Understanding Life

- A post-metaphysical Philosophy of Life

Translated from the German by

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Preface to the English version

This is the second translation of one of my German online-books that my youngest daughter has made.[1] As elaborated in the opening *Introduction* it starts with a discussion of the concept expressed by the German word ›Sinn‹ (sense; meaning) in order to clarify what sensibly can be understood by the turn of phrase ›Sinn des Lebens‹ (meaning of life).

The idea to have this book translated goes back to my acquaintance with Mark LeBar. Some years ago I participated in an internet discussion on the philosophy of Robert Brandom, which Mark, then Florida State university, had organised. A year or so after the discussion group had ended, Mark visited Berlin and I had the pleasure to meet him and his wife in a coffee shop in Berlin-Mitte. We talked also about our philosophical projects and I spoke about this book then available only in German. At the end Mark was so kind as to say that he would certainly read it if available in English. This inspired in me the hope that also other anglophone philosophers might welcome a translation – and here it is.

In advance a general remark on the difficulty of translating the German vocabulary, that is also used for semantic relations, is needed, since the spirit of even family-related languages like German and English differs in conceptually important details.

In both languages the expressions ›sense‹ (Sinn) and ›meaning‹ (Bedeutung) are closely related but assessed differently. This is due to the fact that ›Sinn‹ in German has more strongly retained the objective meaning of ›direction‹ (Richtung). In German the turn of phrase ›im Uhrzeigersinn‹ is quite common, whereas in English ›clockwise‹ is used. In English the objective meaning of ›sense‹ seems to be present only in marginal uses (i.e. ›sense of rotation‹). On the other hand, in English a subjective meaning of ›meaning‹ prevails as shown in the possibility to say ›I mean to say‹, where to translate ›to mean‹ into German as ›bedeuten‹, results in nonsense. But for ›Sinn des Lebens‹ English uses ›meaning of life‹ by default. Hence the difficulty of avoiding an objective misunderstanding of what might be meant by ›the meaning of life‹ in English cannot be as acute as in German. But it can arise. I therefore have not attempted to adapt what I have to say in the first Chapter on ›Sense and the Meaning of Life‹ to the conceptual conditions in English. Even if the correction of the objective misunderstanding of the meaning of life is not as urgent in English as it is in German, I hope that reflecting on the possibility of this misunderstanding is useful even to Anglophone readers. After all, philosophy has to deal with possibilities (of understanding).

Other differences of this English version of my most important German book are as follows: Chapter VII in German contains a detailed critique of the positions of two German moral philosophers, Ernst Tugendhat and his disciple, Ursula Wolf. Since I expect this to be of less interest to anglophone readers, I have replaced it with a less dialectically framed exposition of the concepts of ›convention‹, ›morality‹ and ›law‹ taken and revised from Part III of ›After Wittgenstein‹. Further, I have deleted Appendix I of the German version on Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy which was essentially aimed at clarifying his dazzling remark that

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[1] The first is *After Wittgenstein* on academia.edu and www.emilange.de.

one „really (should) write philosophy only as one writes a poem" (CV 28e).[2] The reason is that in the interim I have come to see the necessity of correcting Wittgenstein's conception by replacing his primary focus on the dissolution of philosophical problems with his secondary aim of achieving conceptual oversight.[3] The German Appendix II on Heidegger's Philosophy of Time, on the other hand, is preserved as the only one in this English version. For although it is as predominantly exegetical as the deleted appendix, I thought it worthwhile to expose the gross errors in Heidegger's analysis.

Introduction

Already a fragment by Heraclitus has been passed down to us which reads: "I investigated myself". (fr. 103) And ever since Plato had Socrates say in his *Apology* that "a life without self-exploration does not deserve to be lived" (St 38 a), philosophy has always been about understanding the life in which we find ourselves when we explicitly think about it. But since then philosophy has also always been tempted to take the life of philosophy for the good life itself - thus the Platonic Socrates, in the place of the cited, harsh judgement about which life deserves to be lived at all, also explicitly says "that this very thing is the greatest good for man, to converse daily about virtue and about the other objects about which you hear me speak and examine myself and others". This confidence of claiming absolute excellence of the philosophical life has rightly been lost to philosophy, but the reasons for this have only rarely been explicitly admitted and acknowledged. Also a contemporary ethicist can declare in his provisional conclusion about the good life for man: "the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is".[4] In any case, it still seems that he who wishes to lead a good life must also be a philosopher.

However, in the particular sense of philosophy that has come to characterise the intellectual activities that are pursued today under this title at universities and academies ["primarily or solely in public service (as employee of the state)" - Hegel[5]] - philosophy as *reflexive conceptual clarification* - only a few are philosophers who think for themselves (incidentally also at universities and academies). And the following proposals for clarification of an explicit understanding of the life we have to lead do not at least aim at explicitly eliminating the prejudice, which is obvious in philosophy for reasons to be discussed, that whoever wants to lead a good or meaningful life must also be a philosopher in the sense of the clarified concept of philosophy.

I began these investigations as a project to clarify the concept of a meaning of life. The result I arrived at is presented in the first chapter. It limits the competence of philosophy to the

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2 The German actually does not compare writing philosophy to writing a poem, but is more objective: „Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten". (CV 28)

3 Cp. *After Wittgenstein*, part II.

4 Alasdair MacIntyre: *After Virtue*, Sec. ed. London (Duckworth) 1985, 219.

5 Hegel: *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (1820), Vorrede. (Philosophy of Law). This is so in Germany and many other countries on the continent and different from the UK or the USA.

clarification of the pre-conditions and some themes in the conduct of life that exist for every life to be led, quite independently of any particular conceptions of life that can determine the life of an individual in the same way that the interest in penetrating clarity of understanding should determine the life of philosophers. It also shows why not everyone needs to gain clarity about these pre-determinations in the way that should be characteristic of philosophy. Philosophy has no stronger jurisdiction for the good or meaningful life than it has for all its other subjects - the responsibility for a reasoned explicit understanding.

A post-metaphysical philosophy of life is given by the following discussions not only in the weak sense of a hermeneutically secured historical philosophy of mind; but first of all in that they confine themselves to making clear in a broad sense analytically given concepts (according to Kant the philosopher does nothing but clarify *given* concepts), not to constructing them for theoretical purposes[6]; that it claims for the clarifications the practical status of suggestions for better understanding, not that of an insight into the nature of the world and of life; and finally, in the narrower sense, that at the end of a chapter on time it will be shown that a conceptual constellation of necessity and eternity has been decisive for philosophy's more far-reaching claims to significance of life, which metaphysics from Aristotle to Hegel and beyond explicitly and non-explicitly has made, and which, for reasons of conceptual clarity, cannot be maintained today.

1. *Meaning - Life - Meaning of Life*

Meaning

In order to understand life as a whole, the terms ›happiness‹ and ›meaning‹ compete in philosophy. Ancient philosophy, especially Aristotle, believed that life was essentially about *eudaimonia*, happiness, because that is what everyone strives for in the whole of their lives. As a clear-sighted philosopher, who joined this ancient view on the question of the good life as fundamental to philosophy, succinctly remarked, compared to the concept of happiness, that of meaning has the advantage of also being able to take into account life goals outside one's own well-being from the outset.[7] She saw its disadvantage in the fact that it easily entangles one in metaphysical speculation. I want to avoid this by trying to recover an order from the word-field of 'meaning' that can orient the question of a meaning of life.

For, first of all, 'meaning' is a word of language in which language becomes reflexive. For in one of its uses, which according to the German Dictionary of the Brothers Grimm is today "only common and very ordinary"[8], sense is the correlative of Verstehen, understanding. For when we ask about the meaning of an expression - word, phrase or sentence - we are asking how it can (reasonably) be understood and how it is to be understood.

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[6] In making this contrast, I am thinking of the metaphysical talk of the formation historically called 'philosophy of life', e.g. Georg Simmel's talk of 'life', 'more-life' and 'more-than-life'.

[7] Ursula Wolf: *Die Philosophie und die Frage nach dem guten Leben*, Reinbeck bei Hamburg (Rowohlt) 1999, 16.

[8] *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (DW) vol. 12, vol. 397, para. 2(b).

But even if this use of sense was common and very ordinary as early as 1905 (the year of publication of DW vol. 16), it is still a high-level formation that presupposes a great deal. If one tries to arrange the details of the article 'Sinn' in DW, which are divided into 24 points, a division into four groups emerges right away. The basic meaning of 'sense' is 'direction' - we still know it in the turn of phrase ›im Uhrzeigersinn‹ (English: clockwise), i.e. the direction in which the clock hands run. This meaning, which is to be understood as physically localised, is supposed to have been transferable 'into the spiritual/intellectual' from the outset. There, 'sense' means something like 'purpose' or 'intention' or 'tendency'. The meaning of an action, for example, is its purpose, its tendency, what it is aiming at. One builds on/develops this usage for the capacity or ability to set a purpose and pursue/follow a tendency. We still know it in marginal meanings. For example, if a person is said to have a sense of/for painting or music or beauty, then he is said to have a special ability to enjoy painting and music or to pursue beauty. This usage refers only to the receptive side of our abilities, but in the history of language there were also uses for active and productive abilities. There are also only remnants of this today - when a person is said to be in the mood for something, it is meant or understood that they want to have, do or experience something (often it is about having, such as the enjoyment of a food or drink).

The now common and very ordinary use in the sense of 'meaning, understanding' can be connected to the use as 'purpose' etc. Actions have their intelligibility through their intentions and purposes as well as the reasons that at first/foremost the acting persons can give for their actions. Such reasons are themselves purposive - they seek to explain and justify and must be intelligible. Often we cannot act alone, but have to coordinate and agree/come to terms/reconcile with others - and for this we often have to speak. Such action-coordinating utterances must also be intelligible. The reflexive use of language for the sake of communication and understanding is only an autonomisation and specialisation of action-related speaking and understanding. It therefore makes sense - can be reasonably understood - that this use of 'sense' has become the central and practically only common one today.

Accordingly, we expect four types of use of 'sense' and its derivatives (sensible, senseless, paradoxical, nonsensical, etc.).) - (1) in the 'sense of direction'; (2) in the 'sense of purpose'; (3) in the 'sense of ability', and in this case with reference to understanding and action/acting alike; to this group must be added the use of 'sense' for the total of abilities, for which in other contexts 'consciousness' and (subjective) 'mind' are also used (a subspecies of these uses concerns the five senses - touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing; interesting also that the phrase 'sixth sense' originally had a sexual connotation - the word-field of 'sense' contains essential elements of a descriptive anthropology); and finally (4) 'sense' as understandability'.

Life

That 'life' is a basic word of language is understood from the fact that we understand ourselves as living and that in understanding everything else we start from ourselves. Again, according to DW, the basic meaning of 'leben' is being alive "in contrast to an expected and feared deadness/being dead".[9] While 'Sinn' is derived from a verb - *sinnan* or *sinnen* as 'to travel, to stand by, to take care of' - but is a noun, 'leben' (to live) is first a verb related to 'to

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9 DW vol. 12, col. 397, para. 2(b).

remain', but also to 'Leib'. In Old Norse also meant 'to be left, to remain'. (Perhaps that is the reason why in *Being & Time = Sein und Zeit* Heidegger wrote of the life of a person as he experiences it himself, as of 'Dasein' - he who lives and is left, is still there, he still exists). Only the extended use of the infinitive as a noun has led to a fully developed noun 'life' in the sense of 'the whole life of a person', which in Latin is *vita*.

That the contrast between 'living' and 'being dead' is a basic distinction that cannot really be explained, only elucidated, has sometimes been seen by philosophers. Wittgenstein, for instance, points out, "Our attitude to the living is not that to the dead. All our reactions are different." We cannot ascribe pain to a stone, but we can to a wriggling fly - "pain seems to be able to get *a foothold* here, where before everything was, as it were , *too smooth* for it."[100] The character of the opposition as a basic distinction is clear above all from the fact that significantly different ways of understanding attach themselves to the distinction. What is dead we understand from 'outside', in the contexts of natural laws that determine its constitution and its relation to other items. What is alive we also understand from 'within'. This is easy to misunderstand and should be understood as follows: In understanding what is alive, we expect that what is understood itself has a somehow understanding perspective on itself and its life. And we also understand it essentially from its perspective. This is clearest in the case of a person's actions. An action is a behaviour with an intention and for a reason - a *behaviour for which something can be said*, a reason can be given, from the perspective of the person behaving. In the simplest case, the intention, what the doer wants to achieve, is itself the reason. The fact that this perspectivity, the difference that is expressed in the grammatical persons of language, is fundamental for understanding of what is capable of action has far-reaching consequences. As a matter of course, this mode of understanding is initially applicable to beings that speak and whom we can therefore ask about their reasons for action. Often we do not have to ask because their intentions seem obvious to us from the context of their behaviour, and often they are. But in difficult cases we must (be able to) ask in order to understand - and this makes actions of persons essentially intersubjective realities. Their intersubjectivity already belongs to the phenomenon of action itself, not only to ways of talking about the phenomena (as in the case of dead objects and processes).[11] We also apply the 'intentionalist' mode of understanding to animals, talk about a dog 'just wanting to play', 'looking for' the bone, 'knowing' that there is a cat on the tree, etc., etc.. But with animals, we can base our understanding only on the context of their behaviour and the general knowledge of their behavioural repertoire. The crucial source of evidence that is the possibility of questioning in human persons does not exist because animals have no language (at least none that we can understand). The applicability of the 'intentionalist' mode of understanding to animals is thus decisively thinned out. This is even more the case with regard to the third class of living things, plants. There, too, we talk about them 'striving' for the light, 'directing' their flowers towards the sun, etc., but this in no way implies the assumption of intentionality and the exclusive contextuality in relation to animals is solidified into a functional

10 *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) section 284.

11 There   is a commonplace according to which man is the being who cannot *not* communicate. If 'can' here has its ability-sense and 'communicate' is to be understood intentionally as 'to give something to understand', this assertion is false, for one can willfully keep one's mouth shut and not participate in any speech that may be conducted. If 'communicate' here is to be understood non-intentionally in the sense of 'show intelligible behaviour', then the assertion is correct and the intersubjectivity of action (even solitary, 'monologue') is the explanation for this.

understanding of the requirements for the maintenance of the metabolic process, the presence of which, after all, biologically defines 'living'.

The verb 'to live', by its biological definition, denotes a process, without the duration of the process being determined by the logic of the expression. Who lives, the contrast to being dead implies, will die, but it is undetermined when. The fully developed noun 'life' in the sense of *vita*, on the other hand, denotes a temporal whole limited by birth and death. It is never given to the living person himself (in 1st person), only to the biographer post mortem in 3rd person. The vita, the CV that a person may write at one point in his or her life is therefore always partial vita, from 3rd person partial biography. And yet, in situations of searching for orientation or looking back on their life, the person is in a certain sense confronted with her whole life. This wholeness is essentially not temporal, but structural - the wholeness of the life-accomplishments that make up life: Activities, actions and experiences; and life references: Family, occupation, membership in organisations, etc. In the usage of the verb 'to live', this structural wholeness has partial representatives in expressions such as 'living in the city' or 'living at the countryside' or also 'living at (in) a certain time (epoch)'. 'Living in the city' includes certain typical life activities: working, getting necessities, recreation and entertainment, etc. The structural wholeness which a person confronts in the above-mentioned typical situations of searching for orientation and looking back at his or her whole life is a biographically determined totalisation of such ways of life as 'living in the city".[12]

So we have to reckon with 'live' as a verb and as a noun ('life'). As a verb, it denotes a process of indeterminate temporal duration determined by the existence of metabolism. As a fully developed noun, the vita, which is always incomplete, is a process with a beginning in birth and an indefinite end in death. Between the two, the substantive use mediates for a wholeness of life references and life accomplishments.

Meaning of Life - The Conceptual Problem

At the end of the overview of the words 'meaning' and 'life', which are important for our concept, we may look a little further, but are rather even more in an aporia in light of the question of the meaning of life.

This applies less to the term 'life' - for we cannot understand it in the sense of *vita* as something closed off, as long as we ask about the 'meaning of life'. The question of the meaning of life in situations of searching for orientation or looking back on a life lived is a practical one about the character of the future process that is still partially open to us, which continues by sustaining itself from inner strength or is/is to be sustained by us. It is a practical one also in relation to the past, which can no longer be changed, but in relation to which one

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12 What is being merely claimed here, I shall explicitly substantiate, beginning in the next subsection, in critique of the prevailing contrary philosophical views since Kierkegaard.

can consider which parts of it one really wants to ascribe to oneself (and therefore take into account and/or continue into the future).

The aporia, however, applies to the ambiguity of 'sense'. For the uses of 'sense' that take up most space in the dictionary for affective and cognitive abilities of persons, i.e. the psychological uses, do not apply to the expression "sense of life". It is true that there are people who enviably easily cope with their lives, but one will not therefore want to ascribe to them a sense of life analogous to the sense of beauty. The ability-sense of 'meaning' will, however, perhaps play a role in explaining why we can ask about the meaning of life. Among the uses of 'sense' that I think come into question are prima facie the other three: 1. the use indicating 'direction'. To this the comment has to be that, at best, it contributes to the problem of the meaning of life - the 'direction' of life from birth to death. For we commonly fear death and our will to live seeks to avoid it. Also, in what we do with our life, we should certainly be aware that it can basically end at any time, that we do not have unlimited time and should spend it sensibly. These are important points of view for the evaluation of the meaning of life, but they alone do not solve the problem of the meaning of life; even if it should be about the direction of our life as a whole, it is not only the temporal direction from birth to death. For, the meaning of life cannot be its temporal course alone, it would have to be what it means for us, what is important about it for us. (Analogously, not everything that has happened in the past is already 'history'; it only becomes so when it is considered worthy of remembrance by witnesses and worthy of narration by historians). But what the individual parts and sections of our life mean in their temporal context, what is and was important about them for its course, would only be clear at the very end. In fact, philosophers, e.g. Wilhelm Dilthey, have held the view that with regard to what he called meaning as the relationship of the temporal parts to the whole of life, "one would have to wait for the end of the course of life and would only be able to survey the whole at the hour of death, from which the relationship of its parts could be ascertained".[13] If the meaning of life were essentially its temporal course and its rememberable connection, this is quite consistent. But that alone cannot be "the meaning of life", since for Dilthey it also lay "in shaping, in development", that is, in something that can already be important during the course of life. Heidegger does not escape the aporia of a temporal conception of the meaning of life with his conception of a "running ahead" into the extreme possibility of death already in resolute existing, which is also developed from Dilthey's aporias. Rather, it is a futile attempt to hold on to a temporal sense of 'meaning of life' against the evidence by drawing death into its course as the temporal end of life in anticipation.

2. To understand the meaning of life, the aspect of purpose of 'meaning' should be considered. Here it is a historical consideration that makes the difficulty clear. Up until the first third of the 19th century, it was a religiously based and often philosophically adopted and elaborated idea that there was something like a 'destiny of man'. With the waning of the persuasive power of religions and metaphysical doctrines of man, this conviction has also weakened, and it is in this situation that the talk of the 'meaning of life' arose in the first place.[14] It is only when there is no longer a belief in a 'destiny' of man predetermined by God or the

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13 Wilhelm Dilthey: *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*, ed. by M. Riedel, Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp) 1970, 288. The following quotation ibid 245.

14 To have shown this is the essential merit of a contribution by Volker Gerhardt, 'Sinn des Lebens: Über einen Zusammenhang zwischen antiker und moderner Philosophie', in: Praxis, Vernunft, Gemeinschaft, ed. by Volker Caysa and Klaus-Dieter Eichler, Weinheim 1994.

constitution of reality that the individual has both space and reason to ask about the meaning of life. If this consideration of the historical place of the question of the meaning of life in a situation of 'metaphysical homelessness' is correct, then it is clear that the use of meaning as 'intention' or 'purpose' as such is also out of the question for 'meaning of life': there is no external purpose or extraneous higher intention to our lives to be led when we no longer believe in a 'destiny of man'; we have purposes in life, but not a single purpose for our lives, and the many purposes we have need not be hierarchised or otherwise form a harmonious whole. Aristotle's contrary notion, if understood teleologically, of *eudaimonia*, happiness or successful living as an overarching purpose, will be discussed.[15]

But it was Aristotle who provided the elements for an argument according to which life can have no such overarching purpose - if only for grammatical-logical reasons. He distinguished physically between unfinished and completed movements and based two different aspects of activities/actions on them. Unfinished movements are directed towards a goal external to them, in which (with the attainment of which) they expire. Actions belonging to this category of movements are *poieseis*, goal- or purpose-directed actions. Completed movements, by contrast, are not directed towards any goal external to them and do not expire for internal reasons. The physical model was the circular motion of the heavenly bodies (a ideally perfect circular motion according to the conception of the time). Activities belonging to the category of this type of movement were called *praxeis* by Aristotle. And he marked their difference by means of a grammatical-logical observation regarding the different relation of the tempora of verbs to each other: "one cannot at the same time walk and have walked, or build and have built, or become and have become ... On the other hand, the same being can at the same time see and have seen, think and have thought..." (*Metaphysics* 1048 b 31-3). According to this grammatical criterion, 'life/to live' belongs to the completed movements, for one can have already lived and still be living. Now, some verbs can be constructed differently, and the different constructions determine the belonging to the respective other subcategory. For example, one can have already swum and still be swimming - 'swim' would then be a *praxis*. But one cannot have swum to the other shore and still be swimming - 'swimming to the other shore' is a *poiesis*. This modifiability of the appropriate verbs could be made intelligible in an action-theoretical context, which is not to be entered into here, with reference to the respective intention of the agent. Here it only has to be pointed out that despite the use of the figura etymologica 'to live/lead one's life', 'life/to live' cannot be constructed in such a way that it slips out of the category of *praxeis* into that of *poieseis*. This means, however, that life cannot have an overarching goal in the sense of an external point of reference for its movement. 'Life' in 'to live one's life' does not primarily denote a movement or even the temporal wholeness of it (the *vita*), but at best the totality of life's references and life's accomplishments. This is sometimes expressed by saying that life is an end in itself. To me, this talk of ends in themselves seems unfortunate and misleading, because it describes the category of completed movements from the point of view of unfinished ones. But if one keeps in mind that a self-'purpose' is what we can will/want for its own sake, and does not forget that 'life/to live' is not only not an action but also a *praxis* only grammatically, because according to its temporal origin in birth and according to many of its circumstances it belongs

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15 Dilthey, too, anachronistically still took for granted: "We interpret life as the realisation of a supreme purpose to which all individual purposes are subordinated, as the realisation of a supreme good." (op. cit. 248) When the meaning of life has become problematic, we no longer do precisely that.

just as much to the category of the happenings, then the talk of life as an end in itself is harmless. But with this reminder, the meaning of 'sense' as 'purpose' or 'intention' in the context of 'meaning of life' is precisely not proven.

That leaves 3. ''sense' as comprehensibility. And 'comprehensibility/understandability' certainly plays a role. For insofar as the meaning of life is something we (can) ask for, what we find/discover/invent as an answer must be understandable. So the meaning of life certainly has to do with comprehensibility/understandability. (This is the reason that Heidegger relied on when he claimed priority of the analysis of Dasein for his central question of the "Sinn von Sein (meaning of being)" in *Sein und Zeit* because Dasein is characterised by having an *understanding* of being). But comprehensibility/understandability cannot be all that constitutes the meaning of life. Something must be added so that 'meaning' in the composition "meaning of life" has its special sense. But what is it?

Meaning of life - what is asked for; why; and how

The aporia we encountered at the end of the overview was that none of the four categories and none of their elements seem to be able to account as such(s) for the meaning of "meaning" in the phrase "meaning of life". To resolve it, it is useful to discuss the question of why we can ask about the meaning of life, what is the reason for the possibility of this question.

A start to the answer is made by the trivial statement that we can ask about the meaning of life because we can *ask*. And we can ask insofar as we can speak, that is, insofar as we are persons. So far, I have used the term "person" casually to refer to a living being that is capable of speech and action, when I have written that persons strive for this-and-that and ask for this-and-that. But the provisional explanation thus casually assumed is of course not sufficient. By being able to speak and act, we can engage in normative practices. Not only in acting according to morals and law, already in speaking, in the use of language, we are bound to norms, in this case to criteria of right and wrong. What we say and do by speaking is not only judged or evaluated by others according to right or wrong (fundamentally: comprehensibility or incomprehensibility), but also by ourselves. We are bound to norms by binding ourselves to them - in speaking we *not only act in a regular way*, but, as Wittgenstein has explained and discussed at length, we *follow* rules.[16]

Wittgenstein starts from very simple learning situations - a pupil is taught to continue an arithmetic series correctly (cf. PI section 143). This may initially involve learning/teaching the series of natural numbers and the task in rewriting the number signs. The pupil's hand may even have to be guided at first. Then, however, Wittgenstein, with the reasonable resignation of an educator[17] - as is well known, he also worked as an elementary school teacher - admits something that is little considered by his philosophical interpreters: "then,

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16 Cp. centrally PI sections 142-243. Wittgenstein's intention in his discussion of ›to follow a rule‹ is, of course, not only to clarify the concept of 'rule-following', but to do so only and to the extent necessary to criticise philosophical illusions about rule-following. Cf. my commentary on the PI,   Paderborn 1998 (UTB 2055), 225-260.

17 In Sören Kierkegaard's view, it already played a role in Socrates' characterisation of his art as midwifery - cf. e.g. Über den Begriff der Ironie mit ständiger Rücksicht auf Sokrates (On Irony), trans. E. Hirsch, Düsseldorf 1961, 197; Philosophische Brocken, trans. E. Hirsch, Düsseldorf 1952, 7 sq.

however, *the possibility of understanding* will depend on his going on to write it down by himself." The readiness to continue independently is a contribution that the pupil must make and "the possibility of communication" depends on this readiness. Only a pupil who is prepared in this way can be taught how to continue correctly and how not to continue (incorrectly). This means, however, that the pupil must *want to* apply the rule that he is to be taught himself - he must bind himself to the rule and thus to criteria of correctness and incorrectness (norms of judgement). All acquired abilities, in the acquisition of which one could be taught or could have been taught, are bound to such objective criteria of rightness and wrongness, which are shared or capable of being shared (because without them there could be no monitoring of the learning progress). (Some capacities, by contrast, are acquired by natural processes of growth and maturing - e.g. the capacity of female beings to bear offspring - for these there are no learnable criteria of doing it right. But very many abilities possessed by an adult person are such that they could have been taught, even though they may in fact have been acquired mainly by spontaneous imitation). The consideration of acquired abilities that could have been learned/taught and are therefore subject to objective criteria of rightness and wrongness leads to further defining the concept of the person in such a way that it must be said: *persons are essentially self-assessing living beings* who bind themselves to norms.

In more recent philosophical discussions, this concept of person has been recovered by Harry Frankfurt.[18] With regard to persons, Frankfurt assumes two levels of desires - 1st level desires, to do or have something, and 2nd level desires which refer to first-order desires and are based on wanting to attribute certain desires and not others to oneself . For Frankfurt, these second-order volitions constitute a person's will itself. Gary Watson criticised early on[19] that it is too narrow to allow only higher-level desires to operate on the second level and not also rules, norms, ideals, role models, etc. But above all, this structural model of two levels does not solve the problem of the possibility of such a structure, as Peter Bieri has recently discussed.[20] With Wittgenstein, one cannot consider it the task of philosophy to be interested in explanations, at least not in causal and motivational explanations. But rational potential explanations that allow the possible formation of a structure of becoming comprehensible, must be of interest to anyone who wants to understand the connection of the fact of the command of normative abilities with the problem of the possibility of the question of the meaning of life.

The offspring of living beings capable of learning have a generic motive to want to learn - they want to grow up and *become like* adults in this. The willingness of the pupil in

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18 Cf. Harry Frankfurt, 'Willensfreiheit und der Begriff der Person' (English 1968), in: P. Bieri (ed.): *Analytische Philosophie des Geistes*, 2nd improved edition Bodenheim 1993, 287-302. - An analogous concept of the person, not limited as in Frankfurt, is also developed by Ernst Tugendhat: *Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung*, Frankfurt am Main 1979 et al. More recent studies show that it is also implicit in the rational psychology assumed by Kant's moral philosophy and goes back to Plato - cf. Christine M. Korsgaard: *The Sources of Normativity*, Cambridge UP 1996, 3.2.1 ff.

19 'Free Agency', in Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975), 205-220.

20   Peter Bieri, Das Handwerk der Freiheit - Die Entdeckung des eigenen Willen, Munich 2001, 445.- I see the solution to the problem of the possibility of this structure in the positing of desires of different structure already at the 1st level. In addition to desires to do and to have, which are directed outwards, the long-term dependent human offspring form desires to be like (his elders) from the outset. These are directed in intentional diversion, as it were, via the 'outside' towards the 'inside', towards the wisher himself or herself. This second type of desire can be linked to the educational influence from the outside and enable and stabilise the development of the second stage, on which rules, norms, role models, etc. can operate.

Wittgenstein's example to try independently to continue correctly is also based on this generic motive. Now, the possibilities of success and failure of continuation attempts are connected with the possibilities of doing it right or wrong. And because of the generic motive of wanting to become like the adults, the pupil cannot be or remain indifferent in the face of the alternative of success or failure (if he were or were to remain indifferent, the possibility of understanding would be exhausted - educators repeatedly and painfully encounter the limits to the teachability and instructability of their charges). The pupil therefore typically reacts to failure with negative feelings of disappointment and dejection, to success with feelings of satisfaction and pride.

Such feelings become symptoms of the self-assessment which become powerful in the learner. They even become criteria for the self-assessments 'I can do it ' or 'I cannot do it'. It is in the context of these concrete self-assessments with regard to specific abilities that, I would like to suggest, the question of the meaning of life, also belongs.It no longer concerns *specific* abilities and no longer only *abilities*, but the whole life experience. Not only what we can do and achieve, but also what happens to us and what we are as a whole is to be judged when asking about the meaning of life: Can and do I want to understand and accept myself as I am, can I understand and do I want to accept it how things are my life? - that seems to me to be the reasonable plain language of the question about the meaning of life ('What is the meaning of my life?'). The question of the meaning of life concerns the whole meaning (in the ability sense of this expression) of a person. Not only the abilities of speech and action, but also the capability of desire as the seat of all striving and wanting/willing, affectability through moods and feelings, the mind and perceptive faculties, and the sexual desire (all expressions appear in the DW article '*Sinn*' as explicatures of different uses of the term ›Sinn/sense‹) are involved in judgements of the meaning of life, and the experiences relating to them are affected by judgements of the meaning of life. Of course, the more receptive faculties are more only involved in the judgments, and the more productive faculties are primarily affected by them - because it is only with regard to them that the person can deliberately change something.

If this is correct, then "meaning" in the question of the meaning of life means something like "comprehensible acceptability".[21] Mere comprehensibility/understandability, i.e. the modern basic meaning of "meaning", is not sufficient for the meaning of "meaning" in question, because the question is embedded in the context of evaluative self-assessment. Evaluative judgements are not just about how it is, but about whether it is good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable, how it is - and thus about acceptability. And the dimension of acceptability even takes precedence over that of comprehensibility in this context, hence 'comprehensible acceptability' and not 'acceptable comprehensibility'. The primacy of acceptability explains how many people can find meaning in ways of life that we as outsiders cannot find ourselves in, that may not seem incomprehensible to us, but in any case and above all seem unacceptable. (Let's take a current example: an Islamic fanatic on his way to becoming a

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21 In this explication I have followed David Wiggins' maxim "that in the case of a question so often asked, the philosopher must make the best of it, and that if the meaning of the question is really dark, he must find out what meaning the struggle for an answer can impose upon it." 'Wahrheit, Erfindung und der Sinn des Lebens', in: G. Meggle et al. (eds.): Der Sinn des Lebens, Munich (dtv) 2000, 408. But in doing so I have after all taken into account the logical priority of the semantic question, which Wiggins also recognises and to which he has formulated his maxim: "But logical priority is not everything; above all, the order it establishes need not always be that which leads to discovery." (ibid.) I hope to have shown that it can lead, if not to a discovery, at least to an insight.

martyr through a herostratic assassination. He is completely understandable - according to his faith, he goes straight to heaven and is allowed to sit to the left of God without the mediation of the Prophet; moreover, he is allowed to bring 70 members of his family to heaven, so he endears himself to his family in an unsurpassable way. If that is not an understandable motive ... But *we* reject it, also because we do not believe in post-mortem rewards). But because the question of the meaning of life belongs in the context of self-assessment, the judgement of the self not only has priority for it, but even sole jurisdiction.

It is not, then, as it sometimes seems, a peculiar linguistic coincidence that we primarily ask about the meaning of our own lives.[22] The argument for this being meaningful/sensible is this: If, for instance, one presumed to judge another's life as meaningless, then nothing at all would follow for the one being judged. With his judgement, the 3rd person judge was actually only saying: *I* don't want to lead a life like that. And with what he is letting us know, he only confirms the primacy of the 1st person perspective, because he was talking about himself (and against his will criticised his presumption of wanting to judge the meaning of another's life). The question of the meaning of life does indeed fundamentally possess the "character of mineness (Jemeinigkeit)" that Heidegger ascribes to Dasein as such (*Sein und Zeit* § 9, p. 42). This does not mean that a group of persons cannot find meaning in common activities and a shared form of life, but only that this happy circumstance also owes itself to explicit or implicit statements, judgements of meaning by individual members of the group who want to fit into this form of life. Nor does it mean (in contrast to Heidegger's conception of mineness) that judgements of the meaning of a person's life are not possible from the 3rd person judging perspective. It is just that such judgements are inevitably related to prior self-judgements of the person being judged and have no independent authority.

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22 Cp. for the opposite view Ernst Tugendhat: *Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung*, op. cit., 168 f.: "We speak not only of the meaning of linguistic expressions, but also of the meaning of actions, and accordingly we use the word 'understanding' not only in the sense of understanding linguistic expressions and other signs, but we say: we understand an action, and also: something effected by the action, a work, and then also: a person (in his or her actions). The question of meaning here always means as much as: what does the or an actor want with it, what does he intend? Ultimately, talk about the meaning of a linguistic expression is also a special case of talk about the meaning of an action. For the question of what sense - what meaning - a linguistic sign has means as much as: what does one want to make understood with it, what function does the expression have? Where we now have such linguistic expressions that, because of their meaning, stand for something that in turn has or can have meaning - in particular an action - the possibility arises of a graduation/scaling of questions of meaning, e.g.: what is the meaning of 'mountaineering', what is the purpose of the word? In these cases, however, it is clear that a) they are two sharply different questions and b) the second question presupposes that one has implicitly answered the first. Now there is a meaning of the   word 'being' in which the question of meaning can be asked in   precisely this scaled way, namely in the case of being in the sense of human existence, life. The life of a human being is the overall/ overarching context of his or her actions. For that reason, we also ask about the meaning of a person's life, especially our own life - and here with particular concern: is something intended by it, or what is it that I myself want with it? In the case of this being - but also only of this being - it is therefore also understandable what the question of the meaning of being says, but it is not subordinate to the question of the meaning of the word 'being', which in this case is all the more clear as it is only possible in the case of one of the meanings of the word 'being'. It can be seen from § 32 of Sein u. Zeit (p. 151 f.) that Heidegger, in asking the question about the meaning of 'Being', actually had this further question about the meaning of his own life in mind. He did not, however, keep the two questions apart, and this added to the ambiguity of his question about the meaning of Being." Tugendhat's own view, in contrast to his justified criticism of his teacher Heidegger, deserves a detailed critique, for which the space here is lacking. It would start from his dictum that the life of a person is essentially the overall context/connection of his action. While his teacher Heidegger still   uses the term 'Geworfenheit' (thrownness), Tugendhat's conception of the meaning of life amounts to an inappropriate complete   voluntarisation of the problem.- I will make good the many references to Heidegger in a critique of his analysis of time in the appendix; Tugendhat's conceptions are essential points of reference at various points in the main text.

If the question of the meaning of life is distinguished by the character of mineness, then a difficulty arises for the intention of reflexive conceptual clarification with which philosophy has to approach this question. The reflexivity of philosophical questioning, unlike that of the question of the meaning of life and despite the frequent creation of an appearance to the contrary, is not personal and what the philosopher may have to say about the meaning of his own life is not necessarily of general interest. The clarifications presented with philosophical claim are bound to the idea of judgement, to the impartial capacity for assent/agreement by everyone who should judge under the same conditions. The person reflecting on his or her own life, on the other hand, can be satisfied with a degree of clarity that helps him understand and lead his life - and this can very often be much less than is required for philosophical clarifications. In my opinion, the discrepancy can only be circumvented thus: One must limit oneself philosophically to the discussion of topics with regard to which the answer to the question of the meaning of life can, and in part must, be decided for persons. I am thinking of topics such as those discussed below: 'circumstances and givens', 'time and age', 'love and friendship', 'achievement and competition', 'work and autonomy', 'morality, law and politics', 'upbringing and education', 'play and self-development', 'intoxication and expression', 'art', etc. With regard to such topics, something can be said with the claim of general assentability. Philosophically, then, the accent is inevitably on intelligibility, albeit in the perspective of the pre-philosophical 1st person, that is acceptability. For the autonomy (and the capacity of self-design) of persons is not, after all, absolute (as the existentialist terminology of 'projection/Entwurf' might misleadingly suggest), but is exercised under conditions that are not self-selected and cannot be self-selected - just as the linguistically opened possibilities of our understanding are only characterised by situated autonomy, not autonomy independent of contexts.[23]

Any selection from among the themes of life is inevitably subjective, but it can strive for objectivity, impartial assentability, as even more so can its discussion in detail. With regard to the themes of life, each person has evaluative autonomy that cannot and should not be prejudged by any clarification undertaken with a claim to objectivity (assentability). What then remains, if there is to be any talk of it at all, is admitted subjectivity. Although philosophical reflexivity is not that of personal way of living, here what can be said, if it is to be understood, is inevitably related to an understanding of the one who expresses what is to be understood. In philosophical *dialogue*, this imposition can be compensated for by the possibility of replies and one's own self-expression; writing does not allow this. This is what has made live philosophy critical of writing since Plato. But on the other hand, writing allows a greater range of communication and more thorough criticism than fleeting oral speech. The alternative would only be, with Wittgenstein, to remain silent altogether. Although I do not follow the commandment of silence about higher things in Wittgenstein's first book, it will be a test of the persuasiveness of the proposed clarifications that from them also something becomes understandable that Wittgenstein wrote about the question of the meaning of life: "One notices the solution of the problem of life by the disappearance of this problem. (Is this

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23 I borrow the term "situated autonomy" from Charles Taylor, who has written extensively on the problems of modern subjectivity and speaks of "situated freedom", which he contrasts with its modern predecessor, the concept of freedom as 'dependence only on oneself'. That exercising freedom or autonomy is situated means that it never depends only on itself, but always on conditions that are also found. Cp. e.g. *Hegel and Modern Society*, Cambridge UP 1979, 154-69. - In the context of the problem of freedom of the will, Peter Bieri impressively emphasises that our freedom must always be and remain 'conditional freedom' - cf. *Das Handwerk der Freiheit*, loc. cit. Part I.

not the reason why people to whom the meaning of life became clear after long doubts, why they could not then say what this meaning consisted of?)"[24] Incidentally, as in philosophy in general, so also in this field, authoritative insights cannot be proclaimed ex cathedra, but are at best reasoned suggestions for, if possible, better understanding. The reader should test the suggestions against his or her understanding and his understanding against the suggestions. How he or she then positions himself or herself in relation to them must be left up to him or her, as is otherwise the case in philosophical clarifications.

The often implicit character of answering the question of the meaning of life

The restriction of philosophical discussion to life issues, with regard to which the question of the meaning of life can and must be decided in the sense outlined roughly , is, however, not only justifiable from methodological difficulties of philosophising, but also factual. So far, I have predominantly written as if the question of the meaning of life were an explicit question - something like 'Does my life have a meaning or not?' - and could be answered directly (if not in just one sentence) in a way that is still unexplained. Explicit - the question can be that, but usually it is not. Actually, only two types of situations can be thought of in which the question can become explicit: Situations of searching for orientation as a young person; and situations of looking back on a life already lived in large parts as an older person.[25] The methodological fiction of an explicit question was unavoidable in the hitherto guiding question of the meaning (sense/significance) of "meaning" in the question of the meaning of life. (It was necessary to clarify the meaning of a question for the time being, so the discussion had to be oriented towards a possible formulation of the question, at least implicitly).

Once this meaning has been formally clarified as "intelligible acceptability", the fiction can be abandoned and explicitly emphasised, which has so far only been mentioned in passing: The meaning-of-life question is a comprehensive practical question (an aspect or version of the question "How do I want to/should I/can I live?"); and this question rarely arises explicitly. Most of the time it only arises implicitly when decisions are made that give structure to one's life. Such structuring decisions regarding e.g. partnership or marriage and family, occupation, participation in social activities and organisations etc. help to determine what we want and have to understand ourselves as (e.g. which types of reasons for action we have to give priority to in which context based on such a self-understanding/self-conception)

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24 *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 6.521. (own translation) - Gerhardt expresses op. cit. a complete lack of understanding of Wittgenstein's dictum.

25 A personal remark: I am writing this in a situation of the second kind. But I also have evidence from my own experience of a situation of the first kind. During my studies in Berlin in the 1960s, I kept a diary and recently took the opportunity to reread the records of that time. For 7 June 1969, the following is recorded: "I am currently psychologically completely incapable of doing anything. Find myself in something like an 'epistemological vertigo', can hardly listen to others without getting stuck on a word and thinking about its use and the reality named and invoked by it and whether it can be met in this way. Also the sense of such a study ... has become deeply questionable to me." Apparently, at the time of writing, the information that my girlfriend had given me three years earlier (23 September 1966) in a similar mood - that the meaning of life lies in life itself - was no longer sufficient for me. In any case, then I wanted to understand more precisely what that meant. That the method of hanging on to words and asking about their use could also be philosophically respectable for this purpose, I only learned from Wittgenstein much later.

and thus about the meaning of our lives.[26] It is these aspects, which are also accessible to judgement by others, that can therefore be objectified as topics for discussion. If we recall the appearance of such structural decisions in our experience (of our own lives and the lives of our acquaintances), we will have to concede that even such important life decisions are sometimes, but by no means always, made rationally after thorough consideration of the pros and cons, but often also spontaneously on the convincing impression in a moment or a situation, or arise from a longer development without ever having been explicitly made. Not only the question of the meaning of life, but also the thematic, structure-giving life decisions often remain implicit, because and especially when they are based not only on our actions, but also on the experiences we encounter/make (events of the type of love at first sight, the encounter with a convincing/persuasive person - for example, an academic teacher who makes one change one's field of study, or an acquaintance who runs a business and is looking for an employee, whom one then stays, etc.). This mode of coming about as "fate" need not detract from rationality as intelligibility, even with regard to reasons. For with regard to very many abilities that we acquire, it is the case that we can *do* more by virtue of them than we *can say* about their execution and their results. And in the shaping of one's own life, a complex ability is at play, resulting from many individual abilities, which we can dispose of without having to be able to explicate as a whole. In any case, complete explicability is not to be expected or demanded because having an ability means being able to find one's way in new, unforeseen and unpredictable situations. No explication can want to anticipate the inherent inexhaustibility of acquired abilities (in contrast, for example, to programmes according to which electronic calculating machines work).

We often know what is good (for us) in - even big - practical questions without being able to say and justify it straight away. And yet what we do on the basis of such insight is understandable and we can also understand (and then also express) the reasons for it if we have reflected on them. With regard to the question of the meaning of life, this can generally only be done, if at all, with regard to the major life decisions in which it is implicit. I believe that this is the factual reason that made Wittgenstein make his remark in *Tractatus* No. 6.521. One notices the solution of the problem of the meaning of life by the disappearance of the problem insofar as one can understand oneself in the decisions of life and their consequences without difficulty, experiences the comprehensible acceptability of one's own life, which is constituted by its results, and can therefore forget about the explicit question altogether.

But what one can forget, one can also remember. Plato, to whose philosophy, according to the bon mot of Alfred Whitehead, the whole of the subsequent philosophy has only written footnotes, also compared the reflexive insight of philosophy with remembering for this reason. And according to an impressive interpretation of this philosophy[27], it was precisely the problem of the limits to the explicability of practical knowledge that motivated him to criticise the written nature of philosophical clarifications and to adopt strategies of indirect communication (including the use of invented myths, the writing of dialogues and their artful direction). What he called ideas are to be understood as the multiplicity of the inexpressible

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26 This point of view allows moral philosophy in Thomas Scanlon to gain a greater social realism than is customary in academia: cp. *What We Owe to Each Other*, Harvard UP 1998 pass. Scanlon uses this realism in a convincing critique of the teleological status of happiness as a 'master value', e.g. p. 108 sqq.

27 Cp. Wolfgang Wieland, Platon und die Formen des Wissens, Göttingen² 1999.

points of reference and orientation of practical abilities, with the idea of the good as the idea of all ideas. A craftsman, for example, may take the idea of the artefact he wants to produce as a good specimen of that kind of object, and measure that idea to the conditions of the material he is working with. Therefore, the idea must not be a blueprint to be transferred one-to-one to the material, but must have sufficient indeterminacy or flexibility for such measuring adaptations not only of means to ends, but also conversely of ends to available means. The meaning of life could be conceived as an analogue of an idea in the Platonic sense from the perspective of the person leading his or her life, i.e. taking into account its 'mineness', if one keeps three essential differences in mind: For Plato, ideas were *necessary* givens and orientation to ideas was necessary - the meaning of life is a contingent given (or non-given) and explicit *orientation* to it is *optional*; ideas were general givens for Plato (simply because they were to be the object of the highest knowledge and, Platonically speaking, there is knowledge only of the general), the meaning of life as the idea of an individual life from the perspective of the person leading the life would be an unavoidably individual given; and, unlike ideas, the meaning of life would be a point of reference and orientation not only for practical abilities, but also for understanding and self-understanding in relation to experiences and givens.

At the point where I see the concept of the meaning of life on the map of our concepts, the idea of *eudaimonia*, of the good or successful life, stood in ancient philosophy, which was seen above all under the aspect of being active, because the even more exquisite pure contemplation of theory in *bios theoretikos* was said/supposed to be possible only for a few, and even for these only in a few moments, completely. Eudaimonia was often translated as "happiness", because that is supposedly what all essentially strive for. But even if it was explained quite adequately, as by Aristotle, when he compares it to the scopus, the archer's aiming point (which, because of the elliptical trajectory of the arrow, is precisely not directly the object to be hit, so that the shot would be a means of reaching the goal and a component of said goal at the same time), a teleological understanding oriented towards poietic individual actions prevails.

Moreover, the ancient conception did not know the modern idea of the individual person with free will, in the context of which the question of the meaning of life belongs for us. (It is apparently precisely the orientation towards *eudaimonia* that is objectively given to man - everyone wants that; Nietzsche dryly remarked that man does not seek happiness, only the English do - if he wanted to express himself in such a politically incorrect way, he might have better said 'the American'. For in the American constitution the 'pursuit of happiness' is guaranteed as a fundamental right.) Therefore, in my opinion, the modern idea of the meaning of life must not be short-circuited with the ancient idea of the good life - it is a follower idea of the ancient idea under the intellectual conditions of modernity.[28]

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28 This goes against Gerhardt, op. cit. Cp. Ursula Wolf, Die Philosophie und die Frage nach dem guten Leben, Reinbeck bei Hamburg 1999; on Aristotle's understanding of eudaimonia and the comparison with the scopus ibid. p. 49.

A metaphysical version of this modern thought was given by the philosopher Georg Simmel in his idea of an "individual law".[29] This is perhaps a paradoxical turn of phrase[30] because the dominant use of "law" connotes generality (validity for all cases in a field). A metaphysical theory perhaps may express itself paradoxically. However, an explication within the framework of the understanding of philosophy followed here will have to try to gain the non-metaphysical version of an analogous thought that does not require a paradoxical formulation.

II. Preconditions and challenges

The question of the meaning of life, if the previous considerations were correct and convincing, asks about the comprehensible acceptability of one's own life. We can ask this question because, according to a formula to be further explained in this section, as persons we are essentially self-assessing living beings who have the possibility of taking a position on everything that is directly given/presented to us.

In the sense indicated and to be clarified in more detail we are not persons from birth; we must first become such in the course of time in/via a process of growth and maturing, of learning, being educated and forming ourselves. But at any point in our lives when we are able to ask questions and understand answers, we are already persons, albeit a long time in the making. The course of the process of becoming a person may have typical phases and stages, but it is ultimately individual and can only be narratively represented in a person's biography or autobiography. If the philosophical discussion of themes and problems on which the meaning of life for persons is commonly decided is different from life-historical/biographical reflection, then it cannot be such an account, which is ultimately adequate on its own. But if we disregard the course of the process of becoming a person in its inalienably individual form, then there is nevertheless the possibility of attempting an abstracting overview of its essential preconditions and challenges. Such an overview is abstracting because it largely disregards, on the one hand, the temporal order in which such conditions become effective and, on the other hand, the categorial diversity of the pre-conditions and challenges.

I would like to refer to the *preconditions* of personhood that exist in the same way for all persons as givens, and to those that have a particular appearance for each person despite possible coincidences with others as *challenges*. With regard to the challenges, the abstraction from the temporal aspect of the process of becoming a person cannot be sustained objectively because persons, as self-assessing living beings with a future that is still partly open at any point in their lives, are essentially *processes*; living beings that develop in confrontation with their experience, partly shaping and changing themselves. This circumstance, seen constructively together with the developments of extra-human nature and supra-individual

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29 Cf. Georg Simmel, *Lebensanschauung* - Vier metaphysische Kapitel, Munich and Leipzig 1918, ch. 4, p. 154 sqq.; the "preliminary outline of the problem" states that it is a matter of the "context of the ideal form of life which is woven into this individual in particular, following the principle uniqueness of his sense of life" (p. 160). Simmel uses the concept of the meaning of life without analysis, which was the aim here.

30 Even if the concept of law is related to the totality of the moments of the person's life - which are, after all, so different that they can be unified only narratively - how can one law link them? And if a law of formation analogous to biological ones is envisaged, then this remains metaphorical for the problem of the meaning of life.

human history, determined, for example, Hegel's idealistic conceptualisation of the mind/spirit as essentially becoming-itself.[31]

If persons are essentially processes, the fundamental precondition for them seems to be the temporal condition of our reality. We are born and thus thrown into the temporal course of a life, as the philosophers of existence have said. With the beginning of life at birth, it is certain that the process that begins with it will also end one day, even if it may take a long time for us to realise this even abstractly. The bodily functions according to which a newborn baby at first seems to live exclusively are themselves temporally composed: Waking and sleeping, starving/thirsting and eating/drinking, digesting and excreting, playing and being bored. And they are not only temporally constituted processes, they have their times in the alternation of times of day, of days and nights, weeks, months and years. We cannot take care of the requirements of our bodily functions ourselves from/at the very beginning, we are in need of help and completely dependent, if left alone we would not survive. Abandoning newborn children meant abandoning them to death (or to the chance of survival as a foundling). The fact that we learn to control our bodily functions and become independent with regard to them is a pre-condition and task set by the temporal condition of our biological life process. Its solution is partly due to spontaneous processes of growth and maturation. But because of the fact of helplessness from/at birth, these are always socially shaped as well. Another aspect of the pre-conditioned nature of a temporally constituted reality is that we are born into a certain time.

The temporal condition of our lives that is set when we are born - Hannah Arendt spoke of the basic condition of natality[32] analogous to mortality - implies social pre-givens. We are not only born, but we are born by our mother. If we are lucky, our mother accepts us as her child, for whom she cares and whose need for help she accepts as a task. Even the fact that the father participates in the task of child rearing is not self-evident, but it is common. Socially functionally, it is to be understood that the mother, if she has to care for a child, can only care for herself to a limited extent (at least as long as her child is very small), so that she has to be cared for as well - and since women are indispensable when it comes to childbearing, it is obvious that this co-care is taken over by a non-childbearing adult, a man.[33] But the functional requirement of co-care for women with infants and young children (as correspondingly at the end of life for the sick, the old and the infirm) can of course take on quite different forms and is largely socially designable. It does not have to be the mother who cares for the helpless child, but some adult, it does not have to be a blood-related family concerned with the task of child rearing, but some social grouping that shares the effort/task of making a living. When family is spoken of in the following, it is often to be understood in purely functional terms. Not, however, in this memoir: the social precondition of family corresponds to the precondition that each of us is born into a particular familial constellation - to a particular mother at a particular time in particular familial and social circumstances.

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[31] The metaphysical conceptualisation presents the developments of education and upbringing that shape the finite subjects as consequences of a super-subject mind/spirit that is only "brought into existence" in the individual subjects. But Hegel emphasises that "in the philosophical view of mind/spirit as such ... it itself is regarded as forming and educating itself according to its own concept" - *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, Part Three, The Philosophy of Mind, § 387. Post-metaphysical philosophising can no longer make affirmative, unreduced use of super-subjects and therefore pay more attention to the subjects' own share in 'bringing mind to existence'.

[32] cf. *Vita activa oder vom tätigen Leben*, Stuttgart 1960, p. 15

[33] I heard the famous anthropologist Magaret Mead, who was committed to women's emancipation, say dryly at the end of a heated discussion on gender relations: "There still remains the basic fact: that women bear children and men do not."

The basic condition for the possibility of family, apart from the need of children, is the fact of sexuality. We are not only born and born to a mother, but as children of female or male sex. Through psychological theories that became influential after Sigmund Freud, the sexual drive, along with so-called self-preservation drives, has been emphasised as the fundamental driving force of human-personal development.[34] These theories tend not to take seriously enough the possibility of even a completely rejecting stance of the person to the fact of their sexuality, the possibility of free abstinence and asceticism, insofar as they tend to regard such a stance as pathological (which it can be, but does not have to be). But it is easy to see that sexuality is in any case the generic motive for men to commit themselves to a family, insofar as it involves the possibility of a privileged sexual relationship with the mother of the children. And certainly, for each person, the given precondition of sexuality is connected with the task of incorporating this powerful driving force into the way they lead their lives and shape it thus.

A family consisting of parents and children is not self-sufficient/autarkic. Even when the wider social context was still based on family relationships, the core family was inserted into such wider contexts of generations and the social division of labour that transcends the narrower family context. This insertion into society is another social precondition - that of the orders of living together/coexistance in society. This brings up a categorically different type of precondition - social demands and norms. Today, the important types of this precondition are conventions, morality and law. The social order in which the family is inserted is based on these preconditions. The state is the comprehensive order of the legal constitution of a society and, as supra-individual agencies often simply called 'state', forms the instances for the establishment and protection of law; religion was once the generally binding organisation of the moral order of society with the associated instances of the church(es) capable of acting, a function it no longer has in modern society.

In modern societies there are social conventions and forms of morality that are limited to sub-groups and classes of persons in society. Norms are general rules of giving oneself, behaviour and action that take effect as reasons for and demands of action. Since acting and demanding are primarily activities of individual persons (collectives can only demand and act by means of individual persons doing so on their behalf), norms initially only become effective when they are asserted by persons, either explicitly or implicitly. The primary caregivers of an adolescent in the family are also those who first assert social norms towards him or her, demand that they be observed and criticise, sanction and punish their violation. Institutions of social education and training such as kindergartens, schools, etc. build on the foundation laid in this way. For the adolescent person, the pre-conditions of social norms are initially associated with the task of learning to satisfy and comply with them by increasingly binding himself or herself to the demands and norms of coexistence; later, also with the task of assuming an independent position vis-à-vis them.

Where demands and norms are explicitly asserted, they are *spoken*. This brings into view a peculiar precondition of becoming a person, the language that one learns growing up. It too is based on norms, norms of intelligibility (of meaning), but these norms need neither be explicitly formulated nor linked to formal sanctions, because the adolescent has an overriding general motive to learn to express himself or herself and to do it properly - this facilitates and ultimately increases the chance of satisfying his or her needs. Every person has a strong interest in comprehensibility, the norms of meaning; not being understood and therefore not

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[34] Sigmund Freud, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie* (1905), Studienausgabe Vol. V; *Triebe und Triebschicksale* (1915), Studienausgabe Vol. III.

getting what one wants, for example, is sanction enough so that formal means of sanction - criticism, disapproval, contempt, punishment - are not or hardly needed.

Empirically, moral learning of the norms of human interaction probably cannot be separated from language learning. And of course, the language learned not only serves to express one's own needs and desires, but is also the universal means of understanding, not only social but also natural reality. One can assume a general motive on the part of adolescents to learn to understand their own reality, even if at first perhaps only as a dependent component of the even more general motive of wanting to grow up and become independent like the adult persons of reference and therefore to be curious about everything that can or could contribute to this.

In growing into the normative orders of language, social conventions, morality, etc., a human being becomes a person, a living being that essentially evaluates itself. With regard to these orders, self-assessment/evaluation consists first of all in the self-application of the norms of these orders. We become self-evaluating beings by being evaluated by others, first of all by the caregivers who raise us, and by learning to adopt the points of view/criteria of the evaluation ourselves and to apply them to ourselves. The child does something forbidden or prohibited and may be reprimanded with a shake of the head or with stronger corrective measures. Maybe the next time it does the forbidden thing again, but this time shaking its head. The adoption of the defensive gesture is the beginning of self-assessment, which in this case does not yet really determine the action - but in most cases it is only a matter of time before that is the case. For it wants to become like the adults, grown-up and independent, and therefore has an overriding motive to obey prohibitions, instructions, advice etc.. To the extent that it succeeds in doing so, it has adopted or internalised, as psychologists say, the instance of judging its own behaviour and conduct as a point of view of self-judgement. The instance of moral self-assessment has its own name - conscience - but there is not only moral conscience because there is not only moral self-assessment. Nietzsche quite rightly spoke of intellectual (understanding-related) conscience. Not only do we acquire an instance of evaluation towards our desires and impulses for action, attitudes and feelings as we grow up, we also gain reflexive evaluative distance towards our non-practical opinions / convictions (those not directed towards action). We learn not only to ask practically: "Is this advisable, reasonable, permissible?", but also theoretically or epistemically (knowledge-related): "Is it credible, right, true?" Acquiring (the possibility of) critical distance of judgement with regard to all the capacities we acquire in growing up and being brought up, allows us to become persons, self-assessing living beings. One can also define a person as a living being who can refrain from himself/distance him/herself from him/herself, i.e. from his or her own immediate desires, opinions, attitudes, feelings and moods, etc. After all, the possibility of critical judgement no longer refers exclusively to the acquired abilities, with which objective criteria of correctness and incorrectness are and must be connected (because otherwise the progressive acquisition of abilities could not be checked and corrected), but also to the whole of one's own experience and being. This broadest horizon of self-assessment also opens up the possibility of coming to a distance to social orders and pre-conditions and asking: "Is it right and good that it is regulated/ordered this way, can I want it to be regulated this way? The monotheistic religions have helped to form this broadest horizon, especially when they have connected the idea of a personal relationship to God with the fact of moral conscience: The believer's personal relationship with God and his or her overriding obligation to him in his or her own conscience establishes a principled distance from human orders and demands. Martin Luther's 'Here I stand, I can do no other' is an incomparable historical symbol of this. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political philosophy is based on the insight that this general/accepted distance between the person and the community has

made the state constitutions of antiquity (often perceived in an idealised way in the European tradition) impossible in modern times.[35]

The person will not be able to practically question and change some of the preconditions and givens, but with the gaining of independence as a person, one can nevertheless distance oneself from them in an evaluative way. A widely used prayer going back to the Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, and believed to be a traditional, reads: "God, give me the serenity to accept things I cannot change; the courage to change things I can; and the wisdom to distinguish one from the other." It expresses very well the desires for the reasonable attitudes of an adult person, even if he or she should no longer be religiously attached and find God incomprehensible as a giving authority.

I had suggested that the question of the meaning of life belongs in the context of the person's self-evaluation and concerns not only his or her abilities but his or her whole experience and being. In order to link this appropriately with what I have just said about normative orders and becoming a person through acquiring the abilities for self-assessment, it is necessary to emphasise an aspect that has so far only been mentioned in passing. I had said that we only become self-assessing beings by being assessed by others and learning to apply their standards to ourselves and apply them ourselves. I had then referred exclusively to the acquisition of abilities, and thus it remains incomprehensible at first why self-assessment also detaches itself from that of one's own abilities and reaches beyond it. However, this problem only arises from disregarding an aspect that still needs to be developed.

It is not at all the case that evaluation by others is first and foremost directed only at skills to be acquired and acquired and consists in asserting norms. Rather, for the healthy development of a human being, another kind of evaluation is much more fundamental. I touched on it when I said that if things go well, the child born to a woman will be accepted by her as a mother and will be her life's task until the child attains independence. This form of acceptance, in its developed form is the attitude of love, is also a way of evaluating the child - now not an evaluation in terms of its qualities/characteristics and abilities, but as a whole becoming person already in its very existence. The philosopher Leibniz defined love as joy in the happiness of the other[36] , but it seems to me more correct to say: love is joy in the *existence* of the other and in his or her happiness only insofar as he himself or she herself (as is commonly assumed) wants to be happy or become happy. This joy in the existence of the other, of her child, must be mustered by the mother (or the caregiver) and expressed in her behaviour, so that the child can gain confidence in the right of its claims to care and attention, which become entitlement rights to the extent of their recognition, and in the reliability of the same, in the reliable and friendly, at least not consistently hostile character of reality. This affective evaluation that the young child experiences also translates into self-assessment - into self-confidence and trust in one's own claims and abilities. I think that the meaning-of-life question connects to this affective dimension of evaluation and self-assessment by connecting (being connected) to the potential of understanding of the acquired abilities. Then it is not at all a matter of the function of self-assessment spilling over from the abilities to a broader area/domain/field, but rather of the connection and integration of different dimensions of becoming a person with aspects of self-assessment belonging to them.

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[35] cp. *Du Contrat Social* IV, 8: „De la rél, religion civile"

[36] Cf. Robert Spaemann: *Glück und Wohlwollen* - Versuch über Ethik, Stuttgart 1989, S. 123.

At the end of this cursory recollection of the preconditions and challenges for becoming a human person, we must return to the first point, the temporal constitution of experience. With the practice of the rhythms of the fulfilment/satisfaction of needs, of the tasks and activities of coping with life and shaping it, we also acquire an awareness of the temporal constitution of all of this. At any time after elementary language acquisition, a person has an awareness of the future (not yet, later), into which he or she reaches ahead with intentions and plans, and the past (no longer, earlier), of/by which he or she is affected in spontaneous memories, and the present (now, presently), in which he or she is, is going through, is occupied with or is bored with/by. This consciousness/awareness of time is not only an intellectual matter, but also an affective one.[37] The no-more of past satisfactions that cannot be repeated, as well as the experience of the non-realisability of intentions, etc., becomes the occasion of anger, rage, sadness, in the case of one's own responsibility for these negativities, the occasion of remorse, shame and guilt. And the future becomes just as much an occasion for anxiety and fear in the light of negative experiences as it can become an occasion for joy and positive fantasies from one's own and others' expectations, intentions and plans. These, too, are self-assessments of the person in terms of his or her experience, lot and expectations. The dependence on a past that can no longer be changed and an open future that can never be completely/fully controlled is a pervasive given of human experience to which each person must again and again try to find an attitude. It is not for nothing that, along with love and death, transience and contingency in general are the essential themes of cultural expression in poetry and the fine arts. Essentially because of the reference to an open future, persons are processes, parts of which are still pending/open, also for themselves. The unavoidable holdout in any person's experience is their own expected and feared death, to which the life lived and yet to be lived is the complete contrast. Whether death as the event of the termination of a life plays the role of structuring experience that philosophies of existence have attributed to it, still needs to be investigated.

III. Time and age

If the fundamental precondition is the temporal condition of our experience and of reality, there is reason to be clear about 'time'. While the goal here is to be clear about the role of time in a person's experience of their life and in terms of the meaning of life, this goal cannot be approached directly. Even Heidegger, who wanted to trace objective time back to the subjective time of temporalisation of Dasein (Being-there), recognised this: *"Time ... is all the more deserving of a fundamental analysis because, apart from history, natural processes are also determined 'by time'."*[38]

Attempting to clarify time independently of the interest in the philosophy of life is also advantageous because it is suitable for demonstrating the method of philosophising pursued here. The question of what time is is, after all, one of the 'eternal' questions of philosophy, which is ironic in that time and eternity are often seen as diametrically opposed. Augustine wrote in his *Confessions* to being at a loss regarding the question of what time is (quid est ergo tempus?): If no one asks me, I know it (si nemo ex me quaerat, scio); if I wanted to explain it to a questioner, I do not know it (si quaerentem explicare velim nescio). Both Kant and Wittgenstein referred to this confession by Augustine and saw in it the paradigm of a philosophical problem, to which they therefore wanted to link the task and method of

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[37] The interpretations of Pindar's poetry by Michael Theunissen provide a grandiose explication of the consciousness of time from the perspectives of life experience - cf. *Pindar* - Menschenlos und Wende der Zeit, Munich 2000.

[38] *Sein und Zeit* § 78, 404. I will critically examine Heidegger's analysis in the appendix.

philosophising. For them, the task of philosophy was *reflexive conceptual clarification*, i.e. (to explain the formula already used several times a little further) the effort to explicitly understand and explain what we, as acting, understanding and speaking living beings, are already familiar with implicitly, already can and already know (understand). Like Augustine, we all know what time is when no one asks us, insofar as we can communicate about temporal facts (e.g. make appointments for certain points in time) and usually succeed in doing so. Those who can successfully deal with temporal facts know (practically) what time is. What we, like Augustin, cannot do at first go is to make our practical understanding of time explicit and put it into overview in such a way that we could explain it to someone who asked us what time is.

We generally cannot do this offhand because of the aforementioned fact that we *can do* more with regard to very many acquired skills than we *can say* on the basis of and about them. In the particular case of time and other philosophically fundamentally important concepts, moreover, we cannot because the concepts are very widely ramified and therefore, because we do not have an overview or survey of all the contexts, it remains unclear to us what we are asking.

Both Kant and Wittgenstein understood the question of time as a question about the meaning of expressions, including the expression 'time' itself. Kant, however, was of the opinion that "determinations of a word meaning" or several of them "are never philosophical definitions (but), if they are to be called explanations, they are only grammatical" (*Deutlichkeit* CPR A 72[39]). What however is sought philosophically, according to him, is a real explanation of time, and this has "never been given". He also believed it of no use to begin with a "name explanation" because it helps us "little or not at all, for even without it one understands this word ('time') enough not to confuse it." (*Deutlichkeit* A 80)

Wittgenstein, on the other hand, was of the opinion that there was already ambiguity with regard to words and that the substantive phrasing of the question of what time is, in particular, was capable of leading us astray (because nouns index objects and time could appear to us as a strange kind of thing due to the form of the question - *The Blue Book* 6). But he taught that the meaning of an expression is what explanations of the meanings of that expression explain (this analytical sentence simply links the concepts meaning and explanation). And if we have no explanations of the meaning of an expression in a sentence, or at any rate not in a lucid/clear way, then, according to Wittgenstein, the meaning of the expression is to be taught by the use we actually make of it in language. In any case, unlike Kant thought, word explanations are in any case the beginning of philosophical insight. And 'time' is now a very common expression in our language that has meaning, and so it must be possible to explain it.

Time - The Methodological Explanation

If one of the ways in which we demonstrate our practical understanding of time is by successfully making appointments at certain points in time, then as a beginning of an explanation for the term 'time', it cannot be wrong to begin with: *Time is what we determine as time* (e.g. the point in time of an appointment). This is again analytical and thus at first says nothing, but it links the concepts/terms of time and the determination of something and in this respect/thus is not entirely empty. Then the question that leads further, how do we go about determining time? If we reflect a little on the many ways in which time is determined, after

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[39] Kant: *Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und Moral* (1764).

some reflection we will not fail to agree with the following initial explanation: *time is what we determine by dividing it up with calendars and measuring it with clocks*.[40]

Now, the distinction between calendars and clocks as means of our determination of time by means of the expressions 'dividing' and 'measuring' is not clear-cut. We determine dates not only with the help of calendars but, if the context demands such precision, with the indication of a time on the clock. And we measure periods of time not only with the clock but, if the context allows for such imprecision, also with the help of the calendar (e.g. as the period of a series of days). Nevertheless, we cannot simply dispense with one of the two types of indications if we want to clarify our normal concept of time. This becomes evident when one becomes aware of the connection that links both types of indications to two fundamental questions about time - the questions '*when?*' and '*how long?*'. These two questions seem irreducible. The first concerns the dating of temporal facts, the second their duration (if they have one). But the two questions are also not completely independent of each other. They are expressions of different interests that we take in temporal circumstances and that therefore guide us in all time determination.[41] Calendars serve primarily for dating, but can also be used for rough measurement; clocks serve primarily for measuring, but can also be used for precise dating.

What are the temporal circumstances that we measure or date? Here, a little reflection leads to the following proposal for an answer: we date *events* at points in time and we measure *processes* in terms of their duration. The terms 'event' and 'process' can be understood as designations of the formal objects of the questions '*when?*' and '*how long?*' '*When?*' formally refers to events and wants for a certain event, specified by a designation after the question word in the sentence, its dating as an answer. '*How long?*' formally refers to processes and asks for a certain process, which is specified by a designation after the question word, its duration in time units (years, months, days, hours, minutes, seconds etc.) that are sufficiently precise for the question context.

Also, the distinction between events and processes is not precise and subject to interests. This needs to be justified just as a justification for the previously claimed dependence of interests on questions about time needs to be caught up on. First, one can sharpen the distinction by conceiving of events as defined by changes. Then an event as the change of something is in contrast with a process as the unchanged duration of something. To the lack of discriminatory power of the distinction leads the consideration that while changes sometimes occur suddenly, at a certain point in time, they often 'take time', i.e. they last for a certain period of time. On the other hand, many processes begin (like a life in birth) and also end again (like a life in death) and these two formal frame dates of processes, beginning and end, are events/changes (the beginning from a state without the process into one in which it proceeds; the end into a state in which the process no longer continues/proceeds). However, this consideration that events can also be processes and in any case limit such processes does not make the distinction superfluous. We have already encountered the distinction in the chapter I *Meaning* etc. in the form of the Aristotelian distinction between unfinished and completed movements, actions (*poieseis*) and activities (*praxeis*), which here proves to be based on a fundamental duality in the concept of time. We determine temporal events as processes (Aristotle's completed movements) if and by disregarding the fact that they may have had a beginning and will

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[40] Here, as far as the reference to clocks is concerned, I follow Einstein and Wittgenstein (cf. *The Browne Book* section 51, 154). The reference to calendars, which is missing in both, I justify factually in the text.

[41] All of the following analysis of time is an application of Wittgenstein's general insight: "Concepts guide us to investigations. Are the expression of our interest, and direct our interest." PI section 570.

presumably have an end - this does not interest us in the case of temporal events typically determined as processes. Examples would be rain in a certain area or an illness. On the other hand, we often do not notice at first that temporal occurrences that are understood as events do not happen suddenly, but are extended in a processual way. A grammatical criterion of distinction for his narrower action-theoretical distinction Aristotle has found - as already mentioned but importantly - in the different relation of the tenses of verbs for unfinished movements/events/actions and completed movements/processes/activities: One cannot at the same time walk and have walked or build and have built; but one can at the same time see and have seen, think and have thought (*Metaphysics* 1048 b 30 ff.). Aristotle's formulation is vague in the passage cited - one cannot have already gone *to a particular place* and still be going; not have already built *a certain house* and still be building it. But the improvement underlines the very point at issue here - the dependence on interest of different characterisations. An architect with the appropriate professional experience may well have already built and still be building - just not a particular house; that is finished at some point and can be built no further (so also Aristotle himself, *Physics* 201 b). Sometimes we are interested in the information of one type, sometimes in those of the other. If the dependence of interest on the distinction event/process etc. and the basic temporal questions '*when?*' and '*how long?*' is hereby considered to be proven, the persuasiveness of the proof can be strengthened by the consideration that a distinction can also be seen as interest-dependent that lies ahead of the distinctions in the field of temporal determinations - that between primarily spatially determined and primarily temporally determined. Typical events are, for instance, 'the total solar eclipse *in Central Europe* in the summer of 2002' or 'Germany's first victory in a football World Cup *in Switzerland* in 1954'. In the italicised components of these characterisation of events, use is also made of spatially localising determinations, but they are not the focus of interest. On the other hand, artefacts, e.g. a chair, are primarily spatially and functionally determined objects. But artefacts in particular also necessarily have temporal aspects: A chair, by its very nature, has been made by someone at some point; and it will, depending on the durability of the materials it is made of, at some point no longer be able to serve its function of being a piece of furniture for sitting on (and therefore having to be spatially dimensioned accordingly). However, our categorisation of the chair as a primarily spatially and functionally determined object does not take this into account; we are not primarily interested in this, and this part of the language takes care of the eventualities of its temporal aspects in a different way than through the categorial determination of the type of expression itself (e.g. through verb forms for changes of state such as 'is broken'). In this respect, the distinction spatially determined/temporally determined is also dependent on our interest. Only physical theory at the stage of general relativity abolishes this complementary abstraction of categorising givens as primarily spatially or primarily temporally determined and understands all conditions uniformly as four-dimensionally spatiotemporal. But to explain this conceptualisation, it seems to remain negatively related to the abolished complementary abstracting categorisation in natural understanding.[42]

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[42] In a recent paper in German (>Semantische Schwierigkeiten mit einfachen Erklärungen der Relativitätstheorie<, 2022, on www.emilange.de) I argue that physical theory in general presupposes the everyday framework of reference because it needs its central concept (>person<) to make explicable, what physicists do in formulating and testing hypotheses. Treating space-time as the all-inclusive object is exoteric (esoterically relativity theory deals in fields, mathematically described by tensors), but it is a category mistake. – In all its stages, modern physical theory conceives time as the numerical parameter 't = 1, 2, 3, ...' and thus time as a sequence of instants. A philosophical elucidation of our normal concept of time can and must also be able to show the pre-theoretical basis of this concept of time, which I will do later on. (Footnote added to this translation 2022.)

Before I further develop the given explanation for 'time' on the basis of the reminders and considerations made, I would like to respond to a possible objection. It casts doubt on whether the two questions about time are in fact the fundamental ones. It also brings with it a doubt as to whether processes and events are really categorically different temporal givens. Indeed, there seems to be a third question besides '*when?*' and '*how long?*' that expresses a fundamental interest in a kind of temporal determinations, the question '*how many times?*' This question, however, is a temporal one only if the circumstances whose number is being asked about are themselves temporally determined (namely as events) (and not, for example, as numbers). But in the context of attention to the question 'how many times?" as a temporal one, one might doubt that events and processes are categorically different in the following way: There seem to be rephrasing of the questions that have been assigned to the categories that argue for reducibility to one type of temporal circumstance. After all, '*when?*' means something like 'at what point in time?' and could not '*how long?*' be expressed as 'between what points in time?' First of all, the proposed reformulation can convince us that '*how often?*' does not belong on the same level as the other two questions. For that, an analogous rephrasing would have to be 'between which times and between which times not? With regard to the question elements, one would have to expect the possibility of several answers - i.e. '*how often?*' is, if it refers to temporal events at all, a more complex question of a higher level. As for the rephrasing of the other two questions by means of 'points in time', the one for '*when?*' seems to be unproblematic if one thinks only of objective dating (and neglects the answering of the question by indications of relative dating such as 'at the beginning' etc.). The rephrasing for '*how long?*' seems to me to be subject to a valid objection. The question of the duration of a process can be asked without any reference to dating, objective or subjective. The above-mentioned typical circumstances that we understand as processes - the rain in a region or an illness - we do not primarily want to date at all, but only to be able to foresee/predict their duration.

To the difference between events as temporal individuals and processes corresponds in the expressions for primarily spatially determined things to the difference between (sortal) expressions with dividing reference (e.g. the/one chair) and expressions for masses (e.g. water). In the case of mass expressions like 'water', a corresponding expression must be added for a quantitative determination (e.g. a sip/glass of water) - they are thus expressions which, in contrast to sortals, permit any division or formation of units for what they designate (in contrast, half a chair is no longer a chair, but a chair broken at best). Events cannot be combined with processes to form one category without loss of meaning, because they are already determined in terms of their unity, whereas processes are not. (Having said that, the difference between events and processes is seldom considered in philosophy and *events* are spoken of undifferentiatedly as *the* temporal givens). So, even after these additional considerations, the following applies: Insofar as '*when?*' asks about events and '*how long?*' about processes, they are irreducibly different lines of questioning that depend on interest.

Time - the formal-ontological explanation

By referring to '*when?*' and '*how long?*' as the fundamental questions of what is temporally determined, to events and processes as the formal objects of these questions, and to their categorical difference, the explanation of 'time' first given in terms of our practices of dating and measurement can be summarised as follows: *Time is what we determine by dating events constituting changes by means of calendars* (and, where appropriate, clocks) *and by determining the duration of processes by means of clocks* (or, where appropriate, only with the help of the calendar).

The following question can lead us further: If we determine the duration of processes with clocks and the dates of events with calendars, is there not already a time presupposed in which the processes take place and the events occur? And what is this time? The answer to the first question is 'yes' and the answer to the second: *time is the possibility of arising and lapsing, duration and change*. Now this seems to be an explanation *per obscurius*. One wants to know what time is as a fundamental structure of the reality that surrounds and determines us and is determined by us, independent of our ways of dealing with it (of which measuring and dating have been mentioned so far). And the answer is: time is the possibility of temporal conditions and circumstances. One would like to ask then: How can a possibility be something real?

Two lines of thought are helpful in understanding this. The first consists of a more precise description of our previously mentioned instruments of time determination, calendars and clocks.

A calendar enables chronology. Our calendar has been astronomically calibrated in a long historical process by binding the time unit of a year to the singular revolution of the planet Earth around the Sun, the time unit of a day to a revolution of the Earth around its own axis. The orbit of the earth around the sun and the rotation of the earth around its own axis are *processes*. This indicates that, what we do when we divide time by calendars: We use natural processes as norms of unity, make them our measure/standard. In our practice, rules (in the sense of natural regularities) become rules (in the sense of norms) for assessing and determining further (in the example: temporal) circumstances. Like our conceptual practice in general, the determination of time by calendars is thus an example of the validity of an insight that Francis Bacon formulated as *natura non nisi parendo vincitur* (only by obeying nature do we master it): in our normative rules we fundamentally bind ourselves to natural regularities and thereby master them. Our everyday clocks for the purpose of measuring time are derived from the regular division of the unit of time of the day into 24 equal parts, hours. Today, we construct regularly running mechanical instruments as clocks to measure time by means of a cardinal scale, as it were, and even use natural processes such as the atomic decay of certain long-lived chemical elements as units of time for the sake of greater accuracy. The running of a clock is also a *process*. But before there were mechanical and electric clocks, observation and judgement of the position of the sun served as clocks with an equally ordinal scale. Sunrise, solar zenith and sunset (morning, noon and evening) were used as striking natural events for the basic division of the day, and points in time between these dates were determined, for example, by the normal amount of time spent on activities such as ploughing a field of a certain size, travelling from one place ('a morning', 'a day's journey') to another, and so on. Sundials etc. developed from such time determinations.

Reminding of these facts and practices points to the complementarity of events and processes also in determining the instruments of our time determinations. In order to make calendars unambiguous and allow intersubjectively compelling dating, an analogue to the zero point of a coordinate system was needed. In the calendar, we have chosen a unique (and at least with this dating fictitious) event as such a zero point in the occidental tradition - the birth of the Christian Redeemer as the beginning of the year 1 of our calendar. In the case of the clock, the zero point is an event that repeats itself daily: the completion of the last second of the last hour of a day or the beginning of the first second of the first hour of the following day. For this point in time we have the expression 'midnight' in use. The zero point event marks the end of one day and the beginning of the next, i.e. the course of time (process) to which we have bound the division of our clock as a 'unit course' (to be understood analogously to the 'unit distance', e.g. 1 metre, in length measurement).

These explanations make it additionally plausible to what extent 'time' can initially be explained as that which we divide with calendars and measure with clocks. This explanation can be called methodological because it recurs to our methods of determining time. In contrast, the new explanation - time as the possibility of arising and lapsing, duration and change - is formal-ontological. How are the two explanations related? I would like to suggest: concerning coming into being and passing away, we are primarily interested in the date, the answer to the question '*when?*', and rather secondarily in the duration of these processes as they themselves are bounded by beginning and end (i.e. the answer to the question '*how long?*'). With regard to duration and change, our interests seem to be exactly the opposite - first we want to know how long a state or its change into another lasts, and only then when the state exists or the change takes place. The different interests are certainly also connected with the fact that we are interested in time determinations not only theoretically, for our understanding, but also practically, for our actions. The two formal-ontological pairs of titles for the objects of our interest in time could therefore be used in the same way as the previously shown fundamental duality in the concept of time with the different, theoretical and practical, interests in a motivating context.

But still the expression 'possibility' in the formal-ontological explanation for 'time' needs an explanation. The following psychological fact seems helpful to me: when nothing happens, when we are bored because nothing occupies our mind, then time 'passes' - agonisingly slowly for our perception, because that is what the "Langeweile" (literally 'long duration', but in English 'boredom') consists of. But that means as much as: nothing happens except the running of the clock or the progress in the division of time by the calendar. The running of the clock is itself a process, a temporal fact, but *as* an instrument of time *determination*, it is the mere possibility of determining time through time indications, which runs empty during boredom. The thing to be determined, the web of events and processes as which we determine reality from a temporal aspect, falls away from our attention in the state of boredom. Boredom is the psychological correlate of time as a mere possibility (of experiencing something that happens or is happening or of doing something). Kant also explained time as a form of possibility and the explanation given captures one aspect of his explanation:

In regard to appearances in general, time itself cannot be abolished, although one can certainly take appearances out of time. Time is therefore given a priori. In it alone is all reality of appearances possible. They can altogether cease to exist, but time itself (as the general condition of their possibility) cannot be abolished. (CPR B 46/A 31).

If all temporal appearances, events and processes, are thought to be abolished, time remains as the general (condition of its) possibility - that is, the possibility of events and processes as well as of the aspects that determine them, aspects of arising and lapsing, duration and change. The empirical substrate of the claim is that, against the background of our practices of determining time, when temporal realities are suspended, their instruments remain and continue to run, albeit empty.

I have bracketed the words 'condition of its' in the inclusion of Kant's thought after the quotation because I think it is important to distinguish more sharply than Kant did between empirical and logical possibility in view of space and time. The modal character of time as possibility I explained so far is an *empirical* fact. It is initially easier to make this clear with regard to space. An empty space is the possibility of containing bodies, extended material objects. As a closed space (a 'room'), a space itself can be regarded as a body, as it were - a 'hollow body'. And the epitome of all spaces in this sense is *Space (der Raum)*. The definite

article in German here again suggests individuability. But for this, no perspective of judgement is available to us (perhaps this is why Newton called absolute space and absolute time with the Cambridge Platonism of his time the sensorium of God). Because we do not have a perspective of judgement for space that allows individuation (as we do for the many spaces within it), we conceptualise it as the possibility of all localisations. In the older language, therefore, space did not correspond to a noun, but to the pronominal adverb 'any' (German 'irgend') (our present-day 'somewhere').[43] Analogously, but more difficult to grasp because of the inconceivability of time, time is the epitome of all possible temporalisations (time indications). This is an empirical fact. That which is a priori about time (and space), on the other hand (in Kant's terminology), is a logical given - the aspect of our concept of time of which it will be said in the following that time is a 'formal concept'. Kant's talk of time as a 'condition of the possibility' of all phenomena (in Kant's case, moreover, not only of temporal phenomena) throws both aspects together.[44] The formal concept of 'time' encompasses all kinds of temporal determinations - is already given with every single one of them and insofar 'a priori' - and therefore also with the term 'time' designating the empirical possibility of temporalisation.

The time series determinations as modal

The factual tenability of the formal ontological explanation of time as a possibility of temporalisation must be decided by an explanation of the position of modal determinations and facts in our understanding in general and, in more detail, by an explanation of the connection of temporal determinations with the modally fundamental 'alethic' (truth-related) determinations 'real/possible/necessary'. In connection with this, the problem must be kept in mind from what has been said so far, how the interest in uniqueness (events) as opposed to repeatability (processes) inherent in the duality of the questions '*when?*' and '*how long?*' and the associated conceptual distinctions, which has been descriptively assumed so far, can in turn be understood.

For the first point, it is practical to orientate oneself on the temporal determinations which, since Kant, have been regarded as the paradigm expressions of time in general and have therefore been the focus of interest in the costumary philosophy of time. Kant saw temporality as essentially constituted by "simultaneity or succession", and since J.E. McTaggart, analytical philosophy of time has been oriented towards the pair of determinants 'earlier/later' and the series of determinants 'past/present/future'. The first relation orders a sequence of temporal circumstances called B-series ('positions in time'), the second sequence, called A-series, is a further order of temporal circumstances/conditions. The central problem of understanding time for many philosophers since then has been to determine the character (real? subjective? objective?) and the relationship of the two series to each other.[45]

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[43] DW vol. 10, column 2157 ad 2). Interestingly, the genitive '*irgends*' was in use for time (our present-day 'sometime'), ibid. column 2158 ad 2). In a grammatical metaphor, Time (German: *die* Zeit) is the genitive of Space (German: *der* Raum) - reflecting the relative primacy of space over time in our natural conceptual system.

[44] The non-distinction is also consistent under the premise of his transcendental idealism, which allows the possibility-form of time to become a form of (subjective) view (German: 'Anschauung). - Unfortunately, I lack more precise knowledge of physical theory to examine to what extent the non-distinction of empirical from logical possibility has also played a role in the debates between positions of a 'relative' and an 'absolute' conception of time.

[45] The best academic study in this tradition in German was Peter Bieri's dissertation: *Zeit und Zeiterfahrung*, Frankfurt am Main 1972. Cf. also Ernst Tugendhat, 'Heidegger und Bergson über die Zeit', in: *Philosophische Aufsätze 1992-2000*, Frankfurt am Main 2001, 15.

From the point of view of the previous discussions, it should be said with regard to this problem that the orientation towards the two series remains indifferent to the difference event/process - both types of temporal circumstances can be ordered according to both series. And: judging by the use of the words employed to mark them, the series belong in the context of dating questions - earlier and/or later give a rough relative dating of events or processes (or their stages) in relation to each other, past and future a rough dating with regard to a perspective of marked experience as present or a chosen objective reference point from (to) which a perspective of experience (in the sense of possible observation and measurement) is possible.

For the considerations to be made now, the question arises with regard to the modal character of time determinations in this way: How do 'past/present/future' relate to 'possible/actual/necessary' ('earlier/later' can be left out of consideration for the time being as merely relative determinations). And with regard to the perhaps successful proof of the modality of time determinations, the question then arises: How is the position of modal determinations in our understanding to be understood at all?

It is easier to start with a preliminary question regarding 'past/present/future'. How can the distinctions of McTaggart's two series, which are considered elementary, be introduced at all in view of what has been discussed so far? A paradigmatic temporal process is a sunrise. It takes a certain period of time until the process, which begins with the first rays of the sun becoming visible, is completed with the emergence of the lower edge of the sun (judged from an assumed or taken position of perception). These two distinctive events framing the process of a sunrise as beginning and end are themselves ordinally framed by a 'not yet (being visible) at all' and a 'not at all/not any longer (being in progress)'. With regard to this process, both time series are to be introduced in an explanatory way and it is not disputed that the A series has pragmatic priority. With the first becoming visible (the 'first rays'), the darkness of the 'not yet' is rather suddenly over and thus 'no longer', 'past'. But completely the sunball is 'not yet' to be seen at this time, so its complete visibility is still forthcoming ('in the future'). Of course, logically, what is *earlier* than 'now' (in the example 'the first rays visible') is past, and what is *later* than 'now' ('the whole sun visible') is future. This is often interpreted in terms of the primacy of the B-series, by saying that it is the 'construction principle' of the A-series. But as a series, the B-series is no less 'constructed' and it needs an expression like 'present/at the moment/just now' to make the contrast earlier/later applicable to a currently observed process: 'no more now, so earlier', 'not yet now, but later'. Here, the time indication 'now' as the coordinate zero point of subjective temporalisation points back to the 'time sign' 'now' in practical sentences (prompts, commands, requests, etc.). The contrast 'earlier/later', as Wittgenstein showed for the first time in *The Brown Book,* can be introduced without a circle with regard to repeatable circumstances if representations of facts (he chooses images of sun positions in a landscape with salient spots) and sequence formation through activities or available images of them. For the introduction of the A-series, a process is needed that is regarded as nonrecurring or as a process that is deemed to be completed under (possible) continuous observation.

The interests in both types of time determination are different, even if they are related or can refer to each other. In scientistic philosophy of time, much is made of the fact that physics, as the allegedly authoritative theory of objectivity, only uses determinations of the B-series and that this is therefore more objective than the A-series (even if both are 'semantically objective'). The A-series, because it cannot be objectified, is ultimately only understandable in

the context of our experience of reality and in this respect is a structure of subjectivity that promises to be understood as a 'representation' of processes and events ordered according to B-series by means of the A-series (a time-philosophically impoverished version of the old doctrine that the subject is the microcosm to the macrocosm of the world). I know not enough about physics from my own expertise, but the construction seems dubious to me. There is also the point of view of a 'history of nature' (C. F. v. Weizsäcker), which conceives the entire process of natural reality as unique ('from the big bang as beginning to the black hole as the end'). That a considerable amount of events and processes in this process should not have already passed objectively and in real terms at every present point in time at which it is even possible to speak (and not only have taken place 'earlier') seems to me to be simply nonsensical, if only because it took astronomical time before it was possible to speak, let alone to do astronomical and other science.In any case, the question is irrelevant for the clarification of our normal understanding of time. But why the dual interest in processes as repeatable temporal conditions on the one hand and on the other as unique?[46]

My suggestion: The double interest in both repeatability and uniqueness is to be understood in relation to the fact that our concepts for temporality play a role not only for our (theoretical) understanding, but also for our (practical) actions. However, insofar as we cannot foresee their success with certainty and do not know the details of what is to come (i.e. here only later in time), we can only understand our actions as risky (not certain of success) one-time occurrences. The intention guiding an action can be understood precisely as a deictic (singular) reference to the action possibility taken.[47] On the other hand, insofar as we rely on knowledge of causal connections for our actions, we must also be able to conceptualise actions as types and thus always as repeatable processes and, in these processes, to determine one performance as having to be carried out before (earlier than) other(s). In the practical context, the dual interest in temporal conditions as both repeatable and unique in the performance of a type of activity or the performance of a type of action at a certain time (as a datable process or datable event) is therefore immediately understandable.

How this is transferred to understanding can be illustrated by the example of a spectator following a play. If he follows the play in ignorance of its plot, it appears to him as a unique process whose outcome is open to him (with regard to which he could therefore ask such questions as 'what will the hero do?', 'how will the hero fare?'). If, on the other hand, he already knows the play, he can make statements such as 'the hero has already done this, but he will do that first'. He can thus apply determinations of past and future to events that happen earlier or later in the play in a certain order in relation to the whole plot, which he already knows from previous reading or another performance. What is interesting in the second case is that the respective now, which separates past and future, is dually determined for the spectator - by the situation of the characters in the play and by his or her perceptual situation. This duplication does not exist for acting in 1st person - the acting person is in his or her action, as it were, the (co-)author of the play in which he or she plays a role.[48] Therefore, for the acting person the

[46] In the linguistic usage followed here, events are temporal individuals and as such always unique; admittedly, there is the difference type/occurrence with regard to them. When I said earlier about the anchoring of the determination of the time of day by clocks that a daily repeating event was chosen for this (the time of midnight), it could/must have read more precisely: a daily re-instantiated type of event.

[47] Thus Donald Davidson on the logical form of the conclusion of a practical syllogism in 'How is Weakness of the Will possible?', in: *Essays on Actions and Events*, Oxford 1980, esp. 31 ff.

[48] It is very characteristic that Kierkegaard, in his religious frame of reference, naturally has God as the author of the play and seeks to grasp the double determinacy of the acting person involved in the play through the non-distinctness of role and prompter - *Either/Or II*, 145 f. The translator Hirsch's

future is essentially open, for the comprehending person necessarily only as far as its details are concerned. And the perspectives associated with the difference of 1st and 3rd person allow the freedom of choice of a 'way of looking': the conception of processes as either repeatable or unique also for understanding.

Now, to what extent are the determinations of time in the two series a kind of modal determinations? The best way to answer this is to take a broad view of the determinations of modality. The fundamental modal contrast real/possible is already given with having mastered linguistic negation. Every empirical proposition is essentially, according to its sense, either true or false - i.e. in order to be meaningful or to be understood, it must have both truth *possibilities*, be *able* to be true or be *able* to be false. With the decision of the alternative in a given case, the true is eo ipso determinable as real - 'It is true that p' is equivalent to ‚p' and this can be explained as ‚really p'; the false is equivalent to ‚not p' and, if ‚p' is explained as ‚really p', as ‚not really p', but (under other circumstances also) all the same possible. The state of affairs so judged is conceived (because of the reference to other circumstances) as repeatable.

With the use of explicit representations, fundamentally linguistic ones, our relation to our environment has thus become fundamentally *modalised*. That is, in the use of theoretical propositions capable of truth or falsity, or practical propositions capable of fulfilment or non-fulfilment, we have distanced the environment given to us into a space of possibilities, one of which is real or realisable under appropriate circumstances, but the others form possible alternatives to the real/realisable. The use of temporally determined representations is a further development of this fundamental anthropological fact.

I have claimed above that we must understand our life situation in terms of action as open and therefore understand our actions as the unique events or processes of seizing individual possibilities for action on appropriate occasions. Therefore, if the judgement of true or false concerns actions that have been carried out by us (or others), a further restriction of the determination 'possible' is necessary with regard to the qualification of the 'false', unrealised possibility(s): As a type, the excluded possibility of action may also be possible - realisable - under other circumstances, but as an occurrence excluded at the given point in time it is not, because as a 'past', non-grasped possibility it can no longer be causally influenced and is therefore no longer accessible as *this* option (choice). At this point, it seems to me that the continuation of the alethic modalities to temporal ones is necessary. With 'real' and 'possible' regarding the polarity of true/false, 'necessary' was also implicitly introduced by the exclusivity of the alternative. One aspect of this latent implication becomes explicit in the continuation of the alethic to temporal modalities: the past is first and foremost that which is inaccessible to action, that which has necessarily become/happened. Complementarily, the future is precisely that which can still be influenced by actions. To these practical connotations of the temporal modalities correspond epistemic ones (related to knowledge): the past can only be remembered (judged, evaluated, regretted, etc.), the future can only be expected (predicted, feared, hoped for, etc.), the present can be perceived and practically influenced.

However, the fundamentality of the theoretical/practical distinction is still insufficiently determined with regard to temporal modalities. For (theoretical) understanding, the future is actually only 'a later time (in relation to 'now')', but for (practical) action, it is something that is still pending in a certain way and insofar something that actually 'comes towards' [German ‘zukommen (auf)', the first word being a verb corresponding to the noun ‘Zukunft', English:

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notes in the edition I used indicate that the theatrical metaphor in this version comes from Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800).

'future'] the acting person. This observation falsifies the view sometimes held in scientistic philosophy of time that talk of *the* flow of time is descriptively correct insofar as it indicates the *direction* of time (its so-called anisotropy) in a non-trivial way. Although time can also be understood as moving from the future into the past (as for an agent in the first person), only the reverse view, that it consists in the present moving from the past into the future, indicates *the* flow of time. This view privileges observation over action - but there is no good reason for this in the philosophical reflexive clarification of our understanding. For the acting person, the future possible success or failure of his or her action comes towards him or her from the future. So there is no such thing as *the* flow of time. Talk of the flow of time is meaningless if by time is meant the possibility of coming into being and lapsing, duration and change, because 'possibilities' have no *real* (as opposed to logical) determinations - and there is no middle ground between sense and nonsense.

If these considerations are broadly correct, it stands to reason that, with regard to non-temporalised propositional phrases, the expressions 'past/present/future' can be analogised to 'possible/actual/necessary' as propositional operators that can replace the tenses of verbs as the primary linguistic means of indicating A-series temporal determinations for the purpose of simplifying logical treatment in a temporal calculus.[49] In such a treatment, 'He spoke' would be equivalent to 'Past: he speaks' and 'He will speak' would be equivalent to 'Future: he speaks'. In the component 'he speaks' in these explicitly modalising forms, the grammatical present must not be understood as determining time, because of course 'He speaks' would be equivalent to 'Present: he speaks' and if the grammatical present were understood in temporal terms, this formula would be doubly temporally determined.

This view is also suitable for correcting the idea in scientific philosophy of time that there is a fact to be distinguished from the fact of 'becoming in time', which could be called 'temporal becoming' or even 'becoming of *the* time' and which would have to be explained as an "change/alternation of A-determinations of events "[50]. This idea presupposes an un-temporal way of speaking *about events* (the proposal made at the end of the last paragraph, on the other hand, only presupposes un-temporal, i.e. temporally undetermined, facts) and falls prey to the suggestion of the noun 'event' and thus to a mystification. Before they occur, events do not yet exist; when they have occurred and passed, they no longer exist. The expression of an expectation, fear or hope, in which the content of these attitudes is expressed with a 'that' sentence, gives rise to this suggestion of the event that is first future (expected, feared, hoped for) and then becomes present through realisation, i.e. of an entity concerning which time determinations of the A-series change.[51] But the suggestion is based on a false semantics of such sentences - for the expected/ feared/hoped-for event *either occurs* or *it does not occur*. So the linguistic expression of expectation/fear/hope with the that-sentence cannot refer to the datable individual event of realisation, because if it does not occur, the object of reference does not 'exist'.

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[49] It was only after I had come to this proposal through independent reflection that I became aware, through references in Bieri, of the fact that this proposal had already been elaborated widely and in detail in writings by A.N. Prior (*Time and Modality; Papers on Time and Tense*). After that, it was completely incomprehensible to me why Prior's far-reaching clarifications should have left so little trace in Bieri's accounts.

[50] Bieri: *Zeit und Zeiterfahrung*, op. cit., 17.

[51] In existential philosophy, the misunderstanding criticised in the following has been influential through Kierkegaard's (or his ethicist's) thesis that action is "essentially futuristic" (*Entweder/Oder II*, 181) and has essentially determined Heidegger's conception of a temporalization of Dasein. I discuss this in the appendix.

Language is used in the expression of future-related attitudes, and expressions that can be used to describe the fulfilment of these attitudes are also used. But this does not mean that the same entity would be referred to, only in a different 'mode of existence'. One can make the misunderstanding clear in the simplest case of the negation of a synchronously ascribable property.[52] For something to be *not red*, it does not have to be red somehow, because the term 'red' denotes simply Red. The reasoning is correct, but must not be understood in this way: Red must be present so that 'red' can designate it (in the case of negation: *somehow*). The expression must only/simply be explained in the language, in this case by means of a pattern. Similarly, a description which, if it applies to a real occurrence, does not have to correspond to 'real' in otherwise (even temporally) modalised cases - only the use of the linguistic description in this context, e.g. as an expression of a future-related attitude or as a description of its content, has to be explained. So it is misleading to suggest by formulations that there are events that are first future, then present and finally past. And the formulation of an alleged fact of temporal becoming or even becoming of *the* time is guilty of this misleading. It is also this conception (which conceives of time as a change *sui generis*[53] and thus as a actual process) that prevents the scientistic philosophy of time from understanding the modal character of the determinations of the two time series.

Time as a formal concept

McTaggart's two time series are not the elementary facts for our understanding of time, not 'the referents' of the term 'time'. Rather, elementary are events and processes that *can be* ordered in these series. The question is whether it should not read: *are* ordered; and whether it could read equally for both series. This raises the question of the objectivity or subjectivity of time determinations. Another objection to the conception of events and processes as elementary is that time "is not an empirical concept that has been deduced from any experience" (*CPR* B 46/A 31) Can we then have formed the concept of time on the basis of the experience of events and processes, as it would have to be if they were the elementary facts/conditions of our understanding of time?

This concern is answered in substance by the statement, made in passing in the context of the reference to Kant's explanation of time as a form of possibility, that 'time', insofar as it is a priori (and not the empirical possibility of all temporalisations), is a 'formal concept'. Other

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[52] Wittgenstein treats the illness of this 'error' (misunderstanding) about the functioning of language in his characteristically condensed manner in PU sections 518-25. - He deals with patterns for the explanation of words for perceptibles at the beginning of PU. Their use, which identifies them as belonging to language, even if not to the language of words (section 16), is the central example of the fact that the metaphysical reality 'problem' raised by the philosophy of time with regard to time series is ever already decided in the use of language. The circumstances used as patterns are elements of reality and, in contexts other than those of explanation of meaning, can also be characterised by propositions which, unlike explanations of meaning, can be true or false. (In the case of time, this concerns the events and processes used to calibrate our methods of determining time by means of calendars and clocks). The relation of language to reality is therefore both internal and external - internal in the explanations of meaning and the patterns they make into elements of language, external in the dimension true/false or fulfillable/unfulfillable. Thus both idealism, which assumes only an internal relation ('the world is our imagination') and realism, which assumes only an external relation that could also not exist and would therefore first have to be proven, are rejected as untenable. - Nietzsche's metaphorical insight is applicable to the elements of reality that function as linguistic patterns, we are driving (here: with language) "a groping game on the back of things". (German: "ein tastendes Spiel auf dem Rücken der Dinge"; >On Truth and Lies in the Extra-Moral Sense<, KSA vol. 1, 876.)

[53] Bieri: *Zeit und Zeiterfahrung*, op. cit., 36, 69, 78; 177.

formal concepts are 'object', 'space', 'colour', 'number', 'property', 'state' - and also 'process' and 'event' (each in one of the multiple uses of the expressions). For formal terms, in contrast to empirical or material or content concepts, the characteristic feature is that they are already given with each of their instances, cases of application.[54] The formal concepts do not classify realities in experience, but other concepts, by making their formal commonality with other terms belonging to their formal concept noticeable. The term 'event', for example, classifies the terms sunrise, sunset, birth, act of love, death, etc. One can take the basic formal terms with the later Wittgenstein as chapter headings in a Philosophical Grammar. Under the heading 'Time', the most diverse types of expression would be treated equally in terms of the rules that apply to them, which in a normal grammar belong in different chapters: i.e. verbs for actions, activities and occurrences; labels and names for events and processes (e.g. 'the youth of Henri IV', 'Christmas'); temporal indicators (now, then, before etc.); temporal quantifiers (always, never, sometimes); temporal conjunctions and clauses (after, before, as, during etc.), temporal adjectives, temporal adverbs (slowly, leisurely, quickly etc.) and many more. The point of treating what is grammatically so diverse under one heading would be precisely to characterise the formal concept of time by treating its types of instances as fully as possible, and thus to bring clarity to the confusion that our mere practical mastery and so extensive assimilation of language brings to our attempts to make understanding reflexively explicit.

In the course of the elucidation of our normal understanding of time undertaken here, there arises the desideratum of understanding how the characterisation of the term 'time' as (in one of its uses) expressing a formal concept is related to the methodological and the formal-ontological explanation developed so far. Finally, the promise to show the pre-theoretical foundations of the time parameter 't' in physical theory remains to be fulfilled from the preceding discussions.

Peculiarly, this last point is to be settled in the context of the discussion of the first, which raises the question of subjectivity and objectivity of time determinations. So let us ask why there are objective and subjective determinations of time. For the fact that there are both in language is already an objection to constructive attempts in the philosophy of time to subjectivise time as a whole (for example, through proofs of the 'unreality' of time as in Kant and McTaggart). We cannot declare time as a whole to be subjective because we need the distinction subjective/objective for the classification/division of time determinations itself). The question first arises with regard to dating time determinations. For an answer to the question '*when?*' after a certain event, a statement such as 'three years ago' would be meaningless to a listener if he did not know his own position in time. For this, he must be able to refer to his present with 'now', for which indicator also scientist philosophy of time accepts the so-called sign-reflexive analysis, according to which 'now' means as much as 'simultaneously with the sign >now<'. In this function, the expression denotes the temporal origin of a logical space of deixis whose spatial equivalent is 'here', whose factual equivalent is 'this' and whose personal equivalent is 'I'. The point marked by these indicators is the subjective zero point of a coordinate system (or several systems) that is (are) needed for objective determinations of the spatiotemporal to become effective for speakers and listeners in the use of language. In order to understand exactly what is being talked about in each case, speakers and listeners and thinkers must know who, where, when they themselves are - only the answering of these questions (which usually remains implicit) places them in a relationship

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[54] cf. Wittgenstein, *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung* 4.126 – 4.12721.

to the objects (topics) of speech and thought that they can follow.[55] In relation to determinations of time, this means: in order to make effective dating and also measurement possible, both objective and subjective determinations of time are always needed.

There is no better proof of this than the fact that our instruments of time measurement, calendars and clocks, require the determination of a zero point by a 'unique' event in order to function properly - I have pointed this out. The event of the birth of the Christian saviour and the moment of midnight, as zero points of the corresponding coordinate systems, are *points* in time, i.e. temporal circumstances that represent or represented possible situations for the use of the time sign 'now' and the time indicator of the same name.[56] In our conceptual system, the sequences of events and processes that are ordered or to be ordered by McTaggart's series are assigned, as it were, a coordinate system of points in time as the places of possible situations of perception and/or action that allow or require the use of indicators. The past points in time are no longer accessible but have been accessible, the future ones are not yet accessible but will be. The seemingly greater objectivity of the B-series is an illusion - the fact that what once happened earlier than something else always remains earlier than the other is simply a case of true propositions not losing their truth value. What has once passed remains passed forever - this is how reality presents itself to us under the aspect of temporal circumstances. That it must be possible to assign subjective time determinations to objective ones is also not mysterious. It is simply an aspect of the fundamental fact emphasised in the explanation of the modal character of time determinations: With the mediation of our experience through (linguistic) representations - in theoretical propositions capable of truth and falsity and practical propositions capable of fulfilment or non-fulfilment - we have surrounded the actual of an environment with the possibility space of the world and, what is real, has its full determinacy for us only in the context of the possibilities surrounding it but not realised.[57] The logical space of deixis is the point at which reality is linked to the possibility space of the world and from which the applicable selection of possibilities must take place.

The time sequence of the coordinate system of our understanding of temporally determined things in the world now seems to be the pre-theoretical basis of the time parameter 't' in physical theories. As a theoretical-empirical science that is bound to the method of experimental testing of hypotheses, it primarily records repeatable processes (with the exception of the aforementioned viewpoint of a 'history of nature') and strives to explain and predict them. For this purpose, the most meagre elements of our complex grammar for the understanding of temporally determined things are sufficient with regard to the temporal determination of circumstances - precisely the sequence of points in time and the idea of (repeatable) processes. The fact that these appear in the perception of physics as the most objective, as it were metaphysical theory of reality/the real in general - everything is *matter in*

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[55] In this way, this only applies to empirical facts; in the case of rational facts, the uniform space-time system with a deictically/indicatively distinguished zero point is replaced by the chain of explanations and justifications that the listener understands and the speaker can give.

[56] The reciprocal prerequisite of markings of points in time, events and subjective indicators for our forms of determining time were first elucidated in a satisfactory way in the theory of singular terms by Ernst Tugendhat - cf. *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*, Frankfurt am Main 1976, 25th-27th lecture. (English 1982 as >Traditional and Analytical Philosophy<.)

[57] There is no better philosophical evidence for this state of affairs than that a theory such as that of the early Wittgenstein, who wanted to reduce the world ontologically to the factual (as the 'totality of facts'), with regard to the negatability of representations is compelled, as it were against its will, to a double determination of the expression 'reality' in relation to the expression 'world' (*Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung* 2.04, 2.06, 2.063).

motion[58] - as the only objective determinations of time is an illusion due to the intellectual division of labour in society. A simple consideration speaks for this: Doing theory and science are also *activities* that, for their full understanding and self-understanding, presuppose our entire grammar for persons and their activities and actions (e.g. in giving information about what is actually *done* in testing hypotheses through experiments); they thus also presuppose the full pre-theoretical grammar for understanding what is temporally determined. Discounting this as merely pragmatic presuppositions, as scientistic philosophy of time is inclined to do, does not serve *philosophical* understanding in any case.

The question remains: How are the methodological and the formal-ontological explanations of 'time' related to its characterisation as a 'formal concept'? The relationship of the two explanations to each other should be clear after the above discussions: The methodological explanation indicates *how* we primarily deal with temporally determined things - by dating and measuring them with the help of calendars and clocks. The formal-ontological explanation, on the other hand, states in an abstract way *what* we deal with when we do as the methodological explanation says.

First of all, it must be pointed out that while the two explanations claim to address the central ways of dealing with time, they do not address all of them. In connection with the concept of the future, which belongs to actions (as opposed to activities) as the specifically still pending, coming towards the agent himself or herself insofar as he or she anticipates the success of his action in the intention that will or will not occur empirically, we have encountered other ways of dealing with time. With regard to them, it could very well be explained: Time as future is what we anticipate in practical attitudes - what we fear, expect, hope for, strive to shape; time as past is what we remember, regret and deplore, regard with pride or satisfaction, etc.; time as present is wherein we can perceive and observe, operate and act. Each possible explanation is only partially applicable (even if they have different scope), there is none that would be valid for all contexts of understanding and acting and the practices that access them. In the scientistic philosophy of time, this circumstance is echoed in the claim that the experience of time is more universal than any other, whatever may be experienced, time is experienced along with it. But firstly, the assertion is inappropriately unrestricted/unlimited/unconditional - there are also things that can be experienced, which we treat primarily and at first only as spatially determined (I shall address this). And secondly, the hint just given does say: time is not only 'experienced', but is also 'disclosed' (German: 'erschlossen') (that is Heidegger's neologism, in which 'conscious' and 'comprehensible' are amalgamated) in completely other attitudes (such as the practical, the poetic etc.).

What is the status of such explanations? According to the conception of philosophy followed here - reflexive conceptual clarification - they are not theoretical assertions. Rather, they are synoptic, overviewing summaries of a multitude of practices and their associated uses of linguistic expressions, which were always mentioned when examples were given for the general expressions - e.g. for the expression 'process' the examples 'rain in a region', 'illness'; or for the expression 'event' the examples 'sunrise' or 'birth of a living being'. The explanations given would have to be checked/reviewed/examined to see whether they have equivalents in the uses of the concrete expressions serving as examples that are covered by the formal general explanations. Also, contrary to what their formulation in the indicative suggests, the general explanations are not theoretical but practical propositions: Proposals for better explicit

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[58] A philosophical joke attributed to Bertrand Russell, told to me by Peter Bieri, belongs in the context of the physicalist idea 'everything is matter in motion': "What is mind? Nothing but matter. And what is matter? Never mind."

understanding of what we ever already know, can and do insofar as we act, speak and understand. Practical propositions require ratification by their addressees. In the present case, the reader must convince himself/herself (or not) by reflection that the explanations given clarify his/her understanding, make it clearer to him/her than other explanations and than it was before. (The reader can *philosophise* if he/she can measure not only his/her understanding against the explanations but also, conversely, the explanations against his/her understanding and correct, improve, elaborate on them).

Just now, I have casually formulated that the explanations are formal. They are so because (and this finally clarifies the relationship of the explanations to the characterisation of 'time' as a formal concept) because (with the exception of giving examples) they remain on the level of formal concepts. These, as explained, do not classify empirical facts but other terms expressed in the use of the more concrete expressions given in examples. Formal concepts constitute the basic areas of our linguistically constituted understanding (are headings on various text levels in a Philosophical Grammar), because 'language' in the sense in which it is spoken of in philosophy and also here is itself a formal concept - it first classifies the natural languages (the German, English, Spanish language, etc.) and still more various sign systems that are sufficiently similar to these natural languages (aspects of them). And languages are themselves possibilities - possibilities of expression and representation that are always realised when a language is used to express or represent something. The term 'time' for the formal concept classifies all kinds of more concrete temporal determinations, especially those in language. By calibrating the concrete expressions of language to paradigms, the formal terms also indirectly classify the concrete real that is grasped/recorded by the concrete terms they summarise. [For paradigms in language, the foregoing discussions have given examples mainly in the context of the discussion of the instruments of time-measurement. But any explanation of meaning for an expression for perceptibles in the form 'this is (a)....' combined with a pointing gesture to a given gives a further example]. For the explication of the meaning of expressions, therefore, at the level of meaning, of being intelligible (as distinct from the levels of truth vs. falsity, fulfilment vs. non-fulfilment), there is *also* an *internal* (i.e. necessary, presupposing the existence of both relational items) relation between language and reality, not only the external (contingent) one of *true* or *false*, *fulfilled* or *not fulfilled*. Because, due to this sequence of stages in the structure of language, the formal classifications also indirectly capture what can be classified by the classified, the characterisation of the expression 'time' as a formal concept is related to the methodological and formal-ontological explanations in this way: The formal term *time* classifies the formal terms for temporal conditions, of which the central ones in the foregoing were *event* and *process*, but also *clock* and *calendar* (insofar as there can be different kinds of clocks and calendars). These function in the formal explanations, the methodological and the formal-ontological. These explanations thus link different formal classifications of possibilities of expression and representation that are only realised by really expressing and representing something temporally determined. What is indirectly captured in these links of formal terms in formal explanations are rules of the use of concrete expressions for temporally determined things. The formal ontological explanation, for example, implies the rule: what cannot be understood as arising/having arisen, lapsing/ having lapsed, changing/lasting, or related to it, cannot be understood as temporally determined. Should it be doubted that this most general rule of our understanding of time is substantial (because it excludes nothing), then it can be pointed out that logical, arithmetical and geometrical propositions as well as expressions of semantic rules cannot be understood as temporally determined at all. This is philosophically uncontroversial; more controversial are other examples, in particular the example claimed above in connection with the modal-theoretical treatment of the expressions

earlier/later or past/present/future, that representations of what is currently perceived (in the example given, the dependent sentence 'he speaks' in compounds such as 'future: he speaks' instead of 'He will speak') cannot be understood as temporally determined. (The argument was that, if it was temporally understood, there would be a double temporalization in the case of 'Present: he speaks').

This was a long and complicated discussion. As an excuse, I can only cite Einstein: "Everything should be presented as simply as possible, but not simpler." Our linguistically constituted understanding is the expression of an enormously complex form of life and, if it is to be reflexively elucidated, cannot be presented in a simpler way than it is composed. But the whole discussion has been undertaken, after all, to clarify the fundamental precondition in understanding encountered by persons seeking the meaning of their lives. Of course, such a person need not have at his/her disposal what has been elaborated; to do so would be to make the old philosophical mistake of declaring the philosophical interest in reflexive clarity of understanding to be the life interest of every person. Most people do not have this interest and do not need to have it; it is enough that they have learned to master the handling of the temporal practically. Before I now discuss in what respect this requirement raises a life issue for every person - the issue of age - I would like to make a final consideration of the philosophical problem of time.

Eternity, eternal Questions and metaphysical Philosophy

I had begun by pointing out that there is a certain irony in the fact that the question of what time is is one of the eternal questions of philosophy, when time and eternity are often understood as diametrically opposed. This irony is heightened by the fact that 'eternal' is a word of our language of *time*. The word 'time' comes from a linguistic root for 'divide' and originally meant that which was divided, allotted.[59] It meant both the events between two points in time and the points in time themselves (the duality of process and event). In older language there was the coinage 'without time', which meant: without an end, without limitation towards 'behind'. With regard to this coinage, the expression 'eternal' is, first of all, a conservative extension of the language: the replacement of an expression of two words ('without time') by a one-word expression ('eternal'). For its basic meaning is 'the everlasting, *end*less'.[60] The feature >without-a-beginning< has been added to the concept of eternity by philosophical speculation, first presumably by Parmenides in the predicates of his Being.

Now, the conception of philosophical questions as eternal questions is not a resignative formation in the face of their alleged insolubility and, in any case, in the face of the endless dispute among philosophers about these questions, but owes itself to a specific historical constellation of European philosophy. To the Greek philosophers, the cosmos, the beautifully ordered nature, appeared first and foremost to be eternal, unbecome and imperishable. Aristotle, for example, regarded the endless circular movements of the stars (according to the view of the time) as the paradigm of the completed movements, which, according to his explication, are processes and activities. Theory was contemplation of the cosmos, the eternal beautiful order of the whole of reality. Aristotle's praise of *theoria* (speculation, contemplation)

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[59] *DW* vol. 31, column 523.
[60] *DW* vol. 3, column 1201, my own emphasis.

as participation in the eternal life of the unmoved mover as the principle (*Metaphysics* XII, 7) promises metaphysical philosophising the enjoyment of the self-empowerment of superior insight because it grasps the whole. Indeed this insight were only to be possible as an exception for us mortals in moments and not permanently, but in the moments of fulfilment it is supposed to unite with objective reason in the form of the unmoved mover (Aristotle's concept of God) and, "touching and thinking the object so that reason and thought (noëton) are the same", partake of its perfections. Schopenhauer made this connection, which Aristotle only hinted at, completely clear in his description of aesthetic cognition (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* I, § 34). Aesthetic contemplation isolates the object of contemplation from its everyday and scientifically explorable contexts and transforms it into an idea; but "by this very fact, at the same time, that which is conceived in this contemplation is no longer an individual: for the individual has just lost itself in such contemplation: but it is PURE, will-less, painless, timeless SUBJECT OF RECOGNITION." For an understanding of this construction, it is important to realise that Schopenhauer, along with the overwhelming number of philosophers since Aristotle, is of the opinion that sensual (paradigmatic: visual) perception already gives *individual objects* to cognition without linguistic or conceptual mediation; what is perceived are essentially *individual* objects, from whose common characteristics general concepts are first abstracted. Then the transformation of the two poles of cognition (subject-object) in aesthetic cognition is a generalisation: the object becomes the (general) idea, the individual subject of cognition the embodiment of the general/universal 'I'. [Indeed, 'I' is general insofar as everyone says 'I' to himself or herself - but this does not mean that a general (>I<) is embodied into everyone who says 'I', not even in the case of cognition (Kant) or a special cognition, the aesthetic (Schopenhauer)]. Only a later conception that took the symbolic, linguistic mediation of any cognition seriously could realise what Aristotle had also already said in passing, that to sensual perception as such by no means singular objects are given already , but rather things of the same kind ('such a thing') that are only dissociated under the description by singularly predicative propositions ('The x is F') into singular vs. general, namely the subject expression specifying an object and a characterising general predicate.[61] Schopenhauer knows that the assertion of these transformations, complementary in subject and object, must seem alienating in aesthetic cognition and sees the danger that from the sublime to the ridiculous is only a step. He believes, however, that he can shield the idea of aesthetic cognition from this by elaboration and, for a plausibilization, first invokes Baruch Spinoza's conception of a third genre of cognition, which had the same thing in mind: "*mens aeterna est, quatenus res sub aeternitatis specie concipit* (*Ethica V, pr. 31, schol.*)" ("The spirit is eternal insofar as it conceives of the thing under an aspect of eternity"). But this appeal is simply to a (in this point) related metaphysical conception. And Schopenhauer also follows it in ascribing metaphysical relevance to the idea of aesthetic cognition itself, because in the elevation of the object under consideration to an idea, the 'world as idea' "emerges completely and purely", because the idea alone is "ADEQUATE OBJECTIVITY". In addition, for his phenomenology of aesthetic (and extended: metaphysical) cognition, he essentially relies on an interpretation of "a meaningful German expression" according to which one "loses oneself completely in this object" (sc. of contemplation); i.e. one forgets one's individual, one's will and remains only as a pure subject, as a clear mirror of the object".

Schopenhauer's construction makes motifs of metaphysical thought clear, as it were retrospectively, for he writes as a kind of Kantian under post-metaphysical premises, even if

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[61] Cf. Ernst Tugendhat: *Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*, op. cit., 203 and 211 footnote 5.

these have not completely shed the traces of their origin either in Kant or even in his own work. In the characterisation of the subject of aesthetic and metaphysical cognition as 'pure, will-less, painless, timeless', it becomes clear that metaphysical cognition is concerned with overcoming the conditions of finite existence by stripping away or repressing them, with demixing purity from the entanglements of drive and will, and with negating vulnerability and finiteness in pain and death.

In Aristotle, this negating orientation of metaphysical thought is reduced to the sole motif of participation in eternity according to human possibility.[62] Behind this motif, in addition to religious desires, there are also factual views: on the one hand, the cosmological view of the eternity of the world, of the cosmos; on the other hand, the view of the a priori propositions in logic, arithmetic and geometry as timeless. Cosmological convictions have migrated from philosophy to the sciences in the course of intellectual development, and today the cosmos is predominantly regarded as finite and having become, i.e. not eternal; although this means that the duration of the universe is still comparatively 'eternal' compared to the conceivable spans of a human life, this gives no reason to cite it as a support for a possible (participation in) eternity of cognition directed towards the cosmos.

Of course, one must ask: was it ever? And rationally, the answer is undoubtedly: No. But in the early days of the development of rationality, magical notions of the conditions of possibility of certain forms of cognition prevailed to some extent. These ideas, towards the end of the metaphysical tradition, Goethe captured in a verse: "Were not the eye sunlike, / It could never behold the sun." Characteristically, the verse from the 3rd book of the *Zahmen Xenien* continues thus: "Wouldn't God's own power lie in us, /How could the divine delight us?" The image of this thought is ancient, documented via the Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus (*Enneads* I, 6,9) at any rate back to Plato, who in his main work called the eye the most sunlike of all the tools of our perception (*Politeia*, VI, St. 508 b). The thought itself, as it still operates in Aristotle's praise of (cosmological) *theoria*, is this: We, as finite beings, could not know the eternal (the laws of the cosmos and the laws of thought in logic, arithmetic and geometry) unless something in ourselves were eternal, or at least so constituted that it could participate in the eternal, however exceptionally.[63] In formalising generalisation, the thought says that for cognition to be possible, the thing cognised and the thing known must in some respect be consubstantial/coessential or at least similar. Curiously, Aristotle has already criticised this formalised thought as a general condition for cognition itself (*De anima* 409 b 26 ff.), but in his conception of metaphysical *theoria* it nevertheless continues to have an effect: "touching the object and thinking", "reason and thought (noëton) are the same" and if the thought is eternal (like the laws of the cosmos and those of thought), then thought participates in this character by touching the object.

Schopenhauer is perfectly clear about the motives for metaphysics in his theory on "the metaphysical need of man" (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung II*, ch. 17) as well as the additional remarks on the subject of cognition (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung II*, ch. 30): "Without doubt it is the knowledge of death, and next to it the contemplation of suffering and the misery of life, which gives the strongest impulse to philosophical contemplation and to metaphysical interpretations of the world." Regarding the components of his conception of the

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[62] Emil Angehrn, *Der Weg zur Metaphysik*, Vorsokratik - Platon - Aristoteles (Weilerswist 2000), identifies the motifs no longer manifest in Plato and Aristotle under the influence of Klaus Heinrich. Cf. esp. pp. 151-3.

[63] Hans Blumenberg has treated this principle, which he calls "the beautiful homoeopathic principle 'like only by like'", in its importance for understanding Plato's *Politeia* in: *Höhlenausgänge*, Frankfurt am Main 1996, esp. Second Part III/IV (citation 137).

aesthetic and metaphysical cognition, however, he thinks under the modern conditions of a philosophy of subjectivity and therefore the corresponding transformations of object and subject in aesthetic and metaphysical cognition as changes in the individual, "a change in us that could also be seen as an act of self-denial". However, these changes could not come from the will, but only "arise from a temporary predominance of the intellect over the will". They are therefore a contingent experience/happening and this conception makes it possible in principle to ask critically whether this is ever the case or happens at all. Schopenhauer is perhaps therefore convinced of the "indestructibility of our being" through death for reasons other than the transformability of the individual into a pure, timeless subject of cognition (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung II* ch. 41). But in doing so, he nevertheless operates with the concept of necessity (i.e. the assumed character of the laws of the cosmos and of thought/thinking) and his argument only works if necessity connotes timelessness in the affirmative sense of eternity (permanence and imperishability):

"But he will recognise his existence as a necessary one who considers that up to now, since he exists, an infinite time has already elapsed, thus also an infinity of changes, but he, despite this, is still there: the whole possibility of all states has therefore already exhausted itself without being able to annul his existence. IF HE COULD EVER NOT BE, HE WOULD NOT BE EVEN NOW. For the infinity of time already expired, with the possibility of its processes exhausted therein, vouchsafes that what EXISTS EXISTS NECESSARILY."

The argument is of course flawed because possibility is not the shadow reality of an exhaustible set of states and time is not an expiring medium but itself a 'possibility', the possibility of duration (of processes) and change (of events), of coming into being and lapsing (of objects). But what is characteristic is the continuation of the metaphysical constellation of timelessness, necessity and 'immortality' of the one who can understand it, under conditions that are in principle already post-metaphysical. If cosmological supports are no longer available for this (although Schopenhauer's theory of the will as the 'thing-in-itself' also had a cosmological dimension for him, it was nevertheless without contact with scientific cosmology), the logical and mathematical supports supposedly remain.

Only when their necessity becomes understandable in a different way, the metaphysical constellation can no longer be continued. In principle, this was already the case with Kant's critical philosophy, on the one hand because of the Copernican turn on which it was based, and on the other because of the *normative* theory of logic it already assumed. If the necessity of logical and arithmetical propositions can be explicated *normatively* , their timelessness can be understood in purely negative terms, as the inapplicability - the unnecessity and impossibility - of temporal determinations for these propositions. (Norms that can be applied *at any time* given the existence, however contingent, of the conditions of their application not only do not need a temporal index, but also cannot have it). This is not yet the case with Kant, because in his moral philosophy, for reasons of interest in the categorical bindingness of moral norms, he continued the metaphysical constellation in a certain way by elevating the immortality of the soul and the existence of God to postulates of practical reason. However, the fact that these were *postulates* of *practical* reason made the insight into the character of metaphysical thinking as *wishful* thinking at least possible.

Age and Death

The overview of the grammar of time should make the classification of life into the category of processes (of temporal conditions that do not have a definite end for them for reasons of the logic of the expressions - as opposed to events) unexciting. Activities are also processes, but the argument against the conception of life as an activity is that activities and actions also belong to life - but so do experiences/happenings, indeed that life itself, after its origin in birth and the indeterminately imminent end in death and, by implication, in its temporal course, can and must be understood in many of its circumstances rather as an experience/a happening. If this is not already apparent to one from day to day, then it is at the thresholds of personality development, which in a way that cannot be dated in any definite way, make different stages of life distinguishable, which we understand as ages of life.

The conception of ages has a strongly conventional element - a speech on Kant's 50th birthday called the celebrant a 'venerable/dignified old man' - today, in view of the generally increased life expectancy, a healthy 50-year-old would probably not be called and addressed as an 'old man' anywhere. Nevertheless, in many cases the demarcation of ages also has a natural foundation - the clearest example is the demarcation between childhood and adolescence on the basis of the onset of sexual maturity (procreative or childbearing capacity). An understanding of the life process as a whole as an irreversible sequence of temporal stages - ages of life - emerges through the irreversibility of experience at these thresholds, a circumstance that the construction of an active design of the unity of life as a whole from Kierkegaard normatively overarches and tends to register - being blind to existing alternatives.

According to the 'structural' (untimely) conception of the meaning of life advocated here, in a concrete discussion of the themes of life on which people can, and in part must, form their conception of the meaning of their life, the circumstance of the age structure of life experience can initially be disregarded and the elements of possible meaning of life can initially be discussed independently of their connection with ages of life. Only the fact that not every life theme is relevant at every age (one cannot have one's own children at every age and grandchildren can only be given to one if one has had one's own children) and that some presuppose the relevance of others (e.g.) would have to make one reflect on the temporal order of life experience and, as the specifically temporal theme in the context of the meaning of life - the comprehensible acceptability of one's own life - make the theme of age clear.

When I came to the subject of the temporal constitution of our (life) experience at the end of the section *Preconditions*, I wrote: "Essentially because of the reference to an open future, persons are processes of which parts are still outstanding, even for themselves. The uncatchable holdout in every person's experience is their own expected and feared death, to which the life lived and yet to be lived forms the complete contrast. Whether death, as the event of the termination of a life, plays the role that philosophies of existence have attributed to it, and that role in structuring experience, still needs to be investigated."

The sweeping nature of these remarks is misleading. Although in the last sentence there is already a distancing from the existential philosophical tradition, the formulations actually only give existential philosophical commonplaces that have a long tradition in thinking about life and have found expression in sayings of wisdom such as 'The end certain, the hour uncertain'. Only recently, an author from the existential philosophical tradition, Ernst Tugendhat, has

pointed out[64] that the consciousness of having to die one day cannot have the structuring role for the experience of lifetime that existential philosophies have attributed to it, because it remains abstract during most stages of a life course up to the age near the (variable) average life expectancy. The abstract knowledge that one day one will have to die can leave one indifferent as a natural fact, but is to be distinguished from the often frightening awareness of the nearness of death and also from vegetative fear of death in life-threatening situations, for which there are physiological causes and symptoms. Tugendhat criticises his teacher Heidegger for the erroneous conclusion: "Man's being is his 'what about' (German: 'Worumwillen', Heidegger's translation of Aristotle's term of art for 'purpose': 'ta hou heneka'), so man fears (Heidegger: is afraid ...of) (the) death." Most, not all do - and fearlessness of the near, possibly self-induced death is compatible with vegetative fear of death (which is why suicidal people can be admired for their courage). But there is one point about Heidegger that Tugendhat does not criticise, but rather explicitly defends - the strong thesis that Dasein (human beings) are concerned with their being, that this is the ultimate "Worumwillen" of Dasein. Tugendhat's defence of the thesis goes like this: "Whoever does not want a certain purpose, refrains from it, then simply has other purposes; whoever, on the other hand, no longer wants his life, no longer wants it because it is the way it is; he also, by pushing it back, remains willfully related to it." The last sentence after the semicolon, however, seems to me to be simply wrong, unless the mere fact of having remained alive also speaks for *will* to live. (But then one could not meaningfully say of anyone in life and limb that his will to live was 'broken' or even 'extinguished' - and that seems to be possible without contradiction). This objection is even in line with Tugendhat's own argument against the other philosopher against whose views he clarifies his 'Thoughts on Death', Thomas Nagel.[65] Against him, Tugendhat in fact argues that life is not necessarily a good, but is neutral between good and evil - it is, precisely in the sense in which bodily death affects it, a precondition to which the person must find (and, near death, should have found) an attitude. Willingly, we are related to the good and if mere life (vegetation) does not speak for will to live, then this fits well with the fact that life is not a good *per se*, even if presumably most people see it that way, have acquired and formed this attitude towards life.

In my opinion, however, the teleological relationship of life to itself as its last 'Worumwillen' is the reason why the consciousness of having to die has been attributed the formative role of life experience, which Tugendhat himself criticises of Heidegger with his insistence on the distinction between abstract consciousness of death, consciousness of the nearness of death and vegetative fear of death. Death puts an end to life and thus makes it a temporal wholeness. If this wholeness is seen as analogous to the temporal wholeness of an action, it is obvious to assign it, like the action, a purpose, a 'Worumwillen', even if it is the end in itself, or life is about itself. The analogy to action (which is not distinguished from activity) also defuses the problem of the temporal wholeness of life never completely existing - this wholeness is anticipated just as the objective (realised) purpose of an action is anticipated in its intention. Thus, regardless of the assumption of twisted existential-ontological meanings of our normal expressions (Heidegger doubts, for example, that 'death' has only a biological meaning and assumes an existential-ontological one in addition; *SuZ* 237; English 280 sq.), one can make clear how it can come to Heidegger's theorem of 'running ahead to death' as "*running ahead into possibility*", which Heidegger claims for an 'actual being to death' (*SuZ* § 53; English 304

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[64] Ernst Tugendhat, 'Gedanken über den Tod', in: M. Stamm (ed.), *Philosophie in synthetischer Absicht*, Stuttgart 1998, pp. 487-512; also in: *Philosophische Aufsätze* 1992-2000, op. cit., 61-90.
[65] Cf. Thomas Nagel: 'Death', in: *Mortal Questions*, Cambridge UP 1979, 1-10.

sqq.). In this view, everything hinges on the conception of life as activity/action. This view can be put into perspective by a further consideration.

I have assumed so far that the question and search for the meaning of life arises when generally binding convictions of a human purpose dwindle or have disappeared. The successors to these convictions are those of the necessary self-determination of man. But if it is now assumed that self-determination remains in substance *a determination* and only the subject of the determination changes, if accordingly an analogous unity and wholeness is expected of self-determined life, as teleologically mediated life can seemingly have, then life must be thought of as a "draft" and in this sense analogously teleologically to action. Since death is the outermost possibility of Dasein's being whole (what I called the "uncatchable holdout" in the misleadingly sweeping passage quoted at the beginning; at death, even if only in advance, everything is complete, whole) - in this way, it grows to have the function of structuring the experience of life, which Tugendhat himself attacks with the distinctions of the three forms of death-consciousness. However, we can get beyond this teleologically distorted view if we conceive of life neither as action nor as activity, but rather as Tugendhat conceives of it vis-à-vis Nagel - as a precondition to which we must (again and again, changing, only gradually consolidating) find an attitude. We are active and act in life; by being active and acting in life, we *lead* our lives, as it is aptly colloquially called, but life does not thereby itself become an activity or action. Already when it is said that we *carry out* our life in activities and actions, one is on the threshold of distorting the nature of life as a mere precondition. Only with this move does the circumstance come into view that further speaks against ascribing to death-consciousness the function assumed in existential philosophy: Death-consciousness remains abstract during a large part of our lives (except in contingent situations of life-threat), because we tend to associate natural death with a certain *age* and therefore tend and strive to push it further and further out in the course of our life-experience.[66] A child cannot imagine being a youth and already considers its parents and everyone beyond their age to be old (however young they may be[67]). But they are not yet dead, so death is classified in the child's consciousness even later than what is already considered old to him or her. For the adolescent, the young adult, even the mature adult, the perspectives shift accordingly, even as the concept of a more stable order of ages of life is formed. In this order, death is associated with the age of the old and the aged. And it is only with the attainment of this age that a chronic awareness of the nearness of death is to be expected. Because our temporal experience of life builds up and structures itself in the way outlined, death-consciousness remains abstract during large spans of life and cannot play the structuring role that existential philosophies have assigned to it.

IV. Language

Although I mentioned language as a factual precondition according to norms in the overview of *Preconditions and Challenges* of life, in the exposition I would like to deal with language before discussing the norm systems of morality and law. First, the speaking of language is also to be understood as acting according to norms (of meaning, of intelligibility). Another reason is as follows: because the present discussions in vision and factual convictions, if not in method (especially the presentation through aspect-illuminating aphorisms), are influenced by

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[66] Recently read in a death announcement, what seems to resume almost everyone's attitude to age and death: "The idea is to die young - as late as possible." (Fottnote added 2022.)

[67] There is a family anecdote about me, according to which I am supposed to have said to my 28-year-old mother, only 20 years older, on her birthday: "So old and not dead yet."

no great philosopher more than Ludwig Wittgenstein, there has already been much talk of language in the previous discussions, and this should now also be clarified.

Two explanations have been explicitly invoked so far: The speaking of a language is a participation in a normative practice; a language is the possibility (an ensemble of possibilities) of expression and representation. These two explanations are analogous to the methodological and formal ontological explanations given for 'time'. Methodological is the explanation of speaking a language as a normative practice - it indicates *how* we deal with language: by using its means of expression and representation according to rules of meaning, rules of intelligibility. Formal-ontological is the explanation of language as a means of expression and representation - it indicates *what* we deal with in using language, a medium of expression and representation. These explanations, too, are not assertions of superior insight into the nature of the phenomenon of language, but proposals for better understanding in need of ratification. The following explanations are intended to ease such ratification.

The beginning can be made by remembering that Wittgenstein, to whom philosophy owes the methodological 'linguistic turn'[68], was nevertheless not a 'language' philosopher. I discuss his conception of philosophy elsewhere.[69] But here this perhaps astonishing assertion can be provisionally explained by the following evidence. Wittgenstein was clear about the fact that about language in general "only external things ... can be put forward". His reason for this was "that in my explanations concerning language I must already use the full language (not a preparatory, preliminary one)". (PI section 120) The inevitability of using language when explaining something - explaining how something is to be understood (it is not a matter of explaining why ...) - has implications in two directions: for the structure of language itself; and for its relations to what is represented in it.

The possibility of using language for explanations-how to …, makes languages universal media, media that can be used to explain their own constituents. If a medium is called *universal* when it can be used to explain its own constituents, then language is largely a universal medium, which is why for how-to-understand its constituents, i.e. their meaning, Wittgenstein was able to synoptically summarise: "The meaning of an expression is what the explanation of the meaning explains." (PI section 560) However, the character of natural languages as universal media is limited. A foundation of such languages must be learned through training, practice, Wittgenstein spoke of "drill" (German: "Abrichtung[70]"). It is true that linguistic explanations of meaning can also retroactively penetrate the foundation of language thus learned, but often explanations to this effect ultimately lead only to statements such as 'that's just the way we act', 'that's just what we do'. Wittgenstein uses this observation for a famous regress argument first used by Kant in the introduction to the Second Book of the

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[68] In their book *Language - Sense and Nonsense* (Oxford 1984), G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker prove that Wittgenstein was the father of the linguistic turn, and not Gottlob Frege, as academic philosophy under the influence of Michael Dummett's investigations predominantly believes (*Frege - Philosophy of Language*, London 1973). Their one-sidedness is corrected by H.J. Schneider: *Phantasie und Kalkül* - Über die Polarität von Handlung und Struktur in der Sprache, Frankfurt am Main 1992.

[69] Cp. E. M. Lange: *After Wittgenstein* (2020), on: www.emilange.de

[70] The really complicated situation is this: Wittgenstein in 1937 translated (and partly re-worked) *The Brown Book* (into "*Eine philosophische Betrachtung*"). In this process he translated the English "training" into "Abrichtung" which in German is used predominantly for animals (i.e. dogs and horses). "Drill" in German can be considered as the military equivalent to what "Abrichtung" is for animals. So my translator's choice of "drill" is correctly translated - which means sense-preserving -, but not accurate with respect to the full situation.- This is a good place to point out that Wittgenstein, with very few exceptions, used German in writing. In German he is even a great stylist (as was his mentor Schopenhauer) of a realist bent. He considered (as his architecture shows) "ornament as crime". (Footnote added 2022.)

Transcendental Analytics of the *Critique of Pure Reason* for the impossibility of rules for the power of judgement (PI section 202; K. d. r. V. B 172 f./A 133 f.). The argument is based on the insight: "I cannot describe how to use a rule (in general) other than by teaching you, drilling you, to train yourself to use a rule." (Z 318) But despite this limitation of the universal character of language through its anchoring in a factual (teaching and learning) practice, it is the medium that comes closest to the notion of a universal medium - *and the only such medium*. If one compares spoken language with other media of expression and representation - pictures, gestures, dances, music - then one can convince oneself of the unique position of language as a universal medium by remembering that: if something is not understood in these other media, then *speech* must be used to explain it in general and in the end, but conversely, only in exceptional cases can linguistic things be *made* understandable through pictures, gestures, dances, melodies. This moreover justifies for language, due to its sole universal character (its far-reaching self-explanatory capacity), a *claim to universality* with regard to understanding/making understandable. Wittgenstein raises this implicitly when he writes in the first paragraph of PI section 120, where the use of the whole language necessary for explanation is already tied to the "language of everyday life": "Is this language too coarse, too material for what we want to say? And *how then is another one formed*?" Even if the typographical emphasis should be a misunderstanding[71], factually it rightly exists (and is only one of two emphases of a whole, independently usable sentence in the entire text of the PI). The question is rhetorical and demands the answer: another language must be formed by explaining its words through linking them to forms in our already spoken language - but then it itself *can* be spoken right away. And with regard to the other media of expression and representation, it *must* be spoken when in doubt.

The explained structure of language through its self-explanatory capacity has often been called its 'reflexivity', misleading because neither the optical nor the relational-logical nor the deliberative sense of 'reflection' can account for a clarified understanding. It could be understood in the sense of a two-level language - with the level of use/usability and the level of explanation. This is not wrong, but it is misleading. Wittgenstein opposes the misunderstanding in PI section 121:

"One might think: if philosophy talks about the use of the word 'philosophy', there must be a second-order philosophy. But it is precisely not so; rather, the case corresponds to that of orthography, which also has to do with the word 'orthography', but is not then such a second-order."

The opinion that there is a second-order philosophy about philosophy is the reason for the talk of 'metaphilosophy' and, with regard to language, of 'meta-language'. But the relation of linguistically possible explanations to spoken language is not that of meta-language to object-language, but *normative*. Explanations of meaning are *rules*, indications of how something *is to be understood*. This is indicated by the element '-lehre' in 'Rechtschreibelehre' (orthography) and for the linguistic explanations and also his explanations of meaning Wittgenstein therefore used the title 'grammar', which he once also Germanised as 'Sprach*lehre*'. (PG 97 c).

The universal character of language also determines its relationship of representation to reality. Explanations of meaning remain *within* language. This is also true of the kind of explanations of meaning that one might think and have thought 'link language to reality' - indicative or ostensive explanations. They make use of *paradigms* by internalising them to language (though

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[71] This is asserted in the *Critical Edition* of the *PI* ed. by J. Schulte et al, Frankfurt am Main 2001, 813[1]. The other, undisputed emphasis of a whole sentence in the text of the PI concerns precisely the factual practice anchoring of the language in section 654: *this language game is played*.

not into the language of words - PI section 16). The rationale for this classification is: if, for example, a colour expression is explained by reference to a pattern 'this → is blue', then in a later context where something is characterised as being of blue colour, if this is not understood, it can be explained by reverting to the pattern with 'but it is this → colour' - here the paradigm functions as a language element. In this respect, there is an internal, essential connection between language and reality with regard to the meaning or sense of its expressions (one that cannot *not* exist), so that it holds that "I cannot escape (get out of) language with language." (PB I.6, 54)[72] Wittgenstein called this internality of the relation between language and reality the "autonomy of grammar":

"The connection between 'language and reality' is made by the word explanations, - which belong to the doctrine of language, so that language remains closed in itself, autonomous." (*PG* 97 c)

"Grammar is not accountable to any reality. The grammatical rules first determine the meaning (constitute it) and are therefore not accountable to any meaning and to that extent arbitrary.
There can be no discussion about whether these rules or others are the right ones for the word 'not' (i.e. whether they are in accordance with its meaning). For the word has no meaning without these rules, and if we change the rule, it now has a different meaning (or none) and we may as well then change the word too.
'The only correlate in language to a natural necessity is an arbitrary rule. It is the only thing that can be subtracted from this necessity into a proposition.'" (*PG* 184 b/c)

The last remark enters into section 372 in the late version of the PI, but there it is preceded by 'Consider:'. Exegeses that simply assume that there is (only) talk of logical necessity here, when 'natural necessity' is said, save themselves the trouble of following this invitation to consider. The request assumes that something can be found out by reflection - either in what way the quoted thing is right and in what way it is wrong - or, for example, in what different ways it can be right. The second is the case here. What is quoted is correct if by 'natural necessity' is understood logical necessity - in principle arbitrary rules generate logical necessity in that "*this ...* is not arbitrary: that *if* we have determined something arbitrarily, something else must be the case. (This depends on the *nature* of the notation.)" (*TLP* 3.342) Accepting a rule for an expression implies a willingness to commit: "this is not just an arbitrary linking of sounds and facts. If I say this is green, then I have to say of other things that they are green. I am committed to a future use of language." (*Lectures* 59)
However, the statement quoted in *PI*, "the only correlate in language to a necessity of nature is an arbitrary rule. ...", can also be given a reasonable interpretation if 'necessity of nature' really means 'necessity of *nature*'. And in the original context of the *PG* (cf. also *Lectures* 79, 252) this interpretation is intended, as the note in parenthesis "Perhaps to the paradox that mathematics consists of rules." indicates (*PG* 184[1]). Wittgenstein's point in this interpretation of the remark is that facts of the world can suggest to us the acceptance of certain rules as opposed to other possible ones. This is shown by the following elaboration of the thought in a lecture from 1934-35:

"Let us assume that it is a fact that the lengths of the bodies in this room are multiples of the length of the arm. If we want to fix a unit of measurement, it would be natural to fix the arm as the unit. However, we are not forced to do this; it is a matter of convenience. The philosopher would confuse the natural

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[72] The remark as a whole also explains the difference between the deictic proposition 'This is blue', which can be true or false, and the ostensive definition of the same wording, which is a normative rule and cannot be false (or could only be false under additional conditions - a language practice that would not be properly described by the rule).

fact (!) that the length of bodies is a multiple of the length of an arm with the fact that the arm is used as a unit of measurement - which is after all a convention. They are completely different, although they are closely related. One is a matter of experience, the other a rule of symbolism." (*Lectures* 251-2)

To this consideration one only has to add the thought of the lawfulness of facts in order to have for the citation in PI 372 the interpretation of necessity as necessity of *nature*. It would be difficult to deny Wittgenstein this thought.

One could now question the entire remarks on the structure of language and its internal relation to reality in an seemingly Wittgensteinian way if one referred to his utterance: "General remarks about the world and language do not exist. "[73] And one could furthermore turn this critically against Wittgenstein himself in such a way that one said that he himself did not behave according to his remark and, in particular, made general, even metaphysical, statements about the language-game character of language itself. I would still like to emphatically dispel these misunderstandings.

In the late version of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein inserted the remark in section 7d that he "will also call the whole: language and the activities with which it is interwoven, the 'language-game'. "[74] But this late generalisation would also be misunderstood if understood as a metaphysical dictum. The term language game also functions here as an *aspect-illuminating metaphor*, albeit for the whole language - and this precisely because we have no (material) concept for 'the whole language' in the sense that is decisive for philosophy (which reflexively formally emphasises and summarises what is common to the various natural languages).[75] As a formal concept, however, the concept of language is already given by each of its instances (the German language, the English language., etc.).[76] In order to understand it, we have to make use of the same instance or of another one and can then 'no longer get out of it with it' in order to distance it as a whole. A revealing, aspect illuminating metaphor is the expression 'language game' for philosophical reflection also with regard to the whole of language, because philosophy attempts to clarify the grammar, the rules of language and this means "bringing it ... to the form of a game with rules. "[77] This constructive aspect of the use of

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[73] *Vienna Edition*, vol. 3, 275.

[74] This is one of two entirely new (partial, i.e. paragraphs of) remarks in the opening section of the last version of the *PI*, which has formed the nucleus of the whole work since 1936 [the other is 133 d, according to which there is not one method of philosophy, but (various) methods].

[75] On 'formal terms' cf. again Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung 4.122-4.128.- Later Wittgenstein compared formal terms, as already mentioned but not proved, with headings in 'philosophical grammar' - cf. *Wiener Ausgabe* vol. 3, p. 197. A material concept of language not available would have to be one that allowed one to 'remember a feeling of the lack of language (for) the situation before learning the language'. But one cannot "have a concept of language before one speaks", i.e. one cannot remember the lack in this way, "and certainly not afterwards either, because there is no such concept". (Wiener Ausgabe vol. 3, p. 211.) For, if one can speak, then one always already makes use of a special language, which one cannot distance as a whole (but only, for instance, from another), so that the following applies: "General explanations of the world and language do not exist." (ibid. p. 275)

[76] Cf. ibid. 274 as well as PG 190 (Part I no. 137 b): "Language is not defined for us as an institution that fulfils a certain purpose. But 'language' is a collective name and I understand by it the German language, the English language, etc., and still some sign systems which have a greater or lesser kinship with these languages." - The passage for the following 'not with it out of it' is the one cited from *Philosophical Remarks* (PR) I.6 (p. 54)

[77] Vienna Edition vol. 5, p. 24 - "One-sided way of looking at things" - *TheBlueBook* 25-6. Here the motive for this one-sidedness is also named: "Why then do we compare our use of words, when we philosophise, with something that takes place according to exact rules? The answer is that the puzzles we try to clear out of the way always arise precisely from this attitude towards language." (ibid.) This one-sided approach is, as it were, a consequence of Goethe's insight: nemo contra deum nisi deus ipse.

the language-game metaphor, which Wittgenstein himself occasionally calls "a one-sided way of looking at things" to emphasise its un-metaphysical character, leaves room for two descriptive facts - in the use of language we switch between different rule contexts and to that extent we 'play' in it (the basic meaning of 'play' is the rapid switch back and forth as in the 'playing of shadows' on a wall[78]); and these switches are not themselves subject to any rules. Finally: the grammatical investigation of philosophical reflection can reach places where no rules can be found or established: "We can say: let us examine language for its rules. If it has no rules here and there, then *that* is the result of the investigation. "[79] The fact that one cannot say that language is a game in the metaphysical sense is also due to the fact that, as explained, there is no external but an internal connection between language and reality. This makes it impossible to "delimit and emphasise the world in language" (which would imply, complementarily, the objectifying delimitation of language): "The implicitness of the world expresses itself precisely in the fact that language means only it, and can mean only it. For since language only receives the nature of its meaning from its meaning, the world, no language is conceivable that does not represent this world. "[80] Not being able to get out of language to the world with using language means not being able to see or consider the relationship of language to reality, as it were, from the side or from above, and therefore not being able to metaphysically emphasise the world or metaphysically delimit language. The constitution of the formal concept of language and the internal relation of language to reality justify the rejection of metaphysics, also with regard to language itself. Only indirectly is Something analogous to the essence of the world, to which metaphysical philosophy was directed, is accessible to language-reflexive philosophy only indirectly:

"...what belongs to the essence of the world cannot be said. A philosophy if it was able to say something would have to describe the essence of the world. - But the essence of language is an image of the essence of the world, and philosophy as the administrator of grammar can indeed grasp the essence of the world, only not in sentences of language, but in rules for this language that exclude nonsensical uses of signs."[81]

If this remark from 1930 were still able to characterise Wittgenstein's late view in PI, then it should be possible to show that the characterisation of the whole - of language and the activities with which it is interwoven - can also be dissolved in rules that exclude nonsensical sign connections, and thus that something about the essence of the world (and of language) can at best be understood indirectly, not in a philosophical sentence. In this sense, it should first be emphasised that remark 7 d of the PI itself has a possible form of a rule: 'I will call X so-and-so' is a sentence frame for an explanation of meaning and specifies (as a rule) how the utterer wants to be understood. But then the sentence is an attempt at a summary that refers back to other rules. Wittgenstein saw the methodological function of such a summary in this way: "The purpose of the good expression and the good simile is that it allows the

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[78] *DW* vol. 16, column 2325-6.
[79] *Wiener Ausgabe* Bd. 4, pp. 196-7. The passage contains a first version of remark 83 of the late version of the PI, in view of which it has been disputed whether all actions do not follow rules after all - the corresponding positive view of Savigny's, for example, seems to me clearly refuted by the context of origin, which I did not yet know directly in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophische Untersuchungen* (op. cit.,182).
[80] *Vienna Edition* vol. 2, p. 157 = PR V.47 b (p. 80).
[81] Ibid, p 132 = PB V.54 (p. 85)

instantaneous overview."[82] And the overview that the characterisation of the whole by means of the good expression or simile 'language play' allows is above all also that of the relationship between language and reality. For the activities with which language is supposed to be interwoven also interweave it with reality. The linguistic activities that are particularly important for this are the indicative explanations of meaning discussed, and it is now of revealing interest to see that Wittgenstein's conception of this fundamental mode of explanation (primarily) for expressions that refer to perceptibles elaborates an aperçu that Nietzsche coined for sentient perception - it is content to "play, as it were, a tentative game on the back of objects. "[83] Nietzsche may here only have had in mind by 'play' the aforementioned basic meaning of regular rapid back-and-forth movement. But Wittgenstein gives the metaphor an interpretation using the rule-determined, normative and potentially social sense of 'play'.

The learning of the mother tongue is the essential medium of becoming a person also because empirically the learning of language cannot be separated from the learning of the norms of human interaction. Persons, I had tried to suggest, are essentially self-assessing living beings. The explained structure of natural languages, their self-explanatory capacity, i.e. the linguistic formulability of their norms of meaning, is homologous to the structure of being a person, of being able to normatively evaluate and control one's own immediate desires, attitudes, opinions. This homology should give additional persuasiveness to the independently given explanations.

V. Love and Friendship

It would not be unfitting to follow up the precondition language with the topic of morality and law. However, I shall continue here with the discussion of topics that are closer from the perspective of persons who have to lead their lives.

We have already encountered the *relational form* of love under the topic of '*Preconditions*'. I had suggested/proposed changing Leibniz's definition - love is joy in the happiness of the other - to "joy in the existence of the other". This was not only due to the fact that the earlier context was about the mother-child relationship and women, when they become mothers, first have to come to terms with the existence of another being dependent and still belonging to them. As joy in the being of the other, which is connected with the desire to be able to be with them and to do them good, love is first of all an *attitude* of one person towards others (another). If psychoanalysis sees mental health in a person's ability to work and love, then the ability to love means the ability to have this attitude.

But if someone is or has been lucky enough to find 'their great love', then love does not mean just the attitude (and certainly not a mere *feeling* of being in love), but a social form of relationship that results from the reciprocity of the attitude of love. The encounter of this reciprocity is an experience. Why is this experience and thus this form of relationship commonly longed for? (It would not exactly be contradictory, but strange to say that it is "desired").

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[82] *Wiener Ausgabe* vol. 4, p. 214. The expression *erlaubt* (allows) is underlined with a wiggly line in the manuscript, which is a sign that Wittgenstein was dissatisfied with it.
[83] *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn*, in: KSA vol.1, 876.

The question is directed to a potential rational explanation (and thus an explanatory *scheme*) in the light of which the relational form and its role in our experience can be better understood. The problem is to understand how a being capable of action can seek something that is centrally an experience, that is, opposed to its ability to act. Therefore, the key to the phenomenon to be elucidated here is not the person's own attitude towards the other, but their experience of the other's attitude towards them. From the interweaving of the attitudes of both partners (pleasure in the existence of the other) and their experience of the other's attitude ('I am the object of the other's pleasure') arises the reciprocity of attitudes; and from the perception of reciprocity the stabilisation of the form of relationship: each knows about himself or herself and about the other and thus about the relationship linking the two and can therefore say 'we love each other'.

In his speculations on drive theory, Freud[84] points to Aristophanes' eulogy of Eros in Plato's *Symposion*, according to which the drive to unite with one's respective other arises from the rupture of an original unity as a drive to return to the same. Psychoanalytical speculations have linked the idea of a symbolic return to the womb to this kind of thing. Theories of this type do not provide the rational explanation we are looking for. Against such mythical explanations of origins, I propose to see the stability of the relational form of love in the coincidence of homologous structures on the physical and psychic levels.

At first, the sexual drive is a dominant driving force for a long time after puberty. It goes elementarily to the abreacting release of through the sudden[85] dissolution of a spasm of desire produced in rhythmic movement (and can therefore also be satisfied alone), but only finds more pleasurable fulfilment with a sexual partner. The mutual satisfaction of this instinct gives a bodily fulfilment of the desire to be recognised, to be accepted as a whole person. As psychic persons, however, we as self-assessing living beings are directed towards an exact psychic analogue of fulfilment in physical union - we want to be (assessed and) accepted as a whole person, not only because of our abilities and according to the views brought to us by others. And physical union in its most successful form even surpasses psychic union in that it allows the consciousness of bodily separateness to be suspended for a moment in orgasm. I think that this view of the matter lets the *New Testament* say of lovers that they are "one flesh" (-religiously, of course, this is only supposed to be possible in heterosexual marriage). And this momentary surpassing of possible psychic union on the one hand makes its repeatability[86] and thus the stabilisation of the form of relationship in which it is possible desirable, and on the other hand justifies, as the Catholic philosopher Spaemann realistically acknowledged, that "the act of sexual union ... underlies all conceptions of happiness as a paradigm. "[87]

This concession corrects Hegel's one-sided spiritualising theory of marriage. Hegel had rightly opposed Kant's contract theory of marriage ("the union of two persons of different sexes for

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[84] *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) Section VI, Studienausgabe Vol. III, p. 266. - In Plato (cf. *Symposion* 189 d - 193 d)) the respective other is not eo ipso the other sex; it is so only in the case of the originally (androgynous) third sex; Aristophanes assumes three original sex types realised in double individuals, which were then divided by Zeus and therefore strive for their reunion.

[85] When one learns that the sudden was the primary manifestation of the divine for ancient religious experience, one gets an inkling of the experiential basis of ways of speaking that have become foreign to us. Cf. M. Theunissen: *Pindar*, op. cit., pp. 399- 441.

[86] This is already emphasised by Socrates in the *Symposium* when he explains Eros as the desire to always have the good (204 d ff.).

[87] Incidentally, the paradigmatic position of an experience of suddenness for our idea of happiness is the reason for not operating with "happiness" as a formal term for the understanding orientation of human life (the idea of an uninterruptedly lasting orgasm might be rather terrible), but with "meaning"/"Sinn". This envisages an orientation that has room for happiness and unhappiness and that creates a pattern of the whole experience that allows both to be lived.

the life-adversary mutual possession of their sexual properties"[88]) as a "disgrace" and understood the essence of marriage as a (relative) moral totality. In a moral totality, no side of the relationship can be isolated as a dominant purpose - contractual purpose - without distorting its understanding. For Hegel, marriage "transformed the external *unity* of the natural sexes into a *spiritual* one, into self-conscious love"[89] but he wanted to understand the circumstance only as a spiritualisation of the corporal and not *equally* as a corporalisation of the spiritual (because this did not fit into the conception of a hierarchical superordination of moral relations in a teleological gradual progression of the objective spirit - for example, as the strict normative subordination of marriage as a private-law relation to the public-law relations of the state; the gradual progression of the spirit, in the case of equally weighted independent balances on its path, may not even have to progress - for the consciousness of those involved - to anything superordinate). The proposal made here is to be understood in the sense of such a reciprocal, equally weighted interpenetration and, moreover, is not to be limited to legally formalised gender relations.

Against this background, friendship can be understood as a form of relationship that is also characterised by the mutual recognition of the whole person of the friends, but in which the moment of desire (the sex drive) that conditions the integration task in gender relationships is missing, so that the relationship allows a greater degree of independence of the partners from each other. People who are unable to open up to others on the level of sex, for psychological or other reasons, generally look for an equivalent for the central functions that this dimension forms for being a person in the embedding in a larger close circle of friends.

If, among the life themes on which the meaning of a life is formed, love and friendship are placed here before many other factual preconditions, it is because I want to suggest that we have in them the centre of gravity of our experience of social relations - we measure all others by the distance to these, which are central to our self-relation. The insight into this function of the experience of the relational forms of love and friendship entered into Hegel's artificial conceptualisation. He conceptualised love as 'being one in *the other* with oneself'[90] and thus explicated it as the central case of human freedom given the structure 'being in the other *with oneself*' (if one deciphers the terminology in this way).

In fact, this terminological version in Hegel is misleading in that it obscures perspectival differences of characterisation possibilities in the interest of a metaphysical integration of the experience of mind across its various dimensions. As 'being in the other', for example, love can only be meaningfully characterised from the perspective of one of (the two) participants - the third person would have to say something like 'being together with the other'. In turn, the relationship can only be understood as 'being with oneself' from the 3rd person; the 1st person would have to say 'being with myself'. The attempt to speak from the 1st and 3rd person at the same time generates metaphysics - in philosophy, too, there are limits to the possibility of objectification for reflexive speaking from the 1st person perspective - reflection cannot become 'science' - the violation of which leads to nonsense (incomprehensible and only laboriously reconstructible).

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[88] *Metaphysics of Morals*, Theory of Law, § 24. Admittedly, I learned from a wedding speech that the Berlin sociologist Heiner Ganssmann, a friend of mine, gave to my wife and me that Kant's explanation of marriage as a contract also has the positive aspect of emphasising the equality of the spouses as contractual partners.

[89] *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, § 161, cf. § 75.

[90] Cf. for instance *Grundlinien* etc. § 167 the use of the formula to justify monogamy. I know well that to quote Hegel is to falsify him, but one should not care about the frowns of the afiçionados if one wants to understand something oneself.

Metaphysical efforts at explication are based on the denial of the fact that the philosophy belonging to a linguistic understanding of the world is not laid down in sentences, but in rules and the categorial divisions of language, and must therefore be elucidated and corrected in the reflexive elucidation of linguistic understanding. It wants (because normal unreflective speech actually 'does not *know* what it is doing' - cannot *say* it explicitly) to rectify the understanding inherent in the divisions in direct access and (in Hegel's case) to let itself unfold from the simplest conceptual elements to this formulation. Although the metaphysical endeavour to explicate is not helpful for analytical understanding, it can be heuristically instructive for an aspect of philosophical understanding that Wittgenstein called "seeing the connections" (PI section 122). It is clear that a philosophical perspective that wants to show us that everything is essentially one (with Hegel: emerges from the self-movement of the idea and the mind), for all its distortions, also makes really existing connections more noticeable than they could be for reflexive understanding alone.

Such a connection becomes visible in view of the formula for freedom and love - 'being in the other with oneself' - in that Hegel also uses it for simple intentional action that does not involve reciprocity, when he characterises this, for example, as the "purpose(s) entering into external objectivity" (*Rphil* § 132). The purpose entering into external objectivity is that which is realised in action - the subjective purpose or intention. If its realisation is understood as 'entering into externality', is 'being translated', etc., then the agent remains with himself in the divestment of his intention through realisation, for the intention remains (supposedly) the same (it is only transferred from 'inside' to 'outside'). That is, the action and its result are essentially described under the aspect of the agent's expression of will, this possibility of description is privileged. This is a constructive distortion of our language for describing actions (subjective and objective purpose have the same content - can be described in the same terms - but are essentially different because of their form - merely thought vs. realised).[91] But there is also a phenomenological insight into connections. We can also be so involved, immersed, in the pursuit of our purposes that, without consciously thinking of ourselves, we are completely with ourselves and thus 'in the other with ourselves'. And the connection that is made visible will, because of its contrast with forms of time such as intoxication, make visible the common *meaning*-constituting character of such different facts as action, love, friendship, etc. If the perspective of understanding does not extend the point of view of the agents themselves further than to a third person who could also be involved, (i.e. does not seek to adopt a metaphysical view from nowhere[92]), they are all fulfilments of empty time with meaning, with the comprehensible, the understandable, and, insofar as it is desired or wanted or approved of, the acceptable, the wanted, and in this they are realisations of freedom - the ability to distance oneself and to be able to disregard oneself, which is made possible for persons by the level difference in thinking and willing that defines them.

VI Achievement, Competition, Work and Autonomy

Although the dimension of acquired abilities is not the only one and, for the self-understanding of persons, not even necessarily the fundamental dimension of self-evaluation, it is predominant in many things. Fundamentally, persons want to be loved, i.e. to be affirmed in their existence and entirety - this is what makes them free in themselves, confident and resilient in their attention to reality. Other forms of recognition and evaluation, as well as the

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[91] Cf. E.M. Lange, *Das Prinzip Arbeit*, Berlin 1980, ch. 1.
[92] Cf. the book of the same title by Thomas Nagel (*The view from Nowhere*, Oxford UP 1986 et al., German 1992 by Suhrkamp) argues for this attitude.

self-assessments related to them, are usually evaluated by their distance to this central dimension of (self-)estimation. (But it is part of the autonomy of persons to also be able to modify the weighting of the dimensions of evaluation within certain limits by their own).

But the acquisition of abilities not directly related to the dimension of personal relationships is unavoidable, because the human offspring wants and should become independent, so that they are able to provide for their livelihood, the satisfaction of their needs, through their own efforts. This inevitability is set by two structural conditions - plurality of actors and non-immediate availability as well as scarcity of means for livelihood. They are the reasons why the acquisition of skills in the long phase after early childhood socialisation in the family, in schools and in places of training and education is still oriented towards usability in a material securing of life through one's own gainful employment, or is meant to be. In the social pressure to earn one's own living, which is imposed at the appropriate age by the expectations of the caregivers who have so far looked after the child, the originally playful wanting to achieve something and competitively assert oneself, which can already be observed in childhood play, is socially exploited. Childlike behaviour corresponds to the structural circumstance that the exertion of any ability can be evaluated as good, better or worse, bad, and the comparability given by the plurality of actors affects the generic desire to become grown-up and strong with the desire to become better than the others - at least in social contexts in which socialisation leads to a social situation in which life must be maintained through one's own work.[93]

As is well known, historically this was not always the case socially and not equally for all strata of a society. Today, however, it is still generally true, although the loss of full employment and the dwindling prospect of restoring it means that the legitimacy for this way to construct social reality is disappearing. This situation opens the way to a historically functional understanding of the conditions associated with the dimension of achievement, competition and work for the self-assessment of persons and thus for their possible meaning of life.

I would like to start from the following consideration. The basic meaning of 'work' is 'toil, complaint, effort, hardship'. Nonetheless, unemployment is experienced as an arduousness. This raises the naïve question: Why, in fact? When one thinks of the basic meaning of 'work' - how can this evil of being unattached and single itself be experienced as an evil? It does not help against the naivety of this question to insist that in 'unemployment'[94] the component 'work' does not have its basic meaning. Rather, it speaks of 'work' as an activity that secures one's livelihood because it generates a monetary income and is subject to social insurance contributions. But precisely work in this sense is usually and for most arduous, burdensome and exhausting (perhaps not exactly distressing) - so the problem remains: how can being unemployed be experienced as an evil?

The answer to this seems to be: If in 'unemployment' 'work/employment' has approximately the meaning given as 'activity securing livelihood', a factor has been named that seems to explain in itself why unemployment is experienced as an evil. Work is the usual source of income that secures one's livelihood. Without work there is no income, without income there is no livelihood, and this must be experienced as an evil, as a threat to the possibility of life, since one may assume a will to live.

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[93] An earlier version of parts of the following text appeared under the title 'Glück, Sinn und Arbeit' in: *Rechtsphilosophische Hefte* Vol. 5 (Frankfurt am Main 1996: Peter Lang), 57-75.
[94] "Unemployment" in German is "*Arbeit*slosigkeit", "work" is "*Arbeit*". This is different in English.

But this simple answer does not necessarily apply. Because in our societies, unemployment does not automatically mean lack of income. Even if social benefits (unemployment benefits, social assistance) are minimal, they secure a livelihood at a legally defined level of subsistence. Nevertheless, unemployment is generally experienced as an evil that one would rather be free of sooner than later, at least as a general rule. If one adheres to the suggested explanatory approach as the exclusive one, one would have to see the financial difference between the social benefits and the achievable income from work as the reason for this striving to get rid of unemployment and have a job again, despite social security. Empirically, this may even be the case to a large extent, but I still consider the explanatory approach that assumes a *homo oeconomicus* maximising his "utiliy" (as economists say) to be insufficient overall.

I argue that in the background of the normative matrix of our social and political self-understanding there is still a conception that has been given a binding formulation for our tradition in Aristotelian ethics. This ethics is eudaemonistic. Its basic question, as already mentioned, is that of *eudaimonia*, happiness or a successful life. And Aristotle's formative answer to this question was that, apart from the life of theory - because only a few can lead it, and even these only for short periods - happiness, that which all strive for and want in the whole of their lives, lies in living in and for the polis, for a legal community of persons striving collectively for the good life. Of course, the historical limitation of the Aristotelian conception lies in the orientation towards the polis, because city states (poleis) as independent, self-sufficient units belong to the world-historical past. (Another reason for this, besides the increased size of the communities, is the insight of Rousseau's political philosophy, already mentioned, that with the religious liberation of moral conscience, a principled distance between the individual person and the society has arisen). It is even argued that Aristotle was already archaising in his own time[95] - his philosophy too, with Hegel's figurative turn of phrase, only began its flight as Minerva's owl in at dusk. Moreover, the city states have long since been replaced by territorial area states that are no longer self-sufficient, and in these, life for the community, which Aristotle had normatively distinguished as guaranteeing happiness, has already become a problem because of the size of the states and the number of their citizens. For *politeuesthai*, being directly active as a citizen for the community, was now no longer possible for all full citizens. In modern societies, with the development of bourgeois economic societies, this was replaced by work - as a form of *indirect* activity for the community, namely by contributing to the social product. This activity was socially expected of all, initially male, citizens of states in the modern era.

I believe that this insight played a significant role in shaping Hegel's theory of bourgeois society when he states in § 187 of the *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* that individuals, who as citizens of the state of need and reason (German: "Not- und Verstandesstaat") are *private persons* who have their own interest as their purpose, are expected, because this purpose is mediated by the generality of the social context (and this is essentially through markets as conditions of economic activity), that "they themselves determine their knowledge, will and action in a general way and make themselves a *link* in the chain of this *context*". That the individual as an adult has become, as Hegel did still put it in male chauvinist terms, a "*son of bourgeois society*" (§ 238) sums up this insight. When Hegel saw the problem of support for the poor in modern societies in the fact that through it "the subsistence of the people in need would be secured without being mediated by labour, which would be against the principle of

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[95] Robert Spaemann: *Glück und Wohlwollen*, op. cit., 81 f

bourgeois society and its individuals' sense of their autonomy and honour" (§ 245), then in my opinion he has designated the decisive normative reason for our difficulties with unemployment. If it is a principle of bourgeois society that its members provide for their livelihood through their own work, then unemployment seems to mean excommunication - prevention of those affected from being able to be independent members of the community and active for it in the way still possible for them through the general conditions of life alone.

At the same time, Hegel's perspective explains why unemployment is also a normative problem for those not affected by it and for the agencies of action in society and the state - if maintaining oneself through one's own work has become the only generally remaining way of being independent due to the living conditions of society, then society owes the unemployed a remedy insofar as it cannot deny them membership in society. In the same § 245, however, Hegel also directly pointed out the problem of remedial action, for example through publicly organised work - it exacerbates the structural crisis of overproduction in modern economic societies. His conclusion was "that with the *excess of wealth*, bourgeois society is *not rich enough*, i.e. does not possess enough of its own capital to control the excess of poverty and the production of the mob (German: "des Pöbels"[96])." And his solution was the normative concept of integration of society through professional corporations and their "Aufhebung" (which in Hegel unites "abolition" and "evelation") in the moral state. This still bore the features of an at least symbolic Aristotelian polis, which is why Hegel's solution should have lost some of its persuasive power as a result of further developments. For by now, there is simply no longer an *ethos* that unites the whole of society, as it was expressed in Hegel's awareness that unification as such is itself the true content and purpose and that the destiny of individuals is to lead a general life (§ 258 A).

If I have formulated with some distance that unemployment, if labour is the principle of bourgeois society, seems to be connected with excommunication, it is because it is worth considering for a moment why this is actually not the case. That work is the principle[97] of society is only a philosophical construction that has been renewed in our time, without going into Hegel much, by Hannah Arendt in her derogatory talk of the working society. Unemployment does not mean excommunication from society for the very reason that Arendt dismisses as mere prejudice in the barking (sometimes only yapping) categoricity of her teacher Heidegger - namely that society and the actual political space "always and everywhere exists where people live together, simply because people are beings able to act and capable of language. "[98] While this is cold comfort, it is true - we cannot be de facto excommunicated from society because our sociality is fundamentally tied to our ability to speak, to participate in normative practices in the first place, and to our legal status as persons.

Against the background of the social-ethical conceptions of Aristotle and Hegel, it becomes clear why the utility-theoretical approach, which would have to explain the desire for work from the difference between a social income and a higher labour income, is too narrow. *Homo economicus* is a inhibited/prevented hedonist. He actually only seeks pleasure, and only because pleasure or satisfaction cannot be had without work in the sense of effort does he make an effort. But his efforts are still dominated by the desire for pleasure, insofar as they are oriented towards the relationship between effort and return - only as much effort as is required by the desired success and its extent, no more. In this sense, *homo economicus* is a

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[96] "Pöbel" is basically the same as "the people", but in German has a strongly negative evaluative connotation.
[97] Cf. E.M. Lange, *Das Prinzip Arbeit*, Berlin 1980.
[98] *Vita activa*, Stuttgart 1960, p. 192.

methodological fiction of the sciences of the optimised relationship between effort and return, the economic sciences. The fiction can only contribute to the understanding of our actions in life, at least when viewed from the perspective of the conduct of life, by providing a model for methodological contrasts. Aristotle's conception of man as a seeker of happiness was already a critique of hedonism, which could only be correct if all our lusts and pleasures were sensual. The individual in his autonomy of evaluation can naturally make them so - Aristotle saw in the pursuit of pleasure and power one of the models of life predominantly pursued alongside the political. But also those pursuing this model cannot reasonably be hedonists in the strict sense. Aristotle's reasoning for this was: human beings are beings with a consciousness of time, they seek not only pleasure but more lasting satisfaction. The sensual pleasures cannot satisfy this because of their increasing, temporary and periodically renewing character and, if they are the exclusive goals of striving, because they demand ever greater satisfactions.[99] For Aristotle, human striving finds satisfaction in activities whose completion and success bring such pleasure, joy or satisfaction that cannot be directly intended. Therefore, it is reasonable to orient oneself primarily towards activities.

Compared to Aristotle's pleasure treatises, the time-transcending character of activities should perhaps be emphasised even more strongly. The human-specific evil that orientation towards activities helps to avoid is boredom, which Blaise Pascal, for example, characterised as a primary evil[100]:

"Nothing is more intolerable to man than complete inactivity, than to be without passions, without business, without diversions, without task. Then he feels his nothingness, his abandonment, his insufficiency, his dependence, his powerlessness, his emptiness. Immediately boredom will arise from the bottom of his soul and gloom, sorrow, grief, annoyance, despair."

Schopenhauer also emphasised the central place of boredom as an evil and, in my opinion, he characterised it only in a very temporary way in that he thought that it was above all the scourge of the genteel world, while physical misery was the scourge of the people.[101]

From Aristotle, supplemented by Pascal and Schopenhauer, it can thus be stated that we are interested in activities because of their time-conquering, boredom-avoiding and indirectly more lasting satisfaction-providing character. Schopenhauer now thought that boredom makes people, who in principle prefer to keep their distance from each other like porcupines, also seek out society. This may be true for societies for the purpose of pleasure and diversion, but probably not for society in the social theoretical sense such as Hegel's. Society in the social theoretical sense has a natural basis of socialisation in the functions that the family fulfils or at least fulfilled (sexuality and love, procreation and child rearing), and in the need to obtain food, which seems to have always required *social cooperation* for *homo sapiens* (at least for gatherers and hunters as well as for farmers). The bourgeois society that replaced the family and its household for adults in modernity was based on interests and their interdependence.

In these theoretical assumptions, two further anthropological functions of the activities in which labour consists become tangible. One function is that already stated in the underlying definition, that of securing the income of independent persons and thus their ability to live. The

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[99] *Nicomachean Ethics* VII, 1154 a 8 ff; cf. Ernst Tugendhat, *Vorlesungen über Ethik*, 259-63.
[100] *Pensées* no. 131.
[101] *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* I, § 57.

other function is historically connected with Hegel's talk of independence and dependence - persons want to be recognised, if not anthropologically conditioned, then at least historically irreversibly, as also socially independent and in this sense free. The activities that constitute work are thus sought because they guarantee income and social recognition. Their cooperative character can be its own additional source of satisfaction.

The initial question for the discussion of work in the narrower sense is now answered in such a way that (1) unemployment is experienced as such a dominant evil in our society because work in the socio-economic sense as an income-securing activity subject to social security contributions (and thus contributing to the community both indirectly - through its product - and directly - through taxes and social security contributions). But (2), it is also burdened by our normative expectations with the functions of social recognition of persons and the function of overcoming time, overcoming boredom and activity enabling social cooperation.

If one now takes seriously the assumption that a situation of full employment will not be possible to restore, because mass unemployment will neither be reduced by the so-called improvement of the supply conditions of labour (which is, after all, a worsening for the job-seekers concerned, because it is supposed to make their labour cheaper) nor by any shift in the structure of employment towards services, no matter how great, then it is a reasonable expectation that, in view of the anthropological and/or historically evolved functions that work seems to have, there will be a de-differentiation of the functions that are concentrated on work today in the medium term. The most important of these functions were, after all, the guarantee of income for subsistence, social recognition, pleasure in activities, pleasure from social cooperation and coping with the threat of boredom in the case of non-employment.

In the enjoyment of activities, one aspect of the genesis of acquired skills in processes of evaluative teaching (and related self-assessing learning) comes through. I had pointed out that the generic desire to become grown-up and strong, to become independent, cannot leave the learner indifferent to the success and failure of his or her efforts. One typically reacts to success with satisfaction, joy or pride, to failure with anger, sadness or dejection. The subsequent pleasure of exercising acquired skills in activities is a legacy of the positive feelings in the process of acquiring them and a compensation for one's efforts. For the understanding of persons as self-assessing living beings, the insight into the ultimately indissoluble entanglement of the structures of self-assessment with their genesis is especially important. The problem of different levels of 'pro-attitude' in the will of a person (desires of different levels, other motivationally effective evaluations) cannot, in my view, be solved without recourse to the genesis of personality structures and the possibility of this genesis from different types of immediate desires (desires *to do* and *to have* on the one hand, and on the other desires *to be like*). Many aspects of social recognition are based on the recognition of success in the exercise of skills, so these two aspects are just as intertwined as, on the other hand, social recognition and enjoyment of social cooperation - this is greatest when it is based on the mutual recognition of individuals in their skills and as equals in the partnership of cooperation.

First of all, as far as the guarantee of income for subsistence is concerned, it will have to be separated from employment in dependent work even more decisively in the long run than is already the case today. Possible and much discussed concepts for this are a basic social income or a negative income tax (those with incomes below the tax threshold receive the difference up

to the threshold from the state). As the volume of work in society as a whole decreases for technological reasons, it is a privilege to have work, and those who do not have work are entitled to compensation.

The argument for this strong normative claim is contract-theoretical. The premise of social contract thinking is the assumption that one can ultimately only be obliged by a social order that is in one's own long-term interest and is therefore reasonable and deserving of recognition. Those who are worse off through no fault of their own in the social contract have a claim to compensation for their worse position, the non-fulfilment of which does not bind them to the duty of social harmony.

The other anthropological functions of work are not bound to it. Activities have a time-transcending character and can convey meaning regardless of whether they are performed as a profession. One only has to develop the capacity for such activities and teach it in education - in the sense of a remark by Charles Baudelaire: "One must work, if not out of pleasure, then at least out of despair; for, all things considered, working is still less boring than enjoying oneself. "[102] Here I would replace the expression 'working' with 'being active' and make the qualification in the postscript, "than *merely* enjoying oneself." Baudelaire certainly did not have 'work' as dependent employment subject to social security contributions in mind, but as purposeful activity involving effort. Now, writing poetry or other literature, writing music, studying and making, producing and enjoying works of art etc. is only possible to a limited number of people. I am therefore not advocating a utopia in the style of Herbert Marcuse's book on Freud (*Eros and Civilisation*) or Norman O' Brown's *Life against Death*. But being self-determined in community with others is possible for all who are guided to the necessary extent.

So far, I have not mentioned social independence mediated by one's own earned income. I have taken the problem of unemployment as my starting point, not only because the characters of facts are particularly easy to recognise through their negations, but also for the substantive reason that by looking at structural unemployment it cannot be misjudged how this form of autonomy as a person is largely contingently dependent on social-structural factors that do not lie within the sphere of action of individual persons and that determine the demand for labour. Moreover, if the volume of possible economic self-sufficiency through entrepreneurship is limited, the mediated independence through economic self-sufficiency due to one's own efforts should no longer have to be made into a fetish. It remains important and predominantly a central point of orientation for most persons seeking meaning in their lives. But it seems to be at least as important that those to whom this path remains temporarily or permanently closed do not allow their psychological independence and stability to be threatened by this (nor by social expectations in this regard on the part of others with a different social status - I am thinking of the public insults of the unemployed as lazy people etc.). Every form of social independence is mediated, is situated and favoured or inhibited by unavailable factors of the social situation at large. Today it is only true to a limited extent that 'everyone is the architect of his own fortune'.

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[102] Which the theologian Küng cited in a symposium of the Herrhausen Society on 'Work of the Future etc.' (p.12).

Conceptual and anthropological considerations suggest that the search for the meaning of one's own life should be oriented towards activities (and actions) that transcend time, but not necessarily towards the form of gainful employment that has emerged from changeable, historically grown and (in the rich countries) just passing social conditions. For reasons of the necessary conservation of resources and ecological self-limitation of the too large populations of human societies, this will probably only be possible in the medium term at the cost of undermining their own livelihoods.

VII. Convention, Morals & the Law

The essential self-consciousness of a person is to be one of all (persons). We are, live among others, among indefinitely many. We lead our lives in being active and in being object of many things that befall us. Among these not the smallest part are effects of activities and actions of others. This is the source of potential conflict and conventions, morals and laws constitute an order (orders) that are meant to avoid conflict or, if it is unavoidable, lead it according to rules.

Conventions, derived from Latin *convenire* – which means *come together*, agree on – are best instituted explicitly by use of language. But because language itself is conventional in many respects, an explanation of ›convention‹ by ›(explicit) agreement‹ would be circular. It is to the credit of David Lewis' book *Convention*[103] to have removed this difficulty definitely. He showed that not all conventions need explicit agreement, but that it could result from convergent expectations of independent actors under suitable conditions of overlapping orders of preferences. He saw his sophisticated conception as an elaboration of David Hume's insight that convention is a *general sense of common interest* in recurring situations.

Convention may concern the most divergent topics and be followed in groups of all sizes. Of general and philosophical interest are those conventions that include all members of a society: morals and law. They have as their topic the interpersonal relations as such and have a general peace-keeping purpose. In their content they overlap therefore vastly, which is why the general concept of law in Kant is applicable to both: the totality of conditions under which the freedom of each is compatible with the freedom of all. By which traits then are they distinguished? Formally in the main by the form of the sanctions of their rules. Morals are sanctioned by moral sentiments[104]; shame in the 1st person; resentment towards the 2nd person; indignation at 3rd persons. Sanctions of the law by contrast are themselves of legal form, punishments in the broadest sense. Law essentially is what is enforced and requires enforcement agencies: police, courts, prisons etc. Therefore the law generally exists effectively only within states.

Materially morals and laws both contain rules of non-impairment and non-injury, help in emergencies and trust in cooperation. The German philosopher Ernst Tugendhat called them ›the contractualist core of morals‹. Disciples of his have added the spheres of justice in its different senses, of truthfulness, special obligation in institutional contexts and/or personal relations. A special moral obligation is the obligation to obey the law.

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[103] Harvard UP 1969.

[104]   This insight in discussions of late is due originally to Strawson: Freedom and Resentment. Many followed suit.

I propose to understand a formal use of ›justice‹, given in the Latin *suum cuique*, as overarching morals and laws. This allows one to see the administration of justice and justice of distribution(s) as belonging to the same wide context. It is needed, because legal sanctions and punishments are not simply distributable ›goods‹, rather ›bads‹.

If morals and the law intertwine in the ways adumbrated, a more differentiated view of the concept of morals is needed. Talk of a contractualist core of morals point the way to this. Agreed on rules can also be followed with purely self-interested reasons. The following of the rules acquires a specific moral quality if the reasons are the rules themselves and the fact that they are valid. This Kant intended with his distinction of ›out of duty‹ („aus Pflicht") and the mere ›according to duty‹ („pflichtgemäß"). Acting out of duty or from reverence for the law (Kant: „Achtung vorm Gesetz") is connected to the description that the rules are followed out of respect for other persons, who, because of the validity of the rules, have definite (claim-) rights. It is at the latest here that the concept of a person has to be further enlarged to include the mark ›bearer of claims and rights‹.

With this motivational conception of what is moral the concept of the ›moral of a person‹ (as the totality of a person's principles for behaving oneself and for treating the others as persons) takes precedence over morals individuated by the content of its rules.

If following the rules of morals in this way intrinsically is what specifically is moral in the modern sense, the rules are followed as the law is obeyed, but without exterior sanctions. And even the inner sanctions of the rules by moral sentiments lose their weight, because the meta-purpose of the moral agent is his integrity: He wants so to act that his ways of acting are justifiable to everyone.[105]

If morals and law motivationally come that near to each other the question could rise: Why do we need the law besides morals at all? The law with its formal sanctions is needed as a deficiency guarantee for important cases of violations of the rules. Persons are speaking and reason-giving, therefore rational animals. But they are rational only in a limited way in that they find themselves repeatedly in situations where they tend to prefer their short term interest over the long term reasonable and to the interests und rights of others. This is rationally unavoidable, because ›free-riding‹ in anonymous situations (when persons cannot communicate directly) is rational. If so, then infringements have to be sanctioned at least ex post in order to stabilize the rules and action contexts which are in the interest of everyone. Complete uncertainty without the law and legal sanctions would put individual persons under unbearable strain, which as mortal beings fearing death they rationally want to be fee from.

VIII. Politics

The fact that the life that people have to lead finds itself in circumstances determined by politics is one of the obtrusive preconditions of most people's experience. I have already touched on this fact in two places: in the context of discussing work from the perspective of

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[105] This explanation of moral motivation is due to Thomas Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other, Harvard UP , 4th ed., 2000.

impending unemployment, and in discussing law as a fallback guarantee of interpersonal interaction dominated by the moral aspect. In the first context, I mentioned that I consider a form of social-contract theory of the political to be correct because it is largely descriptive of conditions in modern societies. On the other hand, when discussing morality and law, the fact emphasised by Ernst Tugendhat and unchallenged by me is that the core of social morality is also best understood in social-contractual terms. In this, it is assumed by Tugendhat and also by Jürgen Habermas, with whom he agrees in this respect, that the foundations of the moral and the political-social social contract are simply the same. Given the order of our political coexistence, this leads to a profound ambivalence regarding the fact of representative, indirect democracy. This ambivalence expresses itself in the moral conviction that actually, i.e. apart from adverse factual circumstances, direct democracy deserves moral preference. As a member of the revolting student generation of 1968, I myself have long held this conviction that a form of government by soviets is to be aspired to. I would therefore like to frame the discussion of the precondition of politics in terms of the question: Is it really the case that direct democracy deserves moral preference?[106] In doing so, I will take the role of the political theorist and deal with the foundations of the modern theory of a legitimate state. The form of the argument in discussion of a hypothetical question has a function analogous to the argument of the fact of work from the perspective of factual or imminent unemployment: by distancing factual conditions, a negative fact allows them to be grasped more sharply in their characterization.

According to Wittgenstein, a philosophical problem has the form 'I do not know my way around'. The question 'Does direct democracy deserve moral preference?' articulates such a not-knowing. It concerns the traditional philosophical justifications for a legitimate state. A legitimate state socialisation was traditionally called *politie* or *republic*, today we speak of democracy in this sense. In modern times, the traditional justifications operate with the concept of sovereignty and base sovereignty that justifies all state power on the moral autonomy of the individual person in the sense of equal freedom of action. The problem with these justifications is not that they are too weak. On the contrary, they seem too strong to me and justify something as ultimately legitimate exclusively, which I call direct democracy in the key question. Now, all reasonable people admit that in modern societies direct democracy in the sense of, say, the Athenian *agora democracy* often regarded as exemplary by idealising Aristotelian ethics is not to be had. The main reasons for this are the size of modern territorial states and the pluralism of modern societies based on the division of labour. Thus Habermas, clearly dispelling earlier ambiguities of his position, also writes in *Faktizität und Geltung*: "In the discourse-theoretically conceived constitutional state, popular sovereignty is no longer embodied in a clearly identifiable assembly of autonomous citizens. "[107] On the other hand, he also brings the democratic radicalism of the idea of popular sovereignty to bear by stating that from the power aspect, the idea requires "the transfer of legislative competence to the totality of citizens of the state". (*FG* 210) From this point of view, representative democracy, "the *parliamentary* principle of establishing deliberative and decision-making representative bodies" can only "offer a way out". This is the problem with the too strong justification of democracy - it creates ambivalence towards representative decision-making and thus distance from the political order we have and to which we cannot think of fundamental alternatives that would be more desirable. One could, of course, simply dispense with reasonable justification - for instance, in the sense of the cynical dictum attributed to Winston Churchill that democracy

[106] An earlier version of this text in: *Praktische Visionen*. FS Hermann Scheer zum 60. Geburtstag, Bochum (Ponte Press) 2004 entitled 'Volkssouveränität und ihr plebiszitäres Missverständnis' (16-27).

[107] Cf. Jürgen Habermas: *Faktizität und Geltung* - Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, Frankfurt am Main 1992, p. 170. (cit. FG).

is the worst conceivable form of government except for all the others that have already been tried. But then, one cannot expect that a mere least evil will be defended resolutely enough in situations of crisis. Therefore, one should find ways to eliminate the normative underlying conviction that is doubted in the question of my topic - that only direct democracy is real democracy and therefore deserves, even if it cannot be realised under the bad conditions of reality, the moral merit, - also in a reasonably argued way.

Not knowing leads reasonably to the questions of where one is, how one got there and where one actually wants to go. Something has already been said about the first question with the few key words explaining the question to be discussed, and more will have to be said about it by way of answering the other questions. The question of how we got to where we are will only be dealt with very selectively with a look at the beginning of modern state philosophy in Thomas Hobbes, in order to then sketch out a way to answer the third question with the help of a theory that seems to me attractive and overall correct. In doing so, my aim is to contribute to a positive justification of representativeness in the formation of the will of the state as a whole. The result of this attempt will be unsatisfactory. However, since for methodological reasons I do not consider the normatively weak premises of the theory responsible for this to be disposable, the repair attempt will be in need of discussion.

In Hobbes, the normative foundation of his theory of the state is formulated in ch. 21 of *Leviathan* (1651): "One can ... be bound only by one's own actions, for all men are by nature equally free. "[108] In Hobbes' first writing *On the Citizen* (1642), the principle of individual autonomy of natural persons founded here is not yet clearly formulated, although it is implied in the concept of wrong in III.4.[109] From Hobbes' political philosophy, this principle has come into modern ethics. It enforces in itself a contract theory of political obligation and the state. In § 46 of the *Rechtslehre*[110] Kant also still relies on the connection with the concept of injustice when he establishes the competence to legislate solely of the united will of the people: only to the willing no injustice is done (volenti non fit iniuria).

However, de facto everyone in states is subject to obligations that they have not entered into themselves. If these are to be compatible with the principle of autonomy, they must be of such a nature that one *could* at least have agreed to them by contract. Otherwise, they would not be legitimate obligations, because they are virtual self-obligations of citizens. The autonomy principle thus leads to the idea of the contract as a criterion of legitimacy for obligations, including political ones.

In Hobbes, it now also leads to ambivalence towards the issue of representation. This is made clear in *De cive*, Chapter VII by the fact that for Hobbes all political constitutions must be established via democracy in the form of an assembly of all citizens, i.e. via direct democracy: "When several come together with the intention of establishing a state, a democracy is almost established by this coming together..." (VII.5) This democracy exists as long as the assembly exists. The reasoning: the will of the assembly was the will of all citizens and therefore the highest power that possessed sovereignty.

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[108] In the edition by Iring Fetscher, Frankfurt am Main - Vienna - Berlin 1976 p. 168
[109] Edition by G. Gawlick, Hamburg 1966, p. 99.
[110] *Metaphysik der Sitten*, Rechtslehre, § 46, A 165-6 / B 195-6 (Werke, ed. W. Weischedel, Darmstadt 1966, vol. 4, p. 432).

Now, as is well known, Hobbes was politically not remotely an advocate of democracy, certainly not a direct one. Rather, he wanted to convince his contemporaries in England to give their consent to a stronger authority than that of the king at the time, because the existing authority had been unable to prevent religious civil war. However, only the authority of an absolute monarch appeared to Hobbes to be strong enough in the interest of peace.

In the cited Chapter VII of *De cive* , Hobbes tries to show that both aristocracy and monarchy must not only have their origin in the initial democracy, but can also have it. To do so, the assembly need only transfer its sovereign rights to a smaller group or a single person. However, Hobbes can only stabilise such a transfer of rights by arbitrarily stating that with it the people dissolves as a union of individuals determined to establish a state and again becomes a crowd incapable of action, which has no legal personality, which is why the new sovereign cannot be obligated towards it. (VII.8; 11) This is a rather weak safeguard of representative decision-making power, in which the ambivalence towards the fact of representation is expressed. Hobbes must have seen it this way himself, for nine years later in *Leviathan* he develops a new theory of the sovereign and of the authorisation of this legal person by the original contract, through which all obligation to the sovereign becomes self-obligation, in a strong sense. For all individuals, by transferring their rights to the sovereign, are to become authors of all his actions.

Hobbes is quite explicit about this meaning more than consent to the actions of the sovereign: "It is /true unity of all in one and the same person." (Ch.17, 134) But with this Hobbes has come out of the frying pan directly into the predicament (we Berliners would also say this a little more explicitly). For while his first theory only had to make use of an arbitrary determination in order to stabilise political representation, his second theory requires an incomprehensible mystery. Under the person-theoretical interpretation of sovereignty, Hobbes' philosophy of the state, together with its correct and enduring insights, became an epitome of the politico-moral wicked, and the intellectual hunt for the great Leviathan took off. Hobbes succeeded only at the price of the acceptability of his whole theory in forestalling radical and direct democratic conclusions from his principle of autonomy. The theory in *Leviathan* is to be understood in comparison to *De cive* as an overreaction to the weakness of the first theory that betrays ambivalence towards the fact of political representation. Representative decision-making power must exist in the interest of peace - but on the basis of the non-differentiating and thus context-insensitive principle of autonomy, it can only be justified in an implausible way or through conceptual overkill (in the assumption of real unity of many in one person, which must nevertheless remain quite incomprehensible).

I see the reason for the ambivalence towards representativeness in the context-insensitive use of the autonomy principle for the assessment of political institutions. It is well tangible in modern authors such as Habermas and Tugendhat. Both assume, as do others, that political decisions are about agreeing on what is just and good for all. And if one invests with Habermas an ideal of democracy or with Tugendhat a moral-political prohibition of incapacitation (German: "Entmündigung"), then ambivalence towards the issue of representation is unavoidable. In contrast, the subject of state politics can be understood more specifically as the provision of public goods. They are called such because individuals cannot produce them for themselves, because their provision inevitably requires the cooperation of others (insofar as the most pious cannot live in peace if his evil neighbour does not like it). Because Habermas, Tugendhat and others do not sufficiently take into account the specific difference of public

goods, moral principles that are valid for direct interactions immediately impinge on the assessment of the legitimacy of collective decision-making procedures. This is the reason for the ambivalence towards the fact of political representation. To resolve it, I draw on a form of social contract theory developed by Nobel Prize-winning economist James Buchanan[111].

This theory aims to make individual liberty and property rights, the political institutions of a society and their complementary juridical and police enforcement institutions rationally understandable from the enlightened self-interest of independent actors in a hypothetical genesis. For the initial state of this hypothetical normative genesis, the theory in no way departs from orders of preference actually occurring among members of a society. Neither methodological individualism nor the assumption of rational self-interest in all participants is meant to prejudge anything about the factual preferences of the actors - in terms of content, altruistic or even collectivist orientations in individuals and groups are not excluded. Admittedly, methodological individualism has a minimal normative content insofar as it entails the requirement that the resulting social and political order must be able to be justified to anyone it is intended to bind. Buchanan operationalises this claim analogously to Hobbes with the provision that the basic regulations of the social contract must be accepted unanimously. But this is not obligatory. It is rationally sufficient if the overwhelming majority agrees and those who do not agree are compensated for being outvoted (forced to cooperate) by not only having the restrictions of the social contract imposed on them, but also by being granted the rights of the social contract like everyone else.

For Buchanan, the social contract unfolds over four stages. Stage 1 is a distribution of goods and power between independent actors resulting from anarchistic interaction in the sense of domination-free interaction. From there, at stage 2, the individual claims implicitly recognised in stage 1, because they are tolerated, are defined as rights to freedom and property. Since the claims at level 1 are not yet conceived *as* rights, as in John Locke's natural law theory, they lose much of their special status vis-à-vis the other clauses of the social contract and are enter into the whole negotiation mass. Only the requirement of acceptability to everyone, in Buchanan's case unanimity, sets them apart. In particular, Buchanan points out that in order to achieve stage 2, a redistribution of resources may be required vis-à-vis the anarchist equilibrium in stage 1, because otherwise those worse off in this distribution may be unwilling to disarm. Buchanan thus abandons the traditional assumption of fundamental equality in the state of nature, which we also found in Hobbes' principle of autonomy as a justification, and allows also for extensive de facto inequality (not legal inequality, for rights do not yet exist at the first stage). This has the theoretical advantage that a stronger theory is possible: a theory that shows how law and state can also come about among unequals. Another advantage is that redistribution in this theory, because potentially built into its foundation, does not cause the great difficulties it did in the natural law tradition (in contemporary philosophy, for example, in the theory of Robert Nozick[112]). The 3rd stage in the social contract is marked by the establishment of enforcement institutions for the regulations from stage 2. A 'protective state' is formed, so called because it *protects* individual rights and *enforces* compliance with closed contracts if need be. Provision is made for its financing through taxes. The first three stages thus contain all the conditions for private goods exchange. So far, there is only one public good

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[111] Cf. *The Limits of Liberty*, op. cit.
[112] Cf. *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, New York 1974.

- more on this concept in a moment - and that is the security of rights and the non-violence in social intercourse guaranteed by the protective state. Finally, stage 4 of the social contract is marked by the establishment of a legislature - Buchanan calls it the 'productive state' because it is responsible for the provision of further public goods. At this level, it must be determined with which smaller majorities than the previously required unanimity decisions on further public goods - e.g. infrastructure goods, health, pension provision, education and cultural services - together with the associated financing regulations may be taken. At this level, representativeness of decision-making can obviously be established - and will usually be established rationally for reasons of division of labour, information processing and information costs. So much for a rough orientation on the foundations of social contract theory on which I draw.

Above I have attributed correct and enduring insights to Hobbes. For an example, on the keyword 'public goods', I point out by way of explanation that the concept of a public good I am claiming was already grasped in essence by Hobbes when he saw the *raison d'être* of the state in the fact that voluntarism in the observance of natural laws is not sufficient for the peaceful coexistence of people in society (and peaceful coexistence is the fundamental public good): "...if we could assume a great multitude of men to agree with each other in the observance of justice and all other natural laws, without any general power to restrain them all, we might as well suppose the whole human race to behave so, and then there would be no civil government or state at all...." (*Leviathan*, ch. 17, p.132) For Hobbes, this was the *reductio ad absurdum* of the assumption that voluntarism was sufficient for peaceful and prosperous coexistence, because states did and do in fact exist and a world society without a state does in fact not exist. Hobbes saw the rational explanation for the existence of states in the difficulties of achieving respect for the natural laws of peaceful coexistence among a large number of people without coercive force. The problem here is not so much ill will or the de facto cooperation of all or most, but the guarantee of sufficient security for the cooperation of all, on which we depend as needy, time-conscious and death-fearing beings.

With this, Hobbes has now captured an important aspect of the modern notion of a public good: such a good is (1.) indivisible; it cannot (2.) therefore, when provided, be granted selectively: no one can be excluded from its enjoyment; and it is (3.) because of the non-excludability that a public good is not provided, or is provided inadequately, in a market of private actors (i.e. it is voluntarily 'produced' not efficiently). A textbook example of a true public good is lighthouse services in an isolated fishing community of sufficient size (so large that not all members know each other personally and can control each other through their knowledge of each other). If lighthouse services are made available in such a community, it is rational for each individual to try to use them without contributing to their cost. This is because the contribution demanded from the individual will be a *quantité négligeable* for the community as a whole, but will cause tangible costs for the individual. Therefore, lighthouse services will not be made available voluntarily in a market with consumer freedom, even though everyone could make good use of them. To secure them, an agency for lighthouse services needs to be established, which has the right to compulsorily finance its costs by apportioning them to all beneficiaries as well as the necessary possibility of sanctions against non-cooperation and free riding. Such an authority for lighthouse services functions with regard to the public good it provides like the state with regard to the public good of legal security and its consequential goods of freedom from violence and protection, i.e. like Buchanan's protective state. The constitutive public goods that the protective state must guarantee in any case are:

(1.) Integrity and protection of the lives of all citizens;

(2.) Establishment, safeguarding and sanctioning of law, especially private contracts - law understood here as the epitome of the rules of social intercourse requiring sanctions;

(3.) guaranteeing the security of the state according to the totality of all citizens. This third good, external security, in the political realm is what comes closest to a true public good in the sense of neoclassical economics.

Agreeing to the establishment of a protective state and its functioning is now rational for every citizen, regardless of the decision-making procedures of that state. This is the rational reason why modern state philosophy has considered quite different political constitutions possible on the basis of a radical democratic conception of popular sovereignty.

There is *prima facie* nothing to be said for a radical or direct democratic formation of will in the protective state. For this state is, as it were, a mechanism of self-binding of its citizens to compensate for their own limited rationality (which leads to preferring short-term advantages over long-term interests time and again). The establishment of a protective state by limited rational actors is, as a collective phenomenon, related to individual self-binding out of insight into one's own drive, for which the behaviour of Ulysses has become exemplary. In the face of temptation by the sweet song of the sirens, he allowed himself to be bound to the ship's mast in order to be able to listen to it without falling prey to it.

It is rational for everyone to agree to the establishment and functional existence of the protective state, because this relieves everyone of considerable own expenditures for private analogues of public goods, which, moreover, as private ones would always be in danger of remaining in vain, and thus creates the prerequisite for the exercise of individual autonomy in all other spheres of action. A direct-democratic formation of will in the protective state would violate its *raison d'être* and import into political decisions all the dangers of mere voluntarism that it is set up to avoid. But even for the formation of wills through representative delegates, if I see correctly, only reasons of prudence speak, not legal reasons can be rationally given. The limited rationality of the individual as an individual, which the protective state is set up to compensate for, does not disappear with the formation of the state, as Rousseau assumed with his conception of the complete divestment of the contracting parties (aliénation totale de chaquun ... à toute la communeauté), through which the perfect union (union parfaite) of a republic was to result. (The assumption of the fundamental morality of individual citizens in relation to politics among more recent theorists is a functional equivalent for this.) Rather, limited rationality persists and with it the inclinations to avoid obligations in social intercourse. Elected representatives may be useful in mitigating these tendencies. For their election concretises, personalises, as it were, and thus demonstrates more convincingly that submission to the protective state is also a rational self-obligation than, for example, a different kind of recruitment of holders of political offices and state officials could do. But with regard to the constitutive public goods, elected representatives are rationally less representatives of the empirical interests of their voters than interpreters of the state's welfare.

On the other hand, it cannot be expected that election to a political office or a function as judge, policeman or soldier will make people more rational beings (despite Luther's confidence that to whom God gives an office, he will also give the necessary intellect). The rationality of office holders is also predominantly very limited, and because political and state offices confer powers and these are capable of tempting limitedly rational beings to abuse them in their own interests, the ordinary citizens of the state also have an interest in the self-commitment of those among them who exercise the state functions. A mechanism of election can also serve this purpose because it ensures, as Karl Popper repeatedly emphasised in his late statements as the virtue of democracy, that inthe worst case one can get rid of a government without violence.

Now, the constitutive public goods are usually not the only ones provided by the state. In Buchanan's terminology: the state is never only protective, but always also productive. The interlocking of both aspects, and thus of the constitutive with the facultative public goods, can again be rationally understood from the unequal distribution of goods and resources in the initial state. The worse off will demand the provision of further public goods in addition to legal equality and legal security as a precondition for their disarmament and conformity. The better-off will concede it out of an interest in the security of social peace, although some of the other goods produced as public goods - education, health care, culture - generally benefit the worse-off more than the better-off, who could satisfy their interests in this respect without the state.

It is because of the optional public goods that with the American Revolution the principle of "no taxation without representation" prevailed against a protective state, which could also be conceived as an absolute state. With regard to these other goods, there is a legal basis for representative decision-making in the state. Because the heterogeneous interests in society as indicated exist with regard to these goods, the fact and the extent of the provision of these goods is not constitutive but, even if empirically unavoidable, only optional, and different baskets of goods are possible, the better-off in particular will demand and it will be accepted as a right in the social contract that representatives of social interests are involved in the decision on these goods.

Now it would not be rational to have two instances with the same right to compulsory financing of public goods. For two instances with the same right to compulsory financing would compete for a state budget that is limited in any case, and resulting conflicts could be destructive for the whole, which contradicts the *raison d'être* already of the protective state. So rationally there will be only one decision-making authority, a legislature for both the protective and the productive state. Thus, the principle of representation for political decision-making has also become binding for the protective state (or the protective aspect of the state) - because of the interlocking of the constitutive with the facultative public goods. The possible conflict between two legislatures has thus admittedly migrated into one, because the delegates are now representatives of social interests in addition to their function as interpreters of the state's welfare vis-à-vis their voters for the constitutive public goods. And delegates now have to deal within themselves and among themselves with the conflict of competing demands on a limited state budget, and there is a structural danger, because of their dependence on their electorate (their interest in being re-elected), that they will increase the amount of optional public goods at the expense of the constitutive ones - against the reasonable interest of all.

This structural danger of the degeneration of the state into a state of associations is one of the reasons why some people think of a plebiscitary control of representative political decisions. But again, in the abstract, this idea contradicts the character of the goods provided by the state as public. They voluntarily are not provided efficiently, this also defines them. This is also evident in phenomena that Buchanan brings under the title of a 'paradox of being governed'. The best known and probably most widespread of these phenomena is that of tax evasion. It again is rationally explained by the limited rationality of individual actors. All are, to a greater or lesser extent, in favour of the constitutive and at least some of the optional public goods being provided by the state, but yet they try to shirk all or part of the funding required for them. And again, this is only rational: the tax contribution of the individual is negligible for the state as a whole (however large it may be), but for the individual it is usually a tangible sacrifice. And plebiscitary decisions on public goods would give the generic motive for tax evasion direct influence on political decisions of state-wide importance. (In particular, in the

case of plebiscitary decisions on contentious issues of national policy, it is even less possible than in the case of representative, publicly controlled decisions to exclude the possibility that coalitions of group interests will prevail at the expense of the common good).

Generally speaking, in the social contract frame of reference I have chosen, division of labour and information costs arguments always speak in favour of representative and against plebiscitary policy-forming on public goods. For the facultative ones, because representative information can be better processed and conflicting interests can be better balanced; for the constitutive ones anyway, because for them representative decision-making only becomes binding because it is linked to the facultative ones.

The consequence is short and painless and will no longer come as a surprise: If, as Habermas, Tugendhat et al. assume and at least in the present context can be accepted, the rationale of modern morality is 'equally good for all', then, insofar as public goods, fundamentally the constitutive ones, but also the facultative ones, serve the good of all, there is a moral reason for representative political decision-making in addition to the rational reasons cited. This negates the question of whether direct democracy is at least morally preferable - if it does not have the also possible sense of whether it might not be more desirable to live in small manageable face-to-face communities rather than in a modern Western-type society.

The meagre, empirically rational social contract theory of a legitimate state does, for what I have taken it to be, provide a positive explanation and justification of representative political will formation. But it raises problems of its own. First, in support of it, I can point out that Habermas's discourse theory of the democratic constitutional state, which operates with much more demanding premises, agrees with the theory presented on the point at issue. Habermas also thinks that a positive reason for representative will formation can only be found in the dimensions of negotiations on distributional issues, in the negotiation of compromises. He argues that the election of representative deputies has "an immediately plausible sense for the delegation of representatives who are given a mandate to *negotiate compromises*. For participation in a fairly regulated bargaining practice requires the equal representation of all concerned..." (*FG* 222). But Habermas finds it unacceptable that whole-of-government politics is reduced to the negotiation of compromises. To this end, he applies his theory of practical argumentation, which has been modified since 1991 and according to which, in addition to moral discourses on questions of justice, there are also ethical discourses on self-understanding and negotiation, in order to postulate further dimensions of the formation of the will of the state as a whole, in which the principle of representation has no affirmative justification, because in discourses on justification and self-understanding there categorically are only participants. Even if one agrees with this thesis, however, one has to say descriptively that such discourses of nation-state relevance do not exist in our political relations, because giving reasons in the nation-state public sphere mediated by the media does not belong in discourses, but serves to mark positions in the battle of opinions. The additional dimensions of politics that Habermas demands create the ambivalence towards representative will formation that makes him speak of the establishment of deliberative parliamentary representative bodies as only a "way out" (*FG* 210). I find this unacceptable, as is Habermas' criticism of an empiricist social contract theory, which he takes note of in the form of a book by Werner Becker and which he accuses of not being able to offer a justification of democracy because, as an empiricist theory, it limits itself to an observer's perspective and is therefore guilty of a so-called performative self-contradiction with the intention of justification (*FG* 358). But Habermas must be admitted

that empiricist theory does not offer a satisfactory explanation and justification for some of the citizen's relations to the state and to state-wide politics. And at the same time, he can be reassured that empiricist theory can by no means capture only a sphere of norm-free sociality. I consider it one of the most important clarifications of Ernst Tugendhat's ethics that he showed that the contractual core of modern egalitarian morality can also be followed out of the self-interested motives of interest in social cooperation and in many contexts also functions as this minimal morality. This makes the actual, full-blooded morality, which is characterised by a motivation that can only be grasped deontologically (of following the rules for their own sake or respect for others), dispensable for theoretical purposes. For in theoretical intent we are limited to the observer perspective. From this perspective, however, we never have sufficient reasons to ascribe stronger motives than merely rational ones or to provide for their ascribability. To believe otherwise is wishful thinking.

Phenomenologically, I see three relationships of an ordinary citizen, who is not in a political office or public employment, to national politics. First, there is the basic contractual matter of protection and other public goods - this state service is matched on the part of the citizen by obedience to the law and the payment of taxes. In principle, theory can rationally explain and justify these relations. However, the obligation of male citizens to serve in the military or civilian service may pose a problem in this dimension, if one considers that participation in national defence may involve the risk of life. There is no merely rational, self-interested reason for taking this risk, and in this respect empiricist social contract theory cannot explain and justify it (in this case, there is not only temptation, but resounding reasons for refusing/dodging). But the other two relations of the ordinary citizen to political life, electoral participation and political informing oneself through newspaper reading and media consumption, cannot be rationally explained prima facie either. In both cases, the individual's feat is arduous, but his or her possibilities of exerting influence are so infinitesimal that there are overwhelming reasons for free-riding. Regarding the problem of voter turnout, Buchanan-type theories also talk about the 'paradox of voting'. I now ask whether there is a way within the framework of empiricist social contract theory to remedy these deficits.

I believe that this is only possible if one allows for another type of action in addition to the type of purposive action considered by the empiricist theories alone. Since action is only behaviour under certain descriptions in the first place, the consideration of another type of action only amounts to the admission of richer descriptions of behaviour. In order not to fall into the dualisms of Habermas' *theory of communicative action*, the other type of action must be described more sparsely than Habermas' 'communicative action' characterised by a complex attitude - I call it expressive action in terminological and partly also content-related reference to Charles Taylor. An alternative expression would be presentational action, the character and importance of which Wittgenstein, for example, emphasised in his *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough*. - Only globally do I refer to the fact that there are proposals to consider this type of action within the framework of an empiristically rational theory of action, apart from economists such as Thomas Schelling, Amartya K. Sen and Herbert Simon, by the American philosopher Frederic Schick.[113] In expressive action, the individual does not act in order to

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[113] Schick's most important book is *Understanding Action* - An Essay on Reasons (Cambridge UP 1991). It also deserves attention because he has discovered a conceptual gap in the standard model in action theory, according to which action is behaviour based on reasons and reasons are pairs of opinions/convictions that function causally, and which has been best explicated in philosophy by Donald Davidson (*Essays on Action & Events*, Oxford 1980). To discuss his proposals would require a

realise a desirable state by means of his action - at any rate, this is not the most revealing description of this action, although it is possible, for, as even Habermas, if only casually, now acknowledges, all action has teleological structure and can therefore be described as the realisation of purpose. But for expressive action, the more revealing formal description is to say that the agent acts to express, to represent, that something is important to him or her. The most important case of expressive action is morally motivated action - by following a moral rule, the agent shows that he or she cares about following that rule. The fact that the agent himself or herself will justify this differently, if really morally motivated, does not detract from the possibility of this description. For example, in keeping a promise, he will say with Kant that he is acting out of duty or because he made the promise and promises must be kept. But whether we agree with him/her or not - and methodically we can only do both if we communicate with him/her, not just observe him/her - then we can only understand his or her justification as an expression of a value opinion, i.e. expressively. As theorists, however, we are committed to the observer perspective, and therefore, with regard to action and its orders, with which we deal, for example, as political theorists, we are limited to the normative assumptions of understanding rationality, which are necessary for understanding action, but which are meagre. The higher levels of communication rationality (which is achieved when we can ask agents about their reasons) and deliberative rationality (which is achieved when we can discuss with agents the appropriateness of their reasons) are only available to us in a participant perspective, but from which again no compelling theory is possible. Therefore, I think that the methodological assumptions of a Buchanan-type theory, if it is really theory that it is about[114], are not at one's disposal. But expressive action can take theory into account under a teleological description - as value realisation. The possibility for this is offered by the fact that the theory does not want to move away from the factual preferences of the participants in the social contract for its initial state. If expressive values belong to these preferences, then they are to be taken into account in the clauses of the contract.

Back to the two courses of action of ordinary citizens that empiricist rational theory *prima facie* seems unable to explain and justify. Both participation in elections and participation in the political process through political media consumption can be understood expressively. The citizens who do so show through their actions that belonging to the political community is important to them, because through this form of participation the community becomes a reference point of their self-understanding *as citizens* and not only as predominantly passive protectees. In this way, democratic participation rights can also be thought of as being more extensive than the purely rational point of view of fair representation of interests guarantees.

The actual degree to which these participation rights are shaped in a society can then be understood as a compromise between the demands of a culturally generated self-understanding and the minimum regulations required in terms of social contract theory. The best reason for this form of description is, in my opinion, a historical one. In the modern European-American tradition, the demands for democracy go back to the Reformation doctrine of the universal priesthood of all believers and the radical critique of the Catholic division between clergy and laity inherent in this doctrine. The fundamental equality was the equality of all believers before

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detailed treatment; therefore I only mention him here, but keep myself factually independent of his theory.

[114] One could of course ask why philosophical intentions for reflexive clarification regarding politics have to be about theory - the answer is that only in theories can we have models of macro-social structures that do not leave us at the mercy of society's virtual ideological normative self-descriptions. Western society, for example, sees itself normatively as a 'democracy', but historically learned constitutional theory could at best recognise its constitutions as 'mixed'.

God. The critical point of this assertion was the implicit denial that the administrators of the sacraments were closer to God. Today, religious convictions have been replaced by that of the fundamental moral equality of all human beings - again, a first cultural conviction which, to the extent of its spread, exerts pressure on the shaping of the politico-legally constituted polity in the direction of wider participation of all in the political process. For the philosophically rational theory of politics, this means methodologically that it must take into account historical determinants in the form of culturally grown self-understanding. It can also do so by binding itself to factual preferences. At the same time, if it refrains from incorporating the culturally generated demands in the form of, for example, Hobbes' principle of autonomy or the analogues in Habermas and Tugendhat - an ideal of democracy or a moral-political prohibition of incapacitation - into the basis of the theory itself, it can avoid the problem with which I have been concerned - the merely ambivalent justification of the representative form of state-wide political decision-making.

The requirement of generalisability or assentability by all, going back to Hobbes' principle of autonomy, remains undisputed as a moral criterion of judgement (principium diiudicationis) for social rules, norms and laws. Understood as a principle of political action (principium executionis), as for example in the early Habermas or in Tugendhat's procedural version of decision-making, according to which no norm is legitimate that is not "decided on collectively in a procedure in which all those affected are equally involved "[115], the autonomy principle is absurd from a political-theoretical point of view because it takes no account of the context in which it operates in application to state-wide politics.

The aberrancy of the undifferentiated autonomy principle can be illuminated by a diagnosis Charles Taylor made of a dominant modern concept of freedom in the wake of Hegel. In this concept, freedom is understood as radical independence, as *dependence only on oneself*. Nowhere is this clearer than in the description of the problem and as its solution Rousseau describes the people-sovereign republic of his Contrat Social: To find a form of society "which defends and protects with all its force the person and property of each member of society, and by virtue of which each individual, although united with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before". (*CS* I,6) The exaggeration of this conception of freedom lies in the demand to want to remain as free in the manifold cooperative contexts of society as in solitary existence. Only in view of the oppositional position of the modern demands for political freedom, as a contestation of illegitimate claims to state power, which had to exaggerate in order to be heard at all (and to give themselves courage), can it be understood that this demand has not always been seen as a normative child's faith: The wishful thinking that one can have the cake as social cooperation and eat it too as absolute personal autonomy.

Radical autonomy can only exist in voluntary direct relations of interaction. What autonomy can mean in other contexts of action has yet to be determined - in the political-legal sphere by defining rights as either recognised entitlements or bundles of conditional permissions and conditional immunities.[116] Ignoring their complex conceptual structure leads to template thinking in terms of freedom as autonomy in the sense of un-relationality and thus into error.

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[115] *Probleme der Ethik*, op. cit., p.122

[116] The logical analysis of the complex structure of rights, to which I only allude here, goes back to Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld: *Fundamental Legal Conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning, and other legal essays*, New Haven 1923. More recent analysis in this tradition is offered by Stig Kanger, 'Law and Logic', in: *Theoria* 38 (1972), 105-32; Peter Koller: 'Die Struktur von Rechten', in: Analyomen 2. Proceedings of the 2nd Conference "Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy", Vol. III, ed. by Georg Meggle, Berlin - New York 1997 (Walter de Gruyter) 251-262.

Wittgenstein once remarked that the philosopher must cure many diseases of the intellect in himself before he can arrive at the concepts of common sense. (1944, *CultureandValue* 50e) If one may assume that essentially common sense is expressed in political constitutions of the whole state, then it should be noted that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany solves the problem of a plebiscitary misunderstanding of the idea of popular sovereignty, with which I have been concerned, in a single sentence, when it states in Article 2O para.2 GG that the state power emanating from the people is "exercised in elections and votes and by special organs of legislation, executive power and jurisdiction". If my rational reconstructive considerations are correct, one can also understand why the solution has reasonably turned out this way.

IX. Education and "Bildung" (Formation)

We become persons, self-assessing living beings, because we have been assessed in the process of growing up and, because we ourselves want to grow up and become independent, we tend to adopt the assessments applied to us. The evaluations of others that shape us in the long term are often the results of the continuing influence of adult caregivers, for which the term "Erziehung/upbringing" has been used in German since the 18th century.

Kant captured both relevance and historical place when he said in his notes on the lecture on pedagogy: "Man can only become man through education. He is nothing but what education makes of him." (A 7) On the other hand, he states that "education is the greatest problem, and the most difficult, that can be given to man. For insight depends on education, and education again depends on insight. Therefore education can only make steps forward little by little, and only by one generation handing down its experience and knowledge to the next, by the latter adding something to it, and thus handing it on to the next, can a correct concept of the kind of education arise. What great culture and experience does not presuppose this concept? It could therefore only come into being/existence at a late date, and we ourselves have not yet sorted it out it completely." (A 15-6) It is possible that Kant did not mean to say that the concept of education could only arise late and was not yet completely clear even in his generation (after all, education is a key problem already in Plato's *Politeia*), but rather the concept of the *way* of education, i.e. *how* to educate. And behind this concept could have been the idea that there was one and only one best way of educating human beings, the concept (understanding) of which could only become clear in the course of history. Then, in his explanations, Enlightenment beliefs about history as a directed process towards a goal are involved, which we can no longer share. That this is so is indicated by Kant's talk that children should be educated "in accordance with the idea of humanity and its whole destiny" (A 17), whereby "idea" is explained "as the concept of a perfection that is not yet to be found in experience" (A 10) - this implies that it will or can be found one day and then, in any case, the previous development will be at an end. Its formal direction of movement is "to develop natural processes proportionately, and to develop humanity from its seeds... so that man may attain his destiny." The attainment of the "destiny of man" is "in the individuo ... also completely impossible" - here the idea of a necessary development gains additional support: not only is development necessary in order to gain a concept of (kind of) education, the substantive goal of education, which this concept is supposed to define, can also only be achieved in the course of a development through the contributions of many, not by one individual. This idea has been the basic idea of the philosophy of history since Kant up to Marx - history is a process that terminates in a final stage of the development of all human abilities and is necessary to reach this final stage.

If the consideration leading to the historical place of the question of the meaning of life was correct - it could only arise when the idea of a destiny of man had lost its persuasive power - then the concept of education tied to this idea also belongs to a past epoch. Within the framework of the concepts for life topics discussed so far, education is first of all a moral right of the adolescent, to which a corresponding duty of his/her parents and/or adult caregivers corresponds. Furthermore, education has a function in the context of enabling independence, which enables a member of society to support himself/herself (predominantly through work). Nevertheless, there is much to be taken up in/from Kant's latent historical-philosophical educational concept of the Enlightenment, which is mediated by the idea of historical development. This applies first of all to the observance of a special historical place for the emergence of education as a social function, which is also to be fulfilled by public goods (educational institutions, schools, universities, etc.). Such a social function could only take on a life of its own when the life-performing activities to ensure subsistence were detached from the context of families and feudal and guild retinue contexts and began to form their own social sphere of social labour.

Interestingly, the concept of "Bildung" (formation) belongs to the same historical context - as late as 1780, Kant's contemporary Moses Mendelssohn regarded it "as a new arrival in our language ... for the time being, only in the language of books."[117] It is not stably demarcated from the concept of education, but tends to be limited to those aspects of the growth of human children into culture that are not functionally related to the process of social reproduction - Christoph Martin Wieland spoke of "Bildung" as *educatio pura* of human beings[118] and in doing so thought, in addition to the 'formation' of aptitudes and the 'additional formation' of virtue (moral education), of the formation of taste in patterns and examples through "private instruction".

I would like to use a linguistic observation for a proposal on the distinction between education and "Bildung" (formation) - one is primarily educated (by others), perhaps also trained, but one primarily forms oneself. I therefore propose to understand "Bildung" primarily as self-education and to include under it, on the one hand, the reaction of the pupil and apprentice to the educational efforts of his or her caregivers, but then every explicit absorption, mastering and processing of (life) experience. With this reference of the term "Bildung" to the subject's own achievements, I would also like to take into account Wittgenstein's earlier observation that even in the simplest teachable activities, the learner has a contribution to make.

The social function of education - enabling the offspring to be independent in ensuring their own livelihood - corresponds to the fact that in our societies school attendance is a legal obligation for a certain number of years (which has increased historically). On the other hand, the moral right to education corresponds to the entitlement-right to complete the public school courses according to one's own abilities without restrictions. Formal educational qualifications have a central function for access to employment in labour relations and the income that can be earned through these, so that the competition for professional positions is retroactively perpetuated in the educational institutions. This is particularly visible in the competition for grade point averages when these act as entitlements for numerically limited study programmes (numerus clausus). On the other hand, with the mere separation and independence of a school and training sphere, the problem of matching school and training courses to the requirements of the world of work and professional practice is structurally given and leads to constant complaints about the lack of practical relevance of school and vocational training. In contrast

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[117] *HWPh* vol. 1, column 921.
[118] Ibid. column 923.

to training requirements that can be formalised, socially binding educational ideas and goals tend to be vague and nonspecific - the aim is to educate pupils to become functionally (work-) capable members of society and citizens in the sense of the constitutional basic order. The diversification of social milieus and the radical individualisation favoured by the competitive form of the economy, which regularly raises the question of what actually holds society together, i.e. what anchors it in the consciousness of its members, apart from the economic functional context, its welfare state supplements and the excitement community of consumers of political news and other entertainment generated and maintained by the mass media, lets a binding nature of more specific educational goals fail.

Although education and - according to the terminological proposal to understand education as the subjective processing of educational and other life experiences - accordingly "Bildung" (formation), as these memoirs should make clear, occupy a large part of our social experience, Kant's dictum that man is "nothing but what education makes of him" can be considered exaggerated in three respects, even if one takes into account that it is not a descriptive but a normative (evaluative) statement: That which actually makes a person a human being is owed to education alone. Firstly, one could consider the predispositions that make people more or less difficult to educate to be just as important as what education makes of these predispositions. Secondly, one could object to the reduction of the human being to a bundle of abilities implied in that dictum of total pedagogy. For what is imparted to the pupil in education as pedagogical action and acquired in his/her corresponding learning are abilities to understand and/or to act, and if the human being is supposed to owe everything he/she is to education, then he/she is implicitly reduced to a bundle of abilities. But this is conceptually as inappropriate as it is normative - also abilities are, however central, aspects of the person, of the self-assessing living being, *among other* aspects that the person can take just as seriously. Finally, restricting the term education to the explicit influences of adult caregivers on their pupils, one could argue that equally important, if not more important, is what pupils learn without being taught, through imitation, observation and inference.

The first objection seems unworkable, insofar as there is no way to separate dispositions and educational consequences from one another in order to determine their respective shares. This seems as futile today as it did in the days of the barbaric child experiments of the Stauffen emperor Frederick II (who is said to have allowed infants to perish without wet nurses and such, in order to be able to observe nature purely and keep it free of culture). This concern also has consequences for the feasibility of the second objection - even if persons are more than and different from bundles of abilities, this more and others is nevertheless changed and reactively formed by the context of the abilities supposedly acquired through education, so that it seems a wise strategy/way of proceeding to approach the whole of the person analytically from its centre in the abilities. The third objection seems to be really decisive against a pedagogical claim to totality - before more specific abilities can be acquired, beginning with the basic cultural techniques of reading, writing and arithmetic, the spoken language must have been learned to a sufficient extent, and this only happens to the smallest extent through explicit teaching (education). Kant himself formulated an analogous objection to learning by explicit example. All natural endowments, he wrote, "cannot be trained in this way, for they are usually only occasional circumstances in which children see examples." (A 12)

Corresponding to these limits of education in the limitation of opportunities for explicit examples is the limitation that arises from the fact that examples must be conceived of and understood as examples. For Kant, this limitation is important right down to the foundations of the use of understanding, since it has the consequence that logic, as the organon of the rules of understanding, "does not (contain) any regulations for the power of judgement, and … does not

(cannot) contain them either." The power of judgement is the faculty (ability) to subsume under rules (to apply rules), but logic, according to Kant, because of its abstraction from all content, can only determine the rules analytically. If it wanted to teach how to apply the rules, this would require giving further rules, which would in turn have to be applied, thus requiring further rules, etc. The result is a faulty regress. This shows for Kant,

"that while the intellect is capable of instruction and equipment by rules, power of judgement is a special talent which does not want to be instructed at all, but rather practised. For this reason it is also the specific feature of what is called mother wit, the lack of which no school can make up for; for although it can fully provide and, as it were, graft rules into a limited intellect borrowed from foreign insight, the ability to make correct use of it must nevertheless belong to the apprentice himself, and no rule that one would like to prescribe to him with this intention is, in the absence of such a natural gift, safe from misuse "[119]

Now, the power of judgement is also not a pure natural gift. It forms and is formed in the learning of the mother tongue, which proceeds in the acquisition of a whole of judgments that form the framework of all further understanding. Wittgenstein has remarks on this in his last work, *On Certainty* (OC). This is relevant insofar as, on the other hand, he has used Kant's regress argument on the autonomy of the power of judgement in relation to rules for the application of rules on the part of the understanding to reject a certain view of language and linguistic meaning - the view that all speaking of language is based on explicit and to be interpreted/interpreted rules.[120] Wittgenstein proposes to view the formation of the power of judgement thus:

"We do not learn the practice of empirical judgement by learning rules; we are taught *judgements* and their relation to other judgements. *A whole* set of judgements is made plausible to us.
 –
When we begin to believe something, it is not a single proposition, but a whole system of propositions. (The light gradually dawns on the whole.) –
It is not individual axioms that make sense to me, but a system in which consequences and premises support each other." (OC 140-2)

Wittgenstein is interested in this holistic character of the first learning of language from an epistemological point of view. He is troubled by the fact that in the context of what is thus acquired, propositions of the form of empirical propositions play the role of rules and are used as standards of judgement for further propositions; that possible justifications in the action

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[119] Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, BB 171 f. / A 132 f. Kant remarks that the lack of power of judgement is actually what is called stupidity and that this infirmity cannot be remedied. A head afflicted with this infirmity could "very well be equipped by learning, even to the point of erudition", but as long as power of judgement was lacking, "it was nothing unusual to find very learned men who, in the use of their science, frequently showed that deficiency which can never be remedied".
[120] PI 201 a/b: "Our paradox was this: a rule could not determine a course of action, since every course of action had to be brought into conformity with the rule. The answer was: if every action can be brought into conformity with the rule, then it can also be brought into contradiction. Therefore, there would be neither agreement nor contradiction here. (-). That there is a misunderstanding here is already evident from the fact that in this train of thought we place interpretation after interpretation; ... In this way we show that there is a conception of a rule which is not an interpretation; but expresses itself, from case to case of application, in what we call 'following the rule', and what we call 'acting against it'." The connection with the limits of education is this: explicit and interpretable/interpreted rules would be those that could be taught (taught) in educational interventions.

aligned to them come to an end; that the rigidly held worldview or axis propositions lie on this side of the alternative of methodological knowledge as opposed to non-knowledge and remain immune to sustained revision. An example of the latter he does not use is this: We learn with language to speak of sunrise and sunset. Later, at school, we learn at various levels (science lessons, physics, astronomical study group) that it is not the sun that rises above the earth, which remains rigid, but that the earth revolves around itself and the sun, thus producing the phenomena of sunrises and sunsets at different perceptual positions on the earth's surface at different times. This epistemic correction of the world view implied in the talk of sunrises and sunsets does not lead to a revision of the ways of talking [certainly not because they remain phenomenologically correct - it looks at every point on the earth's surface at certain times precisely as if the sun were rising or (at another time) setting].

Now, for the problem of the formation of the power of judgement, this proposal to view the learning of the mother tongue holistically is relevant in the following way: The whole of judgements, the world view of normal language use, which is made plausible to us in the process, forms a fundus in which we learn to move to the extent of assimilating the language and then also learn to expand the realm of judgements beyond the fundus itself - through our own observations and conclusions, through being explicitly taught, through methodical study. It is through the success and failure of such continuations that judgement is formed with an understanding of reality. The examples were those of empirical judgement, but of course this applies equally to practical judgement (relating to action), both when it relates to the choice of appropriate means for given or chosen ends, and when it relates to the matching of ends to available means, and when it relates to moral and legal judgements of courses of action. If a child does not learn, for example, with the basic difference between alive vs. dead, which was discussed in its conceptual consequences for pure understanding at the beginning of the section on *life*, that animals, like us humans, are alive and feel pain and therefore must not be tortured without reason, then there will be no points of attack for later explicit teaching and/or discussions about which reasons for which kind of treatment of animals are sufficient and which are not, which would make it possible to influence their actions.

It is an empirical question how much of the world view anchored in the colloquial language a child must already have assimilated in order to be teachable and to be taught with a chance of success, but it is clear that quite a lot must already be learned before explicit teaching can take place. Much of what belongs in the fundus is absorbed and assimilated in inconspicuously normal human interaction in the family and peer groups - and the formal educational institutions feel it as a massive impairment if the foundations laid in this way are not sufficiently stable and resilient and, moreover, are too unevenly distributed.

In view of the dependence of all explicit education on foundations of understanding that it cannot itself guarantee, education is best understood conceptually as *helping* to develop and unfold dispositions. Original connections of the term 'education' to ideas belonging to agriculture and gardening, and partly also to animal husbandry, are still quite undeniably present in Kant's use of language. Kant, for example, considers uniformity among people desirable and only possible "if they act according to the same principles, and these principles would have to become a different nature to them" (A 10). For the possibility of achieving this, he recalls practices of horticultural cultivation of auriculae (a kind of primrose). On the other hand, when Kant notes that humans, like animals, "can simply be trained, drilled, mechanically instructed," he of course sees a fundamental alternative to "becoming truly enlightened." (A 24) And in the context of the path of enlightenment, which he naturally also advocates pedagogically, he sees the following major problem: "how to unite submission to legal coercion with the ability to make use of one's freedom. For coercion is necessary! How do I

cultivate freedom in the face of coercion?" As a reason for the necessity of coercion, which without room for good use of freedom would be mere mechanism for him, Kant cites that the pupil must "feel the unavoidable resistance of society in order to become acquainted with the difficulty of maintaining himself, of doing without, and of acquiring, in order to be independent." (A 32) In pedagogical coercion, then, according to Kant, the social function of education, to promote the autonomy and independence of the person with regard to guaranteeing his or her livelihood, is to assert itself explicitly - as opposed to the moral right to education, which is present in Kant's pedagogy only as a practical necessity arising from an anthropology of the human-animal comparison (A 1-2). On the one hand, this coercive pedagogy emphasises that a child's will must not be broken if it is to be enabled to use its freedom, but must only be "directed in such a way that it yields to natural obstacles" (A 94; cf. A 51). But he also insists that in the beginning "the child must of course obey blindly" and that the character of a pupil also includes "above all obedience" (A 101). The fundamental conceptual separation of nature and freedom provides the essential pillar for coercive pedagogy - because it is "something quite different" to give laws to freedom "than to form nature" (A 71), a completely different kind of coercion should be possible in this field, which should ultimately lead to the "self-coercion" of virtue (A 128). The peculiarity that greater coercion is supposed to be possible in the realm of freedom than in the realm of nature results from Kant's fundamental idea that all connection in nature owes itself to freedom - in the theoretical realm to the synthesis of the imagination or the intellect (cf. K.d.r.V. A 101 vs. B 130), in the practical realm to the maxims of reason. In the context of pedagogy, this idea is expressed as follows: "the reasons for evil are not to be found in the natural dispositions of man. That alone is the cause of evil, that nature is not brought under rules. In man lie only seeds of good." (A 18) If the laws of freedom cannot be understood as developing natural predispositions (or motivation that inevitably arises in the course of development), but only as imposing rules on an unconnected, diverse nature and thus preventing the degeneration of good predispositions/seeds into evil, then all coercion as a means to this good end is in principle legitimate. This view is expressed in characteristic judgements: One can give children a choice in indifferent matters, but one must insist that they carry out intentions once they have been made and that they always follow accepted principles. For people who have not set themselves certain rules are unreliable. And even in the case of pedantry ("the man who has set a certain time for every action according to the clock"), "reprimand is often unreasonable, and this temperance ... a disposition to character." (A 101) The educational goal of the pedagogy of coercion to freedom is the "vir propositi tenax" apostrophised with Horace - the character persevering in its intentions, which even pleases in the evil man, who is "steadfast, even if it were better that he should thus show himself in the good." (A 117)

It should not be overlooked that Kant's ideas, influenced by Rousseau's educational novel *Emile*, were certainly rather child-friendly and thus progressive in his time - the warning against breaking the will of children has already been mentioned, but Kant also speaks out against physical punishment insofar as he recognises that "no good character will be formed by it. (A 105) The moral punishments for violations of duty, which Kant clearly favours, still seem harsh enough to us, e.g. that "one puts the child to shame, meets him frostily and coldly", for example with a "look of contempt" (A 103-4). The conceptual prejudice that children's natural dispositions or instincts (to want to grow up and become independent, to want to become *like* adults) do not meet the laws of freedom as being completely detached from nature, however, allows Kant to maintain that "initially ... physical coercion (must) replace the children's lack of deliberation" and apparently not only where it is necessary to ensure "that the children do not make harmful use of their powers" (A 105, A 2).

As far as the ideas for education that echo agriculture are concerned, they are only misleading if the special conditions of the educational relationship as a moral relationship are thereby displaced. Even if the pupils' reason only grows in proportion to the success of education, it is not clear why education should not proceed according to the criterion of morally good ends, which Kant himself advocates, also with regard to the choice of means for education. Good ends, it is said, are those that everyone could approve of and that could be everyone's ends.(A 24) If by 'everyone' only adults can be understood, then education should proceed in such a way that the pupils could agree to it as adults in an impartial and, in this case, from the perspective of the children in an advocative judgemental way (for the vindictive 'it didn't do us any harm either' has preserved inhumane educational practices much longer than could be justified in an impartial judgemental way appropriate to the context).

Kant's insistence on the independence of the laws of freedom from the formation of nature is in certain conflict with the fact that, as shown, he does acknowledge a dependence on unavailable natural conditions at a much higher level - when he concedes the non-regulability of the power of judgement. The regress argument offered for this case is rededicated by Wittgenstein, as mentioned above and also in the section on *language*, to the practical character of language in the view that meaning cannot always be the result of interpretations (PI § 202). This also determines his image of language as an ensemble of means of understanding, which sits on the readiness to react that precedes and underlies language and in this respect, in contrast to Kant's assumption of the opposition of nature and freedom for moral learning, unfolds nature, develops it, differentiates it, allows it to pass over into culture.[121] Wittgenstein's favourite example of such a connection is the sitting of our practice of deixis and ostensive explanations on our natural tendency to follow a pointing gesture with the eyes in the direction of the fingertip and not in the direction of the wrist. Some creatures have this propensity to react, others do not (dogs have it and can therefore learn to retrieve, cats cannot).

As far as the relationship between education and the educated is concerned, a structure is repeated that has been encountered time and again from the section on *Pre-conditions and Challenges* - precisely that of dependence on pre-conditions that freedom cannot generate itself, without which it remains empty and in the face of which the freedom to shape must be exercised. Education presupposes spontaneous learning of language and elementary ways of human interaction and a *willingness* to learn that is already effective in this. With language, human offspring acquire a universal medium of communication which, from a certain degree of assimilation, contains the possibility of explaining itself. Since language, as discussed, is the only medium of expression and representation that has this property, it must also be referred to for communication via other media of representation (drawings, pictures, physical representations, etc.). In this respect, language is not only a universal medium (suitable for explaining its own expressions), but also a universal medium of representation (suitable for explaining everything that can be explained).[122] By growing into language, a living being,

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[121] Kant could only think of such unity of nature and culture as a reversal in the opposite direction at the end of an 'antagonistic' process of development, at which "perfect art ... (becomes) nature again" (A 128).

[122] This claim to universality of language is, in passing, the main reason against de-potentiating language to merely one 'symbolic form' among others, as in Ernst Cassirer. (If we do not understand something in art or religion, we can speak about it, but if we do not understand something in language, we cannot 'religionise' or 'artify' about language to remedy the lack of understanding, but must also, again and further, speak. Only if the other symbolic forms could also in their turn serve to clarify language would their equation with language as symbolic forms, the so-called 'objectivations' of the mind, be worth considering at all). Cf. my discussion of this in: *Ludwig Wittgenstein - Denker des 20en Jahrhunderts*, Vol. 6, Cuxhaven & Dartford 2000, 113-123.

metaphorically speaking, enters the space of meaning, of understanding, which also includes understanding itself and the question of the meaning of life.

X. Play and Self-development

In addition to the 'serious' activities related to the preservation of life, for which the terms 'work' and 'education' are (or can be) used, a categorical term for a plethora of activities in life is to be designated by uses of the terms 'play' and 'game'.

In this context, it is probably futile to search for a universally valid definition of 'play'. Wittgenstein has shown that 'play' and 'game' express a family resemblance concept that cannot be defined by a feature (or several features uniformly) characterising all its instances:

"Consider the processes we call 'games'. I mean board games, card games, fighting games, etc. What is common to all these? - Do not say: 'They must have something in common, otherwise they would not be called >games<' - but see if they all have something in common. - For if you look at them, you will not see something common to them all, but you will see similarities, affinities, and quite a number." (PI 66; cf. sqq.)

And in passing from one group of examples to the next, one will, says Wittgenstein, in tracing the affinities among the games, "see similarities appear and disappear. And the result .... : we see an intricate web of similarities that overlap and intersect."

When asking about the function of play and games in relation to the meaning of life, it is advisable to look primarily at the verb. One then becomes aware that by no means always, when we play, are we playing games or a game. Admittedly, it is also the case that when we speak of play, it is not always living beings that are playing. We speak, for example, of the play of shadows, such as the branches of a tree on a wall, and by this we mean a movement of the shadows that reveals a certain regularity, a pattern, without us having to be able to describe this more precisely. (Cf. Gottfried Benn: "Ein Schatten an der Mauer ... Himmelsspiel" = "A shadow on the wall … play of heaven".) But in its use for these phenomena, the verb again might not be very typical. Without paying homage to an erroneous myth of the verb, which says that whenever a verb is used, it is a matter of actions or activities of living beings, one can nevertheless assume a primacy of use for activities and actions with regard to the verb 'play'. The dictionary notes as the basic meaning of 'play' "a lively, cheerful back and forth movement" and thus retains the connection with the playing of natural phenomena not related to living beings, but then explains play as "a movement or activity that is not practised for the sake of a practical purpose, but solely for pastime and pleasure, but which is nevertheless generally guided by some idea or rule".[123] In this explanation, the indication of the generic motive 'to pass the time and for pleasure' - especially 'for pleasure' [because every form of the formation of time, which is always involved in actions and activities, can be understood as a 'pastime' (passing of time, understood as a grammatical active] - is only optional: this can, but does not have to be the motive. To insist on this is essential for the insight into the life meaning potential of the activity form 'playing'. One can also play in the exercise/execution of activities about which one is and must be quite serious. In this case, the acquired abilities, which the activity consists of, are exercised in a confident and playful way. This is usually the expression of joy in the exercise of one's own abilities and, in any case, a way of maintaining and expressing a distance to the activity, however seriously, and to oneself as the person doing it.

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[123] *DW* vol. 16 sp. 2325-6

Understood in this way, playing, which can be connected in a modifying way with almost every activity and every circumstance in life (and only this circumstance gives maxims such as 'One does not play with love' their meaning, their comprehensibility), is a mode of appearance of subjective freedom, indeed subjective self-will, which Hegel explained as a freedom[124] that still remains in bondage (independently of Hegel's constructions of development, one can say: *per*sists). What bondage? With Hegel, this certainly means an ideal-typical historical social relation. Independently of Hegel, 'servitude' can refer to the circumstance of being perceived as a person, as a self-assessing living being in its social relations, primarily as a bundle of abilities, thus being assessed and therefore assessing itself (every newspaper page with job advertisements teaches us this). The one who playfully fulfils his tasks and duties says, as it were: I do what I have to or should do, but I do it the way I want to. As adolescents, we occasionally experience this freedom in all constraints in educators, wanting to become like them is our generic motive for allowing ourselves to be educated and for educating ourselves. And we have a motive to no longer feel the constraint that is done to us in evaluations and that we do to us ourselves in self-assessments, and thus a motive to learn to play (in the thematic sense). If one is convinced of this, one can realise the insight of Friedrich Schiller, who wrote: "Man only plays where he is fully man, and *he is only fully man where he plays*". Schiller claimed that this sentence could "support the entire edifice of aesthetic art and the even more difficult art of living."[125]

Now Schiller starts from Kantian presuppositions and is interested in the concept of play primarily with regard to its potential for explicating aesthetic theory. His normative assertion of the wholeness of the human being only in play has a precise meaning/sense for him with regard to the Kantian presuppositions he explained (cf. 1st letter). Schiller elaborates Kant's basic dichotomy of sensuality and understanding/mind in epistemology by relating sensuality to substance and understanding/mind to form, making both anthropologically the basic drives/instincts of man as substance vs. form drives/instincts[126] (11th/12th letter). Art as an area that mediates between the areas of cognition (forms of understanding that are bound to sensuality but shape it) and morality (forms of the morality of maxims that restrict and shape sensuality in accordance with the Categorical Imperative) is based on a mediating play instinct. However, this is only something independent in that it is able to bring the material and formal instincts into balance and thus neutralises the constraints resulting from each of them (being bound to the given by the sensual material instinct and having to shape the intellectual and/or moral formal instinct). According to Schiller, the material and formal instincts work together in the play instinct; it is a separate instinct only in that it is opposed to each of them in itself. The sensual material instinct aims at receiving objects and being determined by them, the intellectual-moral form instinct at producing objects and determining them itself - "the play instinct will therefore strive to receive in such a way as it would itself have produced, and to produce in such a way as sense strives to receive. "[127] It is easy to see that a play instinct conceived in this way can only come to independent efficacy in an independent aesthetic

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[124] *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Theorie-Werkausgabe, vol.3, 155.

[125] *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen* (On Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters.), 15th letter (last paragraph).)

[126] They are "quite appropriately to be called drives/instincts" "because they drive us to realise their object". (12th letter, 1st paragraph). This assertion is based on a confusion between 'object' as the purpose of an activity or action and a formal-intentional sense of 'object' as that towards which a faculty is sensuously directed, and entails the paradox that sensuality, Kantianly drawn as wholly passive and limited to merely receiving (the unconnected manifold), is nevertheless to be conceived as an active drive.

[127] Ibid. 14th letter (third last paragraph).

sphere and Schiller's assertion that it is also capable of supporting the edifice of the art of living remains unfulfilled - unless one envisages an aestheticisation of the entire conduct of life in such a way that the distinction between art and life is also abolished.

But Schiller's Kantian presuppositions already collapse in their initial field, epistemology. The purely passive-receptive sensuality corresponds to a de-qualification of natural reality to the unconnected manifold due to the general opinion, already problematised in the section on *Upbringing and Education*, that "among all ideas, the *connection* is the only one that cannot be given by objects, but can only be performed by the subject himself, because it is an actus of his self-activity".[128] At the same time, Kant knew perfectly well on the level of examples that the regularities of nature must play a role in the possibility of *applying* our concepts:

"If cinnabar were sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, sometimes heavy, if a human being were sometimes changed into this, sometimes into that animal shape .... or if a certain word were sometimes attached to this thing, sometimes to that thing, or even if the same thing were sometimes called this, sometimes that, *without a certain rule prevailing in this, to which the phenomena are already subject of their own accord*, then no empirical synthesis of reproduction could take place."[129]

But he considered concept *formation* to be entirely free, spontaneous, on the basis of beliefs that belong in the foundations of his moral theory. In fact, many basic descriptive expressions of language (and thus concepts for perceptibles) can (and must) be explained ostensively, as discussed - and what happens in the process is that shaped elements of reality (subject to descriptive regularities) are made into patterns (normative rules) for the intended understanding (meaning) of linguistic expressions, so that for our speaking there is unconnected-manifold reality not even as a boundary concept.[130] This eliminates the Kantian contrast between sensuality and rationality and, as a consequence, everything that Schiller, constructing concepts with aesthetic intent, attaches to it.

But if one detaches Schiller's proposition from its Kantian presuppositions, then it can be held to the role of games as a modifying mode of freedom, balancing between internal drives and external constraints, of in principle any activity and action and thus of a specifically human perfection, just as the restriction of the realisation of this 'drive' to an aesthetic special sphere can be lifted. In fact, the essence of persons as self-valuing natural beings is realised in a particularly concise and perfect way in play, insofar as the person playing binds himself to rules (evaluations) in a way that claims the maximum degree of freedom (of selfhood) for his adherence to the rules.

Now, we will only succeed in playing in this way in activities that we have learned to master very well. This is another reason why playing also occupies its own realms. A factual transition

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[128] *CPR* B 130.

[129] *CPR* A 100-1, my own emphasis.

[130] Wittgenstein deals with patterns and ostensive explanation (definition) in PI sections 8, 16, 27-38. That this contains his critique of the epistemological 'myth of the given', which the phenomenalism of Kant's epistemology follows, can admittedly only be seen in the history of the development of his thought from the theory about names into the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Wittgenstein came to compare the use of language to represent reality with measuring by means of yardsticks, and his great insight, destroying the early theory on names and objects, was "that the yardstick must be and is in the same space as the measured object" (i.e. an element of reality - and then reality cannot be formless), but that *as* a yardstick it belongs "to symbolism ...to the method of projection" (*Philosophical Remarks* IV.44-5, pp. 78-9) - i.e. like the patterns from *PI*, not to the language of words, but to language. The relationship between language and reality is internal, linguistically unformed things that would be decisive for the meaning of linguistic expressions, do not exist - and thus not the unconnected manifold of Kantian epistemology.

to playing games, i.e. the type of activity on which most common explanations are based, is formed by independent play activities such as playing a musical instrument, practising a sport, playing theatre as a leisure activity, etc. The same applies to such activities as it does to playing a sport. The definition of play already applies to such activities, just as it does to the playing of entertaining occupations constituted by rules, with which Aristotle at the same time turned against a conception such as the one developed here based on Schiller (and a fortiori against a conception such as Schiller's). For Aristotle's teleological ethics of virtue, bliss consisted of

"not in the game. It would be nonsensical if our goal were play and if the toil and suffering of a whole life had mere play as its end. We desire almost everything as a means, except happiness. For it is the goal. So it seems foolish and even too childish to work and exert oneself for the sake of play; on the other hand, the sentence of Anacharsis, 'Play in order to work', may be considered correct. For play is a kind of recreation, and we need recreation because we cannot work (be active) continuously. So recreation is not an end. It is cultivated for the sake of activity. "[131]

While the playing of sovereignty and free interaction associated with normal life activities can be understood as the activity and development of life-serving abilities, playing for the purpose of recreation from normal life activities leads to the acquisition and use of further abilities related to and necessary for play, and its relief character is based above all on the free choice of the type of activity, although, of course, to the extent of mastering the activities specific to play, here and here specifically play in the first sense ('as a modifying mode of freedom balancing between internal drives and external constraints') can also take hold and is experienced as particularly satisfying (also because the 'external constraints' here are rules voluntarily chosen and followed).

The problem of the teleological conception of *eudaimonia* has already been touched upon in an earlier section. The autonomy of the evaluation of individual persons, which is to be assumed in modernity at any rate, excludes a given objective order of values; which role playing plays in the whole of a conception of life cannot be determined once and for all independently of individual evaluations. Nevertheless, Aristotle certainly describes a functional definition for play, which in social orders in which activity for the social context - be it in the ancient understanding as citizen, be it in the modern understanding as economic citizen and worker, legal comrade and political subject/citizen - constitutes the centre of the generally approved conceptions of life. But even under such objective circumstances, (often privileged) individuals, e.g. artists, may (want to) give play such a large space in their lives that it could not be described merely as recreation. This freedom of individuals in determining elements of their conception of life and the weighting of the elements in relation to each other belongs to modern times, especially after the disappearance of collectively binding convictions about a purpose of the human being, i.e. the situation of the question of the meaning of life in the full sense. Aristotle can reject not only Schiller's assertion about the art of living, which, if taken seriously, would amount to an aestheticisation of the entire practice of life, but also the moderate view based here on Schiller, only because he harbours the teleological conviction that the activity of life as a whole has an internal goal in happiness. But even if happiness in the positive case should be the result of the entire activity, it cannot be a *goal* of activity and action, insofar as it always remains radically dependent on circumstances that do not fall within the acting disposal of persons. (And *purposes* that should not be goals would be externally set normative standards of judgement, thus contradicting in their factual status the asserted internal relationship between happiness and life activity). Because of this dependence on contingency of any conduct of life, meaning (instead of happiness) - understanding and

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[131] *Nicomachean Ethics* Book X, 1076 b 29 ff.

comprehensible acceptability - is the utmost that life can strive for by itself, willing and acting (as opposed to merely wishing). And although Schiller, too, was still writing under the spell of ideas about a given objective determination of man[132], he was already on the way to radically individualising this and was therefore the more suitable starting point (despite the reversal of the historical sequence) for the reflections on the life-sense function of playing and games made here.

One of the general explanations of 'play' that one can think of in the ordinary explanations apostrophised in the penultimate paragraph is the following by Johan Huizinga[133]:

"According to its form ... one can call the game ... a free action which is perceived as 'not so meant' and as standing outside ordinary life, and yet can completely occupy the player, to which no material interest is attached and by which no benefit is acquired, which takes place within a specially determined time and space, which proceeds according to certain rules in an orderly manner and brings into being community associations which, for their part, like to stand out as surrounded with mystery or, by disguise, as different from the ordinary world."

This attempt at a general definition of 'play' (despite Wittgenstein) obviously thinks of social games with a cultic background in the interest of the cultural-philosophical treatment of predominantly ancient and even archaic material - and in this (unstated/unexplained) restriction for that material it is also as accurate as it is revealing. But Huizinga's definition leads him to argue that in modernity, culture has largely lost its playful character. One argument against this is that Huizinga due to a conventional conviction that a general definition is possible (but he sees the problems that non-social games pose for his approach and pushes them aside as "for culture itself ... barren") tends to look for the play character of cultural and social activities in modernity in the wrong place. Another argument against this is that uses of the concept of play have emerged to describe the reality of life in modern societies, which retain and specify some features of Huizinga's essentially social conception of play. They go back predominantly to the mathematical theory of games by Morgenstern and von Neumann (1942), who normatively explicate a game as a sequence of interdependent rational decisions. But psychological descriptions and 'explanations' of interaction processes can also make use of a popularised concept of game of this type.[134]

Another tradition of using the concept of play has involved the consideration of language within the framework of an activity- and action-based approach. Here, Wittgenstein coined the concept of *Sprachspiel* (language-game) which has become a common catchword. In his case, the use of the concept of play goes back to a comment on a controversy within the framework

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[132] "Every individual human being, one can say, carries within himself, according to his disposition and destiny, a pure ideal human being, with whose unchanging unity to agree with in all his /varieties it is the great task of his existence". With this sentence from the 4th letter, Schiller follows Fichte's *Bestimmung des Gelehrten*. And like Fichte, he first refers to the possibilities of uniting the individual and the ideal human being in terms of moral and state philosophy. The latter is represented in the state and the two possibilities of uniting are that either the ideal human being - the general moral and legal demands - suppresses the individual human being, or that the individuals generalise themselves of their own accord (form themselves into morally and legally thinking persons), becoming the state. The latter is the moral-state-philosophical utopia of the idealists, which was still to determine Marx's image of end-time communism.

[133] Johan Huizinga: *Homo Ludens* (Hamburg 1956, p. 20. The thesis mentioned and discussed in the following ibid. 183 ff.

[134] John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern: *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, Princeton ²1947 (German 1961); Eric Berne: *Games People Play - The Psychology of Human Relationships*, New York 1964 (German *Spiele der Erwachsenen*).

of the philosophy of arithmetic. One of his two great philosophical instigators, Gottlob Frege, in his major work *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*[135] had opposed the formalist conception of arithmetic as a mere sign game and in doing so, according to Wittgenstein, had also rejected what was correct about formalism:

"For Frege the alternative stood thus: Either we are dealing with ink strokes on paper, or these ink strokes are signs *of something*, and what they represent is their meaning. That this alternative is not correct is shown precisely by the game of chess: Here we are not dealing with the wooden pieces, and yet the pieces represent nothing, they have no meaning in Frege's sense. There is also something third, the signs can be used as in the game. ... When we construct the geometry of a figure, we are not dealing with the lines on the paper either. The pencil lines are the same as the signs in arithmetic and what the pieces are in chess. The essentials are the rules that apply to these entities - or rather, not the 'essentials', but what interests me about them."

In the wake of this critique of Frege, the essentially rule-governed and therefore autonomous character of the use of signs is also at the centre of Wittgenstein's reinterpretation of *Sprachspiel*, which has already been discussed and which captures an aspect of comparison - it is most fruitful, it reminds us again and again, to compare the use of language to a game according to rules.

Huzinga's judgement on the loss of the play character of culture thus fails not only because of considerations on the function of play for self-assessing living beings, but also because many activities and aspects of modern culture can indeed be described and understood as playing.

XI. Rushing (Intoxication), Expression, Art

'Rush' and 'rushing' are words that (in comparison to 'play') mark a much less widely branched and anchored concept. The Grimm's dictionary lists four meanings for rush ("Rausch").Fundamentally, 'rushing' is the movement associated with a sound, such as the emptying of clouds or the movement of leaves in the wind. Then a rushing, furthermore often rash movement in general, commonly but not necessarily associated with noise, acoustically perceptible movement. The dictionary traces the now almost exclusively common meaning of an altered mode of experience induced by intoxicants back to an utterance of the drinking joke, although it is unclear whether this was aimed at the 'roaring in the head' after ingestion of adequate quantities of the intoxicant or also at the heightened volume of life's utterances, which in any case are often associated with the consumption of the socially accepted intoxicant alcohol. Only poetic speech, according to the fourth recorded meaning for 'Rausch', applied the expression "also to the frenzy, the mental drunkenness, the rapture of the interior to the point of self-forgetfulness/absent-mindedness".

The key to understanding the place in life of 'rush/Rausch'' and concepts and phenomena connected with it is a move comparable to that which was also required for 'games/playing' - just as there it was to be said that not always, when we play, do we play *a game*, so here it is to be said: not always, when we experience 'rush/Rausch', have we put ourselves into this state of experience with the help of an intoxicant. The key, then, lies in the poetic extension of the use of the word, especially the marking in it of the tendency towards 'absent-mindedness'. Of course, this can have very different, milder lesser or stronger greater degrees, from mere

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[135] Volume II, Jena 1903, §§ 88-137. - The following quotation from *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, Werkausgabe Frankfurt 1984, vol. 3, 105.

absorbing participation to enthusiasm, but in the extreme it takes the form of an intoxicating experience.

An entirely unsuspicious witness to this view is the sober thinker Kant, who in his *Pädagogik* does not hesitate to state normatively: "Man must be occupied in such a way that he is filled with the purpose he has in mind in such a way that he does not feel at all". Kant related this normative statement to the relationship between work and rest, for he continued immediately "and the best rest for him is that after work. The child must therefore get accustomed to work. And where else is the inclination to work supposed to be cultivated but in school? School is a compulsory culture." (A 77) Kant would also have strongly objected to the context established here, because as a representative of Protestant industriousness he was fundamentally opposed to the use of intoxicants, because they lead to an "unnatural state of anaesthetisation of the of the senses" (*Anthropologie* § 23). Kant conceded, however, that the use of stimulants and intoxicants that primarily affect the sense of taste,"promotes sociability in enjoyment" (§ 20), whereby tobacco "is not actually enjoyed and is absorbed *intimately* into the organs", but therefore "can be used throughout the day (excluding mealtime and sleep) without satiety ...". If necessary it can also be approved of "as it were as an often repeated impulse of the recollection of the attention to its state of thought, which would otherwise fall asleep, or be boring through uniformity and monotony", as a "means to awaken it again and again intermittently". (*Anthropology* § 21; cf. § 57 Explanation) Kant apparently approved of the use of alcohol himself by drinking wine in moderate quantities. It too (enjoyed in moderation) has the merit of "enliven(ing) sociability and mutual communication of thoughts". Certainly all stimulants are "unnatural and artificial":

"He who takes them in such excess that he becomes unable for a time to order the ideas of the senses according to the laws of experience, is called *drunk* or *intoxicated*; and to put oneself into this state arbitrarily or deliberately is called intoxicating." (§ 25)

Kant thinks that all these means are meant to "make people forget the burden that originally seems to lie in life in general." And this, too, certainly belongs to the many things that "can (be) adduced to mitigate the judgement of such an oversight, since the boundary line to self-possession can so easily be overlooked and crossed," even if "the freedom from worry and with it probably also the lack of cautiousness which intoxication brings about ... is a deceptive feeling of increased vitality."

Kant would thus contradict the context sought to be described here primarily on the basis of a narrow concept of 'intoxication', which is intended to capture only excess. And accordingly, it must be conceded that the connections to be described below presuppose a broad concept of 'intoxication' in the interest of highlighting and illuminating these connections. An argument can be made for this against Kant with the concession itself, which was the first invoked by him. The feeling of increased vitality certainly also arises in self-forgetful occupation with a realisation of purpose - and it may be less deceptive than as a result of the use of stimulants, but it remains deceptive with regard to the whole context of life, because any realisation of purpose is always only a small part of it. This is indicated by the 'hole' in one's mood into which one usually falls after successfully realising one's purpose and enjoying the satisfaction of doing so. This connection was expressed in nuce by Ovid with his dictum *post coitum omne animal triste*. A second argument for the use of a broader concept of 'intoxication' is philosophically, however, precisely that it allows connections to be made visible that the narrow one obscures.

The Ovid phrase also alludes to the 'normal model' to which the anthropological tendency towards states of intoxication can essentially be traced - the striving to fulfil the drive for sexual love. Here, it is not the narrower tendency towards orgasm as the paradigm of the experience of happiness (Spaemann) alone that is to be seen, but also the state of infatuation that often surrounds this tendency, at least in the beginnings of its realisation. Here, the striving for fulfilment in sexual love has been interpreted against the background that we are self-assessing living beings and that sexual love is or can be a physical expression of mutual recognition and acceptance as persons in the whole. This also allows us to correct Kant's interpretation of the anthropological tendency towards states of intoxication: Not to relieve ourselves of the burden of existence in general (to which, after all, we would only have death as an alternative, which we cannot know and therefore fear), but specifically to relieve ourselves of the pressure of partial social evaluation and self-assessment in the dimensions of performance and conformity to norms, we strive for the states of heightened feeling of life, which in the extreme form is intoxication. In view of this tendency, the anthropological cynic Arnold Gehlen speaks from the observer's perspective of a 'reversal of the direction of drive'[136], the more life-friendly novelist Marcel Proust from the participant's perspective of the fact that one "does not (think) of oneself, one ... rather (wants) out of oneself." (*Combray* 210) One wants out of oneself and yet to be oneself, to be accepted as a whole person - this seems to me to be the generic motif of the tendency towards states of intoxication (in the broad sense), if one takes the pursuit of infatuation as paradigmatic for this tendency.

In the case of actions that realise purposes and the activities that embed them, the tendency towards intoxication-analogous absorbed becoming, which Kant at least recognises in the tendency towards self-forgetfulness, is often only the subjective experiential side of the action tendency to master the realisation of purpose playfully and thus to distance itself in its aspects from achievement and evaluation.

Especially with regard to freely chosen actions and activities, the tendency towards states of intoxication can become effective, also and especially where they can be socially shared and the mutual perception of being completely engaged can be used to enhance one's own experience. One example that can be thought of is making music together. Goethe, out of no excessive musical sense, compared playing a string quartet to reasonable conversation between people, but while this may not be particularly informative for characterising the pleasure derived from making music together, it does indicate that conversing in a conversational manner can be analogously absorbing and self-forgetting, and is more generally accessible than practising music, which is particularly acquired and therefore a less widespread skill.

In favour of assuming such a general tendency towards states of intoxication is the fact that it is socially pursued and sought to be suppressed, making precisely the distinction between sociable and unsociable states of intoxication that Kant already made in order to excuse the sociable ones at most. The intoxicating states that make us sociable are tolerated, the unsociable ones are strictly persecuted and people are even prevented from their adult, i.e. moderate use - the criminalisation of the use of intoxicants such as cannabis, opium, heroin and others is the prominent proof of this. Nietzsche, who will be discussed later, said that it is much easier to get rid of one's vices altogether than to treat them with moderation - people are still socially prevented from attaining such maturity today. Of course, there are good reasons for this: many people find moderation unattainable and the social community wants to protect

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[136] In general, it consists "in man as having the purpose of his behaviour not in a useful change in the external world, but a biologically senseless change in his *own subjective* state." (*Anthropologische Forschung*, Hamburg 1963, 124). - In addition to biologistic reductionism, philosophically the reduction of all behaviour to ends pursuing action is fundamentally flawed.

itself from having to pay for the destructive consequences of drug abuse. But the fact that a dominant part of this motivation is the interest in social control should not be misunderstood. In the course of the recent development of society, this interest has tended to become more and more balanced with the interest of individuals in self-development according to their own preferences. A telling example of this are central prohibitions of Kantian ethics, for example, which are no longer really upheld today. One concerns sexual masturbation, a small, antisocial intoxication that is accessible to everyone and harms no one, and which Kant tabooed in the same context as "self-abnegation" as a violation of a duty against oneself, invoking natural ends in a way that is incompatible with his epistemological restrictions against teleological thinking, if not incompatible, is nevertheless in a strong tension. (*Metaphysik der Sitten*, Tugendlehre, § 7) Here, the interest in social control of the anarchically promiscuous sexual drive, behind which one may often suspect drive anxiety, apparently dominated everything else. Today, there is a general conviction that social rules should not interfere with people's behaviour in this area, as long as it does not affect the rights of other people.

But the tendency to taboo anti-social intoxication, which persons may also seek in necessarily criminalised rule-breaking for the purpose of enjoying self-empowerment (from shoplifting to killing), inevitably continues. It is equally inevitably paid for by the fact that even socially licensed activities are afflicted by an excessive hunger for experience that goes to states of intoxication. The frenzy in locomotion up to massive self-harm, in particular of younger people in private cars, is even advertised as "joy of driving". Many forms of entertainment through visual media (television, film, computer) and through acoustic sound can be understood in this context. In the advertising of physically exhausting sporting activities such as long-distance running as a mass phenomenon, the states of intoxication that can be achieved are even openly discussed with reference to their physiological basis in increased endorphin release. All this is considered socially acceptable ways of getting "high" and complements the social valve customs such as carnival, public dance festivals and the like.

The tendency towards intoxication reaches a higher level of social acceptability and respect when it manifests itself in forms of expression that are open and subject to design. These include many modes of artistic production, especially musical production. The enjoyment of these productions by viewers or listeners often allows the origin of the same from the tendency towards intoxication to become apparent only very indirectly and therefore has a high social acceptability. A connection was already hinted at by Plato in his Critique of the Poets when he attributed poetic speech to divine inspiration and a mental condition of enthusiasm and obsession (*Ion* 533 e ff.). But in view of the fact that poems are also 'made' (Gottfried Benn), it is more plausible what Nietzsche brought to bear in more recent philosophical aesthetics when he unfolded his speculation, which has remained problematic as a historical thesis, of a *birth of tragedy from the spirit of music*. Against a classicist aesthetic of beauty, Nietzsche had assumed that the Apollonian and the Dionysian were two independent artistic drives in the "separate artistic worlds of dream and intoxication", to which the visual art of the sculptor and the non-pictorial/non-visual art of the musician could be traced. Since the birth of the Attic tragedy, the two are supposed to be able to work essentially only together. Whereas Schiller, also starting from dualistic (Kantian) principles of a material and a form drive, had assumed for the arts in general, however, a play drive that mediated both, even if it was not located on the level of the principles that preceded it, Nietzsche saw the difference of the art drives as only seemingly bridged by "the common word 'art'" (§ 1) and could understand forms of expression and art as compromise and balance formations of the different drives. Nietzsche thus anticipated, also in the context of aesthetic theory, the idea borrowed by Wittgenstein from Oswald Spengler of the "family resemblance" of the terms for phenomena marked by

categorical expressions, which he also explicitly mentions in reflections on the concept of philosophy in a moral-theoretical context.[137]

Not one common feature, but a plethora of overlapping and intersecting features are also foundational for such categorical classifications of cultural phenomena as philosophy or art.[138] Presumably, therefore, it would even make sense for conceptualisation with regard to aesthetic theory to reckon with not just two fundamental drives towards art.

In the conceptual contexts considered here, however, it could be said that tendencies towards states of intoxication in socially accepted forms of expression and art always interact with tendencies towards play, whereby another fundamental possibility of human behaviour, which also already enters into the tendencies towards playing and game, plays a role for artistic expression - that human rationality not only expresses itself in the matching of means to given ends, but more fundamentally, because it first creates contexts, in the design of new ends for already available means (and new forms for their combination).[139] This possibility is fundamental for every kind of creativity and invention, and in connection with the tendencies towards intoxication and play, also for diverse cultural forms of expression and also for artistic achievements and, derivatively, the viewing and enjoyment of art.

In my opinion, we can only argue with Nietzsche in one respect comparable to that asserted against Kant. Kant had seen the tendency towards intoxication together with the sought-after relief from the burden of existence in general; Nietzsche sees it as proceeding from "breaking the spell of individuation" (§ 10). But this interpretation depends both on the "consideration of individuation as the primal cause of evil" and on the fact that Nietzsche, under the influence of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will, felt "pushed towards the metaphysical assumption that the truly existing and primal One, as the eternally suffering and contradictory, at the same time needs the delighting vision, the pleasurable appearance, for its constant redemption" (§ 4). In this metaphysical perspective, the tendencies towards states of intoxication appear as tendencies towards "self-forgetfulness" (§ 4), "in the heightening of which the subjective ... disappears" (§ 1).

Against the backdrop of the perspective of the natural conceptuality of everyday understanding, which is maintained here from an anti-metaphysical stance, both the idea of a primal One and a principled alternative to individuation on this side of death cannot be comprehended. The complementary relationship that Nietzsche sees between art and life is therefore related here to the condition of human persons as self-assessing living beings, and the easing of the burden that this normative pressure and self-coercion means for needy living beings does not at all abolish individuation (which already characterises us as physical, spatio-temporal beings), but only the compulsion of the socially induced (self-)formation of this individuation.

If, according to the previous considerations, a distinction is made between socialising and individuating states of intoxication on the one hand and, on the other, a broad concept of intoxication in the sense of tendencies towards all forms of self-forgetfulness is assumed for

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[137] *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (Beyond Good and Evil) § 20.- A theory of art in the context of metaphysical convictions inspired by classical German philosophy must deny precisely this obvious fact - that the categorical term 'art' is, like all others, a family resemblance term. Cf. Dieter Henrich, *Versuch über Kunst und Leben*, Munich 2001, p. 47: "Art is not a mere cluster, the word art therefore not merely a label for something entirely heterogeneous. But art possesses just as little unity from the unity of a single origin."
[138] Cf. *Philosophical Investigations* sect. 67.
[139] Cf. above Section *The often implicit character of the answer to the question of the meaning of life*, p.16; Section IX, p. 74.

the outlined tendencies towards states of intoxication, one can be made aware that there is a polar connection between these tendencies towards self-forgetfulness and tendencies towards increasing self-empowerment, which nevertheless terminate in self-forgetfulness. The phenomena considered so far had been suggested to be understood as phenomena of compensation for the pressure of rational evaluation and self-assessment.

They evade this pressure downwards, as it were, seeking to fall below the level of evaluation and self-assessment. The tendencies to be mentioned now, on the other hand, have the direction of movement of exceeding this level. The phenomena of expression and play, which are produced as art and enjoyed in a contemplative or otherwise absorbing way, were already on the way there. Corresponding to the socialising individual states of intoxication on this path of transgression are many forms of self-assignment in social organisations that are supposed to let the self participate in the greater power of supra-individual contexts - from participation in social movements and political organisations for the purpose of acquiring power, to participation in supra-individual projects in production, culture and science. The fact that these tendencies can belong to the context of tendencies towards self-forgetfulness for the experience of individuals is usually concealed by the fact that they first presuppose classification in collective contexts and subordination to supra-individual standards, both of which must be laboriously acquired and achieved. But insofar as they can bring about an awareness of increased personal importance and self-empowerment, this belonging seems to me to be indisputable.

Unyielding truthfulness of self-reflection, finally, also demands the admission that philosophising, especially the motivation for metaphysical philosophising discussed in the section *Eternity, Eternal Questions and Metaphysical Philosophy*, also demands to be seen in the context of the tendency towards states of intoxication. In Aristotle's praise of theoria (Metaphysics , X 7) and in his exhortation "not to give ear (to) that admonition which instructs us to confine our striving as human beings to the human and as mortals to the mortal", this tendency is expressed as aiming in philosophising to increase self-empowerment in thought thus: "We should strive, as far as possible, to be immortal, and do everything for the purpose of living up to the best that is in us. For though it is small in extent, yet in power and value it is by far the most excellent of all. Yes, one may say: this divine in us is our true self, if otherwise it is our noblest and best part."

XII Religion

If one were to ask a religiously committed contemporary what he or she understands by religion, he or she would probably speak of their own religion. If one were to ask a religiously unattached contemporary, he or she would attempt an explanation of concepts that would probably use the term 'God' ('religion is the totality of convictions associated with a belief in God') and perhaps also the term 'church', perhaps distinguishing between church as organised religion and organisation-unattached religiosity.

The different explanations reflect that, as with morality and law, these are essentially contested, practical terms that would be best clarified methodologically in a critical way. Here, because of the centrality of the terms, a reflection on the original linguistic roots does not help very much. 'Religio' and 'religiosus' originally referred to the conscientious fulfilment of duties, especially in connection with cults of worship.[140] 'God' presumably comes from an Indo-European root

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[140] *HWPh* vol. 8, column 633.

related to 'call' and is derived from the participle of this root ('called'). The expression probably originally meant 'the being called and summoned by incantations'.[141]

Discussing 'religion' in the context of life themes as elements of possible meaning of life suggests itself for at least one hermeneutical reason: even if one is religiously unattached oneself, one encounters many, spiritually quite independent contemporaries who integrate the totality of their practical life convictions through a religious interpretation of the world and life, and one should at least be able to understand them.

The ad hoc definition of the term attributed to the non-religious contemporary at the beginning of this section suggests a distinction between subjective and objective religion - subjective religion as the practical convictions of a person integrated by a religious interpretation of the world and life, objective religion as religion organised in a church or sect with its centre in a cult of worship. Conceptually, such a distinction has been forced by a critique of the traditional proofs of God. Kant's *Kritik* is based on the restriction of concepts of experience to possible experience in space and time, including the central concept of causality. This restriction put pressure on traditional conceptions of God as person, creator and lawgiver because these all have causal aspects. Kant's solution was to separate faith from knowledge and surrender the concept of God to a practical faith that inflated morality in the postulates of practical reason - God, freedom and the immortality of the soul.

Kant did not understand this as subjectification, but only because he believed that morality presented as divine law "must at the same time appear as natural law, for it is not arbitrary. Therefore religion belongs to all morality. "[142] Now, not all necessity is natural necessity and not only natural law is not arbitrary. This is also why Kant's construction of the relationship between knowledge and faith acted as a subjectification and made possible justifications of subjective religion based on a sense of "schlechthinniger Abhängigkeit" (Schleiermacher; English: "complete dependency") or an >ultimate concern< (Tillich), which no longer need to be tied to a conception of God at all.

Since I am most familiar with Wittgenstein's work, I would like to illustrate this movement with Wittgenstein. In his first work, he declared that the world is the totality of facts. Facts are expressed in propositions whose general form is 'such and such is the case.'[143] But in remarks not included in the text of the work, he also declared: 'How everything behaves is God. God is how everything behaves.'[144] God is equated here with the world as a whole, as in Spinoza's principle of 'deus sive natura' and the all-unity views that followed German Idealism. In this way, the relationship to God is given a role that integrates the entire understanding of reality, but God can no longer be imagined personally. On the other hand, in preliminary work for the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein also equated (conscious) life and the world:

What do I know about God and the purpose of life?
I know that this world is.
......
That there is something problematic about it, what we call its meaning.
That this meaning is not within, but outside of it.
That life is the world.
....

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[141] *DW* vol. 8, column 1017.
[142] *On Pedagogy*, A 133 (*Works*, ed. Weischedel, vol. VI, p. 756.)
[143] *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* No. 1, 4.5.
[144] *Critical Edition*, ed. B. McGuinness u. J. Schulte, Frankfurt am Main 1989, p. 255.

We can call the meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, God.

And link the simile of God as a father to it.

Prayer is the thought of the meaning of life.[145]

Wittgenstein here uses the concept of meaning uncritically by equating it with purpose on the one hand, intelligibility on the other, and does not distinguish between the two. But it is precisely this lack of reflection that can make connections clear. If the considerations made here in the section on *Meaning* etc. are correct, then in the context of the meaning of life, meaning cannot simply mean purpose or intelligibility, and there need not be any direct talk of a meaning of the world in the context of life. Then there remains only an interpretation connected with intelligibility, with regard to the life to be led as 'acceptable intelligibility', with regard to the whole context of the conduct of life, the world, intelligibility in general.

Now, Christian theologoumena such as the prohibition of images about the God who identifies himself through the mouths of Old Testament theologians as 'I will be who I will be' and a 'creation through the Word' have prefaced an equation of God with intelligibility in general and as a whole. If a religious feeling of complete dependence or unconditional interest is related to this, then this is expressed in formulations such as those used by Wittgenstein in his 'Lecture on Ethics' (1930): "*I... (marvel) at the existence of the world....* 'How strange that anything exists at all'"; "I am safe, nothing can hurt me, no matter what happens."[146] Wittgenstein characterises these formulations as expressions of the experiences of wonder at the world and the feeling of absolute certainty/safety. He explains that the linguistic expression of these subjective experiences, understood literally, is meaningless (one can only marvel at the existence of something for which non-existence is also conceivable - this is not the case with the world; one cannot be absolutely certain, here, too, the meaningful contrast is missing). The expressions are therefore only to be understood expressively - as an expression of the corresponding experiences and feelings. But they are prompted - by certain perceptions and situations.

This circumstance attracts the attempt at an objectivist explanation of these experiences. One explanation of such 'mystical' experiences that has been proposed says: "The medial sense, the sense-medium, which I like to explain by the thought 'everything', but which is an essential prerequisite ... in all human action, use of language and all artistic activity, this sense-medium ... becomes active itself in mystical processes. In this way, the one-sidedness of action is lifted into a counter-rotation of the sense-medium and the human subject. "[147]

I can understand this explanation if I subjectivise it in turn by adding to it, as Wittgenstein did to the statement of the one caught in an illusion about the objectivity of rules (*PI* 219):

This is what it seems like to the mystically touched or religiously faithful. This is also part of the religious self-understanding: *faith* in God would not be faith in *God* if it were solely a subjective achievement and not also God's work, 'gift'.

But in this subjectivisation, the explanation seems to me to offer a point of view from which even those not religiously bound can understand what the faithful or mystically touched speak of and how they can speak of it in this way. Wittgenstein also expressed the feeling of absolute

[145] *Diary* 1914-1916 (11.6.16), translated from *Werke* (Studienausgabe) vol. 1, p. 167.

[146] *Lecture on Ethics* and Other Small Writings, ed. J. Schulte, Frankfurt am Main 1989, pp. 14-15.

[147] Johannes Heinrich, *Philosophie am Scheideweg*, Vienna 2002, p. 71.- The author, a former Jesuit and philosophising theologian, assumes an objective theory of reflection of the sense-medium made of idealistic components, which I consider false. I therefore read his thesis in the sense of the previously given proof that language is our universal 'sense-medium', understanding-medium.

certainty/safety with the quotation from an Austrian folk writer[148] whose stage character once says: 'From this world I cannot fall'. In fact, we cannot fall out of the possible comprehensibility of everything , out of the linguistically developed sense/meaning, as long as we are still concerned with understanding. I believe that this point of view ultimately underlies Wittgenstein's "theology for atheists, an understanding of religion from the outside (as an anthropological phenomenon) that does not accuse it of being either false or unfounded or nonsensical"[149] and is also suitable as a hermeneutic point of view in general. In the God of religious faith, the intelligibility of everything is objectified and personalised. The one God of the monotheistic religions is a theological construction that turned against polytheistic theologies (for the formulation of their very first commandment, the three book religions need the plural 'gods' in 'thou shalt have no other gods besides Me'). About the one God, who was thus formed in a religion-critical way, theologoumena like the ones mentioned were then to be formed, in which God identifies with all that happens ('I will be who I will be') and all events as 'creation through the Word' were explained comprehensibly. And to these the 'mystical' life experience of the aloneness of the intelligible can find connection - or not:

"A proof of God should actually be something by which one can convince oneself of the existence of God. But I think to myself that the believers who provide such proofs want to analyse and justify their 'faith' with their intellect, although they themselves would never have come to believe through such proofs. One could perhaps 'convince' one of the 'existence of God' through a kind of education, by shaping one's life in such and such a way.
Life can educate one to believe in God. And it is also experiences that do this; but not visions, or other sensory experiences that show us the 'existence of this being', but, for example, sufferings of various kinds. And they do not show us God like a sensory impression shows an object, nor do they make us imagine Him. Experiences, thoughts, - life can impose this concept on us. It is then similar to the term 'object'. "[150]

'Object' is a formal concept - we do not have to form formal concepts, they are given with each of their instances whether we form them or not. When Wittgenstein compares 'God' to the paradigmatic formal concept 'object', he also has in mind the optionality of the formation of this concept. And when he considers thoughts as well as experiences to be important for the formation of the concept of 'God', then this explains the difference in the processing of experience (also of suffering) by the non-religious and the religiously bound. Not everyone has the same experiences and even the same experiences do not necessarily lead to the same thoughts. But the occasions/reasons/grounds for the formation of the thought 'God' should be able to be understood in the direction of the suggestions made here.

[148] Ludwig Anzengruber: *Der Kreuzelschreiber*; cf. the reference in: Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Denkbewegungen* - Tagebücher 1930-1932, 1936-1937, ed. by Ilse Somavilla, Frankfurt am Main 1999, 129.
[149] Cf. Hans-Johann Glock: *Wittgenstein-Lexikon*, transl. by E. M. Lange, Darmstadt 2000, Art. *Religion* (301). (*English A Wittgenstein Dictionary*)
[150] Wittgenstein: *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, Frankfurt am Main 1977, 161 f.

On Heidegger's analysis of time

Heidegger's conception in perspective

Heidegger's programme in *Being and Time* was "the concrete elaboration of the question of the 'sense' of Being" with the "preliminary aim" of "interpreting time as the possible horizon of any understanding of Being". (1)[151] One aspect of the question of the 'meaning of being' was that of the 'meaning of Dasein', for: "Only Dasein can ... be meaningful or meaningless." (151 u. f.) Heidegger thus represented a temporal conception of the meaning of life, which has been a critical reference point in the background throughout the reflections in this book. I would therefore like to conclude by also explicitly discussing his conception critically. First, the critique of the temporal character of this conception made here can be further clarified through critical discussion of two theses that have come down to this conception from historical positions that have become important to it.

The first thesis goes back to Aristotle. It states that life is essentially activity.[152] At the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the thesis is quite inconspicuous. It speaks of the goals of actions and the self-purpose character of activities and then raises the question of whether knowledge of the goal will not also have great weight for life (NE 1094 a 22). This obviously assumes that life is an action or activity or at least sufficiently similar to both - for only then does it have a goal. In another context, Aristotle is also quite explicit that he understands life as activity: "Life is now an action and not a bringing forth..." (Pol 1254 a 6) - in the terminology used here, it should read: life is an activity with an 'end in itself' character and not an action (aimed at an external end). In contrast, it has been argued here that life is at best grammatically an 'activity' in its entirety, but categorically belongs rather to the class of processes that still includes the class of activities - whereby a process is to be understood as a happening that has no definite end that follows from its definition. In terms of content, life does not merge into activity, because it also contains actions and experiences and, in any case, according to its origin in birth and its end in death, is itself an experience. In *Being and Time*, the Aristotelian thesis on the activity character of life is tangible in the determination that Dasein is a being that is concerned in its being with this itself. For this determination of the 'Worumwillen' ('what about'; a translation of the Aristotelian 'hou heneka') of Dasein can only be fulfilled through activity in the form of purpose-related action (colloquially, 'it is about ...' means it is of determining interest to it - and what is determined is the effectiveness or manner of the activity).

The second thesis, which is characteristic of Heidegger's conception, can already be found in Kierkegaard's *Entweder/Oder* (Either/Or), together with the conclusion flowing from it for the understanding of the meaning of life, and states (in the German translation by Emanuel Hirsch p.208) "Action is essentially futuristic". (EO II, 181) This thesis is at first incomprehensible. If 'action' is understood to mean the realisation of an intention or subjective purpose, then action,

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[151] Translating texts by and about Heidegger is a special challenge, because his German is often idiosyncratic and in a want-to-be terminological manner neologistic. Therefore in this appendix quotes from Heidegger are translated independently and not taken from the official translation by Macquarrie and Robinson (Harper & Row 1962). Simple numbers in ( ) in the text refer to pages in *Sein und Zeit*, 10th unchanged edition, Tübingen 1963. The English translation *Being&Time* gives the German pagination (of the 7th unchanged edition) on the margins.

[152] See also Tugendhat: Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstbestimmung, op. cit. 168 .(cp. above p.12 fn 21)

like any other real, seems to be, if at all a priori temporal, then 'essentially present'. But this response may not be charitable. Presumably Kierkegaard's judicial councillor B, defending an ethical view of life against the aesthetician A, meant that action is essentially determined by intentions (subjective purposes) - action is intentional, deliberate behaviour. The intentions of action refer to the future, because the time of their realisation and their completion is mostly in the future compared to the present of the person grasping the intention. It may be possible to make sense of this view, but an obvious interpretation to remedy even its incomprehensibility makes it outright wrong. This obvious interpretation is as follows: the intention describes the behaviour as an action using the description for its successful realisation. For example, I want to meet a friend and express this intention as 'I want to/will meet my friend'. The event that makes this expression/description of intention true would be to describe 'I am (currently) meeting my friend'. The intention therefore refers to the event that is still future at the time of its expression (the time) when this realisation is completed (I meet/have met my friend).

This view cannot take into account the fact that intentions can also fail, that the attempt to realise them is not guaranteed success. If my intention to meet my friend fails, then no case of the description 'I am (just) meeting my friend' is applicable and thus the expression of intention at an earlier time cannot have referred to the event that fulfilled the description. Intentions refer to points in time or periods of time only if their expression contains corresponding linguistic determinations explicitly ('I will meet my friend *tonight*; ... in *six weeks*; ...').[153]

The sense that can be gained from Kierkegaard's ethicist's thesis that action is essentially futural is probably this: Intentions essentially intend their realisation. The realisation of an explicitly and ex ante conceived intention usually begins at a later point in time than that at which it is conceived. And in any case, with regard to something that is already past and concluded (can no longer be influenced by action) intentions are meaningless (incomprehensible). So actions *essentially* refer to the future through their intentions. This is only correct insofar as it expresses a rule of language: the present tense of the sentence component 'I/you/he... intend/s' cannot be combined with a past tense of a verb in the subordinate clause dependent on this clause.[154]

Now these considerations of action theory may seem like dispensable philosophical subtleties, but the implications for understanding the meaning of life are not. Kierkegaard's ethicist casually states them quite clearly when Hirsch's translation says that the meaning of life is "understood as a sequence of time" (*EO* II, 266). How this relates to the conception of action as essentially futuristic is hinted at in the immediate context:

"For therein lies the eternal dignity of every human being, that he can acquire a history; therein lies the divine in him, that he himself, if he wills/wants, can give this history coherence, for it acquires this only when it is not merely the epitome of what has occucred and happened to me, but my own deed, in such a way that even what has happened to me has been transformed and transferred by me from necessity into freedom." (*EO* II, 267)

The context of history, which is supposed to constitute man's eternal dignity, is what Kierkegaard's ethicist essentially calls the meaning of life - and this context is provided by an

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[153] *PI* section 461 Cf..

[154] A special problem is the exercise of 1st person authority with regard to past statements with 'I mean .../I meant ...' (= 'I want/wanted to say ...'); this can be left aside here.

action ('deed')[155] that is essentially futuristic, which is why the meaning of life is a sequence of time (and not, as in the mystic contrasted by Kierkegaard, a moment of mystical vision that is present in each case, the *nunc stans*). The action that establishes this coherence of life and that is even supposed to be able to transform experiences (necessity) into actions (freedom) is the 'inner' action of self-choice recommended by the ethicist to the aesthete (first *EO* II, 178-91).[156] It is what has been called self-acceptance in the view adopted here - but the fact that Kierkegaard's ethicist describes it as a 'choice' is already related to his action- and future-related distortion of the meaning of life. I can also accept something that just happens to me or befalls me (or has happened to me!), but I cannot really choose it - because if what has happened to me is something unpleasant, then I would certainly *not have chosen* it *if it had been a choice* for me. Kierkegaard's ethicist's talk of 'self-choice' is opposed to an even more radically active conception of self-setting/creating (*EO* II, 275 ff.) in idealist philosophy, especially Fichte's; this makes his position more understandable, but still not acceptable.

The conception of the meaning of life as existing in a historical time sequence was opposed in the view represented here by the determination that the meaning of life is not about the temporal wholeness of life, because this does not exist/is not available at any point in time and cannot be anticipated as complete, but about a structural wholeness/entirety of life relations and life activities analogous to 'life in the city', 'life in the country', etc. That is, although time is a fundamental given of the experience of life, the meaning of life, its comprehensible acceptability for the person leading their life, is not to be understood as essentially determined by time. In the following critical discussion of Heidegger's texts, it will be necessary to examine what reasons Heidegger has against this.

Dasein and Time in Heidegger

This cannot be an exhaustive account of Heidegger, but according to the concept of philosophy followed here ('reflexive conceptual clarification'), I must discuss Heidegger's own conception of philosophy and thereby try to make it clear that the critique I am going to make is not entirely external, because it is based on a deep-set common ground due to a shared reference to Kant. I will then discuss a brief résumé of the analysis of Dasein in the introduction to the paragraphs on time; this is followed by what Heidegger treated under the title 'the vulgar conception of time' (§§ 79-81). In doing so, it will become clear how Heidegger in many ways touches on as well as records points from the overview of the grammar of time that I have given.

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[155] The aesthetician is said to be a 'hater of all activity in life' and is thus quite right in this that: 'if there is to be meaning in such activity, life must have a context' (*EO* II, 208) - this context is what is called 'the meaning of life' in many places by the ethicist.

[156] Kierkegaard's ethicist characterises this action as 'inward/internal': "Every individual man has his history and this is not a mere product of his own free actions. The inward act, on the other hand, belongs to himself, and will belong to him for all eternity." Self-choice is not a choice between good and evil, but a decision on the question of "under which conditions one wishes to view the whole of existence and live oneself" and, as an ethical choice, even a choice of will (*EO* II, 186; 180) One must therefore say that it is not a choice if a choice is understood as deciding between different possibilities. One does not choose the frame of reference of one's own understanding, one takes it up/adopts it with the learning of the language and the growing into the culture and then forms it partly consciously, but not in the sense of a fundamental choice, for example, between *the* aesthetic and *the* ethical. This is not made any more plausible by the admission: "The original choice is constantly present in every subsequent choice. (*EO* II, 233)

Heidegger identifies his conception of philosophy as phenomenological and the phenomenological method as characterised by the maxim 'to the things themselves' (34; cp. 27). "Taken factually, phenomenology is the science of the being of being - ontology." (37) This puts Heidegger in a peculiar position. For what 'being' means is to be clarified first of all in the discipline he projects, 'fundamental ontology', which is to pose and answer the question precisely of the 'meaning of being'. (Cp. 1; §§ 5, 15 ff.; 403) In a precise sense, therefore, Heidegger does not yet know in *Being and Time* what he is asking.[157] And even the method, according to its concept, does not guarantee that in the course of the investigation it can in any case be clarified what is being asked (which is not unusual in philosophical investigations, unlike scientific ones). Indeed, Heidegger describes the method in such a way that it must be guided by its object:

"Science 'of' phenomena means: *such* a grasp of its objects that everything that is up for discussion about them must be dealt with in direct exposition and direct designation. .... The character of the description itself, ..., can only be fixed from the 'factuality' of what is to be 'described', i.e. brought to scientific definiteness in the encounter type of phenomena." (35)

Heidegger's method-based information about his conception of philosophy is thus problematic and in need of criticism. The approach followed here - reflexive conceptual clarification - and the method appropriate to it: grasping the concepts on the basis of the linguistic expressions, formulations and ways of speaking in which they manifest themselves, does not suffer from any analogous lack of definiteness. It will become apparent that de facto Heidegger also only analyses ways of speaking. But he cannot acknowledge this because of a feature of his conception that will now be discussed.

Indeed, Heidegger also bases his conception on Kant (as does the one followed here on Wittgenstein, who was a Kantian in this respect), but in a characteristically distancing way:

"The appeal to self-evidence in the sphere of basic philosophical concepts and even with regard to the concept of 'being' is a dubious procedure, if otherwise the 'self-evident' and only it, 'the secret judgements of common reason' (Kant) is to become and remain the explicit subject of analytics ('the philosophers' business')." (§ 1, 4)

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[157] Cf. e.g. § 48, 241: "An appropriate completion of the ontological analysis of end and wholeness fails ... by the fundamental difficulty that, in order to accomplish this task, precisely what is sought in this investigation (the meaning of Being in general) must already be presupposed as found and known." - Heidegger 'solves' the difficulty by assuming that an understanding of being already belongs to the the excellent being from which the analysis starts, *Dasein* (being-there) and that this understanding of being can therefore be clarified when this being is determined/clarified in its being. He defends himself twice against this 'circle', the first time with the argument that there is no circle 'in the proof', because in answering the question of the meaning of being "it is not a question of a deductive justification, but of a revealing basic uncovering". (§ 2, 7 sq.) The second defence consists in anchoring understanding and the interpretation referring to it in a 'pre-structure' hitherto attributed to Dasein and in accusing objections to circularity of misjudging this structure, which they also presuppose. (§ 32, 153) The first argument presupposes the irreproachability of the methodological concept of phenomenology in Heidegger - and the problem of the violence of 'phenomenological construction' discussed in the text speaks against this; the second argument presupposes that such a structure of Dasein exists and that it has been correctly characterised - there are also objections to this (see below).

On the one hand, Heidegger seems to affirm here that the self-evident must be the subject of analytics - that, as has been said here, it is a matter of making explicit what is implicitly object of awareness and knowledge. On the other hand, what seems to be meant is that when the self-evident becomes the subject, which it normally is not by its nature, one cannot simply refer to it. It would still be possible to agree on that in itself - explicit thematisation is not simply an appeal to the thematised. But Heidegger draws consequences from this that distort the descriptive character of conceptual clarification.

"The phenomenological concept of phenomenon means, as what is revealed, the being of being, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives. And revealing oneself is not something arbitrary, nor even something like appearing. The being of the being can least of all ever be something 'behind' something 'that does not appear'.
Behind the phenomena of phenomenology there is essentially nothing else, but what is to become a phenomenon can be hidden. And precisely because the phenomena are initially and mostly not given, phenomenology is needed. Concealment is the opposite term to 'phenomenon'." (35 f.)

If phenomena are concealed and must first be uncovered, then it is always questionable whether it is still the 'self-evident' that is being uncovered. Heidegger sees that this would require a 'methodological safeguard', but he does not give it:

"The mode of encountering being and the structures of being in the mode of the phenomenon must first be *won* from the objects of phenomenology. Therefore, the *point of departure* of the analysis as well as the *access* to the phenomenon and the *passage* through the prevailing obscurations demand their own methodological safeguarding. In the idea of the 'original' and 'intuitive' grasp and explication of phenomena lies the opposite of the naivety of an accidental, 'immediate' and unthinking 'looking'." (36 sq.)

We are not told here how to make it methodologically safe to grasp, 'reveal' and 'expose' the phenomena, it is only polemicised against fictitious other ways of approaching them. In later contexts, Heidegger explicitly acknowledges the 'violence' of his 'phenomenological constructions', which supposedly only remove obscurations (cp. 375), and declares: "Violence in this field of investigation is not arbitrariness, but fact-based necessity." (327; cf. 313) The 'things' that are supposed to justify this necessity are the obscurations in ordinary understanding, especially insofar as they are based on a not-wanting-to-see.
Now, it is not to be denied that a willingness to not see exists and that some ordinary and also philosophical understandings are characterised by it. But Heidegger discredits ordinary understanding as a whole as 'inauthentic/improper/not actual' and 'decaying'. This leads, as will be demonstrated by the theme of the 'vulgar' understanding of time as an example, to grandiose distortions of the 'phenomena' which, as the self-evident, are to become and remain the subject of analytics with Kant. And in any case, it can be said in general: That to which violence is done is not only described. If something is supposed to be meant by it that somehow belongs to that which suffers violence, that is supposed to be its deep structure, its essence (that constitutes it as a 'phenomenon'), then an assertion to this effect is in particular need of justification and it will in no case be sufficient to have generally invoked the idea of 'intuitive' and 'original' grasping/understanding.

In chapter 6 of the Second Section of Part One of *Being and Time*, Heidegger begins in § 78 (404) by explaining the "incompleteness of the foregoing temporal analysis of Dasein".

The cumbersome description must be explained before the matter at hand can be addressed. *Being and Time* was conceived as an academic treatise in two parts, of which only two-thirds of the first part is available. The third section of Part One under the heading 'Time and Being'[158] was supposed to prove the thesis that Heidegger associated with the title of his treatise - that Being is essentially to be understood from the horizon of time and that un-temporal understanding of anything is 'abkünftig' (misleading in the sense of leading away from the phaenomenon). But the proof is not there and the treatise has thus remained a fragment in an extreme sense - only a third of the overall project is there, measured in sections, and the central thesis has remained a thesis.

This thesis is the extreme radicalisation of a 'transcendental' conception of reality. Kant had conceived of the intellect as the capacity to connect and had argued that only the intellect could connect (bring about synthesis). Without its activity, everything is only 'unconnected manifoldness'.[159] Heidegger's thesis specialises this transcendental conception of experiential reality, according to which the understanding 'constitutes' reality, for the temporal determinations. He wants to trace all time back to the original temporality of Dasein, which 'zeitigt'/'temporalises' itself in the course of its existence. Heidegger reads off the structure of this temporalisation from authentic existence. This is supposed to be the way of executing life that does not repress death, one's own having to die, but runs ahead into it as its 'own' possibility and 'shatters' against it in order to be able to act in the concrete situation of life in full self-transparency. This 'running ahead to death' is the 'actual' form of being to death that characterises every existence from its birth. (Heidegger means with a long mythical tradition that everyone dies from the moment of one's birth. This is a misuse of the process verb 'to die'. Everyone grows older from the moment of his birth and can die at any time, but he does not ever die already, but only when a fatal misfortune or a fatal illness befalls him). In the run-up to death, the 'future' constitutes the original temporality that is supposed to underlie all other time (by virtue of the radicalised transcendental thought):

"If authentic or not authentic being to death belongs to existence/Dasein, then this is only possible as future ... Here, 'future' does not mean a now that has *not yet* become 'real', that *will* one day *be*, but the time ('Kunft'/'coming') in which Dasein comes towards itself out of its own possibility to be. The running-ahead *actually* makes Dasein future, in such a way that pre-running itself is only possible insofar as Dasein, *as being*, always comes towards itself, i.e. is future in its being. (§ 65, 325).

This thesis is factually untenable because pre-running in Heidegger's sense presupposes that later events (in this case: one's own death) *will* take place - and the 'future' indicated by the last (italicised) 'to be' cannot be brought about only by a 'pre-running' (which, after all, must take place in the imagination, since one cannot make happen beforehand what will happen later).

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[158] Cf. the outline of the entire treatise § 8, 39.

[159] Cp. CPR B 135 sq..: "Connection, however, does not lie in the objects, and cannot be borrowed from them by perception, for instance, and thereby be received into the understanding in the first place, but *is solely a performance of the understanding*, which itself is nothing more than the capacity to connect a priori, to bring the multiplicity of given ideas under the unity of apperception, which principle is the supreme one in all human knowledge. (my emphasis) This prejudice establishes 'idealism'. It is not unbroken in Kant, because under the title 'transcendental affinity of appearances' he certainly sees that reality must play a part in becoming connected. (cf. A 113 sq. and the telling example A 100 sq.).

Ernst Tugendhat has therefore rightly said that it only takes a short time ('five minutes of clear thinking') to see Heidegger's basic thesis as false: "...if we cannot presuppose that there will be a time after the present one in which I will either live or die, there would be nothing towards which I could walk in the way that Heidegger calls Auf-sich-Zukommen/ coming-towards-oneself. "[160]

In view of the implied thesis about 'original temporality' as that of actual existence in the run-forward to death, the admission at the beginning of § 78 that the analysis so far has been incomplete is absolutely necessary and, only if it goes far enough, a starting point for undoing to some extent the descriptive abridgements that go hand in hand with the basic thesis, which can easily be seen to be false. I will now examine whether this happens.

Heidegger gives two reasons for the incompleteness of his account of temporality up to this point. On the one hand, so far (especially in the 5th chapter of the Second Section on 'Historicity'), the word has been withheld from "everyday understanding of Dasein ... in the course of the existential-temporal analysis of historicity". Everyday understanding understands everything that happens not so much in terms of time, but rather 'within time' (in the course of time), and secondly, this view deserves a "fundamental analysis" because "in addition to history, natural processes are also 'determined by time'." (404)

Attention must also be paid to the everyday understanding for methodological reasons (of reflexive conceptual clarification) even if it is to be critically distanced, because otherwise critique lacks its material.[161] Heidegger does this by depicting how everyday Dasein 'provides/obtains time' by 'reckoning with time'. This account begins with a paragraph roughly recapitulating the analysis so far, which will first be explained sentence by sentence in the following (a number preceding the respective sentence has been inserted for better orientation), because this gives the opportunity to make some of Heidegger's idiosyncratic terminology comprehensible.

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[160] Tugendhat: 'Heidegger und Bergson über die Zeit', in: *Philosophische Aufsätze 1992-2000.*, Frankfurt am Main 2001, 20. Tugendhat's late essays - cp. above all 'Heideggers Seinsfrage', in: *Philosophische Aufsätze*, Frankfurt am Main 1992, 108 ff. - contain a penetrating critique of the entire conception of his teacher Heidegger. As far as the problem of time is concerned, however, he simply presupposes conventional conceptions, probably also under the influence of his student Peter Bieri (cp. at the first place 14 f.), which, as shown, are in need of criticism and in part made Heidegger's further distorting misunderstandings possible in the first place. - Tugendhat's thesis that the Second Part of *Being and Time* (B&T)does not exist because it could not have been written factually is, in my opinion, correct. - Incidentally, Heidegger himself seems to have agreed with this interpretation, even if only semi-publicly. My friend Hans Friedrich Fulda reports this from a seminar on 'Time in Husserl and Heidegger', which Hans-Georg Gadamer organised in Heidelberg at the end of the 1950s or beginning of the 1960s. At Gadamer's invitation, Heidegger chaired the last session. In the discussion, Fulda asked Heidegger whether, like Husserl's phenomenology of *inner* time-consciousness, his analysis did not also presuppose the given-ness of external temporal relations. Heidegger initially avoided the question ("That's not my question. My question is about being...") and finally said, after participants insisted: "I'm not just talking about failure, I really have failed". - In fact, Heidegger already reckoned with the possibility of the failure of his thesis in *B&T.* when he asked "whether an original ontological interpretation of Dasein does not have to fail - because of the mode of being of the thematic being." (§ 45, 233; cf. 148, 174) In this then, on the basis of the detailed methodological considerations in § 4, the fundamental ontological question would also have failed in its approach. - After all, it is not a possible 'failure' that is problematic, but rather the untruthfulness of not clearly admitting it and declaring *B.a.T.* to be a necessary path throughout life under the motto 'ways, not works' (the motto of the complete edition; cf. also the prefatory note to B&T. 1963).

[161] Cp. in another context *B&T* § 58, 281: "All ontological investigations .... must begin in what the everyday interpretation of Dasein 'says' about it." 'Ontological' investigations are conceptual investigations coupled with an additional metaphysical claim.

(1) Dasein exists as a being that is concerned in its being *with* this itself. (2) Essentially preceding itself, it has designed itself to be able to be *before* all mere and subsequent consideration of itself. (3) In the project ('Entwurf'), it is revealed as projected ('geworfen'). (4) Thrown/projected into the 'world', it lapses to it providing. (5) As concern ('Sorge'), that is, existing in the unity of the decayingly ('verfallend') projected project, being is developed as Da. (6) Co-being with others, it holds itself in an average laid-outness/presentation that is articulated in speech and enunciated in language. (7) Being-in-the-world has always pronounced *itself*, and *as being with* the inner-worldly being, it constantly pronounces *itself* in addressing and discussing the concerned itself. (8) The prudently understanding concern is founded in temporality, namely in the mode of the expect-retaining present. (§ 79, 406)

(1) *Dasein exists as a being that is concerned in its being with this itself.*
The following consideration leads to the view that Dasein is concerned with its being. First of all, 'Dasein' is the title for what is colloquially called a human being or a person - what "we ourselves are and which, among other things, has the being-possibility of questioning".[162] The questioning-possibility, among other things, is the expression of an attitude towards oneself. At the same time, Dasein is surrendered to its being, i.e. it has to carry it out - and the determination that it is concerned with its being is concluded from this. If there is more to the latter than that existence must maintain itself in its being, because its self-preservation does not happen by itself and it must do something for it - philosophy has addressed this as self-preservation (oikeiosis) since the Stoa - then egocentricity, a formal egoism, is implied in it. For colloquially, 'he is about to' means as much as 'he takes an interest in it' and in this respect the determination, which is a premise of the entire analysis of existence/being, is ambiguous. In what I have to do, I do not have to take an interest.

(2) *Essentially preceding itself, it has projected ('entworfen') itself to be able to be before all mere and subsequent consideration of itself.*
The second determination shows that in the analysis the second moment of the two 'it is concerned with its being' determining moments - self-preservation and egocentricity - (in Heidegger's language:) 'takes the lead'. Preceding-itself gives the self-fulfilment of Dasein a teleological character that is read off from purpose-directed action and generalises it. In realising a purpose, we have decided on one possibility of action (option) and 'designed' ourselves towards it insofar as acting *in this way* helps to define who we are, what we can be understood as. That Dasein contains elements of this character is undoubted; what is doubtful is the generalisation, blown up into a definition of essence, that fixes Dasein to one of its elements. Nor is it made more convincing by the correct hint that not projecting oneself is also a way of the ontologically so-called 'project/Entwurf'.
For this hint only meets the fact that 'ontological' and 'conceptual-hermeneutical' clarifications move on the level of meaning, of intelligibility, and not on the level designated by truth versus falsity. For intelligibility is presupposed by truth and falsity alike.[163] Criticism can take this into

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[162] *B&T* 7; cp. 12, 3rd paragraph; 46 2nd paragraph end.
[163] This circumstance is partly responsible for the 'violence' of Heidegger's terminology - and partly they are therefore also justified, namely precisely when and to the extent that ordinary language has no expression in use that is suitable for formally characterising a fundamental dimension of understanding. Since language is defined by extensive self-explainability, there are, however, such (usable) expressions (time, space, object; experiencing, acting, understanding, thinking etc. etc.) for many fundamental dimensions of understanding, and where they exist, a hermeneutic language-reflexive philosophy has to clarify them and not become linguistically constructively

account and still hold: A single determination of meaning cannot express the whole, only all could - but who could specify all?

(3) *In the design, it is revealed as thrown.*
One aspect masquerading as the whole: This is also not corrected by the third stipulation, which states that designing oneself onto one's own being-capability is not without presupposition, but dependent on situations in which Dasein finds itself. If being thrown/projected into the situation characterises Dasein just as globally as preceding itself, then the latter can be preserved as a totalising determination of being whose preconditions are settled once and for all in the case of each individual action by another equally global character.

(4) *Thrown/projected into the 'world', it lapses to it providing.*

With this existential, Heidegger's analysis becomes 'worldly'. He saw this as a danger and therefore explicitly defended himself against such an accusation. It is therefore necessary to see whether and where his defence against the accusation fails. First, he insists that 'lapsing' into the world is an 'existential', an "existential mode of being-in-the-world" whose title "expresses no negative evaluation". The existential is thus 'being-in-the-world'. Lapse/lapsing is one of its modes, actual selfhood the other, for selfhood is not to be something "that hovers above lapsing ordinariness, but existentially only a modified grasping of it." (§ 38, 178, 177, 179). Lapsing (Verfallen) is an "ontological concept of movement", through which "nothing is ontically decided". Rather, it applies:

"Faith and 'Weltanschauung', however, insofar as they state one way or the other (e.g. man is 'drowned in sin' or in the state of grace; inserted by me from the context, EML), and if they state about Dasein as being-in-the-world, will have to come back to the structures that have been singled out, provided that their statements at the same time lay claim to *conceptual* understanding." (180).

Can a defence be clearer and more convincing? It becomes unclear by leaving unclear where in the alternative of inauthentic versus authentic the enterprise of ontological analysis is to be located. If analysis is reflexive conceptual clarification, it must be able to provide information about its status at all times. Heidegger also recognises this when he claims 'understanding' as a merit of his analysis that it serves at the same time "the methodological transparency of the

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creative. For example, we colloquially call only the instance of moral self-assessment 'conscience'. Heidegger explicates conscience more formally as the 'call of concern (Ruf der Sorge)', because under it the alternative of (morally) 'being without conscience' must also be grasped. Even more misleading is Heidegger's use of 'being guilty', which in the doctrine of 'being originally guilty' of Dasein's seems to revive Aurelius Augustine's doctrine of original sin (cf. *B&T* § 58, esp. 284) - but only means the formal fact that Dasein moves in the alternative of guilty versus not guilty insofar as it is evaluated by others or evaluates itself in terms of the consequences of its actions and attitudes. What makes Heidegger's terminology violent is that by using one of the members of an alternative as an expression for the formal concept and declaring this expression to be an 'existential' (which is supposed to be exclusively a 'category' applicable to 'Dasein'), it excludes the alternative of not being able to be understood at all under the aspect of a particular formal concept. Oscar Wilde supposedly said to the prosecution at a trial in which he was accused of 'blasphemy': 'Blasphemy is not an expression of my vocabulary'. By this he probably did not mean to say that he did not know or understand the expression, but rather that he did not understand himself to be subject to the evaluation/assessment meant in the expression - he did not understand himself to be 'religious'. Such a possibility of rejecting a whole dimension of understanding oneself also exists with regard to some of the 'existentials' claimed by Heidegger and his terminology does not allow for this.

understanding-interpreting procedure of the interpretation of being" (§ 44 c, 230). If understanding as the "development of Dasein" becomes reflexive in ontological analysis - and this is the sense of the defence of the 'circle of understanding' - then it must be able to provide information about how it relates to the determinations that characterise Dasein as situated understanding. There is then the unavoidable claim that the position of ontological analysis belongs on the side of authenticity, so that analysis is 'party' in the characterisation of the other alternative. The point at which this is unavoidable is the characterisation of actual existence as 'transparent' to itself. This is an expression used terminologically by Heidegger

"to designate the well-understood 'self-knowledge' ...an understanding grasping of the full explicitness of being-in-the-world *through* its essential constitutional moments. Existing being sees 'itself' only insofar as it has become equally original in its being with the world, in being with others as the constitutive moments of its existence." (§ 31, 146)

Heidegger emphasises that, in order to preserve the connection with the tradition of philosophy, he formalises the expression 'view/perspective' to the extent that it "characterises every access to Being as Being in general." And he explicitly states that even the "phenomenological 'Wesensschau' ... [is rooted] in existential understanding". (147). However, since it is certainly not the inauthentic decaying Dasein that has an adequate view of "existence as a whole", the transparency of actual existence[164] touches on the enterprise of Dasein analysis itself and in-expressively afflicts the former with a "'content-related' ideal of existence" that may be one of philosophers, but cannot be universally binding: the greatest possible reflexive clarity of understanding.
Finally, Heidegger does not deny the content of the existential ideal of actual existence at all, though once again not without evasion:

"But does not a certain ontological conception of actual existence, a factual ideal of Dasein, underlie the ontological interpretation of Dasein's existence that has been carried out? This is indeed the case. Not only must this fact not be denied and forcibly conceded, it must be grasped in its *positive necessity* from the thematic object of investigation." (§ 62, 310; cf. previously 266 f., where a 'textual' ideal of existence is still denied.)

The slogan is, as it were: only those who have a point of view, who take sides, see something. However, this does not apply to the undertaking of philosophy that clarifies meaning (understanding, comprehensibility). Because philosophy only describes possibilities, it does not have the 'positive necessity' of taking sides that Heidegger claims for his partiality.[165] At

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[164] This can be verified by later non-thematic uses of 'transparent' in *B.a.T.*. - *B.a.T.* 299, 303, 305, 309. - In Kierkegaard's German translation by Emmanuel Hirsch, the expression 'Durchsichtigkeit' is found in a comparable function - it escapes my knowledge whether it was only under Heidegger's influence. Here, the ambivalence of the character between 'existential ideal' and philosophical goal becomes very clear, because Kierkegaard first asserts "that no human being is capable of becoming transparent to himself" (*EO* II, 202). But then he says of the ethically living individual: "In order that a man may live ethically, it is necessary that he should become conscious of himself, and that so thoroughly that no contingency escapes him." (*EO* II, 270) But that the latter means "that the ethical individual is transparent to himself and does not live randomly." (*EO* II, 275) Kierkegaard explicitly relates this to the philosophical γνωθι σεαυτον. However, self-knowledge that is reflexively related to life does not have to be the knowledge of the conceptual prerequisites of all understanding, which is what philosophy is concerned with.

[165] Of course, this critique is to some extent external, because Heidegger, through a very narrow interpretation of 'understanding' that conflates it closely with 'designing', makes it possible to distance

this point, Heidegger's defence against the accusation that he only, or at least also, conveys ideological judgements by way of ostensibly neutral phenomenological description or 'construction' fails.

Descriptively, therefore, there is no reason to rape language by attempting to totalise 'talk', 'curiosity', 'ambiguity' and 'lapsedness' as the existentials characterising the inauthentic existence in the man-self and at the same time to strip them of their negatively evaluative sense (cf. 167, 175, 179). Nor, for example, is it the case that the "secrecy of oneself" into which actual existence can be called by the call of conscience "in the mode of silence" (273) would be the intelligible antithesis of talk in the negative sense. The silenced partiality of the analysis distorts the semantics. To be an existential, 'talk' must be the generic term formally summarising a positive and a negative possibility. But because Heidegger has made the negative concept of talk the generic term, the positive possibility is left with only an external opposition to talk in general, secrecy/silence. Objectively descriptive it would have been to have 'speech' as the generic term (cf. § 34)[166] and underneath formally contain talk as negative, truthful and serious speech as positive possibility.

(5) As concern, that is, existing in the unity of the decayingly projected design, being is developed as Da.

Heidegger understands the structural wholeness of Dasein as concern (§§ 39 ff.) and summarises in it the moments previously treated as existentials - being-ahead, already being-in-the-world and being-within what is available or present in the world; or existence (Zu-sein), projection and decay vs. determination. These three structural moments formed a unity and this the structural whole of Dasein.

Here it must be remembered again that existentially 'concern' is the formal generic term for the colloquial 'worry' as the opposite of 'confidence/optimism/assurance' (or something similar) and for this interpretation the impressive testimonies from the "pre-ontological self-interpretation of Dasein", which are cited in § 42 to "prove the existential interpretation of Dasein", are only of limited use, because in these testimonies an interpretation of Dasein is given that is different from that of a carefree and worry-free self-understanding (which is certainly logically possible and sometimes seems to occur empirically).

For the structure of the analysis of Dasein with regard to the discussion of Heidegger's §§ on time, it should be pointed out that this structural wholeness of Dasein as concern is subjected to a temporal interpretation in the second section - in the process, existence or being refers essentially to the future, projection to the past ('Gewesenheit') and decay/lapsing/resolution to the present. (§ 65, 323-31) The attribution and interpretability leads to the thesis that the original unity of the concern structure lies in temporality, because in interpretation this 'has

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disinterested understanding from possibilities as 'abkünftig' - cf. the references to 'theory' and 'practice' *B.a.T.* pp. 193, 300, 356 ff. ('Abkünftig' is, as it were, the methodological version of 'uneigentlich'; but descriptively well understood it can only mean that something has preconditions without which it is not possible and from which it can be derived, made intelligible).

[166] I.e.: if one already arranges speech with 'understanding' and 'state of mind (mood)' in the same original way and de-potentiates it to the mere "articulation of intelligibility" (161); behind this depotentiation lies a misunderstanding of the togetherness of understanding and language (among other things as speech), which is narrower than he sees due to the universal character of linguistic means, which only language has and which conditions that they can largely themselves be explained linguistically. Heidegger draws on theses from Husserl's phenomenology about pre-predicative and yet already understandable experience through the structure of 'something as something', which are unverifiable. (Cf. 149: "The fact that the expressiveness of a statement can be lacking in simple looking does not justify denying this simple seeing any articulating interpretation, hence the as-structure.")

revealed itself as the meaning of concern proper.'" (327, 326) 'Sense' here means what the actual concern is about (the illusionless, determined being to death) and what makes it possible (the running ahead into death as a condition of actuality 'constitutes' the future ("Zu-Kunft") - the coming-towards-oneself of actual existence from its own and outermost possibility, the being-no-more). And because temporality is the sense of concern, concern the structure of Dasein, and Dasein the existential successor of the transcendental subject of the constitution of world, the temporality of Dasein is the 'original' and many other determinations of time 'future' and 'vulgar' ("abkünftig"). This is admittedly crude, but it represents the structure of Heidegger's account. The construction depends on proving that the temporality of Dasein is original in the sense claimed, a proof which, as already discussed, fails by simple reasoning.

(6) Co-being with others, it holds itself in an average laid-outness/presentation that is articulated in speech and enunciated in language.

This sentence is reminiscent of the existentials understanding/interpretation and speech/language already mentioned in connection with the discussion of decay/lapsing. Here, the reference has the function of a transition to the next sentence, which is intended to methodically motivate the orientation towards linguistic time determinations in speech for the analysis of time determinations to be undertaken and has a strategic function in the emphasis on Dasein speaking *itself* out:

(7) Being-in-the-world has always pronounced (expressed) itself, and as being with the inner-worldly being, it constantly pronounces itself in addressing and discussing the concerned itself.

For Heidegger, the dating of events by means of 'now' (and the temporal contrasts to it: 'before', 'then'...) becomes "the most elementary proof of the origin of the interpreted from the interpreting temporality" of Dasein (408), because in saying 'now' a descriptive content of the event is also meant, which belongs to the world in which Dasein already is, because it is 'ob-jiciert' with the openess/accessibility (an amalgam of 'consciousness' and 'intelligibility/sense') of Da (419); and because at the same time, with the descriptive content of the event, Dasein expresses not only a piece of its world, but *itself* - an interpretation that could be based on the circumstance (but interestingly is not) that whenever 'now' can be said, 'here' and 'I' must also be able to be said and 'this' could be said. The proof of the originality of the original time of Dasein is based on this also declaring itself. The validity and tenability of this construction will have to be examined more closely.

(8) The prudently understanding concern is founded in temporality, namely in the mode of the expect-retaining present.

This sentence anticipates the proof just outlined and requires explanation first of all with regard to the apparent neologism 'present' ('Gegenwärtigen'). The expression is (according to *Grimm*) not a coinage of Heidegger's, but of Klopstock's, who used it for Latin 'praesentare' = to make something present; in Goethe it has passed into 'vergegenwärtigen' (corresponding to 'repraesentare'). But Heidegger's use, which he himself traces back to Husserl in a footnote (363[1])[167], is peculiar - for in substance it amounts to 'making the present' / 'zeitigen' (instead of

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[167] Because of the use of the term 'present' ('gegenwärtigen') for the intentional analysis of perception and opinion, Heidegger already attributes to Husserl a "'temporal' marking of the phenomenon" - but

'making something present'). Heidegger introduces the expression in the context of his effort to prove the temporality of the prudent provision of what is present (§ 69 a, 352 ff.). It is the existential structure of this that constitutes letting things be. (Here, too, the 'activating' transcendental turn is to be noted: Something can only have a meaning on the basis of an active behaviour of the subject/being, i.e. leaving/letting it alone; and it is true that something only has a meaning for meaning and action when it is 'realised', perceived, etc.). However, letting go belongs as being-with to concern and if this is based in temporality, "then the existential condition of the possibility of letting go must be sought in a mode of temporalisation of temporality" (353) - and this mode is the present ('das Gegenwärtigen'). The following argumentation leads to this. The letting go of the prudent concern of something has the structure of the knowing ('Gegenwärtigen') of the wherefore of the Bewandtnis ("leaving it at that")[168], comes back from this knowing ('Gegenwärtigen') to the wherewith of the Bewandtnis, which it thus 'keeps' - and what Heidegger calls the 'ecstatic unity' of knowing and keeping "makes possible ... the specifically handling presentness ('Gegenwärtigen') of the stuff/things." The letting go "is constituted ... in the unity of the current retaining, in such a way that the present that arises from it makes possible the characteristic emergence of the concern in its world of stuff/things". (354)

This complicated description is meant to capture losing oneself in the performance of a craft or artistic activity, for example, as the subsequent thematisation of self-forgetfulness shows.
But it is precisely the phenomenon of losing oneself in a self-determined activity that seems to speak strongly against the temporal interpretation that Heidegger gives to worrying (concerning oneself). Does not the self-forgetting surrender to an activity also and precisely involve a forgetting of time? It is not useless here to take a closer look at the reasons that can be read from Heidegger's text. He admits:

"The 'Gegenwärtigen' of the wherefore is neither a contemplation of the 'purpose' nor an expectation of the imminent completion of the work to be produced. It does not have the character of a thematic grasping at all. But even the keeping of what it has to do with does not mean a thematic grasping. The handling is just as little related to the whereat as to the what with of the leaving at that. Rather, the latter is constituted in the unity of the present holding, in such a way that the present that arises from it enables the characteristic emergence of the concern in its world of stuff/things. The 'actual', completely devoted occupation with ... is 'together' neither in the work nor in the tool, nor in both. The leaving at that that is founded in temporality has already created the unity of the references in which the preoccupation 'moves' circumspectly". (353 f.)
Heidegger does not say what the 'Gewärtigen' is - if not contemplating (pondering) a purpose and not expecting an event, then what? A positive answer would have to come to the question, but it is only said again negatively, albeit with a more comprehensive claim, that it is not a thematic grasping at all. Then an unthematic one? What can one understand by this?
I think that there is only one possibility here: One who moves circumspectly in a world of stuff/things can be ascribed an understanding of the connections (der 'Bewandtnis') that form it. Any stronger attribution would be guilty of a philosophical move that Wittgenstein called the

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lets it be known that it is he himself who thereby goes beyond Husserl, because in the same context he announces to show "that and how the intentionality of 'consciousness' is *founded* in the ecstatic temporality of Dasein" - a conception that was far from Husserl.
[168] This is a temporal interpretation of teleological, purposeful action related to the future, which is also present in Kierkegaard's thesis 'Action is always futuristic' and since is based on the misunderstanding of the semantics of intentional sentences - in Heidegger no reasoning at all is apparent.

step into a "mythology of psychology or symbolism". Both versions of the move amount to the assumption that the corresponding contexts of meaning 'ever' or 'always already'[169] existed for themselves or made themselves and were, as such and always as a whole, 'effective'.

(all at the same time) 'effective'. An affirmative answer to the question 'unthematic grasping?', for example, would be the step into the 'mythology of psychology'; Heidegger's information at the end: the letting go of things has ever already created the unity of references - is on the way to a mythology of symbolism. It is important to him to emphasise the prior unity of the phenomenon, which is not to be understood as composed of its individual features. This is also justified, but depends on the way the phenomenon is described - there are also descriptions from the details, which then miss something other than the 'holistic' one, which has this in mind from the outset. But at any rate, for a currently considered concern, it is implicitly assumed in Heidegger that the references to meaning exist in themselves and make themselves. But there is not only no physical, there is also no symbolic long-distance effect - only connections for which evidence can be adduced in the behaviour of the concerned and what he says exist justifiably for the consideration and description of his behaviour.

This epistemological memory for the interpretation of behaviour and utterances has application to the temporal interpretation that Heidegger gives to concerning oneself/worrying. No convincing reason is given for it, rightly considered. Rather, the referential references do not exist for themselves and the teleological ones are not to be understood temporally because of the semantics of intentional propositions (subjective purposes): the description of the intention describes an intentional possibility (option) whose realisation *or* non-realisation lies in the future, but which as such has no temporal index. And the 'ever already' existing sense references of the relationship with something likewise have no temporal index (in this case of the past/being), because they can be explained at *any* time and are insofar independent of *all* time indices.

The riddle of the intentionality of meaning, if it is perceived as a riddle, cannot be solved by a temporal interpretation.

Heidegger believes he can show that intentionality is '*founded*' in the temporality of Dasein. He attempts the corresponding proof under the title "The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World" (§ 69 c), 364 ff.). In order to even understand his sketch of an argument, terminological explanation is again necessary. Heidegger calls 'past', 'present' and 'future' "the *ecstasies* of temporality". Temporality is not "a being that first emerges from *itself*, but its essence is temporalisation in the unity of *ecstasies*". (329) This temporalisation supposedly underlies concern as the structure of Dasein - and since Dasein is essentially being-in-the-world, the worldliness of the world must also somehow be traced back to temporality. Namely, to the fact "that temporality as an ecstatic unity has something like a horizon", which is supposed to be constituted in horizontal schemata. The schema in which Dasein comes towards itself ('to-future'/'zu-künftig') is the "Umwillen seiner"; the schema in which Dasein is opened up ('intelligible/conscious') as thrown/projected in Befindlichkeit is the 'Wovor' of thrownness/projection that marks the horizontal structure of *Gewesenheit* ('past'/'having been'); and the horizontal schema of the present is the 'in-order-to' ('Um zu') of purposeful action. There is supposed to be a horizontal unity of the schemata of ecstasies that makes possible the connection of the in-order-to relations with the in-order-will ('Um-willen')

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[169] With regard to these explications, the term 'mythology' is chosen with care. Rightly understood, 'mythology' is justification in the mode of the narration of primordial events and realities - and it is precisely as such that the contexts of meaning are passed off in such a view.

and lies in the fact that "something like a world that has been opened up" belongs to Dasein. (365) Like Dasein itself, the world is not present or at hand, "but comes into being in temporality" - and insofar as world is the correlate of intentionality, this too is grounded in temporality that comes into being.

I consider this to be an illusory justification. An indication of this is already the grammatical underdetermination of the newly coined expressions 'temporalisation', 'horizontal unity' etc. used. I think that Heidegger is trying to give a kind of explanation of intentionality that is utterly inaccessible to us (the derivation from an 'origin'), and it is inaccessible because giving explanations is itself an intentional enterprise, and in the derivation from an origin in which intentionality is not yet itself contained, the rug would first have to be pulled out from under one's feet in order to perhaps regain it if the explanation succeeds. This is absurd because it is an undertaking of the likes of Munchhausen ('pulling oneself out of the swamp by one's own hair'). Only a reflexive clarification/explanation is possible, which would have to start from the assumption that intentionality ('Absichtlichkeit') is a very high-level (a multiply 'founded') phenomenon, which at least presupposes a) the use of representations and thus the modalisation of the environmental reference outlined in the time chapter; b) a way of using representations to characterise a behaviour that is not yet present but possible, which can commit itself to such a behaviour in the corresponding use of the representation (can bind itself to the representation as a yardstick and signpost). If circular objections were made against such a path of clarification, they would have even less of a basis than in Heidegger himself, because no explanation of origin is intended. For it could only be intended out of misunderstanding. That such a clarification would and must be self-applicable is precisely its characteristic as reflexive. Self-application is simply a further application in the use of self-explanatory representations.

On *Being and Time* §79

When Heidegger's remarks on the connection between the 'temporality of Dasein' and the 'concern for time' (in § 79) are considered, it is helpful to highlight some basic classifications that Heidegger makes, in part quite descriptively, as an orientation and to place them in front of the text.

For the expressing-itself of Dasein in the concern of time, on which Heidegger, as outlined, wants to base the originality of the temporality of Dasein as opposed to 'vulgar time', Heidegger orients himself to temporal indicators. The following classifications apply:

Time ecstasy	*Word expression (indicator)*	*('subjective') attitude*
Future	'then'	gewärtigen
Past	'at that time'	keep / forget
Present	'now'	gegenwärtigen

Heidegger then takes off the logical relations in which the use of indicators is embedded. 'Then' implies ("mostly inexpressively") 'not yet now' (Heidegger forgets 'and also not already before') and that means: "it is spoken in the present-retaining, or forgetting present." (406) Correspondingly, the 'at that time' contains the 'now no longer' (Heidegger forgets 'and also not only later') - and with this, "retaining is expressed as a 'gegenwärtig' present." Here, the reference to the future claimed in the attribute 'gewärtigend' seems unfounded, unless a non-existent reference to the future is conceived as a 'negative reference to the future' and therefore also a 'reference to the future'. But even for this conception, a reason would be needed. Heidegger gives such a reason at most for the present that expresses itself in the 'now', to which he ascribes "a peculiar weight", because in view of it 'then' and 'at that time' "are (to be) understood as well" (which is apparently to be shown by the implications that apply to them, which Heidegger has selectively tapped/hinted). The next sentence is curious: "Indeed, it always comes to pass in the unity with awareness and retention, even if these are modified into unpresent forgetting. ..." The 'indeed' is not followed by a 'but', but the 'analysis' moves on to further differentiations through 'just now' and 'at once'.[170] Methodologically, one must ask - are there also corresponding implications for 'now' as for 'then' and 'at that time'? Does 'now' also mean 'not already then' and 'not only then'? Here it must be noted that 'now' has a theoretical use as a time indicator (which Heidegger alone seems to have in mind) and a practical use as a 'time sign' (e.g. for beginning a common activity requiring coordination). In both uses, 'now' functions as a temporal coordinate zero point and therefore as an 'absolute' entry into a ('subjective' and 'relative') time order. Only in a further step, I believe, does the theoretical use of 'now' initially apply only to the implication related to the past, but not also to the implication related to the future - and the practical use primarily applies to the implication related to the future, but not to one related to the past. Only further differentiations (in contexts in which predictions are used) supplement the theoretical uses also with implications related to the future.

It is no coincidence that Heidegger does not go into this - the necessary differentiations would have undermined his origin-theoretical 'transcendental' concept of the grounding of the temporal ecstasies of 'Zeitigung' in behaviours of Dasein (Gewärtigen, Behalten, Gegenwärtigen) just as much as his devaluation of carefree life in the here and now as "unpresent forgetting ... in which mode temporality entangles itself in the present, which says presently primarily 'now-now'. "228

For it is precisely the phenomenon of 'horizons' for the temporal indicators ('Früher' for 'damals', 'Späterhin' for 'dann', 'Heute' for 'jetzt') and the trait of their variably determinable duration (409), which Heidegger only thematised later, that speak 'phenomenologically' for a different description. It seems to be so: The 'present' of experiencing and acting is not a temporal one from the outset, i.e. modalised by means of temporal determination, but becomes so only in explicit contrasts. Indications of this are: a) no temporal determination needs to be used in the coordinate zero point, it is already sufficiently designated by 'I' and 'here'; b) the 'halving' of the implications in 'now' in contrast to 'then' and 'then' - only with their use is what is experienced or to be done also temporally modalised.

Heidegger, however, wants 'present' to be understood temporally from the outset - his whole concept of temporalisation is based on this. He means that 'then' always means 'then, when...', 'then' always means 'then, when/if...' and 'now' always means 'now, since...' (in the case of

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[170] Possibly the 'zwar' is short for 'und zwar' - analogous to Heidegger's frequent use of 'so zwar' in explanatory post-sentences.

'now' this is questionable in its use as a 'time sign' - in any case, this is used sign-reflexively and means: simultaneously with the utterance of the sign 'now' - and calls "this seemingly self-evident structure of reference ... datability". (407) He quite rightly emphasises that such dating does not have to take place with reference to a calendrical date, but can also be given by the description of a state of affairs, but the determination that 'then', 'then' and 'now' are "more or less definitely dated" even without such dates is one-sided, and lesser determination does not mean that "the structure of dating is missing or is accidental". For above all, the temporal indicators are not dated, but dating. In order for a use of an indicator to be dated, it requires additional objective determinations of time.

Because he overlooks this active trait in the practice of dating, Heidegger arrives at a stultified illusory explanation of its possibility. He asks: to whom does the structure of datability essentially belong and what is its basis? In the course of embellishing this question and distancing the trivial answer '(in) time' it is said:

"Where then do we get this 'now - there ...'? Have we found such a thing among the inner-worldly being, the existing? Apparently not. Was it ever found in the first place? Have we ever set out to search for it and determine it? We have it at our disposal 'at all times' without ever having expressly taken it over, and we constantly make use of it..." (407)

And then he claims that every present tense predication, because it is a grammatical tense, also has a time index (that of the present) - precisely what is being contested phenomenologically here with the view that the 'present' of an experience or action is not a priori temporally determined. For the (in my opinion descriptively false) assertion that every use of a grammatical present also already has a time index, the explanation is then given that was already anticipated in the introductory overview:

"Why does Dasein, in addressing the obtained ('Besorgtem'), although usually without announcing it, also pronounce a 'now. there...', 'then, when...', 'at that time, when...'? Because the interpretative addressing of ... is co-expressed, that is, the circumspectly understanding *being with* what is present, which allows this to be encountered in a discovering way, and because this *co*-expressive addressing and talking about is founded *in a present* and is only possible as this.[1]" (407 f.)

This is only a specification of the general transcendental assertion that time ecstasies go back to constituent achievements of Dasein, not a specific justification of the predication/time-theoretical thesis that is claimed and then seemingly justified. But that would be factually necessary here. It is of course true that every behaviour and action, including speech, has an expressive side in which the person behaving/doing/speaking shows himself as a so-and-so person.

[1] "Cf. § 33, p. 154 ff." (= Heidegger's own footnote in *B.a.T.* - the reference is in the § with the title "The statement as a original mode of interpretation" and does not contain any justification for the time index of a predication in the grammatical present presupposed here

Whoever expresses an opinion shows himself or herself as a so-and-so, whoever uses time determinations shows himself/herself or presents himself/herself as someone who is concerned with temporal facts. But it would be bordering on misunderstanding to say that he/she 'speaks out with' - he only speaks out *when he speaks*, and 'speaking out with' cannot lie in just any speaking, because otherwise it would not be a pertinent/factual determination. It can be justifiably said that whoever says such and such can be understood as ... i.e., that further views and attitudes can reasonably be attributed to him/her. To say that he speaks them out with (because he speaks out with himself) is a version of the 'mythology of symbolism or

psychology', which assumes relations of meaning to be effective even without ratification by their users. Heidegger would have to justify his thesis here that in every predication of the form 'x is so-and-so constituted' there is a reference to time (an index of the present) in the grammatical presence of the copula. He thinks that this is so because the present (substantive: 'Gegenwart') is based on a 'presenting (verb: 'gegenwärtigen')' of the speaking existence/Dasein and this is expressed in the predication, saying 'now' or (without verbalisation) 'speaking out with', "and is only possible as this". This does not lead beyond the general transcendental thesis inherent in the coordination of the expressions present/presenting. It is only a justification in 'architectural' form, only a false cornice (cf. PI 217 c) without a supporting function in the construction of Heidegger's representation.

The following generalisation of the transcendental thesis of the 'subjective' grounding of time in the temporality of Dasein is based on this justification:

"The present that warrants and retains lays itself out. And that, in turn, is only possible because it - ecstatically open in itself - is already opened up for itself and can be articulated in the understanding-representing interpretation. *Because temporality ecstatically-horizontally constitutes the clarity of the Da, it is originally always already interpretable and thus known in the Da*. The present that is interpreted, that is, the interpreted that is addressed in the 'now', we call 'time'. .... The fact that the structure of datability essentially belongs to what is interpreted with the 'now', 'then' and 'at that time' becomes the most elementary proof of the origin of the interpreted from the interpreting temporality. ... The *datability* of 'now', 'then' and 'at that time' is the *reflection of the ecstatic* constitution of temporality and *therefore* essential to the enunciated time itself." (408)

These wordy explications also do not, strictly speaking, take us one step beyond the original thesis, let alone provide any justification for it. But one can agree with Heidegger that our normal understanding of time is to be understood and clarified from how we deal with time and what we say about it in particular. His statement "we call what is addressed in 'now' (add: and all other expressions of the language of time) 'time'" has the same form as the statement given here in the section on *Time*: "Time is what we determine as time" - but as explained, this can only be the very first beginning of an explication. (And the identification of the laid out that is addressed in 'now' with the 'laying out present' is the criticised transcendental bogus explanation).

In the descriptive overview of the concept of time in everyday understanding, a duality between dating/measurement, events/processes, points on time/duration etc. had been established. The structure of Heidegger's origin-theoretical approach illuminates well that he not only tries to derive 'objective' time from 'subjective' temporality (even if he does not get beyond the general constitution thesis in justifying it), but also the measurement of duration from the structure of dating as he conceives it. Because in the 'then' of an expectant dating there is 'not yet now', an 'in the meantime' is extended out by means of a 'until then', which is expressed in the "'during which...'", and duration is constituted, of which Heidegger claims that it "likewise has reference to datability". (409) And this enables him to trace back, as it were, even the phenomena of duration to the temporality of Dasein:

"With the expectant-present understanding of 'while', 'duration' is articulated. This duration is in turn the time that is revealed in the interpretation of temporality, which is thus understood in each case as a 'span' unthematically in caring for ('im Besorgen'). The current holding present only lays out a extended 'while' because it *itself* is opened up as the ecstatic *extending* of historical temporality, albeit unrecognised as such." (409)

At this point, Heidegger records the variably determinable duration of the temporal horizons of ecstasies, alluded to above for a primarily non-temporal understanding of 'presence' in advance.

In this context, Heidegger touches on another 'phenomenon' that unabashedly speaks for a primarily non-temporal understanding of the 'present' of an experience or action, but attributes it to a deficient mode of inauthentic existence in relation to time.

"Since Dasein is absorbed in the cared for and forgets itself, unaware of itself, its time, which it 'lets' itself have, remains *concealed* by the manner of this letting go. It is precisely in the everyday life of providing that Dasein never understands itself as running along a continuously lasting sequence of the pure 'now'. The time that Dasein allows itself has holes, as it were, because of this concealment. ... This disjunction of time with holes is nevertheless not a fragmentation, but a mode of the ever already opened up, ecstatically extended temporality." (409 f.)

Unbiasedly, the phenomenon of 'perforated' time seems to me to speak rather for the fact that precisely temporal determinations are further determinations of primarily spatially determined perceptual experience, which can also not occur in a 'present' (a situation of perception and/or action). Heidegger can seemingly avoid this consideration only at the price of an inconsistency. He will derive in § 81 the conception of time as a sequence of now as a vulgar one of 'calculating' with time. Here, however, he seems to make this conception itself the standard when he wants to judge the everyday handling of time 'with holes' as deficient - for time is perforated when time determinations are not used continuously and throughout, but only intermittently and relatively.

However, "the theoretical idea of a continuous now-flow" is not the only possible standard he could have applied here. Another is effective in the statement "that the possible ways in which Dasein gives itself time and lets itself have time are to be determined primarily *from the way it 'has' its time according to the respective existence*." (410) For in this the transcendental thesis of the constitution of time from the temporality of Dasein finally sums up:

"The factually projected Dasein can only 'take' time for itself and lose such time because it is granted time as ecstatically extended temporality with the determination of Dasein founded in it." (B.a.T. 410)

Here Heidegger touches on the important fact that time only exists for temporal entities - events and processes. Dasein is itself an indeterminately limited, finite process (this is, in my opinion, a translation of 'ecstatic' that is useful and tenable here), which is why it takes time and it attaches importance to temporal facts and determinations at all.

The other standard that contributes to the assessment of the handling of time, which makes it 'with holes', as 'deficient', is that one's own finiteness, having to die, must be constantly present (and existence must be realised as a wholeness in the run-up to death) if one is to live 'transparently'. Thereby, the apparent temporal extension of existence/Dasein is another model of time, which opposes the time with holes of the inauthentic handling of it. In this respect, the inconsistency denoted in the application of the first standard need not be committed, but only seemingly and insofar as the metaphor of temporal *extensibility* is not pursued in greater detail (for it will then become apparent that in Heidegger's case, the difference between standards for spatial and those for temporal measurements is blurred).

From the character of Dasein as being with others, Heidegger finally gains the character of the 'publication' of time, which serves as a transition into the following § 80, which deals with time measurement and other explicit 'provisons' of time. The interpreted and pronounced time ('now') of the respective Dasein is "ever also already made public" because "said in the public

of being-together-in-the-world." And this character becomes "all the more insistent the more factual Dasein *explicitly concerns* time by taking it into account." (411)

On *Being and Time* § 80

As the main point of § 79, Heidegger describes in retrospect that it is "to understand how the temporality founding Dasein exists time and how this ... publishes itself." Further, until the end of § 80, he suspends the questions of traditional philosophy of time, already touched upon in the introduction in § 78, about the subjective or objective character of time and the question of its 'beingness'. (411; cf. 405) As a programme for § 80, he declares that "the phenomenal character of public time is to be more sharply determined." This takes up about the first 10 paragraphs of the § (a.). The next 10 paragraphs want to "characterise the main features of the formation of the chronology of time and the use of the clock in their existential-ontological sense" (414-8) (b.); and the last 4 paragraphs say something about the neither subjective nor objective character of world-time, in which Dasein as being-in-the-world and being-with understands each encountering "as encountering 'in time' circumspectly." (419-20) (c.)

Ad (a.): the publication of time is not something that happens retrospectively, but is based on the development of Dasein as ecstatic-temporal, insofar as understanding interpretation belongs to this. Insofar as time is something that one is guided by, it must "somehow be apparent to everyone".

This being apparent guarantees, although dating, as shown, can take place from environmental events/incidents, what "we know as astronomical and calendrical time *calculation*". Their necessity rests "in the basic constitution of Dasein/existence as concern". In time calculation, "the 'actual' publication of time" "takes place", which therefore has its actual reason in the "*projection of Dasein*".

Insofar as public time proves to be *the* time "'in which' what is present and available in the inner world meet", this is to be called "*innerzeitiges*" (inner-temporal). (412). Heidegger later explicitly explains this determination to the effect that what is present and available "can never be called 'temporal' in the strict sense". (420) This is again a distorting consequence of the transcendental approach in the radicalisation that claims to trace time back to the ('original time' of the) temporality of Dasein (cf. 329). It is true that time only exists for temporal realities (both are 'logically' made for each other), but Dasein is not the only temporal reality, if one does not want to deny that other being also comes into being and passes away, lasts and changes. Heidegger does not deny this at all, but he accepts an outright contradiction when he says of what is 'innerzeitig' (inner-temporal): "it may seem real, arising and passing away, or existing 'ideally'" (420) - what can arise or pass away must be 'temporal', that is, temporal determinations must be applicable to it - in contrast to what 'ideally exists' or (as explained above about the non-immediately 'temporal' character of the 'present' in perception and action) what can be understood without temporal determinations having to be applied to it from the outset. (This does not apply to what is *essentially* coming into being and what is passing away: the birth of a living being, for example, is only conceivable/understandable as a temporal given - as an event; a rock formation, insofar as it is understandable at all, is not).

Heidegger then addresses natural temporal conditions such as the alternation of day and night, which makes time in the environmental context a 'time to...'(e.g. wake and sleep, work and rest, etc.). In doing so, he treats the sun itself (rather than the symbolic use of representations of its positions in the sky marking the different times of day) as "ever already discovered 'natural' clock" (413). He therefore speaks of the sun as *dating* "the time laid out in the providing". This is a succinct linguistic mistake - we *date* events with the help of the sun's position, but not time

itself - whereas Heidegger: the division of the day takes place "with regard to that which dates time: the wandering sun". Behind this linguistic mistake lies a misunderstanding of the measurement of time. Heidegger treats measurement as a 'well-founded mode' of dating in his sense (i.e. the course of the sun): "Dating does not simply refer to something that exists (i.e. not simply to the sun, for example, EML), but the referring itself has the character of measuring." (416 f.)

In this context, Heidegger thinks that measuring consists in determining the "how-often" of the "presence" of a standard in the measured: "Measuring is constituted temporally in the present of the present standard in the present distance/course." (417) It is obvious (from the use of 'distance') that Heidegger understands time measurement by means of a clock to be analogous to distance measurement by means of a metre stick (for example), so he does not even specifically investigate what 'measuring' means in relation to time. But even with length measurement, it is not determined how often the standard is 'present' in what is measured, but *how long* the object is, measured *in units given* by the standard. Heidegger would have it differently, in order to have the strongest possible version of 'being present' or 'presence' of time as 'something present', in order to be able to conceive of ordinary, divided and measured time, as not original in comparison with the temporality of Dasein, indeed as a deficient mode of it:

"In the measurement of time, therefore, the *publication* of time takes place, according to which it is encountered in each case and at any time for everyone as 'now and now and now'. This 'generally' accessible time at the clocks is thus found, as it were, as an *vorhandene Jetztmannigsfaltigkeit*, without time measurement being thematically directed towards time as such". (417)

It can therefore be said that Heidegger's misunderstanding/mistake[171] of the normativity of standards and the normative character of their use contributes very significantly to the 'vulgarity' of his conception of the vulgar understanding of time. If time is, among other things, what we measure with clocks, then the use of clocks is 'ever already' thematically directed towards time, and the units of time (e.g. minutes) are not 'available' or 'present' as intervals of minutes on the clock face, but rather they are measured by means of this representations - and 'measuring time' is a normative practice *sui generis* whose character is not already determined by analogies to length measurement.
Conceptually mistaken is also the treatment of measurement as a 'well-founded mode' of dating. 'Dating events' is a different time-related normative practice than 'measuring the duration of processes' - one answers questions of '*when*?', the other of '*how long*?'. Neither is grounded in or traceable to the other. If Heidegger had clearly distinguished dating from measuring, his approach might be characterised as saying that he treats (as in many other cases) one of the members of the alternative as a formal generic term for it - that is, dating as it were as a genus for dating events on the one hand, measuring the duration of processes on the other. But in fact, the difference has not really become clear to him at all, and that is why he thinks he can characterise public time in its "full structural existence" (416) through a 'phenomenological construction' that represents an indissoluble Galimathias of determinations of both practices: provided time is essentially at the same time "datable, extended, public and, as thus structured, belongs to the world itself." (414)

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[171] Maliciously, one might call this misunderstanding itself 'vulgar'.

Datability in Heidegger's understanding has been explained - it is not the term for so-called everyday practice, because measurement is included under it in an ambiguous way. Extension is a character that Heidegger claims to have gained from the ecstatic-horizontal extensionality of Dasein. Because Dasein understands providing time as 'time for...' activities, and these are specified as intentional through their successful accomplishments anticipated in the intention, time spans result for the accomplishment of the activities and the cared for time gains the character of 'extension' (in the sense of 'stretched', not in the sense of psychological characteristic), which is an action-related proxy for the aspect of the duration of processes and activities. But not every temporal given has this aspect, which is why the undifferentiated claim of character for time is misleading in the first place.

For Heidegger, the public sphere of time results, as mentioned, from the practices of time calculation and time measurement, by means of which everyone can 'orientate' themselves according to a common time.

Finally, worldliness is the character of provided time that is supposed to hold on to the transcendental thesis of its origin in the 'original time' of the temporality of Dasein, for Heidegger explicitly emphasises that the component 'world' in 'worldliness' is about time "belonging to the world in the existentially ontologically interpreted sense". This, however, consisted in contexts of relationship, "'*wherein*' a factual Dasein 'lives' as this." Worldliness in this understanding "then means terminologically a mode of being of Dasein and never such a mode of being of the existing 'in' the world." (65) The distinction between the temporal and the 'inner-temporal' commented on earlier is a consequence of the transcendental, 'existential-ontological' understanding of 'world' as the 'life-world' of Dasein. Heidegger's phenomenological-structural determination of provided time is entirely consistent within his 'phenomenological'-constructive system of thought, which does not shy away from violence, but this makes descriptively misleading presuppositions as far as the normal understanding (the 'sense') of time is concerned and distorts foundations of understanding on which it must itself build.

The 'transcendental' approach of the existential-ontological analysis was affirmed by the remarks concluding the § on the worldliness of 'world-time'. For Heidegger wants to offer a resolution of the alternative of the subjective versus objective character of time, which wants to keep within the framework of Kant's combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism. Time is not 'objective' in the sense of "being-in-itself of the being encountered in the inner world"; but "just as little ... 'subjective' if we understand by it the presence and occurrence in a 'subject'." (419) "*World-time is more 'objective' than any possible object, because it is already ecstatically-horizontally 'objiciert' as a condition of the possibility of the inner-worldly being with the development of world*." (419)

Seen from this angle, Heidegger also believes he can correct Kant's doctrine of time as a form of 'inner sense', insofar as "world time ... is found, contrary to Kant's opinion, *just as directly* in the physical as in the psychic", indeed time even initially shows itself "precisely in the sky" according to the perverse view that the sun is "that which dates time" (419; cf. 413 et seq.). On the other hand, however, it is also true that "*world time is also more subjective than any possible subject because, in the well-understood sense of provision as the being of the factually existing self, it makes this being possible in the first place.*" (419)

If one wishes, one can see in both negative determinations together the attempt to grasp the modal character of time as 'possibility' (in the explanation that it is the possibility of coming into being and passing away, duration and change), when Heidegger emphasises as their

achievement that in them time is "neither 'subjectivistically' evaporated, nor 'reified' in a bad 'objectification'". (420) However, one must then generously overlook the fact that Heidegger makes an almost unbelievable blunder in their context, which makes one doubt that he really understood the facts, but rather compels the conclusion that he only recorded them constructively under system constraint. For he also writes: "'Time' is present neither in the 'subject' nor in the 'object', neither 'inside' nor 'outside' and 'is' *earlier* than any subjectivity and objectivity, because it is the condition of possibility itself for this 'earlier'." (*B.u.T.* 419) Obviously, in the '*earlier*' (italicised in Heidegger's text) reference is made to a logical circumstance, and that for this time is somehow the condition of possibility is simply absurd and far removed from anything Heidegger even attempted to prove.

On *Being and Time* § 81

The § has as its theme "The inner time and the genesis of the vulgar concept of time". It contains 15 paragraphs, the first three of which expose the correspondence of the 'vulgar concept of time' with a definition of time from Aristotle's *Physics*. The following five paragraphs illuminate vulgar time from what Heidegger calls 'the *full* essential structure of world-time' (422). Paragraphs 9 to 14 deal explicitly with the theme of the §, showing how the vulgar understanding of time is "grounded" in the "original time" of the temporality of Dasein, and claiming an additional proof of its originality. The concluding § gives an outlook on the traditional attributions of time to soul and spirit, thus resuming the theme of its subjectivity vs. objectivity.

For everyday preoccupation, time shows itself in the "use of the clock", whose "existential-temporal sense" is determined as a "present" of the wandering hand of the clock or the shadow of the sundial. This present takes place in a unity with a keeping and a knowing, so that Heidegger offers the following definition of time revealed in clock use:

"*It is the counted that reveals itself in the present, counting pursuit of the wandering hand, in such a way that the present is revealed in the ecstatic unity with the retentive and the present that is horizontally open towards the earlier and later*." (421)

This definition, however, is nothing other than the existential-ontological interpretation of Aristotle's definition of time as a 'number of movement in view of the earlier and the later'. This is dominated by the orientation of ancient ontology towards present presence, and insofar as all later interpretations of time in philosophy have remained within the framework of the definition from Aristotle's *Physics*, the occlusion inherent in it has been inherited.

The 'vulgar' conception of time codified by Aristotle of the "'natural' understanding of being" conceives of time as a somehow 'existing' "sequence of now" - the counted in the counting of movement are points in time conceived as 'now'. Because every now is 'now' and as a now ('now' thus 'always'), Plato's definition of time as an 'image of eternity' in the Timaeus can be understood from this point of view. (423) What is 'vulgar' about the conception of time, according to Heidegger, is that it levels the "*full* essential structure of *world*-time" because it obscures the moments of datability and meaningfulness (which made time world-time) that are grounded in the ecstatic-horizontal extension of temporality. Even extension as a structural moment of time escapes its conception as a sequence of now, because it too goes back to the extension of Dasein as original time. This levelling has as its "most insistent" consequence the thesis of the infinity of time, which only becomes possible "on the basis of the orientation *towards a free-floating Ansich of an existing now-process*": "Every last now is as a now always already an immediate-no-more, thus time in the sense of the no-more-now, the past; every first

now is ever a just-not-yet, thus time in the sense of the not-yet-now, the 'future'. Time is therefore endless 'on both sides'." (*B.a.T.* 424)

In order to escape the suggestion of Heidegger's construction, one must first realise that the 'endlessness' of time is based only on the logical unrestrictedness of the applicability of temporal determinations - as 'endlessness', the 'unrestricted permission' to use temporal determinations is objectified as a 'permission to something unrestricted'.[172] Having said this, Heidegger's critique of the conception of 'endless' time is ambivalent - on the one hand, he considers it false in the sense of 'originating' or 'non-original'; on the other hand, he concedes it "its natural right" (426), because he assigns it to inauthentic existing, in which Dasein is "projecting-decaying ...mostly lost to the procured" (424). This inauthentic existence characterises "the flight from death, that is, the looking away from the end of being-in-the-world" (cf. § 51, 252 ff.). As this looking away, the inauthentically existing Dasein must mistake its future and thus its temporality in general, and it conceals it, among other things, by means of the vulgar conception of time. This ambiguous construction is factually untenable because the 'vulgar' conception of time factually embodies the idea of 'flow of time' (cf. 426: "Zeitfluss"), which takes a metaphor literally that is irredeemable (because what *flows* must flow 'in time'), and is therefore a misunderstanding of how we deal with temporal determinations, and not a 'deficient mode' of understanding that nevertheless has its 'natural right'.

But it is consistent when Heidegger then seeks to demonstrate in his construction that moments of the proper can still be demonstrated to the inauthentic understanding in its concealment and obscurity. The finitude that is concealed in looking away from the end is nevertheless tangible in the fact that only the *passing* of time is spoken of and *not* also its *emergence*: "*Dasein knows fleeting time from the 'fleeting' knowledge of its death*." The suggestive formulation is based on an equivocation of 'fleeting' between 'passing' on the one hand and 'superficial' or 'only temporary' on the other. The second character in which actual time asserts itself in the vulgar conception of time is the irreversibility ascribed to time, which "has its ground in the origin of public time from temporality, whose temporalisation, primarily future, ecstatically 'goes' to its end, so much so that it already 'is' to the end." (426)

For Heidegger, the vulgar conception of time only loses its 'natural right' "if it claims to be able to convey the 'true' conception of time and to be able to sketch out the only possible horizon for the interpretation of time". First: concepts are not 'true' or 'false', but useful/appropriate or not. Heidegger, on the basis of his 'transcendental' thesis, means it differently: for it is only the "full structure of world-time, created out of temporality", that gives the guide to 'seeing' the occlusion lying in the vulgar concept of time at all." The primacy of the 'original time' of temporality is shown by the fact that vulgar time can be made comprehensible from temporality, but it is not possible vice versa.

Here, the origin-theoretical record of the structure of the ordinary concept of time is reaffirmed in conclusion. It is not that McTaggart's two series, the A series 'past-present-future' and the B series 'earlier-later', which implicitly also determine Heidegger's distinction between original and vulgar time, exhaust the ordinary concept of time; and insofar as they belong to it, not one is more original than the other, but both are correlative, insofar as only by using both can an event or a process be dated. For, if one does not know where one is in time - what is 'present' - a determination according to earlier/later does not yet tell one anything sufficiently definite. Heidegger mixes the distinction between the two series with that between objective and subjective (indicative) determinations of time ('now', 'then', 'then'). But these are also

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[172] See *PI* section 209 c.

essentially assigned to each other. A marking of what is 'now' is bound for its comprehensibility to the possibility of indicating objective dating by means of events and their temporal relations, and vice versa. Finally, the objection to the temporal interpretation of the run-up to death, which determines the futureness of the actual, original time, must be remembered: death is present in life not as an undated future event (an undated event is either an event type or 'ontological acrobatics'), but as the feared and sought-to-be-avoided state of being dead as opposed to being alive.

Heidegger's analysis of time, in any case, is to be regarded as "failed" not only, as he himself admitted in a semi-public way, with the constructive thesis of the derivability of time from the 'original time' of Dasein (the 'temporality'), but also insofar as it "lay(s) claim to *descriptive* elucidation" of the 'phenomena' in conceptual understanding (cf.180).

POSTSCRIPT

If philosophy, as the authors have insisted since its European beginning, is essentially *self*-thinking - as they have insisted on the essentiality of the 1st person perspective for it - then who and what use are philosophical books, which cannot relieve anyone of thinking for themselves? Well, they may be useful to readers who want to think for themselves and need examples to guide them. And they may be useful in that they represent, with the example, the expression of an understanding in which it is necessary to check how one can arrive at it. However, I am self-publishing this book primarily because it deals with the motives that originally brought me to philosophy in a way that is reasonably satisfactory to me after almost forty years.

Unfortunately, I cannot continue in such an irenic tone. Academic philosophy in Germany has neither fully co-opted me nor promoted me in any way worth mentioning. Certainly, I have greatly appreciated the progress that lies in the fact that one of my grandfathers, Ernst Heilmann, who was still imprisoned and murdered in the Buchenwald concentration camp, but

that I was not adequately employed and alimented for even one professional lifetime. But there is a connection between the so varyingly smooth and happy lives in different generations of our family. The core of educated bourgeois anti-Semitism in Germany was an anti-intellectualism, with the help of which mediocrity[173] knew how to keep intellectual mobility and excellence at bay or even to get rid of it. This core of mentality survived the polar reshuffle in the course of re-education after the Second World War - anti-intellectualism still prevails with the aforementioned consequences, if it is left alone. In my experience, one still allows it far too often in Germany. On the threshold of my seventh decade, this is happily behind me. But truthfulness dictates not to transfigure in memory what it just was, contemptuous.

Berlin-Tempelhof, July 2006

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[173] Cf. Tugendhat's judgement on the "lacking level of German post-war philosophy" (*Philosophische Aufsätze*, op. cit., 12). My teacher at university, Klaus Heinrich, among others, already gave an Oldenburg university speech in 1987 on the *Spiritlessness of the University today* (Oldenburger Universitätsreden N. 8, BIS Universität Oldenburg 1987).

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