that already exist and form the inherited culture. Accordingly, in the context of acting on nature, the mode of understanding 'from outside' prevails, to which we are limited for 'inanimate things' (things that are not mobile by themselves), but in the context of acting in culture, the intentional mode of understanding 'from within' prevails.

*j. Orders of action: the concepts of 'convention', 'morality' and 'law'.*

The essential self-awareness of a person as a rights-bearer is to be one of all persons. We are, live among others, among incalculably many. We live by being active and acting, and by being exposed to many adversities. Among these adversities, an essential group is the consequences of the action of other persons for us. This is the source of potential conflicts, and the three normative realities denoted by the title of this section constitute orders of action that help to avoid such conflicts or, if they cannot be avoided, to resolve them in conflict.

*Conventions*, derived from the Latin verb *convenire* - to come together, to agree - are

agreements, ideally made by explicit intentional convention, that is, by the use of language. But language is itself conventional in various respects, and an explanation of 'convention' by 'agreement to ...' would therefore be circular. It was one of the great merits of the American philosopher David Lewis to have convincingly dispelled this problem in his 1969 book *Convention*. Lewis made it clear that explicit agreement is only one of the ways in which conventions come about, and that conventions can more fundamentally be based on the convergence of independently formed expectations and preferences of persons. If the preference orders of persons coincide with respect to shared but not yet coordinated interests, a convention can evolve with respect to factual situations requiring regulation without the need for explicit agreement. Lewis saw his highly sophisticated analyses prefigured by David Hume's formula for convention as the 'general sense of common interest'.

Conventions can apply to very different subjects and to very different groups of people. Of general and philosophical interest are above all the conventions in which large groups agree, e.g. which language should be used and how interpersonal dealings should be conducted in general.

Morality and law apply to all persons (in a society and the state in which it is organised, and beyond) and they have as a common theme the (conflict-avoiding) regulation of interpersonal interaction as such. Morality and law overlap in large parts. They both fall under a formal concept of justice, the content of which is indicated by the Latin formula *suum cuique*. Hence Kant's general concept of law - 'law' as the epitome of the conditions under which the freedom of everyone (any person) is compatible with the freedom of everyone (all other persons) - is applicable to both morality and formal law. In what then do they differ?

Fundamental by the way of their sanctioning. Morality and its rules are initially sanctioned by moral feelings - 1<sup>st</sup> person shame, 2<sup>nd</sup> person resentment, 3<sup>rd</sup> person indignation. These are obviously attitudes and ways of reacting that are tied to the way and degree in which persons evaluate themselves. Law and its rules, on the other hand, are backed by sanctions, punishments in the broadest sense, that are themselves legally specified. Law is essentially coercive and requires enforcing agencies - police, courts, prisons, etc. It generally presupposes the state organization of a society.

Materially, morality and law agree in that they centrally contain rules of non-injury and non-harm, help in emergencies, and loyalty to cooperation. The philosopher Ernst Tugendhat calls these the "contractualist core" of morality. His student Ursula Wolf adds to the domains of



morality justice, sincerity, and special obligations based on institutional roles and/or personal commitments. If one considers justice as a formal concept for morality and law alike, given by the formula *suum cuique* (to each his own), then it is not only a domain of morality. But one needs the term as a formal one if one wants to group the legal institutions of justice (what is called in English 'the administration of justice') with the kinds of justice that can be understood as forms of distributive justice (under the question "Who gets what for what reasons?"). To do this, one cannot get by with the concept of distributive justice alone. For punishments and compensations as 'products' of formal law are not simply distributable goods. A special moral duty of justice, linking morality and law, is that of obedience to the law.

If morality and law are internally related at least in the ways indicated, a further determination of the concept of morality becomes mandatory. Talk of the contractualist core of morality and law points the way here. Agreed rules can be followed (and violated) for merely self-interested reasons. Rule-following becomes moral only when the rules are followed as valid ones, as it were, for their own sake. Kant captured this with the distinction between 'dutifully' and 'out of duty'. That the rules are followed as it were for their own sake (Kant's 'respect for the law') allows for the subsequent description that they are followed out of respect for the other persons who are bearer of claim rights on the basis of these rules. Thus, as opposed to the matter of morality in its rules, the form of their acceptance and observance out of a personal motive is emphasized, and the concept of *a person's morality* (as the epitome of his principles of giving himself, acting, and acting towards other persons) becomes fundamental. It is a question of moral history since when this shift from the matter of morality in its rules to the form of moral motivation as characterizing morality took hold. What is certain is that it is characteristic of modernity.

If acting according to the rules of morality is 'moral' in the modern sense, then it is followed like legal rules without formal sanctions. If the concept of *a person's morality* has become fundamental, the 'internal' sanctions through moral feelings also lose weight, because the moral agent is then essentially concerned with preserving his integrity: he then wants to act in such a way that he can justify his actions to everyone with reasons. Law thus provides morality with the model of rule-following, morality essentially provides law with the matter of rules.

Complementary to the continued and modern concept of morality, there is a need for a continued definition of the concept of law. It can be asked: If moral rules are followed like legal ones, and morality gives matter to law, why is law needed at all in addition to morality?

The answer is: law, with its formal sanctions, is needed as a fallback guarantee for weighty cases of violation of the moral rules. Persons, as speaking creatures, are reason-giving and reason-following and thus rational creatures. But that they are rational to a limited extent only is shown by the fact that they often find themselves in situations of action in which they are motivated to pursue their own short-term interest at the expense of their own long-term interests and also at the expense of others in violation of their entitlements. If this is rationally unavoidable, because 'free-riding' is *rational* in anonymous action situations (in which one cannot communicate directly with other persons affected by one's own actions), then there is at least a need for the subsequent formal sanctionability of rule violations in order to stabilize the rules and the action contexts based on them. It would burden the individual persons with unbearable uncertainties of expectation if the framework of formal law did not exist for moral and also for merely rational action.

*k. The concepts of 'society' and 'state'*

Society and state consist of persons. Persons were to be explained as speaking, acting and essentially self-evaluating animals and as rights-bearers. If one characterizes society and the state not ontologically (as in the first sentence) but structurally, they are ways of ordering persons to (each other). They are higher-level orders of doing - of being active and acting.

'Society' in the structural sense has already been discussed in section *i*. as one of the common contrasts to 'nature'. Above all, it is the example on which Ferguson exemplified his formula of the 'result of human action, but not of human design'. Society results centrally from economic action in markets, in which each person (ideally speaking) pursues his or her private advantage and thus generates unintended consequences of action (such as the pricing of marketable products), which can have effects on others not directly involved (e.g. reduce or increase the demand for their products) and generate conflicts. In modern societies, action in markets is organised under private law, mediated by contracts to which the provisions of state law apply. Already from the necessity of law for society in this respect, societies exist only in a state constitution. The state is to be understood here as the law-making, law-keeping and law-enforcing authority.

But as consisting of the persons who also constitute society, the state is previously the totality of its citizens as following and subject to the same law, community of law. Only on this

basis is it specifically state 'apparatus' - the totality of agencies capable of acting, concerned with law-making, law-keeping and law-enforcement: Parliaments, administrations, courts. The coercive character of the state in this sense results from the fact that its citizens have to pay taxes to finance it.

Structurally, this is again due to the limited rationality of individuals. It is rational for each individual to want to avoid the costs to the state; for their individual contribution, however large, is negligible for the whole; but for the individual it is almost always a tangible sacrifice. This structural disposition to fare evasion ('free-riding') is helped by compulsory financing through taxes.

Macroeconomic analysis based on rational decision and game theory has taught to distinguish between private and public goods. Public goods are defined by the fact that they are indivisible (non-excludable) and therefore cannot be provided 'efficiently' (sufficiently) in markets of privately produced goods. That the fundamental social public good is the absence of violence and the security of social intercourse, the 'internal peace', was already recognized by Thomas Hobbes - the first modern state theorist - by taking seriously the truth of the proverb that the most pious cannot live in peace if it does not please his wicked neighbour.

From the perspective of individuals, the state as a guarantor of law and security is a collective self-binding mechanism against the threat of lack of peacefulness of individuals for themselves. Other public goods (besides internal and external security) that a state 'produces' are, for example, infrastructure goods such as roads and bridges, educational and cultural services, health services.

By analogy with the understanding of the state as a collective self-binding mechanism, the market-like constitution of society - the coercion exerted by competition in markets - can be understood as the collective self-binding of society's members against the threat that individuals might try to take advantage of their laziness for themselves. The individual model for 'self-binding' is, of course, Odysseus, who allows himself to be bound to the mast of his ship because he wants to listen to the sirens' song without falling prey to them. (By 'self-binding' he insures himself against becoming a victim of his impulsiveness).

Modern state-organized societies like to think of themselves as 'democracies' (literally 'rule by the people'). However, even if they have universal and equal suffrage to political representative bodies, they are not ruled by 'the people' or the population. In constitutional theory, all states calling themselves democratic have 'mixed constitutions'. Their democratic

element is universal suffrage and the protection of law and peace internally and externally for all; their aristocratic element is the office-bearers in politics, law and administration; their monarchical element is the person or body who acts as 'head of state'. This interpretation is based, with regard to the aristocratic aspects of the mixed modern state constitution, on sociological grounds - that the state bearers are de facto an elite; with regard to the monarchical aspect, one has to think of 'constitutional' monarchies, where it is true of the monarch that the monarch rules but does not govern (using a French constitutional formula: 'le roi règne, mais il ne gouverne pas'). In addition to the institutionally conditioned rights of the head of state (appointment of head of government and ministers, accreditation of ambassadors, etc., enactment of laws, etc.), one genuine right that usually belongs to the head of state is historically entirely monarchical in origin: the right to pardon criminals.

#### Conclusion: *Review and Outlook*

The preceding Part III is an improving reworking of the second part of my small book '*Kreffels Ruminations*'. This was entitled 'Sinnbetrachtung - Ein Abriss der Philosophie'. In its combination of fictionalized selective autobiography and 'first' philosophy, 'Kreffel' is an oblique book with the 'straight', that is to say: correct philosophy.

My former assistant colleague in Heidelberg and later professor of philosophy in Duisburg and Erlangen, Jens Kulenkampff, has thankfully subjected 'Kreffel' to a comprehensive and thorough critique. Many of the improvements in the present account, all of which I cannot go into individually, are due to his objections and suggestions.

The philosophy presented demonstrates, to the extent of its persuasiveness, that in the construction of the conceptual system underlying our everyday understanding, a 'view from us' is effective. It already lies in the initial distinction between 'something/object' and 'someone/person' and unfolds into all basic concepts until, with the further definition of the concept of the person as a bearer of rights (in section g. ), a relatively independent province of everyday understanding is formed in the basic concepts of the world of persons within the framework of the previously treated basic concepts, which could also be the basic concepts of a merely physical reality.

The talk of the 'view from us' invites the contrast with that '*view from nowhere*' which the American philosopher Thomas Nagel claims to have identified as the epitome of our cognitive

striving for objectivity.

Kulenkampff had two objections to 'Kreffel' which I have not taken into account. First, he rightly remarked that the talk of an 'outline of philosophy' naturally carries with it the desideratum of a detailed account. I do not (as yet, at any rate) feel able to do this. Secondly, he has meant that the allusion to Nagel already in the concluding section of 'Kreffel' demanded, because of the author's prominence, an elaboration of the criticism, only hinted at in 'Kreffel', of the conception of a 'view from nowhere' from the idea of judgment.

I cannot bring myself to this criticism because of the resistance of Nagel's metaphysical conception of philosophy to almost all linguistic reflection and the linguistic-analytical method beyond the following remarks.

What separates this conception from the fundamentally Wittgensteinian one I have unfolded by a chasm is the attitude to scepticism. Nagel claims to have been persuaded by the author Thompson Clarke that scepticism is 'irrefutable'. For Wittgenstein, from the outset, scepticism was "*not* irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, if it wants to doubt where it cannot be asked." (LPA 6.51) This is because, as I have shown at length, Wittgenstein's original insight into the internal connection between language and the world leads to a dissolution of the traditional opposition between realism and idealism, and, because scepticism in the sense of doubting the reality of the external world and solipsism in the sense of denying the existence of other centres of consciousness are radicalizations of idealism (for which reality is only 'our imagination'), also allows scepticism and solipsism to be nonsensical. Nagel sees quite correctly that it is metaphysical realism that entails scepticism. But metaphysical realism - the view that reality is also conceptually (and not only causally) radically independent of us and that it cannot be ruled out that it far exceeds our conceptual possibilities - is precisely senseless in linguistic reflection because it is incomprehensible. A philosophical position whose premises include the maxim "Let's forget about (empirical) sense" cannot be fruitfully addressed internally by a Wittgensteinian position. 'Reveries of a ghost-seer' (Kant) must be left to themselves.

I have reinterpreted Wittgenstein in Part I from the point of view of what philosophy should learn from him, marginally improving my account in *Wittgenstein's Revolution*. In Part II I proposed a re-accentuation in LW's conception of philosophy from the primacy of the dissolution of individual philosophical problems to the primacy of the pursuit of an overview of grammar, and I elaborated the beginning with this modified conception in broad outlines in Part III.

In it, I have used a concept of formal concepts from LW's LPA, liberalized for applicability to everyday language and everyday understanding, as a guide to clarify the basic terms of everyday understanding. The descriptive discovery that set these investigations in motion in the first place was the insight that the indefinite pronoun 'someone' anchors the notion of person in the reference system of a natural language. That indefinite pronouns form the antecedents of bound variables in his canonical notation had already been seen by Quine for 'something'. What he did not see is that 'someone' functions in normal language like 'something' and is equal to it.

The analysis of a set of basic concepts for a domain of understanding gives a successor formation to a doctrine of traditional philosophy that has been called category theory. The problem of the completeness of a table of categories has been associated with the major category doctrines of Aristotle and Kant. Aristotle did not claim it for his ten categories (plus five postpredicaments) in the *Categories*, but apparently assumed it in other writings. Kant has accused Aristotle of having only 'rhapsodically raised' his categories and, with their development from his table of judgements, has also explicitly made a claim to completeness for his categories. By way of claimed completeness necessity grew to the categories in traditional philosophy.

This problem cannot arise at all for the successor formation of formal concepts for a domain of understanding. On the one hand, because the explicit formation of formal concepts is optional, and on the other hand, because the series of formal concepts can therefore be extended at will. After all, they are not technical conceptualizations in special areas of understanding, but formal uses of everyday words that are also used materially. Thus the titles of the books in the morning newspaper: politics, economics, culture, sport, travel, entertainment etc. express formal concepts. And new ones can be formed at will: 'the culinary' and 'the nautical' express formal concepts that philosophy may not need to worry about. The conclusion of a set of formal terms for a domain of understanding can only be justified pragmatically and limited under certain issues. Philosophy thus becomes lighter and less demanding - reflexive conceptual clarification across the board - but also more open to continuations in further efforts to understand explicitly what we all, as speakers of language, ever already know, can and do.

Appendix: Wittgenstein, Ludwig (draft for a handbook article)

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), born in Vienna, first studied mechanical engineering in Berlin and Manchester, then on the recommendation of Gottlob Frege 1912-13 with Bertrand Russell at Cambridge Philosophy. As a war volunteer for Austria 1914-18 he wrote his only in his lifetime published book, *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung* (1921; 1922 in bilingual edition with English translation: *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*). Only after a ten-year interruption he returned to philosophical work at Cambridge in 1929, became famous for his book and was a fellow of Trinity College in 1930-36. From 1939 he was a British Citizen and Professor of philosophy at Cambridge, from 1947 a private writer. His philosophical work after 1929 took the form of a self-critique of the logical-metaphysical system in the first book and culminated in the posthumously published *Philosophical Investigations* (1953).

Add motivational linkages of the bare data to this resume, and it also becomes philosophically expressive. As a youth, Wittgenstein had read Schopenhauer and turned to the turn to philosophy in academic training owed much to the growing interest in the philosophy of mathematics; in his first book he believed to have essentially finally solved the philosophical "problems" (TLP, Preface), left philosophical work for becoming an elementary school teacher, gardener and co-educator, among other things, architect of a Viennese residential building. In the *preface* to his posthumously published second main book (1953) he wrote that he had to recognize "grave errors" in his first book.

First on the list of his principal achievements must therefore be placed the example of intellectual truthfulness, which he gave with the self-critical movement of his philosophizing after 1929. (Black 1964, 19) Other accomplishments include: The elaboration of a philosophical method of conceptual clarification through linguistic description, which can be continued and consists in the essential "... (in) the transition from the question of truth to the question of meaning". (MS 106 46); the elaboration of fundamental clarifications on the problems of linguistic representation using definitions of 'sense', 'meaning', 'truth', 'fulfillment', 'rule and rule-following' on the basis of an independent philosophy of logic and mathematics; the comprehensive critique of the inside-outside picture of the human mind in the descriptive clarification of psychological terms such as 'think', 'understand', 'mean'; the sketch of a socialized epistemology based on the clarifications for 'believe', 'know', 'know and be certain' (in his notes up to two days before his death. (*On Certainty*, 1969 b).

"All philosophy is 'linguistic criticism'". (TLP 4.0031). Not only analytic philosophy, but the project of critical philosophizing from Kant in general owes Wittgenstein the 'linguistic turn'. This turn arose from the philosophy of logic that led to Wittgenstein's first book leading and that is presented in it in all essentials.

Wittgenstein had become acquainted with Frege through a book by Russell (1906) and had also visited him in Jena. In the debates on the foundations of logic with him and Russell three questions were mainly controversial: What is logic? What are the propositions of logic? Which role do rules of inference play for the logic? (cf. Baker 1988) For Frege and Russell, logic was a nomological science, for Frege that of the "most general laws of truth" in a Platonic third realm of 'thought' (Frege 1897 *Introd.* ), for Russell, the most general features of the reality. For Wittgenstein, logic was not essentially science, but the most general condition of meaning, of comprehensibility in general, and as such presupposed by of everyday understanding and the sciences as well. This changed view resulted in part from the the answer to the second question. For Frege and Russell the propositions of logic were essential laws, general propositions. Wittgenstein saw that the propositions of logic are not *propositions* at all, said nothing about an ideal or empirical reality, but were tautologies, meaningless expressions, a limit to language. Accordingly, for him 'It's raining or it does not rain' (as saying nothing about the weather) an expression of logic (TLP 4.461) and he considered the development of an axiomatic system of logic, in which Frege and Russell had set their ambition, as dispensable. Finally, rules of inference, for Frege and Russell further laws of logic, for Wittgenstein were "superfluous". (TLP 5.132) as justifications for conclusions in a correct logical notation.

If 'propositions' of logic are meaningless tautologies, then to understand them fully the concept of the proposition had to be clarified contrastively. Wittgenstein regarded this as the "whole task" (NB 22.1.15). His first book therefore gives in its factual center (TLP 2.1- 6.1) a theory of the proposition (the famous picture theory of the proposition) in the framework of a general theory of representation (of the general picture theory - 1921, 2.1 - 3.5).

Wittgenstein's first book is "not a textbook," but borrows its form of presentation in a numbering system textbooks of logic. The text is not to be read linearly, because Wittgenstein of Schopenhauer retained the idealistic idea that in a philosophical book there must be no first and no last proposition (Schopenhauer 1859 Preface; 1933/34 b, 199). This led to the result that in the system first and last proposition are in reciprocal presupposition. Within the system its propositions are linked by formal traits in the numbering system into sequences of propositions



forming the units of sense for its doctrine. (cf. Lange 1989, 1-31).

Wittgenstein describes the aim of the book in the *preface* thus:

"The book deals with the philosophical problems and shows ... that the questioning of these problems is based on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language. One could sum up the whole meaning of the book in the words : What can be said at all can be said clearly; and what cannot be spoken of, must be spoken of ...silent. So the book wants to draw a line under thinking, or rather - not thinking, but expression of thought: for to draw a boundary to thought, we would have to think both sides of that boundary (so we should be able to think what cannot be thought).

So the boundary will only be able to be drawn in language and what lies beyond the boundary will simply be nonsense."

The outline of the logical-metaphysical system in which the critical task of drawing the bounds of sense is executed, can be explained in seven postulatory theses (cf. Lange 1996, 41-61):

1. bipolarity principle: only that is a proposition, which can be both true and can be false. (TLP 2.21 – 2.221, 4.023-4; 1961, 189, 196)
2. propositional context principle: "The expression has meaning only in the sentence." (TLP 3.314; cf. 3.3)
3. determinacy of sense: bipolarity principle and sentence coherence principle as both a necessary and sufficient condition for the importance of expressions (sentence components) lead to the "requirement of the determinacy of sense" (TLP 3.23).
4. demand of analysis: to demand determinacy of sense from the vague propositions of logically perfect ordered normal language (TLP 5.5563), leads to the further requirement of the certain (unique) logical analysis of each proposition into logically independent elementary propositions (TLP 4. 211, 5.134), of which each proposition is said to be a truth-function (TLP 5 - 5.01), which makes its sense determinate.
5. language-of-thought assumption: Since no example for such a logical analysis can yet be given, the last demand leads to the requirement that the logical analysis is tacitly executed already in the thinking projection of the sentence as proposition, which guarantees the determinacy of sense (TLP 3.11; cf. 3.2 - 3.263) in every use of language. (TLP 5.541 - 5.422; 1980, 90)
6. no subject of thought: although in the thinking projection of the sentence as proposition, both in hearing and in speaking, an analytical language of thought is already operative (unconsciously available) there is no thinking subject (TLP 5.631). There is only a formally

unitary reference point of the unique representation of the world of facts mapped in the propositions of language, called 'metaphysical subject' or 'philosophical I', which is a 'sliding peg' - Pears 1987,153-195; 1988, 233, 277) instantiated in each case of thinking a propositional sense. It forms 'upper' bound of sense and together with the "totality of the elementary propositions" as the 'lower bound' and the logical propositions (tautology as the 'inner', contradiction as 'outer limit of propositions' - TLP 5.143) the limit between sense and nonsense that the book intended to draw. For these elements mark the limits of "empirical reality" (1921, 5.5561).

7. beyond the limits of sense is only nonsense. (TLP Preface; 7)

Within the framework of the system outline spanned by this sequence of theses, which can be in philosophical-historical perspective can be interpreted as the attempt to realistically transform Schopenhauer's 'world as representation' (Lange 1989, 89-114), specific views on ontology, on the theory of propositions, on philosophies of logic, mathematics and natural science as well as on ethics and aesthetics (cf. 1921, 6.421) and the conception of philosophy itself.

For Wittgenstein, his impressively closed system began to crumble when he realized that he had to concede that not all logical reasoning is based on the form of tautology. Simple colour predications must be considered as syntactically and semantically elementary, but do not satisfy the demand of logical independence of elementary propositions. If some thing is said to be red all over, it is eo ipso excluded that it is any other colour of ever presupposed colour scale has (is blue, yellow, green, etc.). Units of sense with colours, lengths, other quantities etc. are not isolated propositions, but 'propositional systems', which in the further development in Wittgenstein become 'language games'. A propositional context principle of meaning becomes meaningless already from this point of view. (PR 59; noted 10.1. 1930). One by one, all the theses determining the outline of the early system had to be either abandoned or restricted, or transformed into language-descriptively redeemable conceptions. The bipolarity principle is restricted to empirical propositions and applies even to them not generally, because Wittgenstein recognized that some propositions of empirical form in our understanding nevertheless function like rules (norms) that cannot be false. (1969 b) The propositional context principle is abandoned as meaningless. The requirements of the determinacy of sense and logical analysis are seen as dogmatic. What matters about sense is not determinacy, but determinability. Vagueness, which characterizes many normal terms as a

family resemblance terms, does not make contextually sufficient understanding impossible or even precarious, if, for example, any misunderstanding or lack of understanding that arises can be dispelled by meaning-explanations. (PI §§ 33-88) The language-of-thought assumption is discarded as non-explanatory, because a "parallel play of mental elements ... only duplicates language by something of the same kind." (PG 152) It forms the critical point of reference of many clarifications in the philosophy of psychology. Corresponding to its centrality in the early system the central clarifications 'Thinking and Thought' arranged in the middle of the second book. (PI §§ 316-362). The critique of the epistemic subject is transferred into the descriptive clarifications about 'I and Self' (PI §§ 411-427).

The most important substantive result of the transformation of philosophy and language conception at Wittgenstein in general is what he called 'the autonomy of grammar'. In the early system the logical analysis of any normal language proposition, which, regardless of its grammatical form was considered to be complex, lead to independent elementary propositions, in which names should be directly concatenated and should represent a state of affairs through their concatenation. The names should be simple signs not analyzable. Therefore they should not be explainable, but only elucidable circularly. They should refer to the items concatenated in the subject matter in two senses. As is were seen from the object they should 'represent' it in the elementary proposition, seen from the name the object should be 'meant' by the name. From the principles of the numbering system (cf. 1921,1 note) there follows a primacy of the 'realistic' representational aspect (TLP 3.22) over the 'idealistic' meaning aspect (TLP 3.203, 3.2-3.263; cp. NB 6/22/15).

The name theory of word meaning becomes generalized, in self-criticism, as the 'Augustinian picture of language' (PI §§ 1-4, 32) and forms the starting point of the critical representation in PI. The circular elucidations for the postulated simple names would to have been, if they had existed 'inner ostensive definitions'. The proof of their impossibility (PI § 258) is the core of the argument against the possibility of a radically 'private language'. Real names and other simple expressions may very well be explained, not just elucidated in a circular fashion. In the last instance, by means of indicative declarations or ostensive definitions in which the subject matter which is referred to, functions as a 'paradigm' to which the expression is 'calibrated'. What the early system had postulated as absolutely simple objects can be de-dogmatized and redeemed as paradigms descriptively. Also the duality of the relation of name and object can be transformed descriptively: Taken as paradigms, objects

(and) names can represent each other, because in the normative explanation of the meaning of an ostensive definition the latter is calibrated to it; as used descriptively or otherwise the names can then 'mean' their objects, can refer to them (to say something true or fulfillable about them). This now leads to the 'autonomy of grammar': that the elements of reality that function as paradigms are best described as belonging, as one type of its instruments, to language, even if they are not part of the word language (PI § 16). This makes language independent of an ultimate metaphysical structure of the world, grammar (all conditions of sense; PG 88) autonomous, in contrast to the early conception:

"The connection between 'language and reality' is made by the word explanations, - which belong to grammar, so that language remains self-contained, autonomous." (PG 97)

Wittgenstein used his clarification of the autonomy of grammar to dissolve the traditional controversy between idealism and realism used (cf. 1953, § 402). For the idealist the world is only 'our representation', for the realist essentially independent of us. The idealist can adduce the fact that reality is given to us only in concepts made by us. The realist insists that whether our propositions about reality are true or false depends on the reality depends, not on us. The arbitration of the seemingly irreconcilable controversy (because descriptively both are right) leads to the insight that both opponents make the unproven assumption that only one or the other can be the case. In fact, both can, in different respects, be the case: for conceptualization and explanation of meaning the idealist is right, for the description and knowledge of reality the realist. With this, if you want to, one gets rid of the problem, offered a possible solution for it.

The subjects about which, according to the last sentence of TLP, *it was* necessary to be silent as nonsense, included propositions of ethics and philosophy in general, which is why the book consistently recants his own sentences in the penultimate sentence, declares them to be a 'ladder' to be thrown away must, after one has climbed it. (TLP 6.54) The restriction that leads to this self-denial becomes obsolete with the restriction of the bipolarity principle. As rules must be recognized as equal-original with propositions, philosophy acquires the possibility of expressing itself in a legitimate way, by describing language use from the point of view of rules, establishing ('tabulating') rules .

With this correction the method and conception of philosophy already proclaimed, but not followed in the early system can be maintained and further developed. "The purpose of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. - Philosophy is not a doctrine, but an activity.

- A philosophical work consists essentially of explanations. - The result of philosophy are not 'philosophical propositions,' but the becoming clear of propositions." (1921, 4.112) Because of his postulatory-constructive approach, Wittgenstein had already declared this "only strictly correct" method of this conception of philosophy as reflexive conceptual clarification in TLP, but there he did not use the dialogical-dialectical critique of sense implied in it (TLP 6.53). Only the liberation from the "dogmatism" of the earlier view, which he self-critically accuses of 'arrogance' (WVC 182-6; of 1931), makes consistent adherence to this method possible. According to the matter it is a renewal of a fundamental aspect of Kant's logical concept of philosophy (cf. Glock 1996, 292 ff.), according to which the philosopher has "only has to make given concepts clear". (Kant 1800, A 95) And Wittgenstein (1967 b, 29) holds, like Kant, that to conceptual clarification also belongs the explanation of errors, not only their refutation (1800 A 81; A 129f.).

Even the metaphysics-critical scopus of conceptual clarification from Kant's analytics remains with Wittgenstein received (Z § 458). But because Wittgenstein distinguishes more consistently than Kant between truth and sense, cognition and understanding, in his treatment the idea of the philosophy as reflexive conceptual clarification takes a non-cognitive turn. As clarifying activity, philosophy for him contributes not to theoretical knowledge, but to better understanding. For concepts, unlike sentences, are not true or false, but useful or useless, therefore at best expressively adequate. Philosophy has yet to learn this revolutionary lesson.

Early on, Wittgenstein noted: "...work in philosophy is ... actually more the work ...in oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one demands of them.)" (BT 407) Nonetheless, he tried to keep in background the influence of self-criticism on the book, which he conceived of, and wanted to present mainly the means, he had found against his difficulties and misunderstandings.

In any case, the main focus of his work until 1943 (according to the extent of the related texts in the *Nachlass*) was in the field of the philosophy of mathematics, in which the number-theoretical operationalist approaches of the early system (TLP 6.02 ff.) only seemed in need to be elaborated. Also the book, the first version of which was the so-called *Big Typescript* (BT; 1932-33) was in one-third devoted to mathematical topics and by 1943 Wittgenstein's idea of his book was that it should be composed of a part on philosophy of language and another part on the philosophy of mathematics. In 1943 he read his first book

again with a friend, and the result was a change of conception. It appeared to him "suddenly that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and on the background of my older way of thinking." (PI, *Preface* ) At the same time, he now continued the linguistic-philosophical beginning of the book into philosophy of psychology. This meant an expansion of the scope of the self-criticism about the whole of PI, because it is motivated by the centrality of the language-of-thought assumption in TLP.

To his new insights in the philosophy of psychology, however, he also gave a self-criticism more independent space in a second part of the book, for which Part II of the posthumous publication of 1953 (now PPF); and he did not abandon the clarifications on the philosophy of the mathematics, but provided for it in a Part III. (cf. v. Wright 1982, 133 ff.). The idea of this three-volume book, Wittgenstein did not elaborate. *Philosophical Investigations* is thus an unfinished work, even the whole of Part I, motivated by self-criticism, should, according to reports, still underwent changes, but Wittgenstein gave up work on the text in 1945 and intervened in him only once more briefly in 1947.

The text begins with an explicit critique of the first book (PI §§ 1-88), then turns to the critical elaboration of the basically preserved conception of philosophy (§§ 89-133), then criticizes the picture theory of the proposition (§§ 134-142) and confronts it with the foundation of the changed conception of language in the term 'following a rule', which, however, is only developed far enough to be used in the criticism of a logical objectivism, which, as with the earlier thought-language assumption, also can be connected with the rule-following linguistic rules can connect. (§§ 143-242) With the famous argument against the possibility of a 'private' language begins the part on psychological concepts. (§§243-315) It goes back to lectures of 1936 and is the successor of Wittgenstein's critique of solipsism, the most detailed version of which is contained in a dictation to his students of 1933-34, entitled *The Blue Book*. (1958) It follows in the middle the discussion of illusions about 'thinking and thought' (§§316-362). At the end of further sections mainly on the philosophy of psychology [ e.g. 'images and imagining'](§§ 363-397), '> I<' and the nature of the self' (§§ 398-411), 'consciousness' (§§ 412-427), 'intentionality' (§§ 428-465), 'mental states and processes: expectation, conviction' (§§ 571-610), 'will and want' (§§ 611-628), 'intend' (§§ 629-660)] the language-of-thought assumption is corrected descriptively (§§661-693).

Already in Part I, Wittgenstein often touches on a problem (e.g., §§ 531-9, 568) that is at

the heart of Part II (Section XI) (now PPF) and can find its descriptive clarifying completion only there- that of the seeing, hearing, understanding under 'aspects'. (This is the one argument for the affiliation of a Part II to the 1953 conception of the book. The other: The synoptic-general explanation of 'meaning of a word' as 'use in language' is already a priori conceded to be incomplete - applies 'to a large class of cases, not to all' § 43 - and may be only be completed in the context of physiognomic understanding of meaning under aspects). The detailed discussion factually forms a parenthesis of philosophy-conception, conception of language and philosophy of psychology. For this Wittgenstein succeeds in the epochal evidence that our use of psychological vocabulary invests the general attitude towards a constant aspect (the 'attitude towards the soul'; PI II IV), in which we ascribe to those similar to us an 'inner life' a priori. This too is a lesson that philosophy has yet to learn.

Today it is, in contrast, predominantly under the spatial misunderstanding of the psychologically interior and thus has succumbed to the vehicle reductionism of a brain idolatry. (In Wittgenstein's style, one could it should read: "Not: the brain 'thinks', 'remembers', 'intends'. But: the person. And not 'with her brain,' but herself.")

Wittgenstein's 'second', better: self-critically transformed philosophy is *critique*, also its descriptive generalities (e.g. "The meaning of a word is its use in language"; PI § 43) do not give descriptive *doctrines* ('theses' - dogmatic doctrines), but describe, summarizing ('synoptically'), our practices of word use and explanation of meaning (because it explains the 'use' of the word whose meaning it is explaining - cp. PI § 560): "If one wanted to set up *theses* in philosophy, it could never be discussed about them, because all would agree with them." (PI § 128)

It is therefore mistaken, to look for *theories* in Wittgenstein's philosophy, for instance about language (cf. 1930-35, 270 f.) or about cognitive psychology, (or to claim to have found them). Wittgenstein's text offers therapies for diseases of the mind (1953, §§ 255, 593; cf. Glock 1996, 23-27) and is addressed to readers who feel the need to to make their own understanding transparent - he did not want to "spare others the thinking. But, if it is possible would inspire someone to think for themselves." (PI, preface) The remarks style of his original notations in notebooks and manuscript volumes he kept, only smoothing them, sharpening and insightfully arranging them, in his text to stimulate such introspection. He was a solitary one-in-a-century mind and for critical, descriptively clarifying philosophizing the probably greatest conceptual talent of the German language since Kant.

An updated dictionary of commonplaces would also say about Wittgenstein, "that he developed two fundamentally different, self-contained views" (Glock 1996, 28).

This commonplace has clues in reported statements by Wittgenstein (Malcolm 1984, 58; 1st ed. 1958), but is primarily a reactive consequence of the productive misunderstanding by which Wittgenstein's first book found as a stimulus for the scientific philosophy of the Logical Empiricism in the Viennese circle (Schlick, Carnap, Neurath, Waismann). With its *Weltanschauung* ('scientific worldview') Wittgenstein never agreed. Already his early philosophy of logic has saved him from thinking of philosophy as the 'most general' science of (philosophy of science). Through the expulsion of the members of the Vienna Circle and of their students to professorships in England and the USA under Nazi rule, however, the impression of great kinship at any rate has prevailed until the publication of the posthumous main work. Compared to it, the later could only appear as the completely different.

In discussions of analytic philosophy and of a new approach to the subject that has been in progress since the 60s of the last Wittgenstein research, which has become a broad stream since the beginning of the twentieth century, he has a recording that would have been repugnant to him.

Nevertheless, his writings in analytic philosophy and beyond with regard to widely discussed 'theoretical' propositions on the matter allegedly contained in them, esp. for the conception of philosophy itself, in the philosophical theory of meaning and in the theory of mind. In the first area, for example, a philosopher who started out as a radical empiricist has developed to positions attributed to Wittgenstein (Putnam 1978, 1992); in the second area in which Wittgenstein's view functions as the thesis of language as normative practice, has a misguided interpretation of Wittgenstein's discussions of 'following a rule' (Kripke 1982) not only provoked a boom of interpretative discussions and refutations (Baker&Hacker 1984), but also systematic-critical reactions (Dummett 1973, 1988) and, in the case of a student of Rorty, assimilation in a systematic theory of meaning (Brandom 1998). Systematic work on the philosophy of mind has used Wittgenstein's to correct empiricist and behaviorist conceptions (McDowell 1996).

In Germany, Tugendhat's conception of a formal semantics was based on the attempt of the linking Wittgenstein with a truth-theory of of meaning in Tarski/Davidson (Tugendhat 1976). Schneider (1992), in a comprehensive review of the tradition of meaning theory since Frege showed how far Wittgenstein is right against them, because the idea underlying the project of a



formal theory of meaning for natural languages - to be able to formally distinguish between sense and nonsense - at fails the not only lexical, but also syntactic (and pragmatic) metaphoricity of colloquial language. The imagination necessary for the interpretation of syntactic metaphors cannot be formalized, as is recognized in Wittgenstein's language game pluralism: "What is new (spontaneous, 'specific') is always a language-game." (PPF § 335)

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