Wittgenstein Corrected or: post-tractatus philosophicus

1

The world is everything that can be understood.

The world is the open totality of understandables, not the totality of what there is.

The totality of what there is, is real and neither just possible nor necessary.

2

He (She), who understands, is somebody.

He (She), who is somebody, is a person.

A person essentially carries a personal name.

By use of their personal name a person can be addressed or being spoken of.

Who can be addressed is supposed to be able to answer.

As being able to answer persons are taken to be speaking animals. (Aristoteles)

3

What can be understood without being able to understand, is something.

What is something, is an object.

An object essentially carries a linguistic designation.

The designation is given to the object without it being capable to respond.

4

What is understood is being mediated.

What mediates essentially is language.

Language is the universal medium of expression and representation,

4.1

The constitutive unities in language, by means of which something can be said or understood, are grammatically sentences, logical-semantically propositions.

Sentences/propositions consist of words. Only in the context of a proposition a word has definite meaning. (Frege; Tractatus 3.3)

All propositions have sense (are meaningful), most words have reference.

Propositions basically carry either descriptive or prescriptive force.

Describing corresponds to observation or contemplation, prescribing corresponds to activity or action.

4.2

Propositions are subject to normative assessment as true or false, satisfiable or non-satisfiable.

Everything that is true or satisfied belongs to reality (is real).

The world is more encompassing than reality. For also what is false or not satisfied can be understood. Otherwise utterances are merely expressive or meaningless.

4.21

What carries sense (is meaningful) or has reference, can be understood.

Sense is basically direction or intention, meaning (Bedeutung) is importance (to understand or being understood).

4.211

What is not understood immediately, can be explained.

4.2111

Meaning-explanations explain, what is important to understand.

4.2112

An important class of meaning-explanations is that of ostensive explanations.

4.2113

What is pointed at in an ostensive explanation is a paradigm.

Paradigms belong to language although they are neither words nor sentences.

Because paradigms of ostension can be used in contexts of propositions in lieu of the words they are paradigms for.

4.2114

Because of meaning-explanations language is as far as possible self-explanatory.

4.212

The relation of language and the world is internal. The relation of language and reality is external.

[Internal relations cannot not exist, are necessary. External relations may not exist, they are merely (empirically) possible.]

4.213

Whether an external relation exists, is either dependent on physical laws or contingent.

An external relation, in order to be understood, presupposes internal relations.

4.23

„The meaning of a word is what the explanation of meaning explains.“ (Wittgenstein[1])

5

What is basically real, is encountered in space and/or time. It is spatially or temporally determined or determinable.

1 *Philosophical Investigations* sect. 560.

5.1

Space is the possibility of masses and bodies. Masses and bodies are made surveyable by means of maps or drawings.

5.2

Time is the possibilty of processes and events. Processes and events are made surveyable by means of calendars and clocks.

5.21

These are instruments of articulation (dividing up into smaller unities) and of measurement.

5.3

Formations encountered in space and time belong to nature or art or both.

5.31

Nature is, what originates, exists and develops essentially independently from us.

5.32

Into art belongs, what we produce volontarily or when motivated by a client or patron.

6

Doing is either activity or action. (Activities are processes, actions are events.)

6.1

Activity and action can be led by rules. Action can consciously apply rules.

6.2

From happening according to rules comes regularity. From applying rules come normative orders.

6.3

Normative orders either are purposively created or spontaneously formed.

6.31

Spontaneously formed social orders are conventions, morals and common law. They are „the result of human action, but not of human design.“ (Ferguson)

6.4

The sphere of activity and action dominated by conventions and morals is society. The sphere, in which the law is given, preserved and enforced, is the state.

7

Not everything that can be said is worth saying.

7.1

Matters of course need not be spoken of. (This is different in philosophy, because philosophy is about making explicit, what is conceptually important and normally remains unsaid.)

7.2

If one is not merely enjoying oneself by chatting:

What needs not be spoken of, thereof one should be silent.

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