

## Wittgenstein (LW) Resumed

### Preliminary Remarks

For about 25 years I investigated the philosophy of LW. Since 2005 I tried to be more independent, using what I have learnt from him for something that could be called analytical philosophy of life (German: ›analytische Lebensphilosophie‹<sup>1</sup>). When in 2012 I was asked to contribute an article on LW to a reader on German philosophers of the 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>2</sup>, I took this as an opportunity for a résumé. The resulting book saw a 2<sup>nd</sup> edition 2015 and then went out of print. Although I received no royalties for my contribution I did not succeed in regaining the rights in my text. The publisher only allowed me one offprint to put it on my web-site. I am also not allowed to translate it.

Because I did not stop learning and thinking about LW since and even published a new book on him on my web-site<sup>3</sup>, the following text is not a translation of the text from the German reader, but another treatment of its subject in the light of some new insights.

### I.

LW was born in Vienna 1889 and died in Cambridge/England 1951. He was educated as an aviation engineer in Berlin and Manchester. During these studies he became interested in the foundation of mathematics and started personal correspondence with Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, the founders of the then new logic and philosophy of mathematics. On the advice of Frege he studied logic and philosophy with Russell in Cambridge 1912-13.

At the outbreak of World-War I he volunteered for Austria. During the war he wrote personal and philosophical notes into notebooks. From them he composed his first book, which remained the only philosophical one published during his life-time. With Russell's help it appeared in print not before 1922, although it was finished already in the summer of 1918. The edition was bilingual under the title *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung). (TLP)

In the *Preface* of TLP LW was confident „that the problems (sc. of philosophy) have in essentials been finally solved.“<sup>4</sup> Consequently he gave up philosophy, went through a training for teacher at elementary school and worked as such in three Austrian villages until 1926.

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1 *Das verstandene Leben*, 2005/2013, on [www.emilange.de](http://www.emilange.de).

2 Bedorf/Gelhard (Eds.): *Die deutsche Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert* – Ein Autorenhandbuch, Darmstadt 2015, 311-319. – I was set a limit of 6000 words, which I could not keep. (This English version, in which three paragraphs on LW's reception in academic philosophy are left out, with about 5300 words is nearer to the target.)

3 *Wittgensteins Revolution*.

4 Ogden's translation.

Afterwards he co-architected a living house for his sister in Vienna and for a short time even worked as a gardener in a monastery. He never lost contact to philosophy completely, though, not at least due to several visits of Frank P. Ramsey in Austria. Ramsey had co-translated TLP into English. By the end of the decade LW took up philosophy again, returned to Cambridge and, having been elected a fellow to Trinity College after the acceptance of TLP as PhD-dissertation, started to write again philosophical remarks into lots of notebooks. From 1936 onwards he planned to write another philosophical book which, through many transformations, became *Philosophical Investigations* (PI)<sup>5</sup>, published posthumously 1953 in a bilingual edition the English part of which was translated by LW's disciple Elizabeth Anscombe. An important step to PI was the first comprehensive attempt at organizing his new insights in an almost conventional book (with titles, sub-titles, chapters etc.), in between published posthumously as *The Big Typescript*. (BT)<sup>6</sup> From it LW's disciple and friend Rush Rhees composed what now is known as *Philosophical Grammar*. (PG)<sup>7</sup>

In the *Preface* 1945 to PI LW confesses: „... since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again, I could not but recognize grave mistakes in what I set out in that first book. (sc. TLP)“ As had TLP, PI rapidly won LW renewed fame, first in the anglophone world, from 1960 onwards in Germany and on the continent too.

Resuming 5 main achievements of LW in advance, the first place belongs to the self-critical movement of LW's thought after 1929.<sup>8</sup> Next comes the elaboration of a continuable philosophical method of reflective conceptual clarification by describing language use. Third come foundational clarifications of the vocabulary relating to language use by setting out analyses of ›sentence‹, ›proposition‹, ›rule and rule-following‹, ›sense and truth‹, etc. etc. Fourth comes the thorough critique of the Inner-Outer-picture of the mental that dominated western philosophy since Descartes. Finally comes the sketch of a socialized epistemology in analyses for belief, knowledge, certainty, etc. etc. (*On Certainty*)<sup>9</sup>

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5 I use the revised 4<sup>th</sup> edition, Oxford (Wiley-Blackwell) 2009, in which Anscombe's translation has been improved by Peter Hacker and Joachim Schulte.

6 German-English Scholar's edition Oxford (Wiley-Blackwell) 2013.

7 Translated by Anthony Kenny, Oxford (Blackwell) 1974, 1980.

8 Cp. Max Black: *A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Ithaca/N.Y. (Cornell UP) 1962, 19. – In an anglophone context I should make explicit what I took for granted in the German context: that this remark is directed against Heidegger, who never retracted ›Being and Time‹, although his later philosophy presupposes such retreatment. And, even worse, having collaborated with the Nazis, he never found a word of self-critique in the political context too. Heidegger was, what a philosopher should not be – an un-truthful person. This contrasts starkly with LW.

9 Harper Torchbooks TB 1686, N.Y. 1972.

## II.

„All philosophy is ‚Critique of Language‘ ... “ (TLP 4.0031). Philosophy owes to LW what has come to be called ›the linguistic turn‹. This turn results from a new and independent philosophy of logic, which led to TLP and, for the most part, is represented in it. LW had come to know the writings of Frege through a book by Russell of 1903<sup>10</sup>. In consequence LW even visited Frege in Jena. In the discussions on the foundations of logic between Frege, Russell and LW three questions loomed large: What is logic? What are the propositions of logic? What is the role of inference licenses?<sup>11</sup> For Frege and Russell logic is a nomological science – for Frege the science of the ‚most general laws of being true‘ in a platonic third realm of ‚thoughts‘<sup>12</sup>; for Russell the science of the most general traits of reality. In contra-distinction logic for LW is not primarily a science, but gives the most general conditions of sense (meaningfulness) or understanding, which is presupposed as well by everyday-talk as by the sciences. This change in conception is partly due to a different answer to the second question. For Frege and Russell the propositions of logic constitute laws, general propositions. LW in contrast maintains that the formulae of logic are *no propositions at all*, say nothing about the third realm of thoughts or empirical reality. Rather they are *tautologies*, which, saying nothing, constitute a limit of language. Consequently ›it is raining or it is not raining‹ (as saying nothing about the weather) for LW is an expression of logic. (TLP 4.461) And LW thinks the development of an axiomatic system of logic – which was the ambition of Frege and Russell – philosophically dispensable, even misleading. (cp. TLP 6.126-7) Inference licenses (German: ‚Schlussregeln‘), finally, for LW are not further laws of logic, but in a correct logical notation simply redundant. (cp. TLP 5.132)

If sentences of logic are meaningless tautologies, for full understanding there is need for a clarification of the concept of a proposition and LW saw this as his „whole task“ (NB 22.1.15, 39°). TLP in its centre (2.1-6.1) therefore gives a theory of the proposition (the famous picture theory of the proposition) embedding it in a general theory of representation (the general picturing theory, 2.1-3.5).

TLP is not a textbook, but takes its form, the numbering system, from textbooks of logic. Its text is not to be read in linear order, for LW kept from his first Schopenhauerian philosophy the

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10 Bertrand Russell: *The Principles of Mathematics*, London 1964.

11 Cp. Gordon P. Baker: *Wittgenstein, Frege, & The Vienna Circle*, Oxford (Blackwell) 1988.

12 Gottlob Frege: ›Logik‹ (1897), in: *Nachgelassene Schriften*, Hamburg (Meiner) <sup>2</sup>1983, 139.

conviction that a book on philosophy cannot have a first or last proposition. Therefore in TLP no.s 1 and 7 are connected in reciprocal presupposition so that the text of course has a first and a last sentence, but with respect to their propositional content forms a circle. Within it sequences of propositions are to be formed by reading it according the order of the numbering system. For this LW used the formal implications of the fact that the main propositions in TLP are seven in number.<sup>13</sup>

The intention of the book LW declares in its *Preface*:

„The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, as I believe, that the method of formulating these problems rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language. What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent.<sup>14</sup>

The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather – not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought).

The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.“

The layout of the logical-metaphysical system that is to solve the critical task of drawing the bounds of sense can be resumed in seven theses, which according to their logical status are postulates. The first five theses form the premisses of a deductive argument, which, partly motivated from one another, are themselves deductively connected. (6.) and (7.) spell out different aspects of the conclusion of what can be called ›the argument of TLP‹:

1. Principle of bipolarity: Nothing is a proposition that is not situated within the polarity of truth and falsity. (TLP 2.21-2221; 4.023-4; NB 94 c, 98 l)

2. Propositional context-principle: „Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of a

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13 Cp. Ernst Michael Lange: *Wittgenstein und Schopenhauer*; Cuxhaven 1989, Ch.1.

14 This anticipates proposition 7 of TLP. In German it reads: „Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.“ (my italics) It is, in contrast to the English ‚whereof‘ formulated with a deviant mixture of pronominal adverbs (,wovon/darüber‘). I ventured the idea that the reason for this is that it finds a way so that both halves of the resuming proposition 7 in German contain seven syllables. This can be taken as a symbolic hint to the formal-aesthetical structure of TLP. – My interpretational idea was badly received in German academia. The Japanese born LW-researcher Hidé Ishiguro had prophesied to me that it would cost me a tenured position – and so it did. The most sober judgement was made by the German born reviewer of ›*Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer*‹ in the periodical *Philosophical Investigations* (Vol. 16, No. 1, 89 sqq.): that all I showed was „that Wittgenstein *may* have been crank enough to construct the *Tractatus* around a number.“ But Brian McGuinness, certainly a connoisseur too, wrote to me personally: „There is nothing un-Wittgensteinian about such a conceit.“ Unfortunately, there is no evidence for my interpretation besides the text of TLP, because LW, according to a report of Anscombe, burnt the later *Notebooks* in her presence in Vienna, March 1950. – I should add that pop culture of course was more favourable to my idea: Cp. the science-comic *Wittgenstein for Beginners* by John Heaton (a disciple of Russell) and Judy Groves, Icon Books 1994, 30-31 (and 175).

proposition has a name meaning.“ (TLP 3.3; cp. 3.314)

3. Determinacy of sense: From (1.) and (2.) as, together, necessary and sufficient conditions of meaning of expressions (proposition parts) follows „the postulate of the determinateness of sense.“ (TLP 3.23)

4. Postulate of analysis: To postulate determinacy of sense for the vague propositions of ordinary language, which is logically completely in order (TLP 5.5563), leads to the further postulate of analysis of each ordinary proposition into logically independent elementary propositions (TLP 4.211; 5.134). Of these the proposition is said to be a truth-function (TLP 5; 5.01), which makes the sense of the proposition determinate.

5. Postulate of a language of thought<sup>15</sup>: Since there is no example of such an analysis as yet and communication by the vague ordinary propositions is possible and real, but is taken to presuppose determinacy of sense, it follows the postulate, that the symbolically unknown sense-determining analysis is already operative in every communicative exchange by way of a language of thought (TLP 5.541-5.5422), which speaker and hearer operate when „thinking (of) the sense of the proposition.“ (TLP 3.11; cp. 3.2-3.263)

6. No subject of thought: Although a language of thought is already operative in communication (LW later compared his conception to Freud's theory of the Unconscious – *Zettel* para. 444), there is no thinker in the language of thought, no ‚thinking subject‘ (cp. TLP 5.631). What traditional philosophy conceptualized as subject of thought (for instance in Kant's transzendental Ego), is only a ›metaphysical subject‹ or ›philosophical I‹ that as a „sliding peg“<sup>16</sup> is instantiated in each case of thinking the sense of a proposition. This formal subject is the upper bound of sense. Together with the totality of elementary propositions constituting the lower bound, and with the logical principles (tautology as ‚inner‘ and contradiction as ‚outer‘ bound of sense<sup>17</sup>) *they are the bounds of sense*, which TLP intended to draw. For these together demarcate „empirical reality“. (TLP 5.5561)

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15 LW in this conception only elaborates in some detail what Frege already implied in the title of his *Concept-Script*: ‚a formula-language of pure thinking‘.

16 This felicitous term is David Pears's as is ›calibration on objects‹ for what is effected by ostensive definition. Cp. *The false Prison*, two vol., Oxford 1988-89, index sub voces ›sliding-peg‹, ›calibration on standard objects‹ and ›agreement in judgements‹. The latter two are shown by Pears to be the stabilizers of meaning in communication (according to LW). – Pears stood out among anglophone interpreters (Hans-Johann Glock, his only rival, writes in English, but is German in origin) as the only one in my time with LW-research (up to 2005) with an articulate and elaborated conception of LW's development from TLP to PI. Unfortunately I do not fully agree with his conception.

17 Here the Ogden-translation reads: „Contradiction is the external limit of the propositions, tautology their substanceless centre.“ (TLP 5.143) My interpretation takes „substanceless centre“ as „inner limit“. This is justified by the full text of 5.143.

7. Beyond the bounds of sense there only is nonsense.<sup>18</sup>

This layout of the TLP-system historically can be taken as the attempt to transform Schopenhauer's idealistic theory of the „world as representation“ realistically.<sup>19</sup> It is filled out with presenting specific conceptions of an ontology of objects, states of affairs and facts, a theory of the proposition, philosophies of logic, mathematics and science, as well as ethical and aesthetical (TLP 6.421) conceptions, not at least a conception of philosophy itself.

### III.

This impressively closed system for LW began to desintegrate, when at the end of the 1920s he saw himself forced to admit that not all logical inference rests on tautologies. Simple colour predications seem to be elementary in syntactical respect (sc. they do not contain logical operators), but they violate the postulate of logical independence from one another. If something is characterized as red all over, it is eo ipso excluded that it has another colour of the used colour table (sc. is blue or green or yellow etc.). The unities of sense in colours, lengths, other magnitudes, but, for instance, also in psychological characteristics, are no isolated sentences/propositions, but groups of them. LW first called them propositional systems, later they become the semantical core of what he called ›language-games‹. (Against a mere pragmatic reading of ›game‹ - meaning acting according to rules – in ›language-game‹ this semantical core must be kept in mind.) If the units of meaning regularly are groups, not isolated propositions, a propositional context-principle becomes dispensable.<sup>20</sup> By and by in the early 1930s all postulates from the layout of TLP are either given up, or modified and restricted, or transformed into conceptions that can be shown descriptively to have an application.

The principle of bipolarity is restricted to empirical propositions. But even for them it is not valid without exception, because LW came to see that some seemingly empirical propositions in our understanding play a role analogous to rules, which cannot be false.<sup>21</sup> The propositional

18 The interpretation telescoped here is elaborated in Ch. III of my German introductory commentary to TLP, Paderborn 1996, 41-62. The title of the chapter was (translated) „The Argument for the philosophical system of TLP“.

19 So, together with his treatment of solipsism (on which cp. my paper ›Wittgenstein on Solipsism‹ in the *Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein*, ed. Glock/Hyman, Oxford 2017) LW solved what Russell had taken as „The Problems of Philosophy“ (cp. the book with this title of 1912). These are the problems referred to in the *Preface* of TLP as 'in all essentials finally solved'.

20 Cp. *Philosophical Remarks* 59 (10. 1. 1930)

21 *On Certainty*, passim.

context-principle of word-meaning is given up as senseless, while at the same time the prerogative of propositions over words is kept in the form, that it needs at least a proposition to say something with an isolated utterance. The postulates of determinacy of sense and analysis are realized as resulting from an unwarranted dogmatism. What matters about sense, is not determinacy, but determinability. Vagueness, the characteristic of many normal predicate-expressions, does not make contextually sufficient understanding impossible, not even precarious, if not- or mis-understanding can be answered with (further) meaning-explanations. (Cp. PI para.s 33-88) The language-of-thought-hypothesis is cancelled as not being in any way explanatory, because it „simply duplicates language with something else of the same kind.“ (PG VII.104 a) It is the point of reference for many clarifications in the philosophy of psychology and so, too, for the discussion of ›thinking and thoughts‹ in the middle of what formerly was Part I of PI (para.s 316-362).<sup>22</sup> (This location corresponds to the central position of the hypothesis in the TLP-system.) The critique of the subject in TLP is transformed into clarifications on ›I and Self‹ (para.s 411-427).

The most important result of these changes is what LW called the ›autonomy of grammar‹. In the TLP-system logical analysis of normal propositions, taken to be complex whatever their grammatical form, should lead to the logically independent elementary propositions. These were said to consist of names in immediate connection (›as links in a chain‹). The names were taken to have a double-aspect relation to objects. They should ›represent‹ the objects in the proposition and, in opposite direction, should ›mean‹ them (German: ›bedeuten‹). From the elucidation of the numbering system in a footnote to TLP 1 it follows that the ›realistic‹ aspect of representation (TLP 3.22) precedes the ›idealistic‹ aspect of meaning (TLP 3.203 cp. NB 70<sup>e</sup> i).

The name-theory of word-meaning in LW's self-critique is generalized to the ›Augustinian picture of language‹ in the beginning of PI (para.s 1-4; 32). In TLP no explanations of names were thought to be possible, only circular elucidations. (TLP 3.263). These would have to have been ›inner ostensive definitions‹, if they had been possible at all. The demonstration that they are not is the nub of the famous Private Language Argument (PI para.s 258, 347, 380). Names in use can be explained, not only elucidated circularly. In last instance their explanations are ostensive definitions, in each of which the element of reality pointed to is taken as a ›paradigm‹

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<sup>22</sup> It now simply is PI, because the former Part II (MS 144) for philological reasons is now seen as an independent text (*Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*; PPF). As will become clear in the following I have strong reservations against this decision of his second generation executors and editors.

(German ›Muster‹) to which the expression is ›calibrated‹. Ostensive definitions – as meaning-explanations generally – institute internal relations between language and the world. In their case this shows up when in case of misunderstanding one returns to the ostensive definition and uses it in the propositional context: „But it does / does not look like this⇒.“ The element of reality used as paradigm replaces the words it explains. [So as in TLP names only, words have their double-aspect relation to things. When things are used as paradigms, word and thing can represent each other; when used descriptively (or in one of the other modes), they characterize things and help to say something true or satisfiable about them.] This shows the internal relations of word and meaning, meaning and meaning-explanation etc. etc. That there is an internal relation between language and the world (taken as all that can be understood), coupled to an external relation between language and reality (taken as all that there is), was the seminal idea of LW already in TLP (4.014).<sup>23</sup> What leads to the autonomy of grammar is this institution of internal relations by meaning explanations. Through them language becomes independent from a presupposed metaphysical structure of reality, in contrast to TLP, where names were taken to absorb a ›form of objects‹ (cp. NB 70° i): „The connection between ‚language and reality‘ is made by definitions of words, and these belong to grammar, so that language remains self-contained and autonomous.“ (PG IV 55 c)

The autonomy of grammar makes possible a dissolution of the apparently insolvable conflict between idealism and realism. In TLP LW tried a constructive solution with his theoretical concept of ›form of representation‹ as form of reality. (cp. TLP .218) Now the dissolution runs thus: The idealist holds that the world is our representation. The realist holds that reality is independent from us. The idealist grounds his claim on the fact, that the world is given to us only through concepts of our own making. The realist points out that whether our propositions about reality are true or false depends on reality (how things really are), not on us. They believe to be in conflict by both making the unwarranted assumption that only one of the seeming alternatives could be the case. In fact, both can be true in different respects. The idealist has his point concerning formation of concepts and explanation of meanings; the realist is right about the direction of fit reigning truth and falsity (if a proposition is false, it must be given up or corrected; in the other direction of fit, the proposition could be upheld by changing

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23 LW in TLP is not quite consistent in his use of ›world‹ and ›reality‹ – cp. 2.04 with 2.06/2.063. Moreover, in coupling world with understanding and reality with truth/falsity I reverse the dominant conceptual disposition in TLP. The reasons for this I explained repeatedly, for instance in ›An Abstract of Philosophy‹ (emended version on academia.edu).



reality<sup>24</sup>).

Among the themes on which one has to be silent according to TLP 7 belong ethics and philosophy itself. Therefore TLP consequently revoked its own propositions in 6.54, declaring them to be a ladder, which one must throw away after having climbed it. The constraint leading to this recantation is obsolete with the restriction of the principle of bipolarity to only a large class of empirical propositions. Due to the internal relations between meanings and meaning-explanations (PI para. 560), rules – which is, what meaning-explanations are – must be taken as basic as propositions are. Therefore philosophy can say something by describing language use under the aspect of rule-guidedness – it can ›tabulate‹ rules.

With this correction the proclaimed TLP-conception of philosophy can be upheld and developed.:

„The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts.

Philosophy is not a theory but an activity.

A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.

The result of philosophy is not a number of 'philosophical propositions', but to make propositions clear.“ (TLP 4.112 a-d)

Because of the postulatory procedure of developing the TLP-system LW did not follow this conception of philosophy and its method – dialogical-dialectical critique of sense (cp. TLP 6.53) –, but pursued an older conception according which philosophy consists of logic and metaphysics with logic as the basis. (Cp, NB 106 f) But after having liberated himself from the TLP dogmatism he could follow this method, which already in TLP was declared to be „the only strictly correct method“. It may be helpful to point out that it was a renewal of a conception of philosophy going back to Kant's *Logik*. Kant there held that the philosopher ‚does nothing but clarify given concepts‘<sup>25</sup>. LW kept from Kant also the anti-metaphysical scopus of analysis. (*Zettel* para. 458) But because LW distinguished much more clearly between sense and truth, understanding and knowledge, than Kant did, his version of philosophy as ›reflective conceptual clarification‹ took an anti-cognitive turn. As clarifying activity philosophy does not contribute to knowledge, but only to better understanding. The main reason is that concepts for themselves are not true or false, but useful or not and therefore expressively adaequate at most. This revolutionary lesson is one philosophy in general still has

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24 The practical language uses, for which this is true, have been called ›fiats‹ (from the Latin, where ›fiat‹ means: 'it should happen'. (Anthony Kenny, cp. his *Freedom, Will, & Power*.)

25 German: „Der Philosoph macht nur gegebene Begriffe deutlich.“ (Kant: *Logik*, 1800, A 95)

to learn.

#### IV.

Early on LW noted that „work on philosophy is actually closer to working on oneself. On one's own understanding. On the way one sees things. (And on what one demands of them.)“ (BT 407). Nevertheless he first tried to keep more in background the influence of his self-critique on the new book he planned to write. He rather wanted to present the results, not the difficulties themselves, from dissolution of which his new views resulted. (Cp. MS 136, 24. 1. 1948<sup>26</sup>) Up to 1943 the the centre of gravity of his work was in the philosophy of mathematics, where the number-theoretically operational conceptions of TLP (6.02 sqq.) seemed in need of elaboration only. Even the first attempt at synthesis in the *Big Typescript* of 1934 dealt in one third of its text with mathematical problems. Things changed in 1943. He then read TLP anew with a friend in Cambridge (Nicolas Bachtin) and after that a change in conception for the new book occurred. It suddenly seemed to LW, as he relates in the *Preface* to PI, „that I should publish those old ideas and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my older way of thinking.“ (PI 4<sup>e</sup>) At the same time he pursued the text that became PI after the first parts on language not into the philosophy of mathematics, but into the philosophy of psychology. This meant a stronger hold of the self-critique on PI as a whole, for it was motivated by the central position of the language-of-thought-hypothesis in TLP. His new insights in this field he meant to give a place in a second part of the book and the temporarily abandoned investigations in the philosophy of mathematics should be placed in a third part.<sup>27</sup> LW did not complete this three-part-work. PI therefore is an incomplete work. Even the first part, according to reports, should be worked on further, but LW in 1945 gave it up and returned to it only for a small change in 1947.

The text of PI starts, after the work-biographically important *Preface*, with an explicit critique of TLP's name-theory of word-meaning, generalized into the ›Augustinian picture of language‹. (para.s 1-88; 1-4, 32). Then it turns to the conception of philosophy already

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26 Quoted in Michael Nedo: *Wittgenstein – Sein Leben in Bildern und Texten*, Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp) 1983, 316.

27 This is the result of historical investigations of Georg Henrik von Wright on the genesis of PI: *Wittgenstein*, Oxford (Blackwell) 1982, Ch. 4 (in the German edition, published in the same year by Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 117-143, esp. 133 sqq.).

discussed (para.s 89-133). Then follows a short critique of the picture-theory of the proposition (para.s 134-142), which then is confronted with the basis of the transformed conception of language in a discussion of rule-following. But this concept is clarified only insofar as it is relevant for criticizing the logical objectivism which mistakenly can be coupled with rule-following as it was tied to the language-of-thought-hypothesis. With the famous Private Language Argument the text takes its turn into the philosophy of psychology. (para.s 243-315; 347; 380). It goes back to lectures LW gave in 1936 and is the successor of LW's critique of solipsism<sup>28</sup>, the best version of which is in the last third of a dictation to LW's students of 1933-1934, entitled *The Blue Book*. Then follows, in middle-position (as ›thinking and thought‹ in TLP 3-4), the concept of thought (para.s 316-362). At the end – after treatment of further psychological concepts: representing and pictures (para.s 363-397); ›I‹ and self (para.s 398-411); consciousness (para.s 412-427); intentionality (para.s 428-465); expectation and belief (para.s 571-610); will and volition (para.s 611-628); intending (para.s 629-660) – the section on ›meaning something‹ implicitly gives a descriptive correction of the language-of-thought-hypothesis.<sup>29</sup>

Mainly in the section missing in the list given – para.s 531-539; 568 – LW touches a problem that occupies the centre of (philologically) former Part II of PI – aspects and the seeing of aspects (sect. XI). This is one of the arguments that Part II belongs to PI in the 3-parts-conception v. Wright ascribed to LW. The other important argument is that the synoptic characterization of ›meaning of a word‹ as use in the language is from the start restricted to a large class of cases, not all. (para 43) The rest, as LW conceived of it, belongs in the discussion of aspects and the understanding of meaning under aspects. Section XI of Part II gives what materially connects the conceptions of philosophy, language, philosophy of mathematics (›seeing a sequence of formulae as a proof‹) and philosophy of psychology. In the last LW succeeds to show that our use of psychological concepts presupposes a steady aspect, which he called ›attitude towards the soul‹ or ›attitude to a human being‹.<sup>30</sup> Under this aspect we credit the like of ourselves with an ›inner life‹ *a priori*. This, too, is a lesson that philosophy in general still has to learn, which nowadays largely is fallen to the vehicle-reductionism of a

28 Cp. my ›Wittgenstein on Solipsism‹ in the *Blackwell Companion* to LW.

29 The section missing in the list – para.s 466-570 – is a mixed bag. It sometimes returns to concepts already treated of (for instance *meaning* and *understanding*), contains important self-reflective remarks on *philosophy*, *negation*, *language*, *meaning something* by use of words. Most important in general respect is the coda in para 570: „Concepts lead us to make investigations. They are the expression of our interest and direct our interest.“ It has the characteristic double meaning: it describes the use of language generally; and characterizes LW's own philosophy.

30 Cp. PI, pt. II, IV. – LW's best treatment of this is in late MS 169-176, published by v. Wright under the title ›*The Inner and the Outer*‹.

brain-idolatry. [This rests on the misunderstanding of the psychological distinction inner/outer in the basic spatial sense. If one takes it that one thinks with the head, inside it is the brain; so one seems to think with the brain. In LW's style the rejoinder could read: „Not: the brain ,thinks‘ , ,believes‘ , ,expects‘; but the person. And she does it not ,with her brain‘ (as if it were an instrument she could use or not), but herself.“)

LW's second, better: transformed philosophy is *critique*. Even its descriptive generalities like the notorious ›meaning is use‹ do not constitute theses (cp. PI para 128) – doctrinal-dogmatic propositions – but aim at synoptic descriptions of what we do with language. The meaning-explanations constitutive of the meaning of expressions (PI para 560) in last instance have to explain their use and – in teaching (another concept meaning is internally related to) – produce examples of the use of expressions in a performance. It is as wrong as it is vain to look for theories in LW's philosophy. He gives nothing but possibilities of therapy for curing illnesses of the understanding.

In this he wanted to incite self-thinking in his readers. His writing only notes, remarks, short sections and then prune them and bring them into an illuminating order wants to leave his readers the freedom to develop their own thoughts and, above all, patiently clarify their own understanding.